my steps

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STEP1

  RESEARCH     EU      SPAIN       [ UK :  CMA   CMA.cons.enf   cat.coa.fca.top    wpis ]       ELP    WTO   ENFORCE   

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Sales, expenses, price, position, are ALWAYS wrt an industry.market’s::  <>  see my FOR strategy.  is important to distinguish:

• REVENUE = [(gws.sales=gws.income=MAS) + gws.expenses] >> growing MAS >> growing REVENUE
• MAPOS = market.position = a company’s ability to influence customers’ perceptions
• MAP = Market power  = ability of a firm to influence D or S >> gws.price, above or below, competitive levels (ex sumitomocorp)

MAP=CONCENTRATION = is only cocon if (gradually) integrates gws along the value chain >>understanding the value chain is key to ascertain pot.cocons:  is there integration of services along the value chain?, how is pers.data used?, is there self-preferencing in vertically integrated platforms?

ex: advertisers and competitors in the ad tech ecosystem (DSPs and SSPs) are harmed becos, to access big audiences of digital platforms they must use these platforms’ DSP>> it harms their competitiveness as a DSP >> switching costs. Data has become a competitive constraint and a barrier to entry.

-MAP SOURCES:

A/winner-takes-it-all dynamics: EX.via EOS, learning, scope and network effects (for instance in digital markets). network effects and the role of data (with learning, scope and scale economies) generates a trend towards increasing concentration (winner-takesit-all dynamics)

B/ business consolidation via MATOS:  Given the financialisation envelopment and strategies of firms (ex online advert.digital firms), mergers can cause a SLC, even when, apparently, not involving potential competitors , becos The exploitation of data is non-rival.[EX: companies buy a potential competitor or a firm with a complementary database =  data-driven mergers].                    i must identify the (proposed merging.cos’) complementary geographies, and the nature of the relevant markets>> how much do their gws overlap? >> if barely overlap >>  the merging.co lack excessive MAPO >> low risk of ec blocking or requesting divestitures (as cond for clearance) ex: IP.DSMITH. PROPOSED.MERGER

C/antitrust (adp.cartels):  we can prove ADP.cartel by simply adapting to theories of harm (ex wrt online advertising markets) exs: tying and bundling to leverage MAP;  foreclosure or discrimination in the access to inputs; unjustified self-preferencing; lack of transparency; undue abrupt changes in trade conditions)

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cocoo’s STEPS

0-   notes:HOW2.DIGOUT.killer.matos. (ex:PHARMA.IND): overlapping gws etc    ex:PHARMA.IND.Conc.notified2.EC (300 page gd.pdf)

1-did cma.ec fail to review a pot ADP.cartel ? <> the CMA.ec has a permanent duty to identify them>>COCOO has a permanent power to challenge:

EX: disguised matos = acqui-hires= [a company acquiring other co’s highly skilled employees, or their financing agreements and intellectual property rights>> pot. RMS >> cma.ec o.2.review.     ex: recent spat of  “partnerships” made by Big Tech companies such as Microsoft, Amazon and Google, with startups in the AI sector….Microsoft announced that it had hired InflectionAI’s (alleged mato target) two co-founders, to form a new AI division:

-EC held:  did amount to a merger, as it resulted in “structural change” in the market, as  Microsoft acquired “all assets necessary” to gain the target’s market/s position…..But the low size of the target’s turnover meant it did not meet EU notif thresholds, and, since the deal had not been notified in any member states, it could not be referred to the EC

-german.cma ( the Bundeskartellamt) held: can review deals over 400 million euros, if the target has substantial operations in Germany >> held: microsoft’s use of the targets’ key Intellectual property rights, is a de facto takeover >  german notif.thresh triggered, but the target’s AI’s operations in germnay were only “minor,” (number of chatbot users in Germany deemed to be too low)> GERMAN MCR not triggered

-the UK.cma:  is a merger, but that it didn’t raise any competition concerns (see here) >>  COCOO TO CHALLENGE

2-Did cma.ec.top.fca review all pot.rms.matoipos? >> CMA has the power2.prelim.review (NO.o2.REVIEW), if a mato is a pot RMS 

