LA RESPONSABILIDAD DE JUECES Y MAGISTRADOS
Y la responsabilidad objetiva del Estado por el funcionamiento anormal de la
Administración de Justicia, y la posibilidad de repetir contra jueces y magistrados
por sus errores judiciales
no es aceptable, en un Estado de derecho, que ni jueces ni magistrados no acaben respondiendo por los danos que causen
en el ejercicio de sus funciones judiciales, y menos cuando el sistema dispone de multiples vias de resarcimiento,
ya que ello puede provocar en la ciudadania cierta sensacion de fraude o de trato de favor desde el propio poder jurisdiccional.
117(CE) :
La justicia emana del pueblo y se administra en nombre del rey, por jueces y magistrados
integrantes del poder j7dicial,,, sometidos solo al imperio de la ley
La separación de poderes garantiza la independencia del poder judicial, segun el
derecho, sin recibir ordenes o instrucciones de otros poderes del Estado.
<> wpi balancing: dicha independencia <> resp judicial por sus actos.
121 de la CE:
los daños causados por error judicial, y/o del funcionamiento anormal de la
A.just, dan derecho a indem a cargo del Estado =art 139.4 de la Ley 30/1992 (LRJ-PAC):
la RPAP por la AJust, se rige por la (LOPJ)
+ criminal liab
+ disciplinary liab, por los daños patrimoniales y extrapatrimoniales civilmente causados al ciudadano [wpi. eeac]
Jurisdicciones para imputar responsabilidades
-En el orden penal, se procesarán jueces y magistrados por el Cap I del TÃtulo XX del CP
art 446 a 449, si el juez o magistrado, a sabiendas, por imprudencia grave o ignorancia
inexcusable, dicte sentencia/res manifiestamente injusta.
Ademas,el art 1.1 de la LO 5/1995, del Tribunal del Jurado, este tipo de tribunal es
competente para conocer los delitos cometidos por jueces
-En el orden civil, se procesarán jueces y magistrados por todos los daños y perjuicios
,patrimoniales y extrapatrimoniales, que causen en el ejercicio de sus funciones, cuando
incurrieren en dolo o culpa, en aplicación de los arts 411 a 413 de la LOPJ,
y/o el art 1.902 y siguientes del (CC), por danos en las relaciones
no contractuales [TORTS], por ignorancia inexcusable
art 9.4 de la LOPJ: Los tribs JCA, conocen todas los casos re.APs, incluida la
responsabilidad patrimonial.
La remision del 139.4 de la LRJ-PAC, a la LOPJ, conlleva que, por un presunto error o
perjuicio, por una anormal actuacion judicial, el interesado tendra que dirigir su
solicitud indemnizatoria al Ministerio de Justicia, y hay recurso a la JCA
Si los perjudicados [por un acto judicial], decidieran acudir al TC, mediante recurso de
amparo por vulneracion del derecho fundamental a tutela judicial efectiva,
but ...TC caselaw insiste que TC no enjuicia de nuevo la correccion juridica
[de las resoluciones judiciales]...eg. TC held , as it is not part of the Judicial Power,
it would affect the sep.of powers, to replace the judgment...
instead, the TC only investigates whether the sentence/resolution:
a/ was properly reasoned, or
b/ esta viciada por material evidente,
c/por arbitrariedad, o
d/ es manifiesta falta de logica razonable
<> cocoo v sentencias+TC
SUPUESTOS DE RESPONSABILIDAD
Legit. pasiva
411 de la LOPJ, si el juez tuvo dolo o culpa, hay resp. civil, en cualquier jurisdiccion:
[civil, penal, contencioso-administrativa o laboral].
Para determinar el organo jurisdiccional competente encargado de conocer sobre los casos de
responsabilidad de jueces y magistrados, se deberá tener en cuenta la posición o cargo
que ostente dicho juez o magistrado en el momento de interponer la demanda y no la que aquel tuviese
en el momento de producirse la actuacion presuntamente perjudicial
Las actuaciones u omisiones que pueden ser objeto de recurso o reclamación por
responsabilidad personal o patrimonial del Estado necesariamente tendrán que ver con
el desempeño de las funciones jurisdiccionales, pero tambien con otras actividades y
potestades propias de jueces y magistrados
Asimismo, entre dichas funciones no figurarÃan exclusivamente las estrictamente
jurisdiccionales, sino tambien deberan comprenderse otras actuaciones inherentes al
cargo como pueden ser las que hacen referencia al Registro civil, la vigilancia penitenciaria o los procedimientos
disciplinarios 10, todos ellos facultados por la misma LOPJ, ya que seria contraria al 117.1 de la CE
[la existencia de una inmunidad del juez respecto de los danos en funciones
distintas a las estrictamente jurisdiccionales ]
En el orden penal, las actuaciones de jueces y magistrados están amparadas por el
art 20.7 del CP, que establece como causa de exoneración de la responsabilidad penal el cumplimiento
de un deber o el desempeno legitimo de un oficio o cargo. Sin embargo, en estos casos,
jueces y magistrados tambien podrán responder civilmente por los perjuicios causados,
en aplicacion del 411 LOPJ, cuando en el desempeno de sus funciones jurisdiccionales intervenga
dolo o culpa, con independencia del orden u organo al que estin adscritos
Mediante Auto de 25 de mayo de 1999 12, el Tibunal Supremo declaro que por ejercicio del
cargo ha de entenderse algo coincidente con la actividad judicial propia y especÃfica de
los jueces y magistrados, es decir, con la potestad jurisdiccional, pero en ningun caso puede confundirse
el delito cometido en el desempeno del cargo judicial con el delito cometido abusando del
cargo judicial, por lo que en modo alguno puede afirmarse que el juez realiza actividad alguna propia y
especifica de su funcion judicial cuando la actividad realizada no le corresponda legalmente.
Cuando se trate de organos judiciales pluripersonales, si la sentencia o resolución
presuntamente perjudicial o lesiva ha sido adoptada por unanimidad, la demanda de
responsabilidad civil tendra que dirigirse contra todos los magistrados integrantes
del organo judicial, aplicandose la figura del litisconsorcio pasivo necesario: art.12.2 de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento
Civil (LEC), ya que todos los miembros del organo judicial son responsables de la misma al asumirla
como propia.
(STS) 2006 :
el CPN (consorcio pasivo necesario),es caselaw, y es regida por el principio de que el
litigio se ventile estando presentes todos aquellos que puedan resultar afectados
por el fallo, porque, de otro modo, se quebrantarÃa el principio de que nadie puede ser
condenado sin antes ser oido y vencido en juicio
El LPN (litisconsorcio pasivo necesario), deberia enjuiciarse incluso de oficio.
Por la misma razon, si la sentencia o resolucion no ha sido adoptada por unanimidad,
carecen de resp los magistrados que hayan formulado un voto particular manifestando
su disconformidad, ya que en ningun caso podran ser considerados como responsables de
los presuntos perjuicios ocasionados por aquella.
Mientras que, cuando se confirme en segunda instancia una sentencia o resolución adoptada
en primera instancia presuntamente perjudicial o lesiva, cuyos perjuicios o daños
producidos en primera instancia se mantengan por el pronunciamiento de la segunda,
se hablará de una cadena de responsabilidades...eg el TSJ de Cataluna, 1999:
cuando el perjuicio que se concreta inicialmente en la resolucion de primera instancia despues se confirma en la
apelacion, la solucion : si la resolucion, en primera instancia, que origina unos perjuicios,
se mantiene invariable en la sentencia de apelacion, todos los titulares de los organismos
jurisdiccionales que han intervenido, tienen que responder conjuntamente de los perjuicios que
puedan haber originado, unos por haber realizado el hecho danoso y los otros por no haberlo impedido.
Los magistrados del TC tienen el Deber de responder por sus actuaciones judiciales, ya que, a pesar de que su cargo lleva
implicitas las garantias de imparcialidad, dignidad, independencia e inamovilidad, establecidas por
el art 22 de la LOTC 2/1979...tienen responsabilidad civil por dolo o culpa prevista por el
art 23.1.7 de la misma LOTC, y establecida como causa posible de su cese.
Han sido muy pocos los recursos planteados por la responsabilidad de los magistrados
constitucionales. Destaca la querella presentada el ano 1987, ante la Sala Segunda
del TS contra el presidente y algunos miembros del alto tribunal, en relacion con el
«caso Rumasa», que declara la causa inadmisible, por ausencia de sustentacion.
-pero la sorpresiva STS de 2004, estima parcialmente una demanda por responsabilidad civil
contra 11 magistrados del TC, por no haber resuelto una peticion de amparo del actor 19,
STS Held: la conducta de los magistrados constitucionales fue absolutamente antijca, y
que es prevaricacion del 447 del CP, por actuar con una negligencia profesional grave que
suponÃe una ignorancia inexcusable por violacion de normas imperativas, y por una conducta
judicial absolutamente rechazable desde un punto de vista profesional
Tipos de responsabilidades
La responsabilidad de jueces y magistrados por el ejercicio de sus funciones jurisdiccionales
y otras actividades propias:
-Titulo III, del Libro IV de la LOPJ, art 405 a 427, regula la responsabilidad personal de jueces y magistrados;
-Titulo V, del Libro III de la LOPJ, art 292 a 297, regula la rpap, por la A.just
Tipos de responsabilidades [de jueces y magistrados]:
1. Responsabilidad personal penal
arts 405 a 410 de la LOPJ. actuaciones tipificadas penalmente como delitos o faltas, y reguladas por el Tit. XX del CP de
delitos contra la AJUst que, por prevar, son: [Han sido pocas las condenas por prevar en Espana]
-Dictar sentencia o resolución injusta a sabiendas.
-Dictar sentencia o resolución manifiestamente injusta por imprudencia grave o ignorancia
inexcusable.
-Negarse a juzgar, sin alegar causa legal, o so pretexto de oscuridad, insuficiencia o
silencio de la ley.
- Retardo malicioso en la Ajus, para conseguir finalidad ilegitima
2. Responsabilidad personal civil
La responsabilidad [de jueces y magistrados] en el orden jurisdiccional civil se regula por los
411 a 413 de la LOPJ, y se distingue entre la responsabilidad civil contractual y la no contractual [tort].
La impartialidad del pod.jud, conlleva que aquellos danos por actuaciones de jueces
en las que concurra dolo o culpa, se podran enjuiciar como si fueran danos extracontractuales
, y se seguira un procedimiento indemnizatorio por la via civil, gracias a los
1.902 y siguientes del CC....eg. la STS 1999 : se desestimo una reclamacion
por error judicial, por considerar dolo o culpa solo existe se apliquen preceptos legales
inequivocamente inadecuados
Supuestos de responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado (RPAP)
Los danos causados por error judicial, y/o por el funcionamiento anormal de la Ajus,
dan derecho a una indem, a cargo del Estado, conforme a al art. 121 CE).
- Real Decreto 429/1993,aprueba el RPAPRP:
en las reclamaciones en materia de RPAP por el funcionamiento anormal de la Ajus, es
preceptivo el informe del Cgpj
El Estado siempre respondera por los danos producidos mediante dolo o culpa de los jueces y
magistrados, y es posible repetir contra estos la indem impuesta.
El dano debe ser efectivo [=evaluable ec, e individualizado a los afectados]
La mera revocacion o anulacion de las resoluciones judiciales de instancias inferiores,
no presupone por si sola derecho a indem
Requisitos:
1. El error judicial mediante sentencia firme para que proceda su indem,
o sea, no se reconocera error judicial mientras no se hubieran agotado todos los recursos
previstos por la ley. Ademas, por exigencia del 293.1 de la LOPJ, su declaracion tendra que realizarse por STS.
En este sentido, mediante la STS de 4 de noviembre de 2005 26, se desestimó una demanda por
error judicial, porque el error judicial solo se dara en resoluciones firmes injustas
o equivocadas, viciadas por un error patente e incontestable, o incluso con conclusiones
facticas o jcas, ilogicas e irracionales.
La peticion de error judicial, si resultan de un proceso logico, se puede utilizar para poner en cuestion la valoracion de pruebas
ni la interpretacion del juzgador anterior, a pesar de que pueda estar equivocada,
osea, el derecho a ser indemnizado queda condicionado a la imposibilidad de reparar por
otras vias o medios los danos, asi como al agotamiento de los recursos procesales
la STS de 2007, que desestimo una demanda por error
judicial, a partir de la discrepancia interpretativa y resolutoria entre varias instancias
judiciales ...held: no son error judicial, las decisiones que no se ajustan a un entendimiento
mas autorizado o general, siempre que sean razonables.
La mera revocacion o anulacion de una resolucion judicial, no concede un derecho automatico
a indemnizacion....porque el derecho a indem por error judicial [121 de la CE], implicitamente, requiere que,
para que haya indemnizacion por error judicial, el error judicial ha de tener la gravedad que exige el 292.3 de la LOPJ
+ caselaw : ordena al Estado, pagar por los danos causados por sentencias Res Iudicatas.
