ALP (anticorr law and policy)
How come military decisions are in the hands of those who invest in defrnce stocks or benefit directly or indir??..eg usa congresman are ibuying defence stocks are thry are spiking with the israel war
How come pandemic decisions are in hands or pharma [ make the decision] and on those who ptofit?
is not just immoral but supercorruption
Lobbying for war…by creating such profit incentives for wars to exist and prolong
Politicians should not be allowed to buy shares in firms that profit from war,,,should be ilegal, and IS in vio
Ation of codes of conduct…becos they r voted to protect the int of people .not their own int
COCOO steps
1/research:
- access LFF [IFF estimates are identified as data anomalies on Licit financial flows (LFFs), from the main iff datasets: the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics and Balance of Payments data, United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, Bank for International Settlements datasets, Foreign Affiliates Statistics and Foreign Direct Investments datasets.]
- The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a trading bloc of six countries including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (uae= a money laundering hub)….uk goals wrt the gcc [despite their appalling hr record]
1/-a piece of saudia arabia’s 1 trillion pounds investment program [ to diversify away from oil…..just to build another desert city]
2/-to attract investiment from gcc to the uk
3/-saudis to back uk, so that gcc agrees the proposed uk/gcc FTA (FREE TRADE AGREEMENT)
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CI: [CORR IN INFRASTRUCTURE]: cocoo foi +infrastructuretransparency.org: to disclose infrastructure proc contract variations, after awarded…eg: mod<> bae……when a favoured bidder already knows that it will be able to modify the contract, it can submit a competitive bid, or even at less than market value, seemingly delivering value for money <> Dig out data on the quality of construction or early deterioration of material, as evidence for CI….and also on the absence of proper maintenance, and all other corruption risk, and identify confusion arising from unclear division of competencies between: eu/members; or centralgov/ccaa
CI CLUES:
CI is positively correlated with:
- infrastructure prices, even after accounting for input costs such as labour and construction materials
- increased public investment .. but lower expenditures on operations and maintenance
CI is negatively correlated with :
- education gdp expenditure
- lower expenditures on operations and maintenance
- access bors (cocoo has legitint)[eg uk psc reg, TRACEPublic, eiti … )
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The World Bank publicly names all debarred companies on its website + IDB disseminates the List of Sanctioned Firms and Individuals with automatic email notifications + EBRD and the World Bank publish the full sanction decisions+ join the World Bank’s ICHA [International Corruption Hunters Alliance]
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join the EU’s Transparency Register [ https://lobbyfacts.eu ]
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ResourceContracts.org [intl. database of over 1,500 publicly available oil, gas and mining contracts from over 90 countries] + country specific mining contract databases [EG: The contract between the South Sudanese Government and the American company Nile Trading and Development. The publication of the contract resulted in the community of Mukaya Payam leading a protest against the deal, which ultimately led to the President revoking it]
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Request records from the settlement monitor [SFO orders the appointment of a monitor (of settlement compliance) as part of a DPA]
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join the Global Forum on Asset Recovery (GFAR), to empower investigators and prosecutors, and asset recovery practitioners [cocoo].
AR methods
(i) NCC [non-conviction confiscation] = forfeiture of assets that does not depend on a criminal conviction, can result from civil proceedings
(ii) unexplained wealth orders (UWOs), a proceeding based on a rebuttable presumption about the illegal origins of an asset, possibly leading to its confiscation.