COCOO: Any reg (2leg) that would hint a failure of cma.eu duty2review due to below.thres, or 4 months elapsed, >> breach of the spirit of 1leg: cma.ec has o.2.review ALL matos with pot [violation of clp= deadweightlosses = DWLs = cocons) <>  cma.prioritisation.pples

a mato is a pot RMS :

• where 2 or more enterprises ceased to be distinct within the past 4 months, or will shortly cease to be distinct. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER HITS THRESHOLDS OR NOT, or whether it was NOTIFIED or UNNOTIFD.   AND, 
• the turnover or share of supply thresholds are met (that is, either a £70 million turnover generated by the target, or the merger will create a 25% combined share of supply in the UK or a substantial part of the UK)

* The SOSBT may also, under specified conditions, require the CMA to investigate mergers that have public interest.

3-POT.RMS ?:

-if cma finds no pot RMS >> cma has expost and exante o2.review pot. ADP/CARTEL/STEALTHCONS

-if cma find pot RMS >> PHASE1 (MAX.40 DAYS (to decide if could be pot RMS+ pot SLC) within 1 or more markets in the UK, or part of it:

a/ if cma.ec decis : pot. RMS >> cma.ec.top has o2review matos (even if alreadycompleted/belowthresh/unnotified)), in such review, cma.ec has o.2.decide if could pot result in a SLC (in any uk gws IMS)…this cma decis can be reached using indirect/indir.methods 

b/if cma.ec decis= NO RMS >>  no o.2.review…but…..Case C-449/21 :  Ecj: Towercast case: held that eu Matos that escaped ex-ante review (under mcr), can be subject to ex-post reviews (of completed matos) for ADP (at eu or at national level)…..But not if a mato is reviewed and cleared (under mcr)

ex: build-up of  STEALTH.CONS.gdrive  in the given ims. ex.-Less-traditional” matos, such as the hiring of key staff, can also be cma.reviewed.   why stealth.cons happens?: ceos would prefer to disclose (rns…) the news of the forthcoming matoipo clearly and suddenly, becos the market would suddenly rise the plc’s value (to the value it will have if matoipo is completed)…but ceos have to disclose the news subtly.gradually(stealthy) to try to avert cma’s scrutiny..<> tradeoff: the plc’s value rises graduall (and many shs will not participate of the gains)

4- phase2 (no TL. to decide if there is SLC) >>  COCOO MAY CHALLENGE DECIS (CONDS/REMEDIES/FINE.AMOUNTS ETC)

5- CMA.EC PERMANENT DUTY TO MONITOR PLCS’ SOIs(statements of interest)/CONDS/REMEDIES/Undertakings (concesions, commitments, compromises) +  PERMANENT duty to inform sosbt , if any firm’s undertakings need to be released, varied, or enforced

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STEP2: UAs

   OSOC (Nightwish12@)   >> fin.stat >> list of subsidiaries (for each plc in my shortlist) >> identify UAS (use oc.os…) UA.types  Identify the UA’s network of parent,subs,etc (in each ind.ma)

– [UA = 1 EAU(ec.activity.unit)] = scope of 101 and 102 TFEU = scope of the eu.clp prohibitions] >> NO UA, NO cocon

-ua includes every entity engaged in an EAU(economic activity unit), regardless of : their legal status; the way in which it is financed; or the number of of diff.legal/legal persons composing it

-a co that is head (or parent) of a group (or subsidiaries), is only liab for its groupcos (or subsidiaries), if it has responsibility for coordinating the group’s activities, exerting a decisive influence over a groupco/subsidiary, so that they do not decide independently on their market conduct ….WHY?  becos only then an UA exists (between head/parent and group/subs) >> neither the groupcos/subs amongst themselves, nor the parent/head with the groupcos/subs, can be regarded mutual competitors (if they both happen to be active on the same relevant product andgeographic markets) ….. case: allianceone:  ecj: where the parent/head and its subsidiary/groupcos, form a single EA unit =  single UA (under Article 81 EC: EC can impose fines to the parent company, without having to establish its direct liab, and viceversa (Biogaran v European Commission Case T-677/14)

-The simple fact that the share capital of groupcos is held by the same person/s, is insufficient to det that head and group is a UA