Por ello, solo hay error judicial cuando las decisiones [judiciales], de hecho o de derecho, carezcan de forma manifiesta de justificacion,
[pues si no hubiera esta limitacion, se violentaria la Res Iudicata]
En suma, ante una solicitud de error judicial, no solamente se exige que se demuestre
el desacierto de la resolucion judicial, sino tambien que sea manifiestamente contraria al
ordenamiento juridico, o hubiera sido dictada con absoluta arbitrariedad o quebranto procesal
2. La prision provisional seguida de absolucion
Tendran derecho a indem, aquellas personas que, habiendo soportado prision
preventiva, sean absueltas posteriormente, siempre que concurra la circunstancia de que
los hechos imputados sean finalmente declarados como inexistentes o cuando se hubiese dictado auto de
sobreseimiento libre, y siempre que se hayan producido perjuicios en todo caso. La prision indebida
en estos supuestos podria enmarcarse dentro de la figura del error judicial.
El TS Sentencia 2002 : no es posible negar que la existencia de cualquier proceso penal y
el sometimiento a el, conlleva un sufrimiento evidente que varia, se acentua y acrecienta,
segun las circunstancias de cada persona y proceso.
Ello no significa que, en cualquier caso, dicho padecimiento sea indemnizable, pero desde
luego lo es cuando la persona a quien se somete al mismo le lleva a desmerecer claramente en el
concepto social en el que era tenida en cuenta, afectando a su entorno personal, familiar y
profesional, o el proceso adquiere una relevancia publica que excede de lo habitual.
Si se anade que finalmente la persona termina absuelta, con independencia de las razones de
la exculpacion, resulta que entretanto debia permanecer sujeta y afectada por la
incertidumbre que generaba la continuacion del proceso sin que se produjera una resolucion definitiva y,
no cabe duda, se le habria causado un dano moral.
Sobre este supuesto, la Audiencia Nacional, en su Sentencia de 3 de julio de 2007 30,
estimo parcialmente una indemnizacion por prision preventiva indebida, declarando que para
determinar si un caso de prision provisional seguida de absolucion o sobreseimiento libre cumple lo
previsto por la ley, requiere un analisis de la correspondiente resolucion penal y deducir, a partir
de los antecedentes de hecho probados, si realmente los hechos imputados han existido o
hubo falta de participacion del imputado en los mismos
Tambien es interesante la STS de 9 de diciembre de 2008 31, que desestimo la pretension de
indemn por prision provisional indebida del actor ya que la ausencia de sentencia
en el proceso penal en aquel caso fue debida a que se encontraba en rebeldia,
circunstancia no analoga a la absolucion o sobreseimiento libre, puesto que el rebelde no puede pretender que
le sean aplicables las consecuencias juridicas previstas para quien, sometiendose al juicio oral,
resulta absuelto. Quien incumpla un deber no puede alegar que ha sufrido dano.
Para determinar la cuantia de la indem por el perjuicio causado por la prolongacion
de la prision preventiva durante los dias de la indebida privacion de libertad,
sin justificar singulares circunstancias personales, familiares o sociales que conviertan en especialmente enojosa
o gravosa dicha privacion, se tendra en cuenta exclusivamente el criterio de progresion
del perjuicio atendiendo el tiempo de duracion de la misma.
La cuantificacion del retraso anormal se determina descontando del total de la duracion del proceso que se acusa
de indebidamente prolongado el tiempo considerado como razonable o normal, de manera que
sera el exceso lo que se deba tener en cuenta como causa del perjuicio producido.
Es decir, el retraso judicial anormal no es todo el tiempo que el proceso hubiera estado paralizado sino aquel que exceda del razonable.
El funcionamiento anormal de la Ajus :
los danos causados en bienes o derechos como consecuencia del funcionamiento anormal de la
Ajus, dan a todos los perjudicados derecho a una indemnización a cargo del Estado,
salvo en los casos de fuerza mayor. A pesar de que estarÃiamos ante un concepto jurÃidico indeterminado, se entendera por anormal
funcionamiento cualquier actuación u omisión errónea, defectuosa o anómala de los órganos judiciales.
Se tratarian de quebrantamientos formales en los procesos judiciales, como fallos de
notificacion, de identificación de personas, demoras, etc.
Sobre esta cuestión, cabe convenir que en los supuestos de daños causados por el
funcionamiento anormal de los servicios públicos, la inexistencia del deber de soportar
el daño viene determinada, en todo caso, por la ilegalidad o anormalidad de la actividad
administrativa. En este sentido, los administrados no están obligados a sufrir las
consecuencias dañosas derivadas de actuaciones administrativas que vulneran la legalidad o infringen los estándares de funcionamiento
exigibles, de manera que los daños causados serán imputables siempre que la actividad de la AP
esta viciada de ilegalidad o anormalidad
Aunque el origen de la lesión indemnizable se encuentre en la actuación de los órganos
judiciales, es en definitiva la Administración General del Estado la que asume la carga de reparar el daño
causado. En consecuencia, los expedientes de responsabilidad patrimonial por el
funcionamiento anormal de la Administración de Justicia ostentan una naturaleza
idéntica a los demás expedientes de responsabilidad patrimonial de la AP
Ningún órgano de la Administración está habilitado para practicar por sà actuaciones
instructoras conducentes a indagar o comprobar el funcionamiento de la justicia con objeto
de calificar la existencia o no de anomalÃas, osea,el funcionamiento anormal solo puede ser
estimado por los organos jurisdiccionales
Retrasos y dilaciones indebidas
Entre los diferentes motivos de reclamación por el funcionamiento anormal de la
Ajus, destacaan por encima de todos los retrasos y dilaciones indebidas en la tramitación
de los procesos judiciales.
La permanente situacion de saturacion de la Ajus, con importantes retrasos en la resolucion de los procesos judiciales como consecuencia
de problemas estructurales o de funcionamiento del sistema judicial, no puede ser
considerada como normal, y tampoco pueden ser calificados como anormales solo
aquellos casos que destaquen sobre dicha «normalidad».
Los defectos estructurales de la organización judicial exculparÃan de responsabilidad
personal a los jueces, pero ello no privarÃa a los ciudadanos del derecho a reaccionar
frente a sus retrasos y que el derecho a un proceso sin dilaciones indebidas debe predicarse,
aun cuando se deban a carencias de la organización judicial, dado el lugar que la recta y eficaz
Ajus ocupa en una sociedad democrática, siendo exigible que los jueces y tribunales
cumplan su funcion jurisdiccional, garantizando la libertad, justicia y seguridad, con la rapidez
que permita la duración normal de los procesos, lo que REQUIERE la dotación a los órganos
judiciales de los necesarios medios personales y materiales
<> COCOO V GOB FOR UNDERFUNDING EL POD.JUD., THUS VIOLATING THESE RIGHTS
TC 1997 held: el derecho a un proceso sin dilaciones indebidas es el que debe marcar los
tiempos que observan los tribunales en el despacho real de los asuntos y no al reves,
por ello los tribunales deben, por imperativo constitucional, finalizar los procesos
abiertos dentro del plazo razonable que exige la misma CE.
La determinación de retraso injustificado o dilación indebida podrÃa realizarse tanto en
los casos en que el tiempo invertido en la resolución del conflicto jurisdiccional
supera lo razonable, como cuando haya paralizacion del procedimiento que, por su excesiva
duracion, carece de justificacion y supone ya, por si misma, una alteración del curso del
proceso.
Ante una petición de indemnización por retraso considerado como funcionamiento anormal
de la Administración de Justicia,
TS: 1996: la RPAP surge de la existencia de unos perjuicios individualizados y concretos
y su existencia esta unida a unas circunstancias de anormal funcionamiento de
Ajus, ..pero hay que tener en cuenta los niveles de exigencia que la ajus, debe cumplir según las
necesidades de la sociedad actual y para alcanzar los cuales los poderes públicos
están obligados a procurar los medios y recursos necesarios.
El simple incumplimiento de los plazos aceleratorios constituye una irregularidad procesal
que no comporta una anormalidad funcional generadora de responsabilidad alguna.
Si constituye anormalidad, en cambio, un retraso o tardanza, tomando en cuenta la
duraciun del proceso en sus distintas fases.
La AN 2006: estimo parcialmente un recurso por atraso indebido de la Ajus, y declaro que el funcionamiento anormal de la
ajus, es un concepto jcamente indeterminado y, por tanto, dependiente de la naturaleza de las circunstancias de cada caso
En el caso de atrasos de la Ajus, el simple incumplimiento de plazos procesales no es funcionamiento anormal, mientras que
si lo son los atrasos que judicial y socialmente se considerasen impropios de un Estado de
derecho y radicalmente contrarios al derecho a una tutela judicial efectiva
Legitimacion activa = LOCUS STANDI
El artÃculo 412 de la LOPJ :
la accion civil es personal, pero no personalisima...osea, se podra ejercer por la parte interesada o por sus
causahabientes o por los representantes legales
Cuando los perjudicados sean una pluralidad, es posible accion conjunta, de acuerdo con el
12.1 de la LEC, aunque la posibilidad de litisconsorcio activo es voluntario, pues nada impide que puedan presentarse demandas individuales.
La accion de responsabilidad podra ser ejercida por cualquier tercero que se considere
perjudicado [por una resolucion judicial], aunque no sea litigante en el proceso causante de los danos
<<>> COCOO V JUDGES
STS de 1986 y 1997: Diff:
A/ legit ad processum:
legitimidad para promover al organo decisorio, es decir, la aptitud de ser parte en cualquier
proceso y es lo mismo que capacidad jurÃdica o personalidad,
B/ legit ad causam
legitimidad para ser parte en un proceso determinado [depende de la pretensionn procesal que
ejercite el actor o, consiste en la legitimacion propiamente dicha e implica una relacion
especial entre una persona y una situacion litigio, por la cual es esa persona
la que debe actuar como actor o demandado, la incoacion de procedimientos de responsabilidad penal, corresponde al tribunal competente
mediante providencia, o por querella del Ministerio Fiscal, o por querella del perjudicado
410 de la LOPJ: si alguna de las partes, o persona que tuviese interes, formulasen querella
contra el juez o magistrado que deba resolver en dicho proceso, con caracter previo a la admision de esta, el organo competente para
su instrucciin podra recabar los antecedentes que considere oportunos a fin de determinar su propia
competencia asi como la relevancia penal de los hechos objeto de la misma o la verosimilitud de la
imputacion, todo ello para evitar querellas infundadas.
En relacion con los procedimientos disciplinarios, impulsados de oficio por el Consejo General del Poder Judicial en todo caso,
resulta que en via administrativa el denunciante puede solicitar expediente sancionador a la Ap, aunque dicha solicitud no la vincula.
En cualquier caso, la participacion del denunciante en el procedimiento viene constrenida a la notificacion de la
iniciacion del procedimiento, sin que exista, a diferencia del Derecho Penal, la posibilidad de que intervenga o ejerza
en la tramitacion del mismo de «acusacion particular».
Una vez resuelto el procedimiento administrativo, seran los tribunales en via JCA, quienes examinando
cada caso concreto podran apreciar la existencia de legitimacion ad causam del
denunciante, teniendo para ello en cuenta el fondo del asunto y las consecuencias perjudiciales que
la resolucion pudiera haberle producido
Al amparo de los reiterados pronunciamientos suscitados en procesos similares 43, la doctrina
general confirmaria las resoluciones del Pleno del Consejo General del Poder Judicial de inadmision
de los recursos de alzada contra las decisiones de la Com.Disciplinaria de archivo de denuncias
o de actuaciones disciplinarias, por falta de legitimacion activa de los denunciantes.
Plazo de la accion
LOPJ no establece Limitation Clock para ejercer la accion de responsabilidad civil contra jueces y magistrados,
... puesto que esta responsabilidad se asemeja a la responsabilidad civil extracontractual,
sera de aplicacion lo previsto para esta, es decir, las acciones para exigir este tipo de responsabilidad
prescribiran en 1 ano, desde que lo supo el agraviado, contandose desde el dia en que pudieron ejercitarse.
En los supuestos de responsabilidad civil de jueces y magistrados, se entendera que el plazo de
un ano empieza desde la notificacion de la sentencia/resolucipm, cuando los presuntos perjudicados sean litigantes,
mientras que para los que no lo fuesen, dicho plazo empezara a contar, desde el momento que tuvieran conocimiento de dicha resolucion.
caselaw: se trata de un plazo de prescripcion...y no un plazo de...
La relacion de causalidad
En todo proceso judicial seguido para fijar la responsabilidad por daños y reclamar al causante la correspondiente
indemn, es necesario vincular la causacion de los danos causados con la accion u omision, de la persona a quien se quiere imputar
De entre las multiples causas que pueden provocar los danos, es necesario seleccionar aquellas que sean juridicamente relevantes
para poder imputar a alguien su responsabilidad
Responsabilidad objetiva
Para la imputacion de danos, no se utilizan las reglas fisicas o naturales propias de la logica formal, sino que,
se debe utilizar la teoria de la causalidad adecuada: osea, hay que diferenciar:
- la capacidad o potencialidad de una determinada accion u omision para producir danos
- las circunstancias que permitan afirmar que los danos son consecuencia probable de aquella accion u omision.
la relacion causal entre la accion/omision, y los danos, no solo es natural, sino que tambien tiene que ser adecuada y suficiente.
Tambien conocida como causalidad tipica, es necesario determinar de forma proporcionada y
adecuada el resultado de las acciones u omisiones de la parte actora, de manera que no se consideraran como efectos causados
por la misma, aquellos que en el momento de la accion fueran improbables, o sea, que fueran extraordinarios o atipicos.
