OECD : corruption signifies “a failure (of the duties imposed by citizens), on public institutions and good governance” …thus, curbing it requires institutional and legal reforms, as well as an assurance that reform efforts are “implemented and monitored through specialised bodies and/or personnel with adequate powers, resources and training”.
ACAs are publicly funded agencies, setup for a long-term duration, whose sole task is to counter corruption.
ACAs tend to be more successful when they:
- have high levels of independence (including budgetary independence)
- are backed by political will
- have strong internal controls and accountability mechanisms
- have sufficient resources
- are able to establish strong alliances withrelevant stakeholders
- enjoy the support of relevant stakeholders as well as the public
- have true enforcement powers. However, in reality, prosecution remains a separate (state) function
diff : ACAs from other pbs:
- the development (and implementation) of“preventive and/or repressive dimension ofcontrol”…however, sadly, most acas have either a repressive or a preventive control, but rarely both.
- independence (from gov etc). eg: acas report directly to parlimanet, and are long-term or permanent…ie, donot change when gov changes….however, as aca directors are government appointed (and removable)… it is unlikely that they would have the level of independence envisioned
- powers to centralise information
- articulation, formulation or design ofmeasures to be undertaken by otheragencies or stakeholders
- knowledge production and transfer
- rule of law (internal checks and balancesas well as external accountability)
- accessibility to (and knowledge among)the wider public
Typology of ACAs in Europe
Multi-Purpose agencies
(preventive AND investigative powers, most with some enforcement/sanctioning power)
Law enforcement type agencies
(largely investigative and pre-trial functions)
Preventive, policy development and coordinating institutions
(largely preventive and/or monitoring role)
agencies
Independent
Latvia
Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (
https://www.knab.gov.lv/lv/
Structure: independent (under the prime minister’s supervision but not direction; accountable to parliament)
Who can appoint/remove the ACA head: parliament
Budgetary independence: Yes
Korupcijas Novēršanas un
Apkarošanas Birojs, KNAB)
Ukraine
National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (Національного антикорупційного бюро України, NABU)
https://nabu.gov.ua/en
Structure: NABU reports to a parliamentary committee. A civil oversight council monitors its activities.
Who can appoint/remove the ACA head: the director is appointed by the president, after an open competition supervised by a civil oversight council. Dismissal only in limited cases and on serious grounds,
Budgetary independence: N/A
Note: while the NABU’s main role is to investigate and prepare cases for prosecution, it undertakes substantial preventive activities The Ukraine also has a preventive ACA, the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACAP).
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and the Coordination of the Fight Against Corruption (Agencija za prevenciju korupcije i koordinaciju borbe protiv korupcije) http://apik.ba/
Structure: independent (reports to parliament)
Who can appoint/remove the ACA head: parliament
Budgetary independence: yes
Lithuania
Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania (Specialiųjų tyrimų tarnyba, STT)
https://www.stt.lt/en
Structure: independent (accountable to president and parliament)
Who can appoint/remove the ACA head:
Italy
National Anticorruption Authority (Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione, ANAC) https://www.anticorruzione.it
Structure: independent (reports to parliament)
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Montenegro Agency for Prevention of Corruption (Agencije za sprje avanje korupcije, ACP) http://antikorupcija.me/en/ |
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Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency (Agjencia Kundër Korrupsionit, AKK) https://www.akk-ks.org/en/ballina Structure: independent (reports to the national assembly) Who can appoint/remove the ACA head: parliament Note: the AKA has some limited authority to undertake preliminary investigations into administrative matters that are reported to them, before passing the matter on to prosecution. |
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Serbia Anti-Corruption Agency (Агенција за борбу против корупције) Who can appoint/remove the ACA head: the board of the agency (which is voted for by the national assembly) |
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Agencies |
France |
Austria |
Greece |
