the world v google…adtech

progoogle grounds

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1. “Duty to deal” argument

• Google’s stance: Google argues that it should not be required to share its ad tech tools or platforms with competitors, as there is no legal obligation for a company to do so under U.S. antitrust laws.
• Potential gap: The DOJ might argue that while there is no explicit “duty to deal” under current law, Google’s dominance in the digital ad space as a whole effectively forces advertisers and publishers to rely on its tools. This could open the door to claims that Google’s practices limit competition by creating barriers for smaller players, even if there is no formal requirement to share resources.

2. Narrow market definition

• Google’s stance: Google claims the DOJ’s market definition is too narrow, focusing on “open web display advertising” rather than a broader range of ad formats and markets.
• Potential gap: While Google highlights competition from other digital ad platforms (like Amazon, Facebook and Microsoft), the DOJ could argue that Google holds overwhelming power in the specific subset of open web display ads. If the DOJ can successfully define the market more narrowly and demonstrate Google’s dominance, it could strengthen its antitrust argument. Whether Judge Brinkemma will allow this change in definition would be critical to this potential advantage.

3. Defunct practices

• Google’s stance: Google asserts that many of the challenged practices – except for Uniform Pricing Rules (UPR) – are no longer in use, weakening the DOJ’s claims.
• Potential gap: The DOJ may counter that even if these practices are defunct, they could have had long-lasting effects on market structure and competition. Practices like Dynamic revenue, reserve prize optimisation and more would have a long-term effect. These past practices might have entrenched Google’s dominance and limited competitors’ abilities to grow, resulting in reduced competition today.

4. Self-serving justifications for integration

• Google’s stance: Google argues that its integrated tools benefit both advertisers and publishers by providing a safer, cheaper and more effective platform.
• Potential gap: The DOJ may argue that this integration, while convenient, could also be seen as self-serving and exclusionary. The integration of Google’s ad tech stack may prevent third-party companies from offering competitive services and lock users into Google’s ecosystem, making it harder for other companies to compete.

5. Control over the ad ecosystem

• Google’s stance: Google insists that publishers and advertisers have control over how ads are bought and sold, with multiple options to mix and match ad tech tools.
• Potential gap: The DOJ could argue that despite this theoretical control, Google’s overwhelming market presence effectively limits meaningful alternatives. Publishers and advertisers may be forced to use Google’s tools to stay competitive, creating a de facto monopoly in certain aspects of the ad tech market.

6. Competitive landscape

• Google’s stance: Google cites competition from other tech giants like Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft as evidence that the ad tech space is fiercely competitive.
• Potential gap: The DOJ may argue that the competition Google points to exists in adjacent markets, such as social media advertising or ecommerce ads. Within the specific market for open web display ads, Google may still hold a monopolistic position, and competition in other areas doesn’t fully mitigate its control over this segment.

7. Impact on consumers

• Google’s stance: Google frames its practices as consumer-friendly, emphasizing lower fees and improved ad performance.
• Potential gap: The DOJ could focus on the broader implications of reduced competition, such as the potential for higher prices for advertisers in the long term, fewer choices for publishers and an overall reduction in innovation. The DOJ may argue that even if short-term costs are lower, the market dominance could harm consumers and businesses in the future.

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v google grounds

  understanding the value chain is key to ascertain potential competition problems: integration of services, the role of data, self-preferencing in vertically integrated platforms, etc.

MAP=CONCENTRATION, may be attained either through:

Concentration as such is not a problem, unless it alters competitive dynamics by gradually integrating services along the value chain. ex: advertisers and competitors in the ad tech ecosystem (DSPs and SSPs) are harmed becos, to access big audiences of digital platforms they must use these platforms’ DSP>> it harms their competitiveness as a DSP >> switching costs. Data has become a competitive constraint and a barrier to entry.