(iii) disgorgement (restit of illegal profits)
(iv) property claims, a mechanism to enforce ownership rights on aparticular identifiable asset
(v) personal claims, that can be presented against individuals or entities for damages or restitution
(vi) direct recovery: private lawsuits by law enforcement officials in other jurisdictions, to recover corruption property: UNCAC (art. 53) . this is a more expedient route because it does not require waiting for enforcement action by the foreign jurisdiction or international cooperation proceedings
(i) NCC
= non conviction confiscation = judicial confiscation for a criminal offence without criminal conviction = “civil forfeiture”, “in rem forfeiture”, or “objective forfeiture”. In Spanish, “extinción de dominio” and “decomiso sin condena”
Confiscation is the part of ar, for permanent deprivation of property
NCC can take place within criminal proceedings and may target individuals: in some cases, the assets of a convicted person, including those lawfully obtained, may also be subject to confiscation
‘Confiscation enhancements’ CE: permitting the confiscation of assets not connected to the crime. They are especially useful whenever the crime assets cannot be located or are unavailable <> COCOO will pap/foc v offender (res iudicata) , to seek the confiscation of non-crime assets of already prosecuted large firms/banks/govs/, for an equivalent value (to the crime assets)…and/or ask court to order [disgorgement= restit]
FATF (2012: NCC is most useful:
– When a conviction cannot be obtained for procedural or technical reasons (e.g. the statute of limitations is exceeded) << >> COCOO: LOOK AT OLD CASES, TO SEEK FIRMS that should have been CONDEMENED , but tl has passed……Corruption, by its very definition, is a secretive affair…so that TL ends before corr found…<> thus, TL ONLY COUNTS FROM DATE WHICH THE CRIME IS KNOWN (gelmato)….NCC itself may also have a TL set by each country
– When there is substantial (enough) evidence to establish that the proceeds were generated from criminal activity, but there is insufficient evidence to meet the persons’, legal or natural, criminal burden of proof;
– If a criminal investigation or prosecution is unrealistic or impossible;
– When the perpetrator was acquitted due to insufficient admissible evidence
– If the defendant is immune from prosecution
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cocoo foi +infrastructuretransparency.org: to disclose infrastructure proc contract variations, after awarded…eg: mod<> bae……when a favoured bidder already knows that it will be able to modify the contract, it can submit a competitive bid, or even at less than market value, seemingly delivering value for money <> Dig out data on the quality of construction or early deterioration of material, as evidence for CI….and also on the absence of proper maintenance, and all other corruption risk, and identify confusion arising from unclear division of competencies between: eu/members; or centralgov/ccaa
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CI Risk Assessment Tool = (ICRAT) designed to assist civil society and other stakeholders to ask the right questions
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TI’S UK’s published the Defence Companies Anti-Corruption Index 2015 measures the transparency and quality of ethics and anti-corruption programmes of 163 defence companies from 47 countries. Each company is ranked from band A (highest) to F (lowest) using publicly available information
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the oecd has no enforcement powers…….regular meetings of the owg with nationparties, for updates : oecd working group on bribary (OWGB) : next meetings: 10 – 13 October 2023. 5-8 dec 2023….former Meeting documents: 2023: March Agenda: Summary Record…also, oecd publishes a country’s ongoing failure to comply with the antibribconv, via the (OECD) Country credit Risk Classification measures; and the Country Risk Assessment Model (CRAM)
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cocoo to reseach lobbying by joining the EU’s Transparency Register [ https://lobbyfacts.eu ]
According to the EU Transparency Register, for instance, both Greenpeace and Transparency International EU Liaison Office, spend in the region of €1 million, lobbying the EU institutions each year
some lobbyists conceal the true beneficiaries by setting up bogus NGOs/businessassociations, …this practice is called “astroturfing” .. why? to bypass monitoring [so that they have no o. to register in the transparency register]
Law firms claim client confidentiality and demand derogation from rules governing interest groups(lobbying), despite the considerable influence they can exercise through pap/suing for jr and/or damages
2/ identify the wpi (bien social) harms and possible reparations:
-ordinary people suffer the biggest consequences….Money lost to foreign bribery wastes millions of dollars that would otherwise go towards essential, and often lifesaving services, like health care and education….+ the destruction of cultural heritage; depletion of tourism value by irreversible transformation of the valley; concerns that the Project would not lead to sustainable development of the local area or benefit to the local community; environmental and health risks; and social concerns including those arising from displacement of communities
-damages people’s trust in their government, AND IN DEMOCRACY.
-Impedes cross-border investment,
-absence of bors, harms fair competition in international trade + discriminates against small and medium size companies + -anticomp challenge for companies that play by the rules….bors provide a competitive advantage, as multinational companies (to do business with), often require third parties to disclose bos as part of their due diligence process DDP
un: possible civil reparations:
- (i) restitution: measures to restore the victim back to their original situation before the violation occurred
- (ii) compensation: for any economically accessible damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case
- (iii) rehabilitation: medical and psychological care, along with legal and social services
- (iv) satisfaction: cessation of continuing violations, verification of the facts and public disclosure of the truth, public apology, and judicial and administrative sanctions against persons liable for the violations
- (v) guarantees of non-repetition: the implementation of measures designed to prevent future violations. This includes, for example, “promoting the observance of codes of conduct and ethical norms by public servants”
possible Admin reparations:
some countries use (v corr),a non-criminal liability method, via admin proceedings… These include Brazil, Colombia, Germany, Mexico and Russia.