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French Anti-Corruption Agency (Agence Française Anticorruption, AFA) https://www.agence-francaise- anticorruption.gouv.fr/fr Structure: under the ministries of justice and budget Note: the AFA does not have a strong investigative function and has no prosecutorial powers. However, due to its strong monitoring role, involvement in court- ordered enforcement actions against private sector entities and ability to apply administrative sanctions, it is classified as a multi-purpose agency here. But could arguably also be classified as a strong category III agency. |
Federal Bureau of Anti-Corruption (Bundesamt zur Korruptionsprävention und Korruptionsbekämpfung, BAK) https://www.bak.gv.at Structure: Within the ministry of interior Note: the focus of BAK is investigation and law enforcement, but it has increasingly been involved in preventive efforts. Based on activities undertaken, it may arguably be classified as a multi-purpose agency. |
National Transparency Authority (ΕΘΝΙΚΗ ΑΡΧΗ ΔΙΑΦΑΝΕΙΑΣ (EAA)) https://aead.gr Who can appoint/remove the ACA head: government/president Note: the EAA was only recently established (late 2019) and limited information is so far available. While it is supposed to take a largely investigative role, it is unclear whether it will be given enforcement or sanctioning powers. Depending on how it will be implemented, a re-classification as a multi- purpose agency may be warranted. |
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Poland Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne, CBA) https://cba.gov.pl Who can appoint/remove the ACA head: prime minister (after a consultation with the president, the special services committee, and the Parliamentary Committee for Special Services) Budgetary independence: N/A |
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Agencies under police or general prosecutor’s |
Belgium Central Office for the Repression of Corruption (Office Central pour la Répression de la Corruption, OCRC) |
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authority |
Structure: within the federal police under the authority of the general commissariat of the judicial police |
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Croatia Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminala, USKOK) Budgetary independence: No |
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Norway National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (Den sentrale enhet for etterforskning og påtale av økonomisk kriminalitet og miljøkriminalitet, ØKOKRIM) https://www.okokrim.no |
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Portugal National Unit to Combat Corruption (Unidade Nacional de Combate à Corrupção, UNCC) https://www.policiajudiciaria.pt/uncc/ Structure: part of the national police Who can appoint/remove the ACA head: N/A Budgetary independence: N/A |
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Romania |
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National Anti-Corruption Directorate (Directia Nationala Anticoruptie, DNA) Who can appoint/remove the ACA head: president (at the proposal of the minister of justice and following an advisory note by the superior council of the magistracy) Budgetary independence: yes |
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Spain Special Prosecutors Office for the Repression of Corruption-Related Economic Offences (Fiscalía Anticorrupción, ACPO) Budgetary independence: N/A |
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Sweden National Anti-Corruption Unit https://www.aklagare.se/en/contact/public- prosecution-areas/national-public-prosecution- department/national-anti-corruption-unit/ Structure: sub-division of the public prosecution Who can appoint/remove the ACA head: N/A Budgetary independence: N/A |
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United Kingdom Serious Fraud Office (SFO) https://www.sfo.gov.uk Structure: semi-independent public institution under the oversight of the attorney general Who can appoint/remove the ACA head: attorney general Budgetary independence: see case study |
Countries that do not appear in the table above, generally fall under one of two categories:
a/ Countries that do not have a dedicated anti- corruption agency. This does not necessarily indicate an ineffective anti-corruption framework. Some countries in this group have low levels of corruption and/or have established a functioning anti-corruption framework by integrating relevant functions throughout their existing agencies: this includes Estonia (GRECO 2018a), Germany (GRECO 2015), Luxembourg (GRECO 2018d), Netherlands (GRECO 2018b), Finland (GRECO 2018c), Denmark (GRECO 2019a) and Ireland.
b/ Countries that do have a form of ACA or ACA-type agency but insufficient information was available as to its structure, operation and adequacy, making a useful categorisation impossible. This includes: Bulgaria: according to the European Union’s Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) (European Commission 2019), a new anti-corruption authority was established in Bulgaria in 2018.