-EUCLP attributes liability for infringements to EVERY company in the same UA.   CASE: GC upheld a €7.3m fine on Goldman Sachs in respect of a cartel infringement by the Prysmian group of companies, which was at the relevant time owned by one of Goldman Sachs’s investment funds. The court’s reasoning was that Goldman Sachs and Prysmian were part of the same “undertaking”, such that they were jointly liable for the breach.  The GC treated the following factors as of particular significance:    GGoldman Sachs had the power to appoint the members of Prysmian’s boards of directors and the power to call shareholder meetings. Goldman Sachs had links with around half of the Prysmian directors which it appointed. Some of them, the “PIA Employee Directors,” were employed by Goldman Sachs. FFour of the PIA Employee Directors were vested with broad day-to-day management powers. TThe PIA Employee Directors received regular updates and monthly reports on Prysmian’s business. GGoldman Sachs also took steps to ensure that it remained in control even after an initial public offering in May 2007  <>   cocoo: Mere evidence of financial and organisational links, such as were present in the Goldman Sachs case, should not suffice to make the parent/head liable for the groupcos/subs cocons, (or vicev). HOW to limit this liab.expansion?  we should insist that companies should only be found to be in the same UA if acted together in pro of the same commercial policy (connected to the cocon) , or took active action on the cocon. 

-The EU Court of Justice has previously recognised that, when deciding whether a parent exercises decisive influence over the commercial policy of its subsidiary, it is relevant to consider not only direct evidence, such as of the parent influencing the subsidiary’s pricing policy, but also other evidence of the financial and organisational links between the two companies (see Akzo Nobel NV v European Commission, Case C-97/08 P, [2009] 5 CMLR 23, para 74). But it is one thing to say that evidence of financial and organisational links may be sufficient,together with other evidence, to show that the parent exercises a decisive influence over its subsidiary’s commercial policy

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  STEP3: SICSA

ASAVAGAR.SICSA >> filter my shortlist, so im left with plcs in inds with highest.conc.lowest.entry      sicsa=sic.stat.analysis (to det level of conc.entry in an ind)

–eurostat.bus.statistics.drive.pdf

-IND.CONCENTRATION = the (output=gws.sales) MAS, accounted for by the largest firms (within an ind)

-The best ind.concentr.estimates are done using BSD (cos.births.survivals.deaths), becos includes all uk firms, of any legal form, providing they have a record with the tax office (if over £85k annual turnov). This makes it an ideal dataset for studying concentration, and entry and exit, which require data on the entire market. This differs from datasets (ex from refinitive; orbis, compustat) that cover only largest plcs >> fail to include roughly half of the UK business population.

-Annual BSD data, can correspond to a firm’s activity for the previous two calendar years. This is because the BSD snapshot is taken early in the calendar year (not all fin.accs submitted yet) .EX: in BSD data we identify the Great Recession (2009) with a lag  >> to correct the BSD lag, we may also find the number of LTD.cos, in the cos.hse.web, and in the Business Population Estimates (BPE.xls) from the Department for Business

-Concentration(cons) is increasing in most inds. Macroeconomics insist that MOST of todays increased concentration, is originating from greater MAP…..the balance (a bit of todays increased concentration) is originating from increased competition (weeding out the most inefficient firms)

-statistics normally measure the MAS of plcs…not the MAP…ALSO

-if we look at the MAS ,not of the plcs (in an ind), but of the owners of firms, we find even more consolidation: common ownership has grown as a small number of large asset managers own ever larger stakes in all of the major plcs (in an industry)

 stealth.CONS  : stealth.cons emerges from the fact thyat MOST cocons (from adp.matoipos) escape review, due to [excesivethres + courts.cmas using mad.ssnip.hml, as it gives them full discretion to block…or not] >>  COCOO does not even need to challenge ec/cma, but just IDENTIFY CONSOLIDATED INDS, and tell the adp.matoipo perpetrators:….ok, the State lets u go free…BUT…WE WILL MAKE U COMPENSATE ALL VICTIMS (ex.cocoos members) + COCOOS USP: OFFER TARGET CEOS A GOOD EXIT STRATEGY. 