Possible punishments: fines, ar, restitution, revocation or suspension of licences, permits and warnings, debarment, prohibition from advertising, inability to access government benefits such as fiscal incentives, subsidised credit or export promotion benefits, and firm’s dissolution
3/ attack:
- impose sanctions/debarment/suspension :
-sanctions/debarment, in ODA funded contracting, are consulted by development practitioners and NGOs during the know your customer (KYC) and due diligence processes +. UN sanctions lists are also used by financial institutions and NGOs
-debar/susp [from proc or non-procurement (for example: grants, cooperative agreements, loans, leases) ]: [even without a conviction/civiljudgment, debarment is possible just “based upon a preponderance of the evidence” for:
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- wilfully violating contract terms
- a history of poor contract performance
- violating drug-free workplace laws
- intentionally violating “made in America”product labelling regulations;
- committing certain unfair trade practices
- having delinquent taxes
- knowing failure by a principal to disclose certain types of misconduct
- breach of: clp + elp+ hrlp+ alp [eg: breach of fatf and oecd guidelines [ncp: oecd national contact point], and breach of the [uncac = The United Nations Convention Against Corruption : Articles 12 and 14 call on States Parties to enact measures to identify bos behind companies] …..eg: failure to create (more transparent) BORS + [fatf fines+ targeted admin/crim sanctions] v firms/banks/nations, for failing to properly comply with BOR rules + for failing ddp , by doing business with a firm that did not disclose bos [the contracting firm failed to draft a proper ddp, thus disrupting clcp]
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COCOO TO CHALLENGE ALL GOV/EU, FOR FAILING THEIR DUTY TO TURN THE NR CURSE INTO THE NR BLESSING.. LIKE NORWAY
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cocoo to submit a communication [eg on land-grabbing], to the ICC prosecutor’s office, alleging that land-grabbing has constituted a crime against humanity in the country
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COCOO v treasure decisions to grant oilgas SUBSIDIES [ogs] + reg.capture+ csos should be allowes to join consultations + Taxes to oilgas should be 78% like in norway
billions spent annually by govs to subsidise fossil fuels for consumers. fossil fuel subsidies WPI costs:
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- overburden government budgets, thus limiting resources for more efficient use
- decrease the competitiveness of low-carbon industries, thus blocking the energy transition
- compromise energy national security
- damage public health (e.g.increased air pollution)
- delay efforts to decarbonise the economy by locking-in inefficient technologies,
Regulatory capture, favouring narrow business interests over WPI (egs:
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- Influence Map (2017) has found that the oilgas industry successfully lobbied the UK government to get a minimum tax on North Sea operations…the Treasury is making key tax policy decisions followed by consultations open only to oil and gas firms and their lobbyists.
- revolving door= coi: eg a former British Gas director became responsible for setting the energy price cap at Ofgem, the UK’s energy regulator
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challenge cc measures [eg net zero], on the basis that is outweighed by the NEED FOR EC.GROWTH TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY
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cocoo to argue that iccs have a duty to exercise concurrent jurisdiction… or that a different jurisdiction should be recognised:
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- [international and internationalised (postwar) criminal courts [eg icc] may “exercise concurrent jurisdiction when national courts cannot offer satisfactory guarantees of independence and impartiality, or are materially unable or unwilling to conduct effective investigations or prosecutions]
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- If criminal prosecution does not progress [in a country], international law recognises the possibility of extraterritorial enforcement action. Given that grand corruption cases usually cross borders, it may be possible to find other countries with jurisdiction over some aspects of the case
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cocoo to appeal + jr v prosecutor decis not to prosecute: in some countries, victims/csos, have right to appeal, when prosecutors decide not to move forward with a case, unless such decision is reached by settlement…. For example, the EU’s Victim’s Rights Directive(art. 11).
