TI: PP <> CLCP

political party (PP) financing

Unregulated or poorly managed money in politics is often considered as one of the biggest threats to

The Venice Commission and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) have referred to the misuse of administrative resources during the electoral process as “one of the most important and recurrent challenges observed in Europe and beyond”….it also undermines democracy, because a lack of information on how much money circulates in and around elections, where resources are coming from and how they are spent, makes it harder for the electorate to make informed decisions. It also facilitates corruption and erodes citizen trust in political institutions 

COCOO V PSOE: on grounds of:  ASR (Abuse of state resources), to maintain a dominant (<>clcp) party system…DESTROYS DEMOCRACY BY INFLICTING 2 TYPES OF HARM (V WPI):

1/ electoral power inequalities, giving unfair electoral advantage to incumbents, compromise the integrity of an election, reduce public trust in the legitimacy of the process and its outcomes, 

2/CLCP BREACH: An incumbent’s ASR distorts/harms/anihilates free and fair political competition (<>cpcl)

state resources liable to abuse for electoral advantage

• Financial resources: eg. from the state budget; or from publicly owned or managed institutions
• Regulatory resources: incumbents passing laws and regulations , eg. to alter the criminal code to the order in which candidates appear on the ballot paper
• Institutional resources: This includes government officials using official vehicles during campaigns, printing campaign material in national printing offices or holding party meetings and rallies ; office staff working for the campaign and travel costs being billed as expenses. Bias of state-owned media is a prime example. The incumbent may also exploit control of the state’s bureaucracy and security apparatus to mobilise votes among civil servants or intimidate opposition voters
• Enforcement/coercive resources : eg the use of security and law enforcement institutions to implement and enforce laws and rules. Examples : withdrawal of permits for opposition campaign rallies or unexpected tax inspections of rival parties
• Relationship with the private sector: the government pressures companies for donations in exchange for continued business with the state, which can lead to policy capture… or where, acting on behalf of their political sponsors, the owners of politicised firms may also pressure or intimidate their workers to vote for a particular candidate. On the other hand, the private sector may use its influence and resources to pressure the government to implement policies and laws in their favour.  Campaign donors can get access to overpriced public contracts, favourable public loans, or other forms of illegal benefits. Private companies depending on government contracts can also be forced to donate to the party, or be prevented from supporting opposition parties
• International legal standards:  countries should regulate public and private funding, establish a ceiling on expenditures, limit contributions, and ensure transparency, such as disclosure and reporting requirements 

The European Public Accountability Mechanisms (PAM), measure a country’s political finance. These standards recommend that governments:

•   prohibit political candidates from holding official public events (including charitable events) for electoral campaigning purposes;
•   provide equitable access to public buildings and facilities;

•   refrain from making major governmental announcements designed to create a favourable perception towards a particular party;
•   abstain from non-essential appointments to public bodies during electoral campaigns;
•   set clear definitions of what constitutes “campaign activities” and forbid civil servants from engaging in this in their official capacity;
•   provide a clear distinction between “campaign” and “information” activity by public media;
•   establish a functionally independent and suitably resourced state body responsible for auditing political parties’ use of administrative resources; and
•   require political parties to report on the origin and purpose of campaign finance transactions, stipulating that permissible use of administrative resources should be treated as a campaign finance contribution and reported accordingly (see further, Venice Commission & OSCE/OIDHR 2016; Jenkins 2017).Inhibitors of change

COI 

Politicians resist (political finance) reforms to tackle ASR. why? they have COI, and are the asr perpetrators

Politicians and political parties have an innate COI when implementing political finance reform and, as a result, it is a difficult to enact change to tackle ASRs….

PP rivals are restricted their ability to raise funds and exposed to criminal sanctions. Therefore, those implementing political finance reform are required to implement laws and regulations to regulate themselves (COI)

Democratic political systems need to be competitive systems, and this requires the political system regulating parties to be based on equality and operate in an unbiased manner 

Actors for change

A holistic and integrity-enhancing approach to political party financing involves political parties, oversight agencies and regulators, as well as civil society organisations, journalists and activists, and corporate and individual donors. Forceful and engaged monitoring activities by political finance oversight bodies, and vigilance by civil society and the media, is necessary to counteract ASR. However, ultimately, the withdrawal of VOTES from ASR PPs is what is really needed to remove ASR

Citizens and civil society (CSOS)

Civil society actors (COCOO) have key roles in improving control over money in politics

Media

Media, both traditional and new, have a responsibility to make sure people know where politicians get money from and how they use it. 

International community

Since the early 2000s, aid spending on electoral assistance programmes around the world has increased dramatically, from US$75 million in 2002 to US$728 million in 2010,before declining again to US$353 million in 2016.

Direct aid to parties is fraught with political sensitivity. All aid relating to the core political processes of recipient countries – elections, parties and legislatures – is inevitably politically sensitive. But party aid is especially so, given that parties are the institutions that are competing for power 

donor agencies should implement political, economy analysis and other risk assessment tools more consistently….For instance, should identify clientelistic networks that benefit from improvements in electoral integrity (e.g. oppressed social or political groups in authoritarian regime).

Donors should work out ways to mobilise donor agencies/donors/csos, to demand and achieve cleaner elections…eg: funding csos/ngos, to help enforce the regulation of political finance…eg ngos funded to:

a.monitor the distribution of contracts and licences prior to elections, or mobilising powerful social groups (for instance, firms that lose out from the politicised allocation of licences) to expose and sanction illegal ways of raising political finance 

b. tackle vote buying is proscribed, yet common….where unemployment is rampant and interests and preferences may not be clearly defined, voters often see their vote as a good that they can trade for material benefits