Hungary
has a specialised police subdivision, the NVSZ. However, it appears to be largely responsible for prevention and investigation within the police force. Additionally, the Corruption Prevention Department (Korrupciómegelőzési Főosztály) was reportedly established by NVSZ in 2014 to implement measures including strategic planning, coordination, awareness-raising and information campaigns. But no information was accessible in English beyond this, making classification impossible.
Malta:
Malta’s Permanent Commission Against Corruption (PCAC) is one of the oldest ACAs in Europe, having been established in 1988. According to the Ministry of Justice’s website it is responsible for investigating cases of corruption in the public sector. However, very little information is otherwise available, and the agency appears largely inactive. Moreover, GRECO’s listing of national anti-corruption authorities does not include an entry for Malta.
Slovak Republic:
a department for corruption prevention was established in 2017 as part of the government office, and tasked with drafting a new anti-corruption policy, as well as managing and coordinating the government’s anti-corruption efforts. But no information was accessible in English beyond this, making it impossible to assess the level of activity and to what extent it could be classified as an ACA.Case studiesThe following section studies a few country examples in greater detail. These case studies highlight selected good practices from countries that have established successful ACAs. It is also meant to provide snapshots of the very different types of ACAs common across Europe by introducing cases from all three categories that are illustrative of the different rationales for establishing ACAs.
France
in 2016, France’s new transparency, Anti-Corruption and Economic Modernisation Act , established the Agence Française Anti-Corruption (AFA) with much broader powers, making France one of the few countries in western Europe with an ACA that can reasonably be classified as a multi-purpose agency1 (AFA 2017).
According to the AFA (2017), the move to establish a new anti-corruption agency with a broader and stronger mandate came after France’s old system of countering corruption was deemed ineffective and had received international criticism. Built on experiences from other European countries (such as Italy’s ANAC and the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority, Huis voor Klokkenluiders), the AFA was given a broader mandate to monitor and sanction public and private sector entities and to better coordinate and streamline France’s anti-corruption framework.
Latvia
Latvia’s Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (KNAB) was established in 2002 through the Law on Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau in the process of Latvia’s accession to the European Union and NATO (Kunis 2012 and Wickberg 2013). According to Transparency International Latvia (2011), the law was drafted in consultation with several relevant stakeholders, such as the financial intelligence unit, the police, the prosecutor general’s office, the Ministry of Justice and Transparency International Latvia. The KNAB (like Lithuania’s STT) is often said to be modelled after Hong Kong’s ACA model.
The agency is regarded as a breakthrough in the country’s fight against corruption and was commended by de Jaegere (2012) and Kunis (2012) for going after high-level oligarchs and perpetrators of corruption in the administration and in politics. Transparency International Latvia (2011) similarly noted that investigations conducted have “been of unprecedented importance in Latvia’s post-Soviet history”.
Ukraine
Prior to Ukraine’s revolution in 2013-2014, the country’s political system was marred by state capture, and corruption was described by de Waal (2016) as having constituted “the rules by which the state has been run”. Since then, Ukraine undertook substantial steps at countering corruption, both at policy and institutional levels. This included the establishment of several relevant institutions, such as: the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACAP), a preventive ACA that administers asset declarations and participates in policymaking; the Asset Recovery and Management Agency (ARMA); the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU); and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), an independent unit within the prosecutor general’s office
UK
The UK has not established a conventional ACA as part of its anti-corruption framework. However, has the CMA
is one of the best in the world and stated that the UK had “one of the best anti-corruption institutions in the world,
Italy
Italy’s National Anticorruption Authority (Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione, ANAC) was established following the passage of Italy’s new anti-corruption law in 2012 (Law 190 of 2012, Provisions for the Prevention and Suppression of Corruption and Illegality in Public Administration (Disposizioni per la prevenzione e la repressione della corruzione e dell’illegalità nella pubblica amministrazione). It replaces the former Commission for Evaluation, Integrity and Transparency in Public Administration (CIVIT). The law aimed to bring the country in line with its international legal obligations, particularly UNCAC’s Article 6, and responded to previous criticisms regarding the insufficiency of Italy’s anti- corruption framework