A/winner-takes-it-all dynamics: EX.via EOS, learning, scope and network effects (for instance in digital markets). network effects and the role of data (with learning, scope and scale economies) generates a trend towards increasing concentration (winner-takesit-all dynamics)

B/ business consolidation via MATOS:  Given the financialisation envelopment and strategies of firms (ex online advert.digital firms), mergers can cause a SLC, even when, apparently, not involving potential competitors , becos The exploitation of data is non-rival.[EX: companies buy a potential competitor or a firm with a complementary database =  data-driven mergers]

C/antitrust (adp.cartels):  we can prove ADP.cartel by simply adapting to theories of harm (ex wrt online advertising markets) exs: tying and bundling to leverage MAP;  foreclosure or discrimination in the access to inputs; unjustified self-preferencing; lack of transparency; undue abrupt changes in trade conditions)

why digitalisation is harming clp and conslp:

– digital advertising has a direct impact on consumers via novel issues such as privacy and data protection. digital advertising has disrupted the value chain.   the three main sources of competitive advantage for digital platforms: huge audiences, high-quality databases and service integration via intermediary services.  Even if the monetary cost is zero for consumers and totally born by advertisers, the economic cost is shared by both agents: consumers pay with their attention to ads, and personal data >>  affects consumer welfare.

– traditional publishers have to adapt their technology in order to be viewable on new devices (e.g. through online journals or over-the-top audiovisual services).

-digital platforms are competing with traditional publishers for audiences, and hence competing for advertisers’ budget too. Due to network effects, platforms can subsidize additional services (ex search engines) with the fees they charge to advertisers

-the firms that entered first  >> Economies of (Scale, learning (ai algorithms), personal data collection, and scope) are much more potent in digital platforms >> they have a comparative advantage over traditional publishers.  ex: personal data collection allows to target advertising at the level of individuals.

-Demand-Side Platforms (DSPs) aggregate advertisers’/agencies’ bids and Supply-Side Platforms (SSPs) aggregate publishers’ offer of space. DSPs and SSPs can enrich their bids/offers with targetability options, and this explains the relevance of data management platforms (DMPs), whose services can be integrated in DSPs/SSPs to improve targetability or measurability

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GCN: COCOO 2HELP GOOGLE   : Google has said it will “vigorously” dispute a “speculative and opportunistic” class action that claims it stifled competition in the search advertising market. Google hit with new £7.3 billion lawsuit in UK

cat:class foc v google :  2 claims against (1) Alphabet Inc; (2) Google LLC; (3) Google Ireland limited; and (4) Google UK Limited (the Defendants). the 2 diff.claims are from: -Mr Claudio Pollack and Mr Charles Arthur, were consolidated by the cat, into the : Ad Tech Collective Action LLP (the Class Representative). is a claim for loss and damage allegedly caused by the Proposed Defendants’ breach of statutory duty by their infringement of section 18 of the Competition Act 1998 and Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Class Representative seeks to recover damages to compensate UK-domiciled publishers and publisher partners, for alleged harm in the form of lower revenues caused by the Defendants’ conduct in the ad tech sector.

GCN.: COCOO 2 HELP GOOGLE Google is facing a £5 billion class action from a competition law academic for allegedly overcharging UK-based advertisers “billions of pounds” for search advertising.

GCN: 2CLAIMSV.google  : Two proposed class representatives seeking up to €25 billion in damages from Google have urged the UK’s Competition Appeal Tribunal to decide which claim is best placed to proceed ahead of a full certification hearing, thereby taking a different approach to that adopted – and criticised – in the Forex carriage dispute

GCN:TURKEY.cma.vGOOGLE : Google’s online advertising model continues to attract antitrust scrutiny, with Turkey’s competition watchdog today hitting the tech giant with a €70 million fine for abusing its dominant position in the ad server services market. The company must now grant competitors equal access to its ad exchange service within six months of receiving the agency’s full decision. Also in The Briefing, Brazil sanctions a pharmaceutical cartel and Google’s efforts to comply with the Digital Markets Act draw more criticism…..ALSO, Turkey’s competition watchdog begins probing tyre companies already under investigation in Brussels and more details come to light about remedies offered by Synopsys and Ansys to the European Commission.

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