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COCOO WILL COOP WITH SAIS , V GOVS: cocoo to threaten FIRMS/GOVS/BANKS, WITH REPORTING TO SAIS…EG ON GROUNDS OF DELAYED REPAYMENTS TO LENDERS….LENDERS COLLUDE [WITH THE COUNTRY’S MISREPRES OF THE FISCAL ACCOUNT], BECAUSE KNOW ABOUT THE MISREPRESENTATION, BUT THEY DO NOT COMPLAIN ABOUT THE DELAYS, AND DONOTCLAIMMONEYBACKFAST… SO AS TO MAKE SURE THAT SUCH COUNTRY WILL EVENTUALLY REPAY, AND KEEP FUTURE BUSINESS…eg. In Brazil, the Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU) is the SAI, established under the Constitution…TCU has the power to make a final verdict on the accounts of public resources. The sanctions which the TCU can impose are broad…..the rejection of a gov fiscal accounts, is one of the most severe sanctions….eg the rejection of President Rousseff’s fiscal accounts in 2015 was considered grounds for a possible impeachment. TCU found that Rouseff’s government had systematically delayed repayments to Brazilian lenders (US$11.6 billion)…..thus misrepresentating brazil’s fiscal account [appearing to be healthier than it was]
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ML [presumption applies]:
[ eu directive 2018 + FATF + Article 23 of (UNCAC)], and in many countries, like france: ml is a stand-alone offence [ unlike focs, there is no need to have a prior conviction]
-presumption of ml = the [source=operation] : [ investment, concealment or conversion] of funds, is presumed illicit, if either the:
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- a. material conditions
- b. legal conditions
- c. financial conditions: eg. unnecessarily complex financial vehicles lacking economic rationality
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have no other justification than to conceal either:
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- a. the asset/income origin
- b. the bo
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cocoo to challenge firms that cheat on carbon credits + press for proper public accountability, oversight and governance….see the 2013 report by Interpol : ways of manipulating carbon measurements, to fraudulently claim additional carbon credits
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v countries, BASED ON the country’s failing of their duties to comply with the oecd antibribconv + on countrys’ failure to sue their infringing experters…. +. cocoo v infringing exporters + JR v gov recent decision (to sanction/not to sanction/not to sanction enough)
- PRESS OECD TO RISE THE CREDIT RISK OF SOME COUNTRIES, BASED ON the country’s failing of their duties to comply with the oecd antibribconv.
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cocoo as 3pintervenors/amicuscuriae, in ISAs…. + cocoo focs (via ord.courts) an isa order, if the losing party fails to comply and to publicly destroy their reputation +. COCOO appeal, for isas breach of a duty to consider cocoo’s allegations [isa failing to act on suspicions of corruption] = ias decision is void, as isa failed their wpi duty [to be proactive in identifying clp,elp,hrlp,alp ], in breach of their legitimacy and integrity for the administration of justice
ISA:investor-state arbitration = international arbitrations private v state/statedepart (such as a Ministry)
isat =arbitral tribunal: once an isat issues an award, the parties cannot appeal … but only two options left for unhappy parties:
a.set aside proceedings
b. enforcement proceedings: to have a domestic court give effect to the arbitral award, such that the award will take on the status of a judgement within that jurisdiction. usually, where the other party has failed to comply…and also to publicly harm their reputation
If an allegation of corruption is made in the course of isa, isa only becomes burdened with a duty [to consider the allegation and to decide whether or not it is proven], if:
-relevant to the coa, or
-imposed by isas’ ethical codes ; ethical codes of any member-based organisation of which the arbitrators is a member; the International Bar Association Guidelines, or the rules of the national bar association with which the arbitrator is licenced
isa secrecy has much criticism..so, why secrecy is not removed? …my opinion: ISA is preferred [by the corrupted], over ordinary litigation, because saves them from REPUTATIONAL HARM, which is the worst harm…which would be inflicted to them in ordinary litigation
states have entered into over 3,000 international or bilateral investment agreements/treaties (‘iia’s’ or ‘bit’s’)
isat case egs:
-the tribunal in Methanex v. the Usa, using its discretionary power, allowed three csos to submit written briefs as amici curiae [non-disputing third parties]….The decision to accept the amicus submissions in Methanex set an important precedent for csos intervention as amicus curiae in investment treaty disputes, where wpis were at stake cso participation not just enhance the legitimacy of arbitration proceedings, but also provide useful input.