Pueden existir muchas y variadas causas fisicas relacionadas con el dano, pero juridicas son solo aquellas que, de acuerdo con la experiencia,
sean previsibles sus consecuencias
Cuando en la produccion de un dano pueda haber incidido una pluralidad de causas, para imputar, no es suficiente acreditar que se ha sufrido
un detrimento personal o patrimonial, pues no todos los acontecimientos precedentes al evento danoso tienen la misma relevancia,
de manera que se hace preciso demostrar la existencia de un nexo causal entre los actos llevados a
cabo por el demandado y la lesion inferida
El TS se acoge a la doctrina de la causalidad adecuada, valorando en cada caso si el
acto precedente como causa, tiene virtualidad suficiente para que del mismo se derive, como consecuencia necesaria,
el efecto danoso. El nexo causal debe inspirarse en la valoracion de las conductas o circunstancias que el buen sentido senala
en cada caso como indice de responsabilidad, dentro del infinito encadenamiento de causas y efectos.
Responsabilidad subjetiva
En cambio, cuando se trata de perjuicios por delitos/faltas penales, o de danos causados en relaciones extracontractuales del orden civil,
la responsabilidad personal requiere dolo o culpa, ambos criterios de imputacion subjetiva
Dos corrientes doctrinales discuten sobre la base de la imputacion subjetiva, una,
-psicologicista: el conocimiento del dolo o culpa, previo a su realizacion, a nivel estrictamente psiquico de su autor [fantasias]...
la punibilidad no tiene limites, ya que una simple fantasia podria ser imputada penalmente
-normativista: la atribucion de normas, a las diferentes formas de pensamiento
jueces y magistrados, se encuentran sometidos al principio 'iura novit curia' = INC:
= todos los jueces son conocedores del Derecho, por tener el deber de conocerlo. osea, su ignorancia es inexcusable
caselaw:
para que un juez responda civilmente por el ejercicio de sus funciones judiciales, se
requiere mas que negligencia....pues para que un juez pueda ser imputado por error judicial, esa necesario, entre otras, que en
la elaboracion de la sentencia:
- se hubiesen utilizado normas caducadas,
-o se hubiese hecho una integracion normativa opuesta a la legalidad vigente (STS de 12 de marzo de 1996 54);
-o se hubiesen omitido datos significativos, que conduzcan a una sentencia esperpentica, absurda o que
rompa la armonÃia del ordenamiento jco (STS de 24 de enero de 1997 55);
-o que la sentencia contenga una interpret absurda o insensata en derecho (STS de 10 de diciembre de 1999 56);
-o que la interpretacion o aplicacion de las leyes sea imposible de ser apreciada o deducida por cualquier
otra persona entendida en derecho (STS de 8 de mayo de 2000 57).
Por ejemplo, mediante la Sentencia de 1990, el TS desestimo la peticion de
responsabilidad civil contra un juez, al precisar que solo procede en los casos de
infracciones manifiestas de la ley o de vulneracion de algun tramite o de alguna solemnidad del mandato legal susceptibles de nulidad.
Mientras que la STS 1999 , declaro que anular una sentencia no implica reconocer responsabilidad civil por
parte del juez que la dicto, porque el hecho de adoptar un criterio discutible, incluso erroneo, no presupone de forma inmediata un
supuesto de responsabilidad civil de jueces y magistrados, sino que, en todo caso, se trataria de un
error judicial o de anormal funcionamiento de la Ajus
Por ello, a diferencia de otros ambitos de la responsabilidad extracontractual,
en los casos contra jueces y magistrados, la jurisprudencia ha convenido requerir a los imputados, una conducta ciertamente
dolosa o culposa por sus acciones u omisiones, incluso grosera o imperdonable, desestimando todas las negligentes.
3. EFECTOS DE LA DECLARACION DE RESPONSABILIDAD
3.1. Eficacia limitada
413.2 de la LOPJ: en ningun caso la sentencia por responsabilidad civil contra jueces y magistrados, alterara la resolucion
firme [RES IUDICATA] del proceso judicial original. ..esto conlleva la poca utilizacion de la acción por daños
3.2. Agotamiento de la via
De acuerdo con el 413.1 de la LOPJ, la demanda por responsabilidad civil no podra
presentarse hasta que la sentencia o resolucion que pone fin al proceso judicial causante del perjuicio no sea firme,
por tanto, hasta que no se hayan agotado todos los recursos previstos por el ordenamiento y puestos a disposición
de los afectados para instar la modificación de las resoluciones judiciales presuntamente lesivas.
En este sentido, el 403.2 de la LEC : no se admitiran las demandas de responsabilidad civil contra jueces por danos que pudieran
haber causado en el desempeño de sus funciones, mientras aquella no sea firme.
No aceptandose tampoco, cuando la demanda no vaya acompañada por el certificado que acredite que dicho proceso ha finalizado,
= 266.1 y 269.2 de la LEC.
Tampoco se admiten recursos por responsabilidad civil :
a/ cuando la resolucion recurrida no hubiese sido impugnada [mediante alguno de los recursos previstos y en los plazos]
actitud que se interpreta como una renuncia por parte del interesado a no agotar todos los medios
existentes para evitar una situacion de indefension
b/ o cuando se trate de resoluciones sobre la adopcion de medidas cautelares, ya que serÃa imposible valorar los supuestos perjuicios
causados por las mismas antes de que se dicte la correspondiente resolucion del juicio.
3.3. Organos judiciales pluripersonales
la demanda debe presentarse contra todos los miembros del tribunal, como si de un litisconsorcio solidario se tratase.
En estos casos, si finalmente se reconociera la responsabilidad de los magistrados en la causacion de
los danos producidos [como consecuencia de su resolucion], al tratarse de una responsabilidad extracontractual,
podrÃia entenderse de aplicacion el criterio jurisprudencial de responsabilidad solidaria
cuando no se pudiera determinar quien ha sido el causante directo de los danos o el grado de participación de cada
uno de los miembros del tribunal.
A pesar de ello, y de acuerdo con los artÃculos 1.137 y 1.138 del CC, cuando se trate
de responsabilidad de jueces y magistrados no sera de aplicacion el principio de solidaridad, para evitar que el actor o perjudicado
presente demanda unicamente contra uno de los miembros del organo judicial y le exigiera en exclusiva la
Ãntegra prestación de la posible condena, circunstancia que se considera inadecuada al tratarse de
órganos colegiados. En todo caso, es mejor que la posible sentencia condenatoria establezca el alcance de la responsabilidad
personal de cada uno, de acuerdo con el art 1145.2 del CC.
3.4. Responsabilidad por hechos ajenos
A parte de la responsabilidad de jueces y magistrados por los daños causados en el ejercicio
de sus funciones, el Estado tambien esta obligado a indemnizar a los afectados por dichos daños,
obligacion enunciada en el art 121 de la CE para aquellos casos de daños causados por error
judicial o como consecuencia del anormal funcionamiento de la Administración de Justicia y mediante un procedimiento
de responsabilidad patrimonial. Una vez que el Estado haya pagado la correspondiente indemnización,
podra repetir posteriormente el importe de la indemnización contra los jueces y magistrados causantes
directos de los danos, puesto que, en aplicacion del 145.2 de la LRJ-PAC, podra exigir de oficio responsabilidad a las autoridades
y demas personal cuando hay dolo o culpa, y ponderada en funcion de los danos ocasionados o la intencionalidad.
Esta posibilidad, junto al mandato de dirigir la accion directamente a la Ajus, cuando se trate de
exigir responsabilidades a funcionarios publicos, no deja lugar a dudas acerca
de la imposibilidad de reclamar directamente contra aquellos mediante la via jurisdiccional
Aunque el procedimiento para exigir la responsabilidad patrimonial a las autoridades y personal al servicio de la
Ap se encuentra regulado por el Real Decreto 429/1993, que aprueba el RPAP de responsabilidad patrimonial,
en el caso de la facultad concreta del Estado para repetir la indemnización contra jueces y magistrados,
= 296 de la LOPJ y su tramitacion es mediante proceso declarativo ante el tribunal competente, en el que el Ministerio
Fiscal siempre sera parte.
La posibilidad de repeticion del Estado contra jueces y magistrados que causen dano por dolo o
culpa grave, indica que la responsabilidad del Estado no es subsidiaria respecto a los juzgadores, y mucho
menos solidaria, el Estado es responsable objetivo directo a modo de fiador legal.
Limitar la responsabilidad a los supuestos de dolo o culpa grave evita actuar contra los errores o imprudencias
que aquellos puedan cometer, los cuales serán asumidos por la Administración que pagará al perjudicado.
El Acuerdo del Cgpj de 1992: criterios que deben guiar sus informes en materia de responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado por
funcionamiento anormal de la Ajus: diff:
A/- funcionamiento anormal de la Ajus
La rpap por funcionamiento anormal de la Ajus, se tendria que extender
el concepto de Ajus no solo al ejercicio de la potestad jurisdiccional por parte de jueces y magistrados,
sino tambien a las conductas realizadas por cuantos colaborasen, a que aquella cumpla sus fines, incluyendo,
a los secretarios judiciales, funcionarios y policia judicial.
B/- error judicial: la posibilidad de ganar es muy limitada, pues requiere una resolucion judicial que expresamente reconociera
la existencia del error
Segun el cgpj: PASCUAL SALA:
ningun juez ni magistrado tuvo que pagar nunca por las indemnizaciones abonadas por
el Estado en concepto de error judicial, anormal funcionamiento de la justicia o de prision preventiva indebida,
ya que el Estado no repitio ninguna de las indemnizaciones reconocidas en concepto de
responsabilidad patrimonial por el funcionamiento de la Ajus, pagadas durante el periodo 1991 a 1995.
...de las 1.038 reclamaciones presentadas durante aquel lustro, el Ministerio de Justicia tan solo estimo
148 por un importe de 174 millones de pesetas y nunca se iniciaron procesos para repetir contra los jueces y magistrados condenados.
Ademas, nunca se habia ejercido dicha accion desde la entrada en vigor de la LOPJ en 1985
Realizadas consultas en diferentes bases de datos jurisprudenciales, se observa que dicha accion
sigue sin ejercerse. De hecho, la accion de repeticion contra funcionarios es cai inedita en
Destaca en sentido contrario la STSJ de la Comunidad Valenciana, 2005 67, precisamente
por desestimar la pretensión de la parte actora contraria a la negativa del pleno de un ayuntamiento
a utilizar una acción de regreso contra varios de sus miembros, por considerar el tribunal que estos
no habrÃan incurrido en dolo o culpa grave.
Ante la no utilizacion de facto de la a. de regreso, se ha llegado a calificar como
un «bonito florero» que permite tranquilizar consciencias y advertir que el Derecho
ofrece un arsenal completo para exigir responsabilidades, pero sin aplicacion en la realidad
<> COCOO WILL ENFORCE THEM
3.5. Danos objeto de resarcimiento:
Tipos de danos, por su naturaleza :
- danos patrimoniales (aquellos que afectan bienes) . valoracion objetiva de mercado.
- danos no patrimoniales (morales). valoracion subjetiva de los Tribunales.
nunca sera posible volver a la situacion anterior al dano...no podemos ir al pasado
eg. contra el derecho al honor y a los danos emocionales derivados de danos corporales,
en la actualidad los danos morales se han ampliado a toda vulneracion de derechos y libertades personales.
STS de 27 de julio de 2006 : son daños morales aquellos que no sean susceptibles de ser evaluados patrimonialmente,
por consistir en un menoscabo cuya sustancia puede recaer no solo en el ámbito moral estricto
sino tambien en el ambito psicofisico de la persona y consistiria, paradigmáticamente, en los sufrimientos, padecimientos
o menoscabos , sin traduccion economica.
hay mucha mas discrecionalidad en la determinacion del importe de la indem por danos morales, q por patrimoniales
Sobre el dano patrimonial, aun siendo cierto por ser posible concretar su importe con referencia a hechos objetivos o
valores de mercado, tambien puede depender de acontecimientos futuros,
por ello en tales casos tendra que ser apreciado mediante una valoracion prospectiva fundada en la
prevision razonable de acontecimientos que podrian acontecer y, en ocasiones, incluso mediante una
valoracion probabilistica de un determinado resultado economico = lucro cesante <> dano emergente
Esto ocurre cuando el dano ha consistido en la privacion irreversible de la posibilidad de obtenerlo,
es decir, en la perdida de oportunidades para el que lo padece. Un mismo daño patrimonial,
como ocurre con la perdida de retribuciones por incapacidad, debe
ser objeto de criterios muy distintos de valoracion segun se refiera a un periodo determinado y conocido
de incapacidad o bien a la incapacidad de una persona durante su vida futura.
Entre los derechos fundamentales susceptibles de lesion por parte de actuaciones de jueces y
magistrados destaca la prision preventiva indebida que, en determinados casos, puede terminar con
el reconocimiento a ser indemnizado por los danos morales sufridos por privacion de libertad.
=LOPJ en su art 294: derecho a indem de las personas que, habiendo cumplido pena de
prision preventiva, finalmente son absueltas ante la inexistencia de los hechos imputados y exista
resolucion con sobreseimiento libre.
STS 2005 71, estimo una reclamacion de indem por el funcionamiento anormal de la Ajus. el TS la estimo,
debido a la imposibilidad material del procesado de participar en los hechos
3.6. Importe de las indemnizaciones
La jurisprudencia exige la existencia de un perjuicio económico efectivo, evaluable y susceptible de ser individualizado,
por todas, la STS de 20 de diciembre de 2006 72.