UK.MARKET.STRUCTURE.asavagar   uk.bus.dynamics.asavagar   asavagar@gmail.com    a.savagar@kent.ac.uk

[ NOTES: asavagar: HOW2:IND:CONCENTR.ENTRY.PROD  =  asavagar.methodology.pdf  ]

sic.codes.uk    sic.code.search  sic.code.contact (sic containts 10,000 codes, while naics only 1000. thus, sic is much better.   one NAICS code can be further broken down into more specific SIC Code Extended categories. In the example below, NAICS Code 541330 is the most specific classification in the NAICS system, however it can be further classified into 40 SIC Code Extended categories – thereby providing a more refined and specific targeting system)… NAICS.code.search     ISIC.CODES.search (ISIC and SIC, are completely different classification systems, and independent from one another. SIC Codes predate ISIC codes and were developed by and for the United States. The ISIC Code system is developed and updated by the United Nations and many countries throughout the world rely on it…but, for business targeting purposes in the United States and Canada, SIC is best….SCIAN.codes.search   (El Sistema de Clasificación Industrial de América del Norte (SCIAN) 2023, organiza las actividades económicas en categorías acordadas trilateralmente por Canadá, Estados Unidos y México)

uk.dataservice     ukdataservice.main      XLS.concentr.statistics

eurostat.DATA(main)    eurostat.mainDB   eurostat.STATSFINDER    EUROSTAT.DATAvisualisations

prodcom.EUROSTAT     EUROSTAT.bsp   eurostat.DATABASE    EUROSTAT.publications   eurostat.STATISTICAL.THEMES  EUROSTAT.SBR.DATABASE    EUROSTAT.globalisation.dashboard

CensusBureau.bds.USA  censusbureU.BDSexplorer     censusbureau.bds.exployer.YOUTUBE

Contact details for this ons dataset:   prodcompublications@ons.gov.uk     +44 1633 455718

ons  statistical bulletin: Melanie Richard : ABAPS@ons.gov.uk   Telephone: +44 (0)1633 455747

ons.UK(main)    >>     MATOS    MATOS.datalist       MATOS.publications    ukbus.births.deaths.survivals.DATALIST   ukbus.births.deaths.survivals.PUBLICATIONS    BUS.activity.size.location. datalist     BUS.activ.size.loc.PUBLICATIONS    BUS.INNOV.datalist      BUS.INNOV.publications    Size.growth.of.non-financialbus.Datalist   Size.growth.of.nonfin.bus.PUBLICATIONS

manuf.prod.ind.PUBLICATIONS     manuf.prod.ind.DATALIST     IT.INTERNET.datalist    IT.INTERNET.publications   INT.TRADE.datalist    INT.TRADE.publications    RETAIL.IND.datalist     RETAIL.IND.publications     TOURISM.ind.datalist   TOURISM.IND.publications     CONSTRUCT.ind.datalist    CONSTRUCT.ind.publications

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STEP 4: CONREP.DIDA

 CONREP.DIDA to further evidence of pot.stealth.cons: CONREPS.postmato.effects  = scans    :  i must extract all factors affecting that ind >> estimate the postmato impact (in that ind) = exts (+ -); ints (+ -) .  are these impacts a continuation of a premato trend?

uk.tas.of.tas:   tus.list.gov.uk     ind.assocs      wiki.uk        markeluk         tas     taforum    trade.unions.uk    brit.services    build.conservation    memberwise       stark.library   ocu.esp     cons.finance.complaints.db  euroconsumers.org   euroconsumers.class.a.v.apple   eurocons.complaint.v.xbox.playstation   eurocons.colaborations.with.cocoo     eurocons.NEWS:comp.search         eurocons.report.23   eurocons.dynamic.pricing      which?(uk)     consumers.intl      health.eu.portal     econsumer.gov.COMPLAINTONLINE    CONSUMER.disputes (ICPEN)      search.CONSUMER.news.global

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STEP 5: map>>ADP   ADP.pples  CLP

STRATEGIC STEPS to challenge a (cma/cat/plc/fca/top) ADP-decision [to review/refer/block/clear/foc]…OR NOT TO:  cma.ec has o2review any dp.plc that could be a pot SMAP [=when rivals’ competitive stains on a plc, is ineffective]  >> pot. ADP…..Some degree of MAP is the norm and is ok. map is harmful only if has the potential to become durable and therefore become a SMAP.  smap [durable map] = a plc with the pot. to, durably:  raise/maintain price above competitive level ( prevent effective competition) +  to behave independently of competitors….and exclude competitors (or other barriers)