disobedience and the blockade of the city. Bolivian police and army forces were deployeden masseand often met protesters with violence, which lead to
the killing of a protester and the injury of a hundred others.coined as ‘La Guerra del Agua’
-iat admits NGO (as amicus) submissions in Gabriel Resources’ claim against Romania
concerning mining projectthe Canada-Romania BIT (the BIT). Gabriel Resources’ allegations of
breach of the BIT arise in relation to a proposed open pit mining development in Roşia Montană,
Romania (the Project) which was not implemented However, the Tribunal denied admission to
arguments on the law, as well as references to or reliance on testimonies which could not be
tested by cross-examination. The Tribunal also rejected the NGOs’ request to attend and
participate in the oral hearing
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COCOO FOCS (A CORRUPTION NBII SENTENCE), so that the recovered corruption assets are fully used to repair the wpi harm…Atículo 57(3c) (Restitución y disposición de activos): el Estado requerido, dará consideración prioritaria a la restitución, al Estado Parte requirente, de bienes decomisados por corrupcion, a sus propietarios legítimos, o a la indemnización de las víctimas
<> COCOO V NATIONS FOR FAILING TO REQUEST [FROM OTHER NATIONS], COMPENS/RESTIT
via:
A. Acciones civiles: locus solo para víctimas individuales o grupos identificables/ o las ongs que les representan
B. mecanismos constitucionales: no hay requisito de locus
C. los fiscales pueden actuar como representantes del interés público, si ha habido daño social.
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cocoo v reg/cas: reg/cas [are investigator+ judge] attract corruption, and often accept bribes, and also have a coi with gov…thus, they should not be allowed to:
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- use discretion in clcp interpretion (belongs to the judicial power)…eg “fair” competition…..
- influence the legislative power
- be subjected to undue business influence and capture.
- buy laws, or/and lobby, to create more regulations to restrict entry of new players
- receive grants/tenders/donations/sponsorships, unless proper anticorrup/anticomp frameworks are in place, and sufficient quality, resources, capacity and competences…..COCOO WILL ASK how they ensure that donations/sponsorships/grants, are “not used as a disguised form of bribery”
- use transparency (allegedly to prevent corruption), that harms clp, by:
a. resulting in the unnecessary dissemination of commercially-sensitive information
b. making the procurement processes more predictable
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COCOO v corps, for failure to put adequate measures to prevent the ocurred corruption: [ i will identify recent, individuals’ convictions for corporate crimes, and use the IP, to enforce the wpi STRICT LIAB of the corp/soe….the IP “identification principle” [English criminal law], is necessary for a corp to be held criminally liable under sections 1,2, and 7 of the Bribery act
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COCOO v GOV for FAILing DUTY TO WPI/EW, BY REFUSING TO SETTLE…EG. settlements allow for a fair distribution of the sanction among affected jurisdictions
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COCOO: identify firm sentences against fbig (firmsbanksindivsgovs), for ccpm (compliancecorrprevmeasures) failures…then identify fbigs that keep failing to ccpm because of :
eg. fbigs’ accounting practices
eg. fbig’s [whether sentenced or not!] TAS (tax avoidance schemes), causing ongoing failure to properly account for bribery
eg. fbig’s failing to pay alimony [financial support ordered by court]
eg. fbig’s [or individuals thereof] illicit enrichment
eg. fbig’s [or individuals thereof]in breach of the principles of public administration [<> PUBLIC LAW]
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COCOO V PSOE/euelected/etc: on grounds of: ASR (Abuse of state resources), to maintain a dominant (<>clcp) party system…DESTROYS DEMOCRACY BY INFLICTING 2 TYPES OF HARM (V WPI):
1/ electoral power inequalities, giving unfair electoral advantage to incumbents, compromise the integrity of an election, reduce public trust in the legitimacy of the process and its outcomes,
2/CLCP BREACH: An incumbent’s ASR distorts/harms/anihilates free and fair political competition (<>cpcl):
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- PP rivals are restricted their ability to raise funds and exposed to criminal sanctions. Therefore, those implementing political finance reform implement laws and regulations to regulate themselves (COI)
- Democratic political systems need to be competitive systems, and this requires the political system regulating parties to be based on equality and operate in an unbiased manner
- legislative discretionary spending [LDS]: incumbent or dominant pps or coalitions engage in pork-barrel spending of discretionary funds -eg grants- [to support their constituents only]…So the constituents keep voting for them…..most of eu grants etc are granted by eu elected representatives, to their consitutents, to perpetuate themselves in the eu
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COCOO V COL ETC:
THE BRITISH FINANCIAL EMPIRE = financialisation of finance
As the british empire started to collapse, the brits decided to create a cobweb of financial jurisdictions [offshores], to conceal their crimes [and the crimes of escobar etc who also use these cobwebs]. 99.9% of banks offshore clients [indivs/corps] are involved in:
market rigging, coi nondisclosure, arms trading, illicit pp donations, contract kickbacks, fraudulent invoicing, trade mispricing, bribery and tax evasion…. moreover, these corps are then rewarded with public proc. contracts.