En cualquier caso, toda pretensión de resarcimiento busca situar a la vÃctima en la misma posición
anterior a la producción de los daños, aunque será el perjudicado el encargado de determinar su cuantÃa.
En este sentido, a partir de la STS de 20 de diciembre de 2004 73, se admitió la posibilidad de que la vÃctima
pueda escoger el mecanismo reparador de los daños causados que mejor sirva a sus intereses.
Danos patrimoniales
el responsable de cualquier dano, resarcira mediante la restitucion (art. 348.2 CC) , o haciéndose cargo de la
reparacion (art. 111 CP)....Pero, cuando no sea posible restituir o reparar el bien, se abre la posibilidad de indemnizar
con un dinero equivalente al valor de mercado o de referencia, y se podran tener en
cuenta tanto el dano emergente ,como el lucro cesante, por las perdidas ocasionadas (art. 1.106 CC).
dicha cantidad esta limitada a la reparacion integra del dano, para evitar el enriquecimiento injusto de la victima
Se aplicara el principio valorista, frente al nominalista, para evitar las devaluaciones monetarias
y corregir las fluctuaciones que puede sufrir el dinero. STS 2007 74, declara que se trata de determinar si estamos ante una
deuda nominal o de valor...osea, si el dano se debe cuantificar al tiempo del accidente (teoria nominalista)
o al tiempo de su cuantificacion (teoria valorista)
La doctrina se ha inclinado por la teoria valorista, porque el nominalismo impide la restitutio in integrum,
ya que la satisfaccion del dano requiere indemnizar con el valor actual del mismo, y no con una cantidad que se ha ido depreciando
.... no se trata de obligar a pagar mas, sino de evitar que la inflacion conlleve que se pague
menos. El principio valorista es acogido por el artÃculo 141.3 de la LRJ-PAC, donde
se establece que la cuantia de la indem se calcula con referencia al dÃia en que se produjo
la lesion, sin perjuicio de su actualizacion con arreglo al indice de precios al consumo a la fecha en
que se ponga fin al procedimiento
En el supuesto de retraso en el cobro de una determinada cantidad, la indemnizacion consistira en el pago de los
intereses legales por tal cantidad, por el tiempo de dilacion indebida, hasta el momento del cobro efectivo de la misma
1. Danos morales
La mayoria de danos morales, o sea aquellos no relativos a bienes patrimoniales, serán resarcidos mediante el
pago de una indemnizacion a la vÃctima. En estos casos la valoración es más compleja dado que no existe un mercado
de referencia que permita su calculo o determinacion.
Ello no obsta para que en los últimos años, tanto la jurisprudencia como el legislador, hayan empezado a fijar
valores, baremos e importes de referencia que, a demás de facilitar la tarea de fijación de la indemnización,
permiten evitar desigualdades entre vÃctimas y dotan de mayor seguridad jurÃdica el ámbito de las reclamaciones.
Esta práctica ha sido avalada por el mismo Tribunal Constitucional, por todas la STC de 29 de
junio de 2000 76, que, a pesar de declarar parcialmente la inconstitucionalidad de algunos incisos y
apartados del anexo del sistema de valoración de la ley sobre responsabilidad civil y seguros de circulación
de vehÃculos de motor, manifestó de forma clara que la regulación legal vincula jurÃdicamente a todos los
oganos judiciales completamente, sin que se puedan atender singularidades no contempladas en dichos baremos
ni las indemnizaciones que se acuerden superar sus lÃmites, para,
despues de una extensa argumentacion jca, finalizar considerando que la utilización de un sistema de
baremación por ley no vulnera ni contrarÃa ninguna de las disposiciones constitucionales.
En el ordenamiento espanol existe actualmente una baremación de los daños corporales y morales derivados
de los accidentes de circulación, y se esta preparando otra relacionada con los daños
sanitarios. En los casos restantes, los daños morales tendrán que solicitarse de forma expresa en la
demanda que se presente.
Precisamente, mediante la STS de 28 de julio de 2003 77, el tribunal desestimo una peticion de
indemnización de responsabilidad civil por los presuntos daños causados por un procurador, no concediendo
dicha indemnización no por no ser los daños morales indemnizables sino por no haber sido
solicitados de forma expresa en el escrito de la demanda por parte de la persona perjudicada.
En otros casos, dicha reparación no tiene que ser necesariamente económica, como resulta de
la STS de 2 de noviembre de 2006 78, porque, a pesar de reconocer en aquel caso la existencia de un
daño no patrimonial en la imagen profesional de la demandante, la Sala acordó no indemnizar el daño
moral reconocido con cantidad económica alguna ya que consideró que la sentencia favorable reconociendo
la existencia de dicho daño era suficiente por sà misma como satisfacción equitativa y suficiente del daño
moral causado, teniendo en cuenta las circunstancias del caso y la limitada repercusión de los hechos enjuiciados.
2. RPAP por el funcionamiento anormal de la Ajus:
Puesto que la persona afectada por el funcionamiento anormal de la Administración de Justicia no está obligada
a soportar el perjuicio o daño sufrido, la ley obliga al Estado a reparar tal perjuicio o daño y resarcir a la vÃctima
con la correspondiente y concreta indemnización o resarcimiento.
El resarcimiento previsto por la incoación de expedientes de responsabilidad patrimonial por el
funcionamiento anormal de la Administración de Justicia es también el de la indemnización pecuniaria, de libre
fijación por parte de los tribunales, a partir de los criterios y demás consideraciones
que estimen oportunos a tenor de las circunstancias y de los antecedentes de cada caso.
Según el art. 141 de la LRJ-PAC, ante la ausencia de baremos objetivos, la indemnización se
acordará siguiendo los criterios de valoración de la legislación sobre expropiación forzosa, la legislación fiscal
u otras normas de valoración existentes, teniendo siempre en cuenta las predominantes
del mercado. La cuantÃa de la indemnización también tendrá en cuenta el tiempo transcurrido desde
la producción del daño o perjuicio hasta la fecha de finalización del procedimiento de responsabilidad,
aplicándose actualizaciones monetarias de acuerdo con el Ãndice de precios al consumo.
Entre la creciente jurisprudencia relativa a este tipo de responsabilidad, resulta ilustrativa la
STS de 15 de marzo de 2006 79, que estimó parcialmente una petición de responsabilidad patrimonial
por el anormal funcionamiento de la Administración de Justicia por los daños morales sufridos
por el demandante como consecuencia de la excesiva dilación de un proceso penal, cuya resolución
reconoció la existencia de un daño moral ante la anómala y extraordinaria duración del proceso superior
a los 10 años, circunstancia que habrÃa comportado un evidente sufrimiento ante tan excesiva
duración generadora de una desmesurada incertidumbre por la falta de resolución de su caso, concediendo
una indemnización por la suma de 12.020,24 euros
Por su parte la STS de 20 de diciembre de 2006 80, que estimó la petición de indemnización
por la responsabilidad civil de jueces y magistrados en un caso de indebida devolución de un aval
que hizo inviable el embargo por parte del demandante de los bienes del demandado, condenó a la
Administración al pago de 15 millones de pesetas ante la insolvencia del demandado, ya que dicha
devolución no tan solo originó indefensión al actor sino que además superó el margen de error aceptable
en cualquier resolución judicial, admitiendo la existencia de una negligencia grave por parte
del magistrado responsable de aquella decisión y concediendo una indemnización por importe de
10 millones de pesetas, suma del aval devuelto indebidamente y que, de no haberse devuelto, hubiera permitido
satisfacer parcialmente el impago por parte del demandado en el proceso principal.
También resulta interesante la STS de 24 de abril de 2007 81, que estimó parcialmente una petición de
responsabilidad patrimonial por el funcionamiento anormal de la Administración de Justicia,
por los daños morales sufridos por el demandante como consecuencia de la publicación de una nota
de prensa realizada por parte de la policÃa judicial, relativa a su detención y a las circunstancias que
la motivaron, porque consideró que los hechos merecÃan el calificativo de presuntos, porque el caso
terminó archivado y se indemnizó la indebida prisión preventiva y, además, porque suponÃa un ataque a su honor.
A pesar de reclamar una indemnización de 1,8 millones de euros, se concedió una
indemnización de 35.000 euros, fruto del prudente criterio del tribunal y, al no existir un baremo
objetivo, por considerarlo como razonable a la vista de las circunstancias del caso y de la trascendencia social que la difusión
de la nota tuvo en su momento.
Por su parte, la STS de 8 de octubre de 2010 82, declaró, en relación al dano moral, que el mero
hecho de ingresar y permanecer indebidamente en prisión constituye una lacerante y dolorosa experiencia psÃquica,
cuya indemnización, salvo que se acrediten circunstancias especiales, queda inevitablemente a la valoración prudencial
del organo judicial, que debe tener presente la duracion y
circunstancias de la privacion de libertad. Habida cuenta de que la prision preventiva en aquel caso
se prolongó por seis meses, habiendo sufrido ademas un regimen de incomunicacion en los primeros dÃas,
se fijó la indemnización en 50.000 euros. En la misma sentencia, y en relación con la lesion
económica por pérdida de negocio, no se cuestionó su existencia misma, es decir, que como consecuencia de la
prision preventiva se produjo el cierre del negocio del recurrente, el problema es que
distaria de ser facil determinar la entidad y cuantÃa de la perdida del negocio sufrida. A la vista del
informe presentado por el recurrente, el tribunal considero razonable su pretensiin indemnizatoria
limitada al lucro cesante durante los primeros cinco anos siguientes a su detencion.
3. Privacion de libertad
En los casos de condenas de privación de libertad, y en aplicacion del 294.2 de la
LOPJ, la cuantÃa de la indemnización se fija en función de la duracion de la privacion y
de las circunstancias y afectaciones de la vida personal, familiar y laboral de la persona privada de libertad,
siempre de acuerdo con el criterio del tribunal. Las siguientes sentencias ilustran circunstancias e
importes acordados por los tribunales
Por ejemplo, mediante la STS de 26 de enero de 2005 83, el tribunal estimó una demanda de
indemnización de responsabilidad patrimonial por los daños sufridos por prisión preventiva indebida,
el tribunal consideró correcto, para determinar el importe de la indemnización, aplicar únicamente el
criterio de progresión del perjuicio en función exclusivamente del tiempo o duración de la prisión preventiva
indebida, al no haberse acreditado más daños que los puramente morales, ni tampoco otras
circunstancias personales que convirtieran dicha privación en especialmente onerosa. En este sentido,
estimó correcta la cantidad 36 euros diarios como base del cálculo y un 25 por 100 como factor de
progresión por cada mes transcurrido, concediendo una indemnización final por importe de 20.923,46
euros, más los intereses legales acreditados desde la fecha de reclamación hasta la fecha de pago.
STS de 2005 84, estima parcialmente una demanda de indemnización por
responsabilidad patrimonial por prision preventiva indebida, al considerar que eran indemnizables los
nueve dÃas que la demandante estuvo indebidamente privada de libertad, más los consiguientes daños morales,
los cuales causaron unos trastornos psÃquicos relevantes, circunstancia que
llevo a la Sala a cifrar en 10.000 euros el importe de la indemnización correspondiente, como reparadora de los
danos fÃisicos y además de los morales. A pesar de ello, negar la posibilidad de incluir
dentro de la cuantÃia indemnizatoria los gastos de abogado, procurador y constitución de fianza generados en ocasión
de dicha privacion, dado que los mismos ya fueron resarcidos como consecuencia
de la condena en costas a la demandada.
Por su parte, la Sentencia de la Audiencia Nacional de 3 de julio de 2007 85, que estimó parcialmente una petición de
indemnización por prisión preventiva indebida, declaró que para fijar la
cuantÃa de la indemnización ha de tenerse en cuenta el desprestigio social y la fractura con el entorno
personal y familiar que toda pena de prisión conlleva, además de la angustia, ansiedad, frustración,
irritación y temor provocados en la persona privada de libertad, circunstancias que dependerán
a su vez de la edad, estado de salud, hechos imputados, antecedentes penales, posibilidad de rehabilitación
de la honorabilidad, etc., de manera que una misma medida de prisión preventiva no será
igual para todas las personas y ello tendrá que reflejarse en el importe de la compensación económica
del perjuicio moral. A la vista de las circunstancias del caso, concedió una indemnización de 90.000
euros por la prolongacion de la prision preventiva indebida durante más de 22 meses, asà como por
la rehabilitación que necesitó el recurrente, una vez libre, en un centro especializado para recuperar
las habilidades perdidas durante el periodo de privación de libertad dada su minusvalidez.
CONCLUSIONES
La configuracion legal y reg del principio de responsabilidad en Espana, permite afirmar que en nuestro
pais existe un regimen completo de responsabilidades de jueces y magistrados,
que garantiza a las personas afectadas la posibilidad de resarcimiento por los daños y perjuicios que
aquellos pudieran causar en el ejercicio de sus funciones jurisdiccionales. Sin embargo, el ejercicio
de tal posibilidad no parece en la practica muy efectivo.
Para el TS, la responsabilidad civil de jueces y magistrados como consecuencia del ejercicio de sus funciones, cuando hubieran incurrido
en dolo o culpa, no es un derecho abstracto e inalcanzable para los ciudadanos, sino, al
contrario, es del todo conveniente su exigencia. Pero para que proceda tal responsabilidad, considera que la
infracción ha de ser calificable como manifiesta para que sea cohonestable con la voluntad
negligente o la ignorancia inexcusable, pues de otra suerte solamente podrÃa conceptuarse como simple
error judicial o anormal funcionamiento de la Administración de Justicia, en cuyo caso serÃa el
Estado y no el juez o magistrado el que debiera asumir personalmente la responsabilidad inherente.