-EC: ‘THE SUSTAINABILITY(PI) QUALITIES OF A PRODUCT ARE INDEED A COMPETITION PARAMETER (CLP)’  < > OECD: AN UA IS BOTH PI + CL, IF PRODUCES DIRECT ECONOMIC BENEFITS (WHETHER ON JUST THE COMPANY, OR ON THE WORLD), (EG. ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS),

-BANANAS, CHOCS, COFFEE : THE INTERMEDIARIES/WHOLESALERS/RETAILERS , PAY TOO LOW UNFAIR PRICES TO FARMERS (SOUTHAMERICA…)  + ENCOURAGE EXCESSIVE USE OF SCARCE RESOURCES + DISCOURAGES SUSTAINABLE LAND PRACTICES.  (102.A TFEU)

– HOW SH PRIMACY; COMMON OWNERSHIP; CONCENTRATION OF ASSET MANAGEMENT, AFFECT CLP/WPI ?  <> FINANCIALISATION = V. CO/DIRS, ON WPI FOR FACILITATING THE GROWTH OF THE CO’S ‘COMMON OWNERSHIP’ TO HARM COMPETITION…….   OR V FINANCIAL COS, ON PI GROUNDS, FOR BEING TO BIG TO BE ALLOWED TO FAI

-REGULATION (EU) 2022/1031 : thirdcountryfirms can be excluded [=decision not to apply the ipi measure] from eu procurement/concessions, if wpi goals outweight the benefit competition [from allowing thirdcountryfirms to compete for eu tenders  <> COCOO WILL CLAIM THAT THIRDCOUNTRYFIRMS SHOULD , OR SHOULD NOT, BE EXCLUDED FROM TENDERS…and all eu ITAs with morocoo….must be revoked (nulled)

– MARKET POWER (MAP: is inv.prop. to consumers’ ability to switch) >> BUYER POWER (BUP)

-IS THERE A CMA DECISION , ON PI GROUNDS,  INCONSISTENT WITH UK/EU’S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, (EG PARIS AGREEMENT; CLIMATE CHANGE ACT) ?… IF SO, TO THE EXTENT THAT ART. 2 OR 8 ARE ENGAGED, I CAN CHALLENGE THE DECISION UNDER HRA98, (CASE: MILLER V PRIMER MINSTER 2019) 

-FOC OR ADVICE BOTH PARTIES, ON COURT DECISIONS (WITH PLFs BINDING AND/OR NON BINDING)

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  STEP 6: MATOIPOs

caselex: mad.inds   MAD.MAS.notes   HMT=SSNIPP= MAD.mard=RELMA + notif.threshs      MAD.challenges     the.5.questions(to challenge decis based on notifthres/mad/mard/snipp ] = my tech2force cma to review my stealth.cons dugouts  =  the.5.QUESTIONS       UPP.test     

-DID THE COMPANY IDENTIFY (OR AT LEAST TRIED TO) OPPORTUNITIES TO WORK TOGETHER FOR SUSTAINABILITY ?…. DID THEY ENGAGE IN SUSTAINABILITY?…. THEY CAN LAWFULLY ENGAGE IN ANTICOMPETITION, AND EVEN RAISE PRICES, AS LONG AS IT IS WITHIN A SUSTAINABILITY (STANDARISATION – NOT REQUIRED, BUT RECOMMENDED) AGREEMENT….

-ASK FOR DISCOVERY OF THE SUSTAINABILITY/STANDARISATION AGREEMENT>> BREACHED ?

-CAP REP BREACH?

-FAILURE TO FOCUS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS OF THE EU TREATIES?….PROPORTIONALITY PPLE. APPLIED?

-A CONFLICT BETWEEN PI(=SUSTAINABILITY) GROUNDS/POLICIES, CL(=ECONOMIC) GROUNDS/POLICIES. ?

-ask CMA TO DISCLOSE THE SFOs (SHORT FORM OPINIONS) ISSUED

– look not just at announced acquisitions, but also at stealth-matos (ex: licenses;  co-developm agreements; marketing…)

-look at horiz.matos, as they have higher risk of cma’s scrutiny (as is easier for the cma to spot who are the plc’s direct competitors). thus, most stealth.cons happens in horiz.matos.   