Despite the Panama papers leak (that prompted the setup of the panama commission), authorities are still unable to enforce the law, because the assets belong to a few, but very powerful [the elite] who are also within gov [eg hmrc], and lobbying, thus Democracy is a fake. COL has the uk gov and offshore govs, totally captured
<> cocoo: corps with offshore assets should not be eligible for proc + setup public bors in all jurisdictions of the world. + disclose lobbyists/gov with offshore assets
COL is a state within the state, as COL is goverened by the Corporation of London [ a liability firewall to insulate from their economic crime]. COL has:
-col has private tribunals and police; Lord Major, different from London’s major; absence of democracy [col lord major is nominated by the col corps, and not by residents]; a permanent member in the house of commons; in the heart of col is the bank of england [regulator + central bank];
-col has 40% share of the world’s financial market;
<> cocoo: col’s liable for ADP
-col has exemption from most uk laws/regs, so that can decide policies contrary to uk’s
<> cocoo: what’s the impact of col’s policies in uk’s policies (cl,al, ehr, el)??
col strategy:
a legal fiction where economic transactions take place in the city of london [COL], and not on the offshores. Assets are not really in the offshores, but in col. why? because ow, the dollar and pound would drop, and the currencies of the offshores would rise in proportion….however, uk chooses not account for offshore asset figures into the uk BOP (balance of payments), on the basis that this figure belongs to the offshores.
col advertises itself to foreign banks as a liability firewall: confidentiality; no investigation; secrecy; ….the assets (money+goods = 50 trillion dollars, ownership of best real estyate, artworks, cars etc) are in Trusts. fictionally deposited in offshores [former brit empire colonies], via Trusts [fideicomisos]. The fiduciary/fideicomisary = settlor of trust, hands the assets to a trustee (usually a lawyer), so that the fiduciary becomes legally insulated from the assets, thus with no o.to pay tax, no o.to disclose asset origin, no liability….how? because there is no regulatory body or obligations to disclose the trust agreement existence and content….uk/usa keep blocking in the UN, the applications from developing countries for the creation of a UN transparent intl. organisation for taxation with enforcement powers that would end the offshore fraud
<> [cocoo v uk/usa for unlawful decision to block in UN, these proposals….
Trusts are therefore invisible agreements for the trust to administer the assets, which each trust does by setting up a large number of shell companies in offshores of different jurisdictions. this is so that the cobweb is impossible to untangle.
banks are now willing to partially [iea: info exchange agreements, between offshores and uk/eu/usa] end banking confidentiality because it allows them to capture a larger market share of the global banking sector.
the uk gov dismisses the situation by arguing that they lack the power to intervene to end offshore criminality [eg by ordering public bors] on the basis that they are indep.juridictions……. the uk gov lies. they do have that power and could enforce it overnight, since the offshores are not really indep.jurisdictions: uk gov appoints their governors, etc…and uk can veto their laws/regs……the uk therefore has to communicate their orders to the offshore governors via subtle, codified secret language, during a cup of tea in the home office …cocoo: just like firms plotting anticomps during meetings at TAs.
the bank of england, as banking regulator, is failing to prosecute for fraud all uk based banks [all setup and use offshores]
<> cocoo will press for the prosecution of banks based in the offshores
the biggest loser is africa, as their NS (natural resorces) keep getting depleted, and the resulting assets keep falling into these cobwebs, while to africans suffer poverty….. the total african assets on these cobwebs is 5 times bigger than africa’s external debt: 200 billion….thus, africa is really a creditor
people in uk/usa also do not benefit, since these assets are not used by uk/usa banks to invest in local industry, but just to speculate in real estate and in the stockmarkets.