En cambio, la doctrina no se pronuncia ni mucho menos en los mismos terminos.
PICAZO GIMÉNEZ: la accion de responsabilidad contra jueces y magistrados es un ejercicio ineficaz
e insuficiente, que permite un sistema judicial en el que la casi inviolabilidad de sus organos jurisdiccionales
es un hecho y en el que jueces y magistrados son civilmente irresponsables en la practica.
MONTERO AROCA: afirma que en el plano real, la amplitud de posibilidades para ser
indemnizado no se traduce en verdaderas posibilidades para el particular al exigir responsabilidades
a jueces y magistrados, ni en el orden civil ni el penal, por sus actuaciones procesales.
DELGADO DEL RINCÓN : uno de los principales motivos para valorar el sistema de responsabilidad judicial como
ineficaz en la práctica, serÃa la permanente interpretación restrictiva del TS, con el concepto de culpa o dolo ,
para declarar la responsabilidad civil o penal del juez. A dicha interpretación restrictiva se suma la nula aplicacion, por parte del Estado
de la accion de regreso contra jueces, en casos en los que reconoce e indemniza a los particulares por los danos por sus decisiones.
How cocoo will review eu courts' competition penalties
The unlimited jurisdiction granted to Eu Courts [[GC=cfi] and ecj ], under Article 31 of the Regulation 1/20032 and Article 261 TFEU,
allows them to perform an exacting review/assessment of the legality of the EC decisions
JR (judicial review) of fines: Diff:
- focus on the EC competences (i.e. substantial margin of discretion/unrestricted
rights, and absence of manifest/obvious error of assessment) .... the EU courts have become more focused on this,
resulting in limited review of fines (by granting wider discretion to the EC, on fines). eu courts only fine the EC if there is obvious error in their decis.
- focus on review of the proportionality and accuracy of the fines. Full, unlimited review of fines.
the EU courts (especially the GC) do not sufficiently use their power of the full review [of EC decisions] imposing fines for infringements
of EU cl
ECHR) and the principle of proportionality in criminal offences and penalties].
The article concludes with a summary and some reflections for the future.
II. Judicial control under Article 263 TFEU (i.e. plea of illegality)
and under 261 TFEU (i.e. plea for ˜unlimited jurisdiction')
The EU Courts have jurisdiction in two respects over contestations of
Commission decisions imposing fines on undertakings for infringement of the
EU competition rules. First, it has the task of reviewing the legality of those
decisions within the context of the jurisdiction granted under Article 263
TFEU6. The judicial scrutiny exercised under a plea of illegality is limited to
four grounds of annulment, to wit: lack of competence, infringement of an
essential procedural requirement, of the Treaty, or of any rule of law related to
its application, and misuse of powers.
EU courts cannot substitute their own assessment for the economic appraisal contained in contested Commission
decision. The degree of control in the review exercised by the EU courts
is limited to checking whether the Commission did not overstep the limits
of its rights/discretion, and did not commit any error of law or of fact in the
assessment of the evidence before it. Review of issues of law by the EU courts
entails the power to interpret the law and then check whether the Commission
has applied the correct legal principles, in the case before it. Oppositely,
when the applicants seek to challenge the complex economic assessments
conducted by the EC, the extent of judicial control appears to be far less intense
Secondly, the GC has power to assess, in the context of the unlimited jurisdiction accorded to it by Article 261 TFEU and Article 31 of Regulation
1/2003 (previously Article 15 of Regulation 17), the appropriateness of the amount of fines imposed.
By virtue of the Commissions duty, under Article 296 of the Treaty, to set out its reasons in its decision, that assessment may
justify taking into account additional information which is not senso stricto required.
The full jurisdiction regarding penalties requires that the EU courts must be able to not only control fully the objective legality of an act,
but at least to review fully the facts upon which a decision is based.
This unlimited jr over decisions fixing fines endows the courts, with the power to cancel, reduce or increase their amount.
III. Pre-Guidelines era on control of EC decisions imposing fines
It should be noted that the European Commission adopted its own set
of Guidelines in 1998. The Guidelines cannot be regarded as limiting the
Commissions discretion in imposing/fixing fines, but must rather be viewed
as an instrument allowing undertakings access to more precise information on
EU competition policy14. Originally, the Guidelines ensured the transparency
and objectivity of the Commissions decisions on fines.
The Guidelines constitute an instrument intended to define, while complying with higherranking law, the criteria
which the Commission proposes to apply in the exercise of its discretion. As a consequence they constitute a self-limitation
of the Commission’s power15, insofar as the Commission must comply with
a set of guidelines which it has itself laid down16.
unless that examination entails a complex economic assessment, in which case review by the
Court is confined to ascertaining that there has been no misuse of powers, that the rules on
procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, that the facts have been
accurately stated, and that there has been no manifest error of assessment of those facts
The independent approaches of the control of Commission’s decisions
imposing fines were manifested in early judgments of the Court of Justice. In
the Quinine case17, the Court underscored that:
(i) the object of imposed fines was to suppress illegal activities and to
prevent any reference, and such object could not be adequately
attained if the imposition of a penalty were to be restricted to current
infringements alone
(ii) for the purpose of fixing the amount of the fine, the gravity of the
infringement was to be appraised by taking into account, in particular,
the nature of the restriction on competition, the number and size of
the undertakings concerned, the respective proportions of the market
controlled by them within the Community, and the situation of the
market when the infringement had been committed
In the context of the Quinine case it should be noted that the Court, after having
conducted its review of the factual circumstances which constituted the underlying
reason for the Commission’s decision on fines (i.e. duration of the infringement),
held that a shorter (than that in the contested decision) period of infringement
‘does not appreciably alter the gravity of the restrictions on competition arising
from the agreement, it justifies only a slight reduction in the fines
In another case Pioneer: the Court carried out a similarly wide review
of the Commission’s contested decision on fines. As regards its assessment of
the size of the imposed fines, the Court declared that it was permissible, for
the purpose of fixing the fine, to have regard to both
(i) the total turnover, which gave an indication of the size of the undertaking and of its economic power; and
(ii) the proportion of that turnover accounted for by the goods, which gave an indication of the scale of the contravention.
The Court, in reviewing the compliance of the levied fines with the principle of proportionality, stated that
it was important not to confer on one or on the other undertaking fines which
are disproportionate in relation to the other factors, and that the imposition
of an appropriate fine could not be the result or effect of a simple calculation
based on the total turnover of a perpetrator
The Court, reviewing the legality (and also proportionality) of imposed fines, by virtue of its powers of unlimited jurisdiction,
also has to bear in mind other factors which, as shown in an example below, it may point to
in its assessment of the gravity of the infringements in the decision under
review. The duration of an infringement (prohibited practice) enters into both
the general assessment of the Court as well as within the framework of its
unlimited jurisdiction.24 If a period of infringement is shorter than indicated
in a contested decision, that should consequently result in a reduction of the
fine imposed25. In the event that more than one undertaking is involved in the
same infringement, for the purpose of determining the proportions between
the fines to be fixed the period of infringement which should be taken into
account must be ascertained in such a way that the basic turnovers will be as
comparable as possible
In such a context the Dunlop Slazenger case is worthy of brief mention.
On the basis of the factual circumstances in this case the CFI considered
that in the event a court, within the framework of its powers of unlimited
jurisdiction, reduced a finding vis-Ã -vis the duration of an infringement, this
did not necessarily have to translate into a reduction of the fine in proportion
to the reduced period of infringement
The gravity and the cumulative nature of the infringements while they were being actually committed are however
factors which might justify a limited reduction of fines.
- in the Tetra Pak v Commission case, the CFI expressed
a view that ‘in order to enable the undertakings concerned to assess whether
the fine is of a proper amount (…) and the Court to exercise its power of
review, the Commission is not bound to break down the amount of the
fine between the various aspects of the abuse. In particular, such a breakdown
is impossible where, as here, all the infringements found are part of a coherent
overall strategy and must accordingly be dealt with globally for the purposes
both of applying Article 86 of the Treaty and of setting the fines. In exercising
its control over the amount of a fine imposed, it is sufficient for the reviewing
CFI that the Commission specifies in its decision its criteria for setting the
general level of the fine imposed on an undertaking. It is not required to state
specifically how it took into account each factor included among the criteria
which contributed to establishing the general level of the fine
To recapitulate, it can be seen that in the pre-Guidelines period the intensity
level of judicial review and scrutiny of the legality and the amount of imposed
fines may be described as the extensive model of the jurisdiction held by the
EU courts. In the period following the adoption of the Guidelines, the standard
model of review exercised by EU courts over fixed fines began to evolve in the
direction of limited review, which comes down to a mere assessment whether
the Commission did or did not commit an obvious/manifest error. Even
though the judges are not legally bound by the Guidelines concerning fines,
they usually merely verify compliance with them the decision imposing fines.
IV. Adoption the Guidelines by the EC...consequences for the jurisdiction of the EU Courts
After the European Commission adopted the Guidelines29 in 1998, the
position of the EU courts began to alter, evolving towards a more limited
exercise of jurisdiction over decisions imposing fines. Although the Court has
on occasion engaged in an extensive review of fines in cases brought after the
adoption of the Guidelines ...it nowadays often takes a more formal and limited approach with regard to the
intensity of its assessment of imposed fines. In the early fine cases during the
pre-Guidelines period the decisions usually contained a review of the strengths
and weaknesses of the evidence and a prudent consideration of all pertinent
factors, without exception examining the seriousness of an infringement (gravity
and duration). In the cases decided by the Commission on the basis of application
of the Guidelines, the judicial inquiry conducted on review addresses principally
whether the Commission had the discretion (unrestricted right) to impose the
fine, rather than whether the fine was appropriate (proportional).
On the one end of the scale one may note numerous judgments which do
no more than accurately record that the fine imposed lies within the range of
discretion attributable to the European Commission (as in the cases T-241/01
Scandinavian Airlines, T-15/02 Vitamins, or T-116/04 Wieland-Werke). At the
other end of the scale, one may find judgments where the EC courts substitute
their own assessment for the Commission’s (for example T-38/02 and the
appeal C-3/06 P Groupe Danone v Commission or, and T-217/06 Arkema v
EC.... To this effect, the case C-534/07 P Wiliam Prym needs to be
mentioned. In that case the Court, referring to its earlier case-law, emphasized
the view that the unlimited jurisdiction conferred on EU courts authorized
them, by taking into account all of the factual circumstances, to vary the
contested measure/decision, even without annulling it, so as to amend, for
example, the amount of the fine
First, the judgments of EU courts in which the courts carried on the line of
the case-law directed at extensive review of a Commission decision was analysed.
Although the Commission has discretion when determining the amount of fine,
and is not required to apply a precise mathematical formula31, nonetheless the
EC courts have unlimited jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 261 TFEU
in actions contesting decisions whereby the Commission has fixed a fine, and
accordingly may cancel, reduce or increase the fine imposed.
-in Tokai Carbon the Court stressed that its assessment of the appropriateness of
the fine might, independently of any manifest errors made by the Commission in
its own assessment, justify the production of and taking into account additional
information which was not mentioned in the Commissions decision
According to the case-law (in most instances relying on judgments passed
before the adoption of the Guidelines), the amount of a fine must at least be
proportionate in relation to the factors taken into account in its assessment,
such as the gravity and the duration of the infringement33. Consequently,
where the Commission divides the undertakings concerned into categories
for the purpose of setting the amount of the fines, the thresholds for each of
the categories thus identified must be coherent and objectively justified34. In
the Groupe Danone case the CFI stated that, as concerns setting the amount
of the fine, it had unlimited jurisdiction and might in particular cancel or
reduce the fine pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 1735. When exercising its
unlimited jurisdiction, the EU courts must consider whether the amount of the
fine imposed is proportionate to the gravity and duration of the infringement
and must weigh the seriousness of the infringement taking into account the
circumstances invoked by the applicant
As the Court stressed in the appeal case Groupe Danone,in setting the new amount of the fine, the Court of First
Instance acted not within the framework of Article 263 TFEU, but in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction under 261 TFEU and 31
of the regulation no. 1/2003
The EU courts are therefore empowered, in addition to carrying out a
mere review of the lawfulness of the penalty, to substitute their own appraisal
for that of the Commission and, consequently, to cancel, reduce or increase
the fine or penalty payment imposed39. It follows that the EU courts are
empowered to exercise their unlimited jurisdiction where the question of the
amount of the fine is before them, and that this jurisdiction may be exercised
to reduce that amount as well as to increase it.
According to AG P. Maduro the Court, in describing the extent of jurisdiction of EU courts, expressed
the opinion that ‘the distinguishing characteristic of the jurisdiction of the
Community Courts under this provision [unlimited jurisdiction within the
meaning of Article 261 TFEU: allows them not only to review
the legality of the sanction, but also to vary the sanction, even in the absence
of a material error of fact or law on the part of the ec
Finally, the more recent judgments of the EU courts, which refer to the
limited extent of review currently exercised over measures fixing fines, need
to be analysed. According to this line of the case-law, the review of a decision
fixing fines is limited to an assessment of the range of discretion attributable to
the Commission.