-look at filed plc reports:

– usa:   the 8-k yearly report, item 2, is where plcs must (if reaches min.10% of the aquiring plc’s assets) report all completed acquis/dispo of assets. …..Also, the yearly/quarterly cash.flow.stat. must report all matos done in the year , in a single (aggregated amount)

-uk: thresholds: -MCR (set the (vol) notif.thresholds) -HMT(ssnipp): 5-10%  

-I will find any plc’s cash.flow.stats in their quarterly.halfyear.annual Fin.Statements. in the cash.flow plcs must give a single (aggregated) figure for all sign.transactions (premium.listings) >> COCOO HAS O2challenge the values reported(and notes thereof), if (pot) misleading..

-to find the mato.value, I can look at all rns reported acquisitions in the last years….alternatively, i can look at the plc’s cashflow.stat single (aggregated)figure for all matos,  and divide it by the number of matos in that year/s   

-why stealth.cons is rampant in diversified/segmented.frag industries [exs: medical.tech inds: halma ; dyalisis.ind, etc)]:  because:   

– these plcs usually have low.value cap.assets and revenues (wrt to other industries) >> the sizeofperson (SOP) and the sizeoftransaction (SOT) notif.threshs fail always!

-also, becos, unfortunately, In diver.seg.frag. inds, no threshold is ever triggered despite a chain-acquis of cap.assets like offices, clinics.   evermore when entry is slow and expensive (ex: dyalisis ind; medical tech; fire.gas detection tech….ex: halma plc)

-also,  (innov.killer*) acquis of competing facilities, causes health/tech providers to internalise the -exts (as they are business-stealing exts) thus causing lower quality of health/tech provision, etc… KILLER.acquis (cannibalisation)’ . happen usually in innovation inds.   where high MAS incumbents T.O. start-ups(targets) with significant business potential, to kill a business rival emerging threat], and avoiding ec.cma review (as below threshold)

-except in uk (vol.mato.notif), in most countries, there is o.2.notify.cma.ec, only when both a (SOP + SOT ) TESTS are met.   if SOT FAILS>>pot ADP.   IF SOP FAILS>>potCARTEL

– would (price.quality.value) have declined, asbent the mato?. to answer we need to know if the mato is vertical or horiz:

• • for matoplcs (vertical) producing segm.diversified gws:  synergies (but evidence disappears). higher MAS. less EOS >> higher gws prices >> consumers lose (wpi harm)
  • for matoplcs (horiz) producing converging gws: synergies. less MAS. more EOS >> lower gws prices >> consumers win (wpi gain)

-isolate only (quality.price.value) of my matoplc’s gws, WRT the (quality.price.value) of the rivals.gws 

-compare (with those of rivals) only my matoplc’s specific gws categories >> gws substitutes >> i find the true (rivals; relma; prod.ma; geo.ma; mato.IV)   

-HMT =  [MAD >> MAS.HHI.C3.C4 >> MAP estimate>>pot.ADP.matoblock]……BUT…the HMT is only usable in markets with homog gws (ex. postmato convergence), and never in markets with heterog.gws (ex postmato divergence/segm), becos MAP cannot be estimated from MAS in markets with hetero.gws, as there is no poss reas criterion to choose which is the RELMA (MAD), amongst diff candidate markets.   The best way to estimate a postmato’s unilateral effects (on its ims), (particularly when we have a plc producing hetero.gws), is not by using HMT, but the UPPA (upward pricing pressure analysis)

-UPPA:  focuses on postmato price change,(rather than on MAS change) ,because has a predictable relationship with consumer surplus. also, uppa requires no MAD.   [genrule = higher premato UPP >> higher chance for postmato upp]

a. premato:   there is upward pricing pressure (or“UPP”) on the mato.plcs, becos, should one of the firms increases its price, some of its customers will substitute this firm’s gws for a rival’s gws >> rival gains more profit

b. postmato, this pressure (opportunity cost) on price increase disappears, because profits are no longer “diverted”, but jointly maximized.           