The PFI [private financial initiative]: private sector (elite) to lend for infrastructure (schools, bridges, hospitals…), over 30 years, with repayment 5 times higher than if gov[bank of england] had lent….. is a giant scam, implemented by the big 4 accounting/auditing firms [who have staff infiltrated into hmrc]….incredibly, hmrc offices are property of offshore corps, via a company called mapley steps.
<> cocoo v uk , for failing to act in the wpi, by prioritising the interests of the elite, over the citizen’s…eg by use of pfi etc….. cocoo proposes these measures to end the offshore fraud:
- procurement banned for corps operating/connected to offshores
- speed up introduction of worldwide public bors, for : trusts, corp ownership, and foundations.
- total transparency of transactions and fiscal agreements between corps and govs
- public reports of multinational corps in every country
- automatic exchange of info amongst all countries
- End secrecy in ownership of companies which acts as a barrier to detection and investigation of foreign bribery.
- Make enforcement statistics and case outcomes public to show how international corruption is being handled.
- Stop treating foreign bribery as a victimless crime and build in victims’ compensation into the enforcement process.
- Strengthen laws and enforcement systems to handle complex international corruption cases and improve international structures for cooperation.
- Explore increased liability of parent companies for the actions of their subsidiaries to help deter foreign bribery and related money laundering
Statistical evidence assists the parties in meeting their burdens of proof, but rarely will statistical evidence alone be determinative, specially in criminal cases
Based on leaked documents, such news stories, including the Panama Papers, Paradise Papers, Luanda Leaks, Open Lux, Pandora Papers
according to StAR (Stolen Asset Recovery Initative),(UNODC), and World Bank initiative, the number of countries pursuing cross-border asset recovery cases involving corruption proceeds is growing rapidly
how CSOs should prioritize their AR work:
1. The pre-judicial phase: before concrete corruption cases reach the courts or where investigations by authorities are not ongoing. 2. The judicial phase: as soon as cases reach the court system,including for example in initial freezing orders, and up until confiscation. 3. The return phase: starting from a court final decision and including negotiations on the return of funds,and the transparent management of recovered assets.
According to the OECD, tax authorities worldwide identified in 2019 more than 80 million financial accounts held offshore by their residents, recovering total assets of EUR 10 trillions....sources: tax avoidance, tax evasion, corruption
Stolen assets and corruption are human rights issues because acts of corruption have a negative impact on the realization of human rights <> cocoo presents itself as a CSO with the objective of defending against human rights violations [MORE RESPECT to COCOO],originating from corruption/anticomps. ... SNs have human rights HR obligations [nder uncac and hra] to enter into anti-corruption efforts and to seek the recovery (and to seek to coop) of stolen assets, in line with their human rights obligations..... <> cocoo claims that SNs failed to comply with these HR os.
WHY SNS SHOULD ALLOW COCOO TO ENGAGE IN ASSET RECOVERY: Article 13 of the UNCAC : signatory countries should promote the active participation of individuals and groups outside the public sector, such as csos, ngos, and community-based organizations, in the prevention of and the fight against corruption and to raise public awareness
+ OHCHR principle 2: Recommended Principles on Human Rights and Asset Recovery, which give importance to the role of CSO participation in ensuring accountability and transparency + HRA. <> SNs that fail to coop with cocoo, of fail to fund cocoo,or to allow cocoo to propose policy and legal tools to assist AR, are in breach of their duty to promote the participation of csos [in AR]
1/ Tools and Support FOR CSOS: CiFAR: https://cifar.eu/what-is-assetrecovery Country Profiles / CiFAR: https://cifar.eu/country-profiles Basel LEARN / ICAR (Basel Institute): https://baselgovernance. org/basel-learn Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative / World Bank and UNODC: https://star.worldbank.org Corruptionary / Transparency International: https://www. transparency.org/en/corruptionary Basel AML Index / Basel Institute: https://baselgovernance.org/ basel-aml-index Financial Secrecy Index / Tax Justice Network: https://fsi. taxjustice.net/en
2) QUESTIONS TO IDENTIFY ACTORS: If international, which other countries are involved? Do institutions use criminal proceedings, or are institutions using non-conviction-based forfeiture? Has the government engaged StAR in the case? Who in your country is the lead governmental actor for investigating cases of (grand) corruption? Could other CSOs nationally working on anti-corruption collaborate with you on asset recovery? Is this actor - or a different actor - responsible for prosecuting corruption? Are there CSOs who work on social issues who could consider collaboration on asset recovery? Is this actor - or a different actor - responsible for communicating with other jurisdictions on cross-border cases? Who is responsible for coordinating on the recovery of stolen assets? Are there CSOs, journalists or research centres working on this topic from the countries of destination or internationally? Is there a dedicated asset recovery office? Is data collected on asset recovery? Is it published? Are there any coordination bodies established for high profile cases? Is there a mechanism established for managing frozen assets and receiving confiscated and returned assets? Are other jurisdictions involved in the case? If yes, what departments are responsible for collaboration on the investigation and prosecution stages? Which departments are responsible for discussions around the return of funds? Is the government cooperating with a regional asset recovery working group?
3) RISK AWARENESS AND PLANNING: UNCAC recommends that countries should not only recognise civil society work in anti-corruption, but also promote their active participation, csos can face resistance from gov. csos inputs are not always seriously considered, for example, in policy design and implementation. Personal and organisational risks can also be present, particularly for those investigating cases of corruption involving powerful individuals or those work on issues that may impact the lives of powerful individuals in most countries, especially those practicing common law, SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) can be used to hinder public participation through the threat of defamation law suits At a more personal level, it is important to consider self-preservation, home security and the protection of personal contacts such as family, friends and colleagues In addition to having a documented risk assessment, it is also advisable to give a copy to someone in your organisation. In case something does go wrong, others will be aware of it and will be able to trace back possible leads or motives as to what may have happened.
csos start by identifying gaps/challenges highlighted by the national authorities: A thematic report by UNODC published in 2021 presented a compilation on the barriers and successes found in 53 country review AR reports CSOs should assess whether the country has sufficient laws and procedures to effectively conduct asset recovery in the following areas, in order of relevance:
Pre-judicial phase 1. Prevention: risk assessment, relevant data publication and collection (beneficial ownership, politically exposed persons,asset declaration) 2. Detection of transfer of stolen assets 3. Legal and institutional framework, including domestic interagency coordination
Recovery phase 1. Legislation and other measures for the return of proceeds to requesting States. 2. Regulation of costs or means of deducting expenses 3. Protection of the rights of bona fide third parties in return proceedings
Judicial phase 1. Procedures for the confiscation of assets 2. Direct recovery of property: mechanisms or legal basis for to establish ownership of property, be awarded compensation or be recognized as the legitimate owner of property 3. Mechanisms for the transparent and accountable maagement of recovered assets
Return phase:
-engaging lawmakers and institutions on the modalities for return -advocating either for a specific use for returned funds, or for procedures that allow greater transparency, accountability and participation, particularlyof victims eg advocating for participation during negotiations, or for safeguards, or establishing a monitoring programme over returned funds, or releasing alternative reports analysing or auditing the use of returned funds, or engaging with legal and policy reform, to establish permanent mechanisms or for laws and policies on how your country returns assets to other countries.
COCOO to seek compensation for damages for corruption : UNCAC article 35: entities or persons who have suffered damage as a result of an act of corruption have the right to initiate legal proceedings , to seek compensation, against those responsible .....if a human right is breached, the rights holder should be able to seek remedies from those responsible. CSOs should therefore consider how the money is to be returned and whether there is adequate recognition of victims
french csos cases: Teodorin Obiang, who had been suspected of having assets in France obtained through the proceeds of corruption. As a sitting member of the executive of Equatorial Guinea and the son of the president, neither guinea nor france dared ...but Two French CSOs: Sherpa and Transparency International France, required the opening of a judicial investigation into the alleged misdoing....Despite resistance from authorities, the csos convinced the Superior Court of Appeals that they could bring such a case and allowed for the reversing the burden of proof, requiring suspected perpetrators to prove the licit origin of his funds/goods.
A Peruvian NGO was able to successfully advocate for regulatory changes that led to the adoption of a corporate leniency agreement.