There are many examples in the recent jurisprudence where
the EU courts have limited their review to the legality of the fine imposed
by the European Commission (e.g.: T-241/01 Scandinavian Airlines System;
T-16/04 Wieland-Werke). The first case in which the CFI used this concept
of reduced scrutiny was the judgment in Scandinavian Airlines. Examination
of the seriousness of the infringement was limited to reviewing whether the
Commission’s assessment was not vitiated by an obvious error42. Similarly in
case T-116/04 Wieland-Werke, the CFI ruled that ‘where the Commission has a
discretion, for example, as regards the amount of increase for the purposes of
deterrence, review of the legality of those assessments is limited to determining
the absence of manifest error of assessment.
Nor, in principle, does the discretion enjoyed by the Commission and the limits which it has imposed in
that regard prejudge the exercise by the Court of its unlimited jurisdiction
Bo Vesterdorf, commenting on this new approach, reflecting a lesser intensity
of scrutiny, pointed out that ‘the reality is that, almost without exception,
the Court limits itself to performing a control of the legality of the fine or,
rather, to verifying whether the Commission has applied the Guidelines
for the calculation of fines correctly. In doing so, it will normally apply the
manifest error test, as can be seen in the recent judgment in the WielandWerke case
The EU courts are empowered to carry out a mere review of the lawfulness of the penalty, or
to substitute its own appraisal for that of the Commission and, consequently,
to cancel, reduce or increase the fine or penalty payment imposed where the
question of the amount of the fine is before them. What is essential is that
the Court underlined that, in such context, it had to be borne in mind that
the Guidelines were without prejudice to the assessment of the fine by the
Community judicature when it exercises its unlimited jurisdiction45. On the
basis of the facts in the case BASF and UCB, the CFI, exercising its unlimited
jurisdiction, reduced the amount of the fine
V. Unlimited jurisdiction: what does it mean?
Having regard to the issues surrounding the intensity of judicial control over
the Commissions decisions, it seems reasonable to ask: what does the legal
expression unlimited jurisdiction mean?
The term unlimited jurisdiction does not in itself contain an explanation of its consequences. Does such a
formulation of the EU courts jurisdiction suggest that it enjoys a wider scope of discretion than the Commission?
Does it suggest that the EC courts have less scope to alter the amount of the fine, i.e. that there are areas where the
Commission has discretion to which the reviewing EU courts must defer?
Or does it mean that the EU courts may choose to defer?
Another issue which should be born in mind is the relation between the formula unlimited jurisdiction, and the non ultra petita rule.
The non ultra petita rule has the effect of limiting a courts jurisdiction to questions which
have been formally raised by a party to the proceedings before the court.
The question has arisen what implications the non ultra petita rule has in
connection with the concept of unlimited jurisdiction within the meaning of
Article 261 TFEU. The notion of unlimited jurisdiction concerns that very
aspect – the demarcation between the powers of the judiciary and those of
the administrative authorities. Article 261 TFEU and Article 31 of Regulation
1/2003 (previously Article 17 of Regulation 17) grant the EU courts the
possibility to replace the assessment of the administrative authority with their
own, and thus to decide in place of the Commission. This clearly creates
a significant, i.e. extensive, exception to the normal jurisdiction of the EU
courts, albeit in a limited area
Accordingly, within this area, the non ultra petita rule, properly understood
as a restriction on the exercise of judicial power, has only a limited role to play.
Advocate General P. Maduro expressed the view that it merely implied that
the EU courts must not exercise their unlimited jurisdiction without having
been seized of the matter of the fine. Once the issue of the amount of the
fine has been submitted for reassessment, the jurisdiction under the Article
261 TFEU is indeed unlimited, in the sense that it may be exercised both in
order to reduce and in order to increase the fine.
By implication, the GC may apply a different method of calculation when it reassesses the fine, even
if that method is less favourable for the undertaking concerned. It should
be underlined that the review carried out by the EU courts in respect of the
Commission’s decisions on competition matters is more than a simple review
of legality, which would permit only dismissal of an action for annulment or
an annulment of the contested measure.
First of all, a review of the legality with which the EU courts are vested
means in practice application of the criteria used in an appraisal by the
Commission to determine the gravity of an infringement of competition law for
the purposes of calculating the fine, namely the criterion of the actual impact
of the infringement on the market. In the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction,
the GC took into account the defects identified, and considered whether it had
any effect on the amount of the fine and whether it was necessary, accordingly,
to adjust the amount. In the course of that examination, the Court held that
it was not appropriate to amend the starting amount of the fine set in the
decision at issue. The bringing of an action does not entail the definitive
transfer to the EU courts of the power to impose penalties.
The Commission finally loses its power only if the court has actually exercised its unlimited
jurisdiction. In other words, where the EU courts simply annul a decision
on the ground of illegality without themselves ruling on the substance of the
infringement or on the penalty, the institution which adopted the annulled
measure may re-open the procedure at the stage at which the illegality was
found to have occurred, and exercise once again its power to impose penalties.
In consequence, the EU courts are not competent to substitute themselves for
the Commission in re-opening an administrative procedure which has been
entirely or partially annulled.
In contrast, in the case T-15/02 Vitamins the CFI expressed the view that was
possible for the EU courts to exercise its unlimited jurisdiction under Article
261 TFEU and Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003 only where it had made a finding
of illegality affecting the decision about which the undertaking concerned had
complained in its action, and in order to remedy the consequences which
that illegality had for determination of the amount of the fine imposed, by
annulling or, if necessary, adjusting the fine
In that regard the review which the GC is required to exercise in respect of a Commission decision finding an
infringement of competition rules and imposing fines is confined to a review
of the legality of that decision, and only if it holds void some aspect of a
contested decision may the GC exercise unlimited jurisdiction, which includes
the possibility of amending or annulling the fine imposed
-In Dansk Rørindustri the Court ruled that it was not for it,˜when ruling on questions of law in the context of an appeal, to
substitute, on grounds of fairness, its own assessment for that of the Court of
First Instance exercising its unlimited jurisdiction to rule on the amount of
fines imposed on undertakings for infringements of Community law
The jurisdiction exercised by the Court, which is limited to a manifest/obvious
error committed by the GC, is understandable when the Court adjudicates in
an appeal, but it should be rejected for being too formal and narrow when its
reasoning is extended by analogy to the control exercised by the GC in the
context of complaints brought in the first instance by undertakings against the
Commissions decisions. The crucial arguments in favour of rejecting such a
standard are the requirements flowing from the principle of effective judicial
protection and the role of fundamental rights in EU competition law.
It should be underlined that the position taken by EU courts, when they
examine a Commissions decision on fines, seems to be too restrained.
The Commissions broad margin of discretion in assessment of the facts is
confirmed in relation to the many elements involved in the calculation of fines:
duration, deterrence, recidivism, mitigating circumstances etc. According
to the EU case-law, the nature of competition enforcement, which
involves the necessity of making 'complex economic assessments, justifies the
exercise by the EU courts of a ˜limited review in its examination into the
evidence reviewed and assessed by the Commission.
In our opinion, using the standard of review elaborated for cases brought on˜the plea of illegality under Article 263 TFEU, as a
framework for determining the extent of the jurisdiction exercised by the
EU Courts in their review of the legality of decisions imposing fines under
Article 261 TFEU (unlimited jurisdiction), leads to unjustified confusion
between the two separate grants of power to EU courts. Ex definition the
extent of jurisdiction of the EU courts under Article 261 TFEU (i.e. the plea
of unlimited jurisdiction) is wider than the power of EU courts exercised
solely under the plea of illegality from Article 263 TFEU, because Article 31
of Regulation 1/2003 (i.e. ˜the plea of unlimited review) endows EU courts
with full jurisdiction over decisions whereby the Commission has fixed a fine
or a periodic penalty payment’ and consequently with the power to cancel,
reduce or increase their amount
VI. Breach of fundamental rights “ is there a threat?
The aforementioned practice of EU courts should be also analysed from
the perspective of a potential breach of fundamental rights55. In this section
of our article, we examine the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial
(Article 47 CFR and Article 6 ECHR) and the principle of proportionality
in criminal offences and penalties56. Even at first glance it can be seen that
these particular rights may be threatened by the aforementioned practices of
the EU courts.
The right of undertakings to invoke fundamental rights before the
European Commission or the EU courts during competition law proceedings
is not so obvious on its face, and thus requires a short discussion in this article.
1. Fundamental rights in EU competition law proceedings
The adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon has signalled a clear intent to strengthen
the protection of fundamental rights in the EU. The major change envisaged
by this treaty vis-Ã -vis fundamental rights is encompassed in the change in the
legal status of the CFR, which now has become a binding legal instrument of
primary law, having the same legal status as the Treaties themselves. Another
important change concerns the EU itself, which is obligated to accede to the
ECHR59. This new situation raises two issues which should be identified and
briefly described in this short section of our article:
(i) the problem of multiple sources of fundamental rights in competition law proceedings, and
(ii) the question of the character of the competition law proceedings, which impacts
on the right to invoke particular rights, as well as their applicability.
2. Multiple sources of fundamental rights in competition law proceedings:
There are three main sources of fundamental rights that may be invoked by
undertakings in competition enforcement proceedings before EU bodies – the
general principles of EU law, the ECHR, and, since the taking effect of the
Treaty of Lisbon, the CFR. Most often the parties invoke all three sources.
Article 6(3) TEU provides that fundamental rights, as guaranteed in the ECHR
and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member
States, shall constitute general principles of EU law. The content of these
general principles is mostly supplied by the EU courts.
-cases, KME62 and Chalkor: held: The principle of effective judicial protection
is a general principle of European Union law to which expression is now given
by Article 47 of the Charter . . . {which} . . . implements in European Union
law the protection afforded by Article 6(1) ECHR. It is necessary, therefore, to
refer only to Article 47’. So it can be seen that the CFR has gained significantly
in importance, and that as a result the ECHR has been disadvantaged in a
way. Unfortunately, this does not mean that it will be any easier for the parties
to establish the precise scope of the right that they wish to invoke.
The EU courts tend to vaguely describe the scope and the meaning of the principles they
incorporate, in part because of the multiple sources that they themselves refer
to64. Even though the ECJ invoked the CFR in the aforementioned cases, this
does make the scope and the meaning of the fundamental rights in question
clear and precise. The EU courts nearly always refer to their earlier judgments,
and, depending on the principle in question, they might have referred in such
judgments to various sources. It should be stressed that a great step forward
in the clarification of EU fundamental rights would occur if the EU courts
explicitly recognised the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
(hereafter, ECtHR), i.e. its decisions defining the meaning and the scope of
a human right provided for in the ECHR65. In our opinion this should be a
consequence of Article 52(3)66 CFR and the Recital 37 of Regulation 1/2003,
which is also affirmed in the ECJ caselaw.
3. The character of the competition law proceedings “ the invocation and
applicability of particular rights:
Even if an undertaking establishes the scope of the fundamental right
that it wishes to invoke, there remain issues surrounding the invocation and
application of the right in competition law proceedings. The specific character
of competition enforcement proceedings affects which right may be invoked,
since some fundamental rights can be invoked by any entity in any official
proceeding68, others may be invoked only in relation to criminal proceedings69,
and some only to a certain extent in proceedings other than criminal
Formally the Commission is, in the context of competition law proceedings,
an administrative body applying administrative law, and when it imposes fines
by decisions, they are not invested with a criminal law nature per se71. Some
authors72 argue however that, due to their severity and their increasing level,
the antitrust fines imposed by the Commission are criminal in nature. This
is also consistent with the Engel criteria73, established by the ECtHR in the
Engel case in 1976
There are also some scholars who go further and argue that, due to the
˜criminal-like characteristics: criminal-like investigations; severe moral stigma;
huge penalties; possible national imprisonment; and public disgrace (…) the
application of the competition rules by the European Commission is a matter
of hard core criminal law enforcement within the meaning of the ECHR
Others assert that competition law proceedings fall outside the scope of hard
core criminal law76. While we do not take a position on this dispute, because
it exceeds the scope of this article, it is worth noting that if it were agreed
that competition proceedings fall within the scope of hard core criminal
proceedings, then by virtue of Article 6 ECHR it would be impossible for the
Commission in its present shape to impose fines on undertakings, because
it is an administrative body which combines administrative and decisionmaking functions,
and not an independent and impartial tribunal.
The ECtHR has never ruled on the compatibility of EU competition law enforcement
procedures with Article 6 ECHR, but its decisions in national cases seem
to confirm that competition law proceedings are criminal in nature, but fall
outside of the hard core of criminal law, i.e., that an administrative body
(non-judicial) which combines administrative and decision-making functions
(like the Commission), can impose fines which are criminal in nature, provided
that there is a possibility of appeal to a judicial body with full jurisdiction.
‘Full jurisdiction’ means, among other things, that the judicial body reviewing
the decision has the power to change in all respects, on questions of both fact
and law, the decision taken by the inferior body
Furthermore, it should be emphasized while that the EU courts have never agreed that these proceedings
are criminal in nature, they have acknowledged that some rights which can be
invoked in criminal proceedings also apply in competition law proceedings
4. Meeting ECHR standards: the ecj : a judicial body with full jurisdiction?
It can be seen that the EU competition law enforcement procedure
formally meets the Article 6 ECHR standards. ecj shall have unlimited jurisdiction to review decisions whereby the Commission has
fixed a fine or periodic penalty payment. It may cancel, reduce or increase the
fine or periodic penalty payment imposed. In other words, the EU courts
have the possibility to change in all respects, on questions of fact and law, the
decision taken by the Commission and they do not have to limit themselves
to a simple control of its legality
Unfortunately, as has already been shown, the EU courts practice does
not comport with the strong model referred to by judge de Albuquerque
above. In practice the EU courts perform only a limited/narrow, or, as judge
de Albuquerque would put it, ˜weak judicial review of the Commissions
decisions. In taking the position that the Commission has a large margin of
discretion and adopting the practice of confirming the Commissions decisions
in the absence of manifest error, the EU courts are only controlling legality
within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU.
Not only must the EU courts have the power of full jurisdiction, but in order to meet the standards of Article
6 ECHR they must use it, i.e. they should review whether the Commission
has used its competences appropriately, examine whether the Commissions
sanctions are proportional and well-founded, and analyse its technical
evaluations. Moreover they should perform a detailed analysis to assure that
any fines imposed correspond to the pertinent parameters, including the
proportionality of the imposed fine, and if necessary change (cancel, reduce,
increase) the imposed fine drawing on their own evaluations
Recently, a glimmer of hope has emerged for at least a slight change in
the way that judicial review is being performed by the EU courts. The ECJ
has lately been asked, in the Chalkor case, for its opinion on this practice as
implemented by the GC. Naturally it refused to answer, because the role of an
appeal court is not to examine the lower courts or even its own practice, but
to decide on the correctness of a particular decision taken by the lower court.
A similar problem occurred in the KME case85, cited above.
Nonetheless, the Courts judges had to review these two judgments of the GC, which can be
viewed as representative examples of the aforementioned practice86. In both
cases the Court seemed not to discern the problem. In general its judges, having
analysed the powers of the GC, declare that ˜the review of legality provided for
under Article 263 TFEU, supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction in respect
of the amount of the fine, provided for under Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003,
is not therefore contrary to the requirements of the principle of effective
judicial protection in Article 47 of the Charter
This may be seen as positive in that the Court underscores the power of the GC to review the Commissions
decisions, even in areas giving rise to complex economic assessments88. In
addition, the Court examined whether the GC actually performed the full
review, thoroughly analysing all the pleas of illegality submitted to it by the
applicants89. It found that the GC did fulfil its duties. It may be that in these
cases the applicants’ arguments were weak and the GC did actually perform
a full review. However, in our opinion the problem raised was not directly
addressed. AG Sharpston suggests in her opinion in the KME case that the
problem with the review conducted by the GC lies in the language which it
used, rather than in the degree of scrutiny it exercised
his view may be true in these two cases, but it can hardly be true in general. The GC should
start by changing its language, because if it uses the manifest error standard
and refers to the Commissions discretion there will always be voices claiming
that it does not perform a full review. In other words, the GC cannot declare
that it is not required to perform a full review, but then go ahead and do just
that. Unfortunately, the Court was not severe enough vis-Ã -vis the GC. The
ECJ did not comment on the manifest error standard applied by the GC, even
though the applicants pointed it out.
Thus the Court’s decision contained no clear signal to change the existing practice. Hopefully, these two judgments
will have the effect of causing the GC to reconsider its scrutiny of Commission
decisions, but without a clear signal from the Courts the practice may well
remain the same. It should be born in mind that the GC is the only court
entitled to review the Commission’s decisions based on findings of fact – the
General Court’s decisions are subject to a right of appeal to the Courts on
points of law only91. This is a compelling reason for a thorough review in the
first instance. The GC should not be reluctant to use the full review powers
granted to it. This is especially important in the area of competition law,
because of the criminal/quasi-criminal character of the fines imposed by the
Commission, as well as the controversial issue that the administrative body
imposing those fines combines the roles of both prosecutor and adjudicator.
5. Another criterion of control: the principle of proportionality between criminal offences and penalties
As one critic rightly points out92, another reason why the aforementioned
practice would seems not to satisfy the standards of fundamental rights
protection is the lack of review of proportionality. As we can see in the
Chalkor and KME cases cited above, the fact that competition law fines have
a criminal character loses its significance when it comes to the application of
Article 47 CFR, because this provision provides that everyone has the right
to an effective remedy and to a fair trial regardless of the character of the
proceedings. The situation was different on the basis of the Article 6 ECHR.
However, the criminal character of competition law proceedings is important
when it comes to applying those rights reserved for criminal proceedings, such
as, among others, the principle of proportionality between criminal offences
and penalties, as provided in Article 49(3) CFR, which declares that:˜The
severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence.
The review of proportionality is essential in competition law cases, especially
now that the level of the fines has increased so dramatically93. This is another
reason why the GC cannot limit itself to a review of manifest error only. In
the past there have been some cases in which the GC explicitly refused to
review proportionality94. Now that the CFR is legally binding, this state of
affairs is unacceptable
The calculation of the fine assessed must personalise the fine in relation
to the individual characteristics of undertakings and proportion the fine
assessed on an undertaking in relation to the other undertakings involved in
the illegal conduct. The principle of proportionality is applied not in absolute
terms, but rather in relative terms. This means that the principle is designed to
ensure that the penalty is personalised and proportionate to the gravity of the
infringement and to the other circumstances, both subjective and objective, of
each case. From that standpoint, the proportionality and non-discriminatory
character of the fine cannot derive from a simple correlation with the overall
turnover for the previous business year, but rather from the entire set of
factors involved and referred to. As the Court itself has observed ‘the gravity
of infringements has to be determined by reference to numerous factors, such
as the particular circumstances of the case, its context and the dissuasive effect
of fines; moreover, no binding or exhaustive list of the criteria which must be
applied has been drawn up
The relative/ambivalent aspect of the test of proportionality is especially
observable in cases of collective infringements. Where an infringement has been
committed by a number of undertakings, the requirement of proportionality
means that, when the fine is fixed, it is necessary to examine the relative
gravity of the participation of each undertaking. That same requirement is
imposed by the principle of equal treatment which, according to settled caselaw, is violated
when similar situations are treated differently or different
situations are treated in the same way, unless such treatment can be objectively
justified
It thus follows that the fine must be equal for all undertakings
which are in the same situation, and as well that differing conduct cannot be
punished by the blanket application of a single penalty. Proportionality must
be considered as one of the important factors to be taken under consideration
by the EU courts when performing a full review which would meet all the
standards of fundamental rights’ protection.
VII. Final remarks
In our opinion there are no satisfactory arguments for imposing limitations on
the review of the legality of Commission decisions by EU courts in competition
enforcement proceedings, and only the exercise an unlimited jurisdiction can
guarantee the principle of effective judicial protection. Full judicial review
means that the Commissions decisions imposing fines should be assessed
more precisely and in-depth, particularly with respect to proportionality
and adequacy.
The line of the case-law which has been developed after the
adoption of the Guidelines by the Commission, i.e. the introduction of a limited
standard of review, restricted to manifest error vis-Ã -vis the assessments made
by the Commission in the course of deciding the competition law cases before
it, cannot be considered adequate.
Among those numerous factors for appraisal of the infringement may be included the
volume and the value of the products involved in the infringement, the size and economic
strength of the undertakings which committed the infringement and the influence they are
able to exercise on the market, the conduct of each undertaking, the role played by each in
committing the infringement, the benefit which they have obtained from such anti-competitive
practices, and the economic context of the infringement, and the review of discretionary acts,
the General Court should assess the seriousness
of the infringement and the amount of the fine in accordance with the same
criteria as used by the Commission. The General Court should not limit its
power to exercise a comprehensive review of discretionary measures. Instead
it ought to make frequent use of the proportionality principle and adequacy
when it reviews challenges to decisions imposing fines.
When the EU courts simply annul a decision on the ground of illegality (i.e.
based on a plea of illegality alleged pursuant to Article 263 TFEU), without
ruling on the substance of the infringement or on the penalty, the institution
which adopted the annulled measure should re-open the procedure at the
stage at which the illegality was found to have occurred and re-exercise its
power, including the power to impose penalties.
By contrast, when an applicant challenges a decision imposing fines under a ˜plea of unlimited jurisdiction
based on Article 261 TFEU in connection with the Article 31 of Regulation
1/2003, the extent of the jurisdiction exercised by the EU courts reviewing such
decision should not be restricted to the criterion of manifest/obvious error
in the assessment performed by the Commission. The different, and wider,
character of the the plea of unlimited jurisdiction contesting a Commission
decision imposing a fine, exercised under Article 261 TFEU and Article 31
of Regulation 1/2003, in comparison with ˜the plea of illegality brought solely
under Article 263 TFEU, justifies the application of a comprehensive ˜full
jurisdiction
This full review is also indispensable from the point of view of protecting
fundamental rights. Formally, the EU courts have all the tools necessary to
perform a full review, so it is hardly comprehensible why they would limit
themselves and perform only the limited/narrow review. In order to comply
with the standards contained in Article 6 ECHR, the EU courts should ensure
that the 'strong' model is applied without exception.
A good starting point would be a change in the language used by the GC, so that applicants would
know when and if this court really performed a full review. There is also a
great need for continuity in the case-law. Furthermore, particularly since the
CFR has become a binding instrument since the effective date of the Lisbon
Treaty, the EU courts should put a much greater emphasis on review of the
proportionality between the incriminated practice and the level of fine. The
fines should be more personalized... On the other hand, applicants should
bear in mind that it is their responsibility to raise issues and pleas under the
law when appealing a decision, and it is their obligation to adduce evidence
in support of their pleas. The judicial review exercised by the EU courts is
limited to those claims duly raised and presented by the applicants
Ccje: Conclusions on the standards of conduct Of judges
- The CCJE is of the opinion that:
- i) judges should be guided in their activities by principles of professional conduct,
- ii) such principles should offer judges guidelines on how to proceed, thereby enabling them to overcome the difficulties they are faced with as regards their independence and impartiality,
iii) the said principles should be drawn up by the judges themselves and be totally separate from the judges’ disciplinary system,
- iv) it is desirable to establish in each country one or more bodies or persons within the judiciary to advise judges confronted with a problem related to professional ethics or compatibility of non judicial activities with their status.
- As regards the rules of conduct of every judge, the CCJE is of the opinion that:
- i) each individual judge should do everything to uphold judicial independence at both the institutional and the individual level,
- ii) judges should behave with integrity in office and in their private lives,
iii) they should at all times adopt an approach which both is and appears impartial,
- iv) they should discharge their duties without favouritism and without actual or apparent prejudice or bias,
- v) their decisions should be reached by taking into account all considerations material to the application of the relevant rules of law, and excluding from account all immaterial considerations,
- vi) they should show the consideration due to all persons taking part in the judicial proceedings or affected by these proceedings,
vii) they should discharge their duties with due respect for the equal treatment of parties, by avoiding any bias and any discrimination, maintaining a balance between the parties and ensuring each a fair hearing,
viii) they should show circumspection in their relations with the media, maintain their independence and impartiality by refraining from any personal exploitation of any relations with the media and from making any unjustified comments on the cases they are dealing with,
- ix) they should ensure they maintain a high degree of professional competence,
- x) they should have a high degree of professional awareness and be subject to an obligation of diligence in order to comply with the requirement to deliver their judgments in a reasonable time,
- xi) they should devote the most of their working time to their judicial functions, including associated activities,
xii) they should refrain from any political activity which could compromise their independence and cause detriment to their image of impartiality.
Conclusions on liability
- As regards criminal liability, the CCJE considers that:
- i) judges should be criminally liable in ordinary law for offences committed outside their judicial office;
- ii) criminal liability should not be imposed on judges for unintentional failings in the exercise of their functions.
- As regards civil liability, the CCJE considers that, bearing in mind the principle of independence:
- i) the remedy for judicial errors (whether in respect of jurisdiction, substance or procedure) should lie in an appropriate system of appeals (whether with or without permission of the court);
- ii) any remedy for other failings in the administration of justice (including for example excessive delay) lies only against the state;
iii) it is not appropriate for a judge to be exposed, in respect of the purported exercise of judicial functions, to any personal liability, even by way of reimbursement of the state, except in a case of wilful default.
- As regards disciplinary liability, the CCJE considers that:
- i) in each country the statute or fundamental charter applicable to judges should define, as far as possible in specific terms, the failings that may give rise to disciplinary sanctions as well as the procedures to be followed;
- ii) as regard the institution of disciplinary proceedings, countries should envisage introducing a specific body or person with responsibility for receiving complaints, for obtaining the representations of the judge and for considering in their light whether or not there is a sufficient case against the judge to call for the initiation of such proceedings;
iii) any disciplinary proceedings initiated should be determined by an independent authority or tribunal, operating a procedure guaranteeing full rights of defence;
- iv) when such authority or tribunal is not itself a court, then its members should be appointed by the independent authority (with substantial judicial representation chosen democratically by other judges) advocated by the CCJE in paragraph 46 of its Opinion N° 1 (2001);
- v)the arrangements regarding disciplinary proceedings in each country should be such as to allow an appeal from the initial disciplinary body (whether that is itself an authority, tribunal or court) to a court;
- vi) the sanctions available to such authority in a case of a proven misconduct should be defined, as far as possible in specific terms, by the statute or fundamental charter of judges, and should be applied in a proportionate manner.
Uk
forms of judicial accountability
∙ Internal accountability to more senior judges or courts by way of (a) the system of appeals against judicial decisions, and (b) procedures for dealing with complaints about the conduct of judges,
∙ External accountability to the public by way of amenability to scrutiny in particular by the media, but more widely by civil society,
∙ Accountability to the executive branch of the state (the Government), and
∙ Accountability to the legislative branch of the state (Parliament).
These forms of accountability overlap. For instance, the appeal and complaints processes provide both internal accountability and accountability to the public, and the giving of evidence to legislative committees provides direct accountability to Parliament and indirect accountability to the public
The accountability of individual judges
Accountability to the executive of the state
Under the Act of Settlement 1701 and subsequent legislation (currently the Supreme Court Act 1981, section 11(3) as amended by the CRA) judges of the High Court and the Court of Appeal hold office during “good behaviour”. This protection was given to protect judges against the power of the executive. These judges are not individually accountable to the executive in their capacity as such in either the “sacrificial” or the “explanatory” senses. It is axiomatic that safeguards on their tenure are a vital part of the independence of the judiciary.
That is not to say that the executive in the form of the Lord Chancellor has no role to play in the consideration of complaints and disciplinary proceedings made against judges. Such accountability, however, is subject to the limits set out in the CRA and the Concordat. The fundamentally important requirement is that the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice have to agree before a judge is removed or disciplined in some other way. The fact that both have a role ensures that the independence of an individual judge is not improperly infringed, either by the executive, or internally by another member of the judiciary.
Accountability to the legislative branch of the state:
As has been stated, both Houses of Parliament have the power, originating in the Act of Settlement, to petition the Queen for the removal of a judge of the High Court and the Court of Appeal, i.e. the ultimate form of accountability. It has not been exercised in modern history.
Turning to other forms of accountability, subject to a rule (“the sub judice rule”) preventing the discussion of ongoing cases, the decisions and conduct of individual judges may be mentioned in debates in either House. This, however, does not mean that judges are accountable to Parliament for their decisions in particular cases, save insofar as Parliament may legislate to reverse the effect of a decision (on which see below). Accountability for their decisions is incompatible with judges’ necessary independence.
Individual judges may also be invited to give evidence to Parliamentary Committees. Under Standing Orders, Select Committees and their sub-Committees have power to “send for persons, papers and records” relevant to their terms of reference. In modern times judges who have been asked to attend have done so voluntarily, subject to the well-established and long-standing rules and conventions that prevent judges from commenting on certain matters. 7 Parliamentary Committees respect these rules and conventions. The prohibited matters include; the merits of government policy, the merits of individual cases whether involving that judge or other judges, or of particular serving judicial officers, politicians and other public figures, and the merits, meaning or likely effect of provisions in prospective legislation.
Internal accountability to “the judiciary”:
In the sense that their decisions are subject to appeal and other judges are responsible for the allocation of cases to them, individual judges are accountable to senior judges or judges holding positions of responsibility. As for the conduct of judges, a working group established by the Judges’ Council published a Guide to Judicial Conduct in October 2004.8 This seeks to provide guidance on matters such as; impartiality, integrity, competence and diligence, personal relationships and perceived bias and activities outside the court.
The responsibilities of the Heads of Division, Presiding, Resident and Family Liaison and Chancery Supervision Judges, and judges in charge of a particular jurisdiction, are designed to assist in the effective management of judicial work.9 They must be exercised with due regard to the importance of the need to respect the independence of individual judges in relation to the decisions before them. This means, for example, that they cannot tell another judge how to decide a case. Decisions as to listing and allocation are designed to ensure that cases are heard by an appropriate judge and that the available judiciary is fully and effectively deployed within the resources provided by the executive branch of the state. It is to be observed, however, that one of the guarantees of independence under Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights, reflecting underlying common law principle, is that judges must be free from outside instructions or pressure from other members of the court or the judiciary. This limits the extent and form of discipline to which a judge may be subjected.
Accountability to the public: [WPI <>EEAC]
The formal processes of court proceedings provide a form of accountability to the public enabling scrutiny of the work of individual judges. As a general rule court proceedings and the decisions of judges are made in public. Decisions must be reasoned, and are subject to comment, often robust comment, by the media and other commentators. The quality of individual decisions is also subject to control in the form of appeal to higher courts against alleged errors. This identification and correction of error by appellate courts is also public and reasoned.
Complaints against the personal conduct of the judiciary (other than against decisions in proceedings) are handled by the Office for Judicial Complaints. Ultimately a report is made to the Lord Chief Justice and Lord Chancellor. Complaints about the handling of such complaints can be made to the Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman
The limits of accountability and practices:
Reference has been made to the limits on what a judge may properly deal with in giving evidence to a Parliamentary Committee and the fact that High Court judges and above can only be removed by the Queen on an address from both Houses of Parliament. Other judges can be removed for incapacity or misconduct pursuant to statutory powers.
When the Lord Chancellor was Head of the Judiciary he exercised the power to remove members of the circuit and district benches alone. The changes in the nature of the office of Lord Chancellor in 2003 mean this is no longer appropriate and the CRA and the Concordat provide he may only do so if the Lord Chief Justice agrees. The Lord Chief Justice may only suspend a person from a judicial office if the requirements of section 108(4)-(7) are satisfied.
Judges of the High Court and the Court of Appeal court are also absolutely immune from personal civil liability in respect of any judicial act done in the bona fide exercise of their office as a judge of that court.
The position of circuit and district judges who sit in courts of limited jurisdiction is different. They may be in certain circumstances liable in tort for acts beyond their jurisdiction and to judicial review proceedings. The immunity extends to judicial acts undertaken by officers of the courts but not to administrative acts by HMCS.
The reason for a judge’s immunity from civil suit is “so that he should be able to do his duty with complete independence and free from fear”. It is not because the judge has any privilege to make mistakes or to do wrong. The appeal system deals with such matters, and the criminal courts deal with criminal wrongdoing
UK: institutional accountability of the judiciary
There are clear links between individual accountability and institutional accountability.
It is important to distinguish the accountability of the judiciary as an institution from that of the courts as an institution and that of HMCS. This is because of the responsibility of the Lord Chancellor for the resourcing of the courts. For example, if a lack of resources means there are insufficient courts, court staff or judges and the result of this is delay, it is the Lord Chancellor and not the judiciary who is responsible and accountable.
The responsibility of the judiciary for the deployment of judges, training, pastoral issues, part of the complaints and disciplinary system, and the provision of an effective judicial system within the resources provided, mean that it is legitimate for there to be some form of accountability in respect of these matters. In respect of those matters on which the judiciary share responsibility with the Lord Chancellor, it is legitimate for there to be a measure of “explanatory” accountability by the judiciary. The remainder of this section considers existing forms of such accountability.
-Accountability to the executive branch of the state:
The reasons precluding the accountability of individual judges to the executive apply equally to institutional accountability. In the light of the dangers to judicial independence of direct accountability to the executive, it would appear that the primary forms of accountability must either be to the legislature or to the public in the sense that the system is made amenable to and subjected to scrutiny by civil society. 12
-Accountability to the legislative branch of the state:
This takes a number of forms. The first is strictly a matter of control rather than accountability. Save where the issue is one of EU law, Parliament may change the law by legislation reversing a decision or decisions concerning the interpretation of a statute or a body of common law doctrine.
Judges also give evidence to legislative committees in a representative capacity. The basis for such invitations and the matters on which judges should not give evidence are set out above, and more fully, in July 2006 Guidance produced by the Judicial Executive Board (JEB).13 The Guidance recognises that an individual judge might appear as a representative. It states that judges should carefully consider whether they can answer questions about matters concerning the administration of justice which fall outside their area of judicial responsibility or previous responsibility.
The boundaries of legitimate questioning reflect the need to protect the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. Increasingly, committees are interested in hearing from a judicial witness who can give evidence in a representative capacity, although there are also invitations to judges because of their experience. Senior judges including the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, President of the Queen’s Bench Division, President of the Family Division, the lead judge in the Administrative Court, the Judge Advocate General, and the Senior District Judge responsible for extradition have responded to invitations by Parliamentary Committees and have given evidence in a representative capacity.
The giving of evidence pursuant to such invitations by representatives of the judiciary, including those responsible for a particular jurisdiction, is a form of institutional “explanatory” accountability. The accountability is primarily to Parliament, but indirectly it is also to the public. Select Committees can also be an appropriate forum for the Lord Chief Justice or other senior judges to explain or state their views on aspects of the administration of justice that are of general interest or concern and upon which it is appropriate for them to comment. The appearance of judges before Select Committees should, however, be a relatively rare, and thus a significant event less the proper boundary between the judiciary and Parliament is crossed. Appearances by judges before Parliamentary Committees should be a relatively rare and significant event. Such appearances must be truly necessary and appropriate.
-Accountability to the public and amenity to scrutiny by civil society:
Some of the forms of accountability discussed above can be seen as an indirect form of accountability to the public. This is so in the case of the formal processes of court proceedings and the appellate process. These enable scrutiny of the outcomes of cases and comment by the press, interested parties and commentators. In addition, there is also the giving of evidence to Parliamentary Committees by representatives of the judiciary on occasions where this is truly necessary and appropriate.
Interviews and media briefings: The giving of interviews and subjecting oneself to questions by representatives of the press and other media is certainly a form of accountability. From time to time, at any rate since Lord Taylor became Lord Chief Justice in 1993, the holder of that office has given occasional interviews and media briefings, as have other senior members of the judiciary.
The judiciary’s website: Much information about the judiciary is now available to the public on the judiciary’s website (www.judiciary.gov.uk). It has assisted in explaining and opening up the work of judges to public scrutiny. There are sections on ‘About the Judiciary’, containing sections interalia on ‘roles and types of jurisdiction’, ‘Judges and the Constitution’, ‘Conduct, complaints and appeals’, ‘Terms of service’, and ‘Court dress’. The focus of the site is on accessibility and on matters which are considered to be of interest to the public.
Annual Reports: The annual reports on the operation of particular jurisdictions and the report that the Lord Chief Justice makes to the Queen and Parliament are another and more direct form of accountability to the public.
Annual reports are made by the Civil and Criminal Divisions of the Court of Appeal, the Commercial and Admiralty Courts, and the Technology and Construction Court, the regional reports by the Crown, County, Family and Magistrates Courts, and “overview” reports by the Senior Presiding Judge on the Crown and County Courts, and by the President of the Family Division on the Family Courts. There are also reports by the Judges’ Council by the Ethnic Minority Liaison Judges on the judiciary’s website, and the JSB publishes an annual report which can be seen on its website. HMCS also publishes the annual Judicial Statistics.
Formal complaints about personal conduct and other complaints against judges will be considered by the Office for Judicial Complaints (OJC) and the Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman (JACO). Both publish annual reports.
The court reports and Judicial Statistics provide a statistical analysis of the work and waiting times based on the figures provided by HMCS.
Many of them discuss significant developments and assessments of the implication of trends. The other reports referred to, such as the Judicial Study Board’s (JSB) annual report, also contain much valuable information. The reports are valuable tools for external scrutiny of the system and are thus potentially another and more direct form of accountability to the public for the administration of justice.
The court reports do not always clearly identify and separate the respective responsibilities of the department, HMCS, and the judiciary and thus the respective areas for which each should be accountable. While this means that they are not purely tools for the accountability of the judiciary, they do in part provide such accountability. They are important sources of information for the public, for Parliamentarians, and for the government. They are also an important resource for the judiciary in that it is the detailed information in reports which enable the judiciary to comment, for example in the Lord Chief Justice’s annual report, on matters such as the condition of the court estate, staffing levels, and the provision and allocation of resources.
uk Summary
Individual judges are subject to a strong system of internal accountability in respect of legal errors and personal conduct, but outside the judiciary these are often not understood in terms of accountability.
Individual judges are accountable to the public in the sense that in general their decisions are in public and are discussed, often critically, in the media and by interest groups and sections of the public affected by them. The judiciary is similarly institutionally accountable in respect of first instance and appellate decisions.
Neither individual judges nor the judiciary are, nor should they be, accountable to the executive branch of the state because that is inimical to the judicial independence which is a necessary requirement for the discharge by judges of their core responsibility to resolve disputes fairly and impartially. The Lord Chancellor’s role in the consideration of complaints and disciplinary proceedings against judges is not inconsistent with this. The requirement that the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice have to agree before a judge is removed or disciplined in some other way ensures that the independence of an individual judge is not improperly infringed, either by the executive, or internally by another member of the judiciary.
Individual judges should not be accountable to Parliament for their decisions or for matters which fall outside their area of judicial responsibility or previous responsibility, but may be invited to give evidence to Select Committees on the operation of the jurisdictions for which they are responsible and in which they operate. The matters on which they should not answer questions are set out in the Judicial Executive Board’s Guidance. Senior judges are accountable to Parliament through the procedure for removal set out in the Act of Settlement, but there are no examples of dismissal being considered let alone exercised in modern times. There are, however, a small number of examples of senior judges resigning following public discussion about their conduct, including delay in delivering judgment.
When representatives of the senior judiciary and those responsible for particular jurisdictions give evidence to Select Committees on aspects of the administration of justice that are of general interest or concern and upon which it is appropriate for them to comment this can be seen as a form of institutional accountability to Parliament and through Parliament to the public. The boundaries of legitimate questioning are indicated in the Guidance.
The annual reports on the operation of particular jurisdictions and that by the Lord Chief Justice to the Queen in Parliament are valuable tools for external scrutiny of the system and are thus another form of accountability for the administration of justice