-to estimate UPPA we need:

1/ the diversion ratio:  measures the degree of substitutability between the two merging gws : the larger the diversion ratio, thelarger the proportion of customers that would be diverted to the competitor should the firmincreases its price. Thus, two products with high diversion ratios between them will have a largepre-merger pressure on price increase, and subsequently, a large opportunity for actual postmerger price increase. …. Farrell and Shapiro (2010) are rather open-ended on whereor how to obtain the diversion ratio, giving suggestions like company internal documents (“towhom do we lose our business?”) or customer surveys

2/ the competitor’s (pre-merger) price-cost margin

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STEP 7 : ENFORCE

-eu:  Article 11(1) and (2) of TEU + Article 2 of Protocol No 2 on the pples of subsidiarity and proportionality >> eu instits have o2consult the public (indivs,csos…)widely, before proposing legislative acts >> ec has o2beLobbied, but in a transparent manner ( shall meet only with those interest representatives that are registered in the transparency register, inasmuch as they fall under the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement and shall make public information on such meetings

-uk:Businesses found to have breached competition law can be fined up to 10 per cent of their annual worldwide turnover and ordered to change their behaviour

*cocoos recruitment of clp victims (SQAL):  COMPETITORS, SUPPLIERS/BUYERS, CONSUMER ORGS, STATUS QUO LOBBIES

*HOW to challenge a (cma/cat/plc/fca/top) matoipo/adp-decision [to (or not to) review/refer/block/clear/foc]:

-I need to estimate the ma.led.map. to do this i need to use the formulas for the two ed types: med and ced

-I need to argue that,  to be able to decide which is the rma between (say) 2 markets, we need a mad (CRITERION=STANDARD) WHICH IS ALWAYS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND. Thus, there is no possible decision-making criterion. Thus, cma/plcs/regs…can never make INFORMED.DECISIONS…..…>> my questions:

• how did cma.courts.ec decide which are the COES (of adp.postmato)? : they cant, becos there are NO cma.ec guidelines for that >> cocoos challenge: what is the cocon level that triggers cmas d2review or d2block?>> cocoo may choose between: cma failure to act, or cma should not have acted
• HOW DO CMA.CAT STATE AND JUSTIFY THE FORMULA THAT TRANSLATES MAS INTO MAP, OR INTO COES (competitiveEffects) ?:
• WHAT’S YOUR CRITERION FOR WHICH MAD IS BEST?: there is NO CRITERION (for which mad is best)…. is there any way to find out if a matoipo or adp should be blocked/cleared/reviewed/refered?:  Yes, by applying the INCO.TEST: test for INTERNAL CONSISTENCY <> legal certainty (HRA): cocoo will use the human rights to insist for the application of the inco.test, and will compare past cma/cat… similar.decisions (ex. regarding estimates of what would be the postmerger matoipo-price hikes, if the proposed matoipo is cleared) >>> so there is no need for me to be crunching numbers…is simpler for me to just compare decisions (easy with gpt)  
• HOW CAN BE REASN STATED THAT SOME MAD IS BEST THAN OTHER, WITHOUT FIRST KNOWING: 
  • -WHICH MAP INFERENCE/S FOLLOW FROM EITHER CHOICE?,and
  • -WHICH MAP INFERENCE YIELDS CONCLUSIONS CLOSER TO THE TRUTH ABOUT MAP?
• HOW CAN YOU DET HOW CLOSE A MAP INFERENCE IS TO THE TRUTH ABOUT MAP, WITHOUT FIRST PROFERING A BEST MAP ESTIMATE?

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LIP.LOCUS  :

All decisions and procedural conduct of the EC are subject to JR by the EC.GC and ultimately by the ECJ.

3PINTS can:

-file obsrvations (before EC decides to review or not) >>  can appeal an EC decis.or.proc.cond, within 2 months

-request (vol) info: a/ from the merging companies or third parties: i can send questionnaires to competitors or consumers.buyers, seeking their views on the merger, or b/ request info from other market participants, aimed at clarifying the conditions for competition in a given market or the role of the merged companies in that market.

3pint.clp.scans3pint.uk.scans3PIs     ARBITRATION+WTO   ARBITRATION  ADR: med.arb.assign.novation.scans         3pint.CMAINVS.scans     ELON.TAX.avoidance.scan  FUNDING SOURCES.scan  FUNDING4COCOO  CBI.BSI.FSB 

Exs of locus sources: