15dec uk vet pharma

20DEC

Based on your request, the provided files, and the current status of the CMA Veterinary Services Market Investigation as of December 20, 2025, here is your custom balancing act report.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE DECEMBER 15/16 TRIGGER

The focus of this report is the window for Judicial Review (JR) opened by the CMA’s recent procedural steps, specifically the publication of the Qualitative Consumer Research Report and the Updated Administrative Timetable on or around December 15-16, 2025.

Current Status: The CMA published its Provisional Decision Report (PDR) on October 15, 2025, and the consultation closed on November 14, 2025. The Final Decision is now expected in February/March 2026.

The immediate JR opportunities arise from the CMA’s introduction of new evidence (the Consumer Research) at this late stage and the proposed “Remedies Package” (price caps, mandatory prescription writing) which arguably conflict with broader Public Interest (WPI) goals like animal welfare.

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JR OPPORTUNITY 1: PROCEDURAL UNFAIRNESS (THE “LATE EVIDENCE” CHALLENGE)

The Challenge:

You can challenge the CMA’s decision to introduce significant new qualitative consumer research in mid-December 2025, just months before the Final Decision. If the CMA relies on this new evidence to justify remedies (like the prescription price cap) without allowing a “fair” consultation period, this constitutes procedural unfairness.

The Balancing Act:

• Pros (Why do it):

  • Courts are strict on “fair procedure” and “rights of defence”. A public body must give adequate time for consultation, especially when proposals are at a formative stage or new material is introduced.

  • Introducing complex evidence just before the holiday period (Christmas) can be argued as creating an “impossibly short deadline,” a ground on which the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) has previously struck down CMA timelines (e.g., in Sainsbury’s/Asda).

  • Success here results in a “quashing order” or a “prohibiting order” stopping the CMA from acting until proper procedure is followed, buying valuable time.

• Cons (Risks):

  • The remedy is often just a delay. The CMA may simply extend the deadline, correct the procedural error, and adopt the same decision later.

  • The CAT allows the CMA to curtail disclosure for “administrative efficiency”. You must prove the non-disclosure or short deadline “affected the applicant’s ability to effectively defend its interests”.

Verdict:

High likelihood of a short-term tactical win if the deadline for responding to the Dec 16 evidence is less than 3-4 weeks. This is a strong “delaying” move but not a “killing” move.

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JR OPPORTUNITY 2: SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGE (WPI VS. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY)

The Challenge:

The CMA’s proposed remedies (e.g., capping prescription fees to £16, mandating online prescription signposting) are based on “Economic Efficiency” (EE) goals (lower prices, consumer choice). You can argue these remedies are “irrational” or “disproportionate” because they ignore or actively harm a conflicting Public Interest (WPI): Animal Welfare and Access to Services (Sustainability).

The Argument:

• Veterinary services are a “quasi-market” where WPI goals (health, safety) often override pure competition.

• Forcing lower margins on medicines (cross-subsidization removal) may force clinics to close or reduce out-of-hours coverage, directly harming the WPI goal of animal health/security of supply.

• If the CMA failed to “balance” these WPI impacts against the EE gains, the decision is flawed. Courts can intervene if a decision maker fails to take relevant factors (WPI) into account.

The Balancing Act:

• Pros (Why do it):

  • Sustainability and animal welfare are recognized WPI grounds.

  • If you can show the remedies make essential services (like 24/7 care) unviable, this touches on “security of supply” and “public health” (broadly defined).

  • The “Chicken of Tomorrow” case precedent suggests that while competition authorities (like the Dutch ACM) often prioritize price, higher courts/bodies are increasingly open to WPI arguments if the “social benefits” outweigh the price reduction.

• Cons (Risks):

  • The CMA has “wide discretion” in complex economic assessments. Courts are reluctant to substitute their own view unless the CMA’s error is “manifest”.

  • The UK Enterprise Act 2002 prioritizes the “substantial lessening of competition” (SLC) test over WPI, unlike some other jurisdictions. The “Tebbit doctrine” shifted focus away from broad public interest.

Verdict:

A harder legal battle but one with higher strategic value. It attacks the validity of the remedies, not just the timing. It requires strong economic evidence that the remedies will cause “market failure” in the provision of rural or emergency vet care.

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JR OPPORTUNITY 3: ULTRA VIRES (THE “LEGISLATIVE REACH” CHALLENGE)

The Challenge:

The CMA proposes to implement certain remedies (like the price cap or mandatory ownership transparency) via a “CMA Order” before new legislation (the new Veterinary Surgeons Act) is passed. You can argue this is Ultra Vires (beyond their powers).

The Argument:

• Major changes to a regulated profession involving “political choices” (e.g., who can own a vet practice, strict price controls) are “Essential Elements” that should be decided by the Legislature (Parliament), not delegated to an authority via an Order.

• If the CMA’s Order effectively rewrites the Veterinary Surgeons Act (primary legislation), it is invalid because only Parliament can change primary legislation.

• The CMA cannot use its Order-making power to bypass the democratic process for “essential elements” of regulation.

The Balancing Act:

• Pros (Why do it):

  • This is a “hard legal question” where claimants are statistically more likely to win in the CAT than on economic arguments.

  • If the court agrees the measures are “essential elements” requiring Parliament’s assent, the remedies are quashed completely until the government passes a new Act (which takes years).

• Cons (Risks):

  • The Enterprise Act 2002 gives the CMA broad powers to “remedy, mitigate or prevent” adverse effects. The court may find the Order is within these broad statutory powers.

Verdict:

This is the “Nuclear Option.” If successful, it invalidates the CMA’s ability to impose the most draconian remedies without an Act of Parliament.

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RECOMMENDATION: THE “COCOO” STRATEGY

1. Immediate Action (Not Time-Barred):

File a “Letter Before Claim” (Pre-Action Protocol) regarding the December 16 Consumer Research. Demand an extension of the consultation period to January 31, 2026, citing “Procedural Unfairness” and the inability to analyze complex data over the holiday period. This is a low-cost step that puts the CMA on the back foot.

2. The “Fee Promise” (Legitimate Expectation):

As per the Cocoo methodology, check if the CMA or Government made any prior “soft law” promises, guidance, or statements that they would not intervene in vet pricing until the new Veterinary Surgeons Act was passed. If such a promise exists, you can claim “Legitimate Expectation” to block the Order. Cocoo Note: Seek a fee promise from your client (the vet firms) now, grounded in the argument that you are saving them from millions in lost revenue..

3. The “WPI” Pivot:

Shift the narrative from “protecting vet profits” to “protecting animal welfare (WPI).” Frame the CMA’s “Efficiency” remedies as a threat to the “Security of Supply” of veterinary medicines and 24/7 care. Use the “Chicken of Tomorrow” logic: consumers (pet owners) care more about the quality/availability of care (Sustainability) than just the lowest price.

Time Limits Warning:

You must bring any JR claim promptly and within 3 months of the decision. For the Provisional Decision (Oct 15), the window is closing (Jan 15). For the New Evidence (Dec 16), the clock has just started. Focus on the Dec 16 event to ensure you are not time-barred.

ALLIES

Based on the legal analysis in the provided blog post, successful judicial reviews (JR) against regulators like the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and the Veterinary Medicines Directorate (VMD) would create opportunities for compensation and positive change for various groups. These groups are primarily “diffuse victims” such as independent veterinarians, pet owners, and the environment, who currently lack the means to challenge these issues individually.

Here is a list of organizations that would likely benefit from a successful JR, along with their official contact details.

**Progressive Veterinary Association (PVA)**
This campaigning organization represents veterinarians focused on animal welfare and environmental protection. A JR success, particularly on environmental omissions or the SIC policy, would advance their core mission and could allow them to seek remedies for their members.
– Official Email: info@pva.vet[reference:0]
– Address: 81 Stanmer Park Road, Brighton, England, BN1 7JL[reference:1]

**British Veterinary Association (BVA)**
As the national representative body for UK vets, the BVA would benefit from a JR that challenges the CMA’s “soft remedies” and the VMD’s SIC policy. A ruling in favor of more effective regulation would help its members, especially independent practices, by addressing excessive drug pricing and restricted competition.
– Official Email: bvahq@bva.co.uk[reference:2]
– Address: 7 Mansfield Street, London W1G 9NQ[reference:3]

**British Small Animal Veterinary Association (BSAVA)**
This association represents veterinarians in small animal practice. Their members are directly affected by high drug costs and data privacy concerns related to corporate veterinary groups. A favorable JR outcome could lead to follow-on claims for compensation related to overcharging and data misuse.
– Official Email: administration@bsava.com[reference:4]
– Address: Woodrow House, 1 Telford Way, Waterwells Business Park, Quedgeley, Gloucestershire GL2 2AB[reference:5]

**British Equine Veterinary Association (BEVA)**
Equine practitioners are also impacted by the issues of drug pricing and availability. A successful challenge to the VMD’s SIC policy could lower costs for horse owners and restore competitive conditions for equine vets.
– Official Email: info@beva.org.uk[reference:6]
– Address: Mulberry House, Market Street, Fordham, Cambs, CB7 5LQ[reference:7]

**Other Potential Beneficiaries (Contact Details Require Further Verification)**
The blog post identifies several other entities that would gain from a successful JR, but their official contact details could not be verified within the available steps. These include:
* **Environmental NGOs:** Groups like **River Action UK** and the **Angling Trust**, who would benefit from a JR forcing the Environment Agency to address river pollution from parasiticides.
* **Veterinary Corporate Groups:** Large entities like **IVC Evidensia**, **CVS**, and **Mars** could potentially benefit from a JR that clarifies or alters market regulations, though their stance would be complex.
* **Consumer Protection Bodies:** Organizations like **Which?** or **Citizens Advice** could use a JR finding to advocate for consumer compensation funds.
* **The National Farmers’ Union (NFU):** UK farmers are end-users of veterinary medicines, and changes to the SIC regime could affect their costs.

To compile a complete list with contact details for all relevant parties, further specific searches for the above organizations would be necessary.

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19DEC

Based on my review of the case file, I can provide the following legal analysis.

Regarding your first question, no judicial review (JR) proceedings have been commenced in this matter as of the date of the solicitor’s review (17 December 2025). The file indicates the next step is the preparation of Pre-Action Protocol letters.

Crucially, several identified causes of action are **not time-barred**. The primary opportunity arises from the Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) **Provisional Decision of October 2025**, which is a recent and challengeable decision. Furthermore, the omissions by the Veterinary Medicines Directorate (VMD) and Environment Agency regarding environmental pollution constitute **continuing failures**, which reset any limitation period. The ongoing implementation of the VMD’s policy on Special Import Certificates (SICs) also represents a continuing state of affairs.

Your proposed strategy of writing to the public body is sound. A Pre-Action Protocol letter demanding action (e.g., to suspend a marketing authorisation or re-open an investigation) that is met with a **fresh refusal** would create a new, discrete decision ripe for JR. This would also bolster standing, as you would be directly challenging a decision made in response to your specific demand.

The key, non-time-barred Causes of Action (COAs) are:
1. **Irrationality (*Wednesbury* unreasonableness) against the CMA**: For proposing “soft” behavioural remedies (price transparency, a prescription fee cap) that are manifestly incapable of addressing the structural market failures and excessive drug markups identified. This favours a “no particular victim” applicant, as the harm is widespread low-value consumer detriment where individual litigation is economically irrational.
2. **Illegality/Ultra Vires against the VMD**: For operating the SIC regime with the improper purpose of protecting the commercial interests of UK licence holders, rather than the statutory purpose of animal and public health. This directly harms a diffuse class (SME vets, pet owners) who bear higher costs.
3. **Procedural Impropriety & Irrationality against the VMD/Environment Agency**: For the failure to require Environmental Risk Assessments for parasiticides, ignoring compelling scientific evidence of pollution. This creates standing to represent clear public interest in environmental protection where no individual has a sufficient personal stake to sue.
4. **Misfeasance in Public Office (Tort)**: A potential claim if evidence emerges that officials knowingly acted unlawfully (e.g., maintaining the SIC ban despite understanding its anti-competitive effect) or were recklessly indifferent to the obvious harms.

The concept of “sufficient interest” for standing is met here through the **aggregation of diffuse harms** and the **clear public interest in regulating unlawful state action**. The “Lord Hope” model supports standing for an organisation acting on behalf of those suffering low-value, widespread harm where an enforcement vacuum exists.

### Ultra Vires & Irrational DORCAPs

Ranked in order of likelihood of success:

1. **CMA’s Provisional Decision (October 2025) proposing weak remedies**. This is highly susceptible to an irrationality challenge. A court is likely to find it *Wednesbury* unreasonable for a regulator, having identified profound market failures (consolidation, excessive pricing), to reject potent structural remedies like divestment in favour of mere transparency measures. The reasoning is that transparency does nothing to alter the underlying market power and the evidence suggests it will be ineffective.

2. **VMD’s omission to require Environmental Risk Assessments for prophylactic parasiticides**. This ranks highly for both irrationality and illegality. It is irrational to ignore scientific evidence (e.g., 99% river contamination) and maintain a policy based on outdated assumptions. It may also be ultra vires if the statutory duty to ensure safety is interpreted to encompass environmental safety, from which public health derives.

3. **VMD’s policy/conduct regarding Special Import Certificates**. Strong ultra vires potential exists if the predominant purpose is proven to be economic protectionism rather than health. The legal reasoning turns on the distinction between a lawful but harsh policy and one pursued for an improper purpose forbidden by the parent statute.

4. **Environment Agency’s omission to prosecute or regulate river pollution**. This is a pure failure to act, challengeable as irrational. However, the court may afford the agency wider discretion on prosecution priorities, making it a slightly weaker ground than the VMD’s positive regulatory failure.

### Suspended Quashing Orders

Two primary quashing orders should be sought:
First, an order quashing the CMA’s Provisional Decision on remedies. This should be suspended for **six months** to allow the CMA to conduct a lawful remittal, consulting on and implementing effective structural remedies. The condition should be that the CMA publishes a consultation on divestment and/or direct price control mechanisms within two months of the order.

Second, an order quashing the VMD’s policy of not requiring Environmental Risk Assessments for companion animal parasiticides. This should be suspended for **nine months** to allow the VMD to develop and consult on a legally compliant framework for environmental evaluation. A condition must be attached prohibiting the grant of any new marketing authorisations for such products during the suspension period without a full assessment.

### Ongoing Harm & Injunctive Relief

The ongoing harms are clear: continuous environmental contamination of waterways and the continued overcharging of millions of pet owners due to ineffective remedies and restricted import competition.

An application for a final mandatory injunction should be drafted against the VMD. The core elements would be: (1) a mandatory order compelling the VMD to issue, within 28 days, a direction to all marketing authorisation holders for specified parasiticides to submit a full Environmental Risk Assessment; (2) an interim prohibition, pending completion of those assessments, on the promotion of these products for non-essential prophylactic use; and (3) an order for the VMD to report to the claimant’s solicitors every 60 days on compliance.

### Statement of Legal Principle Declaration

The requested declaration should state: “It is hereby declared that the Competition and Markets Authority acted irrationally and in breach of its statutory duty under the Enterprise Act 2002 by determining that behavioural remedies centred on price transparency and a prescription fee cap were sufficient to address the substantial adverse effects on competition identified in the veterinary services market, where such remedies are incapable of mitigating the structural market power and excessive pricing caused by vertical integration and consolidation.”

### Risk Disclosure Statement

The proposed court order should require the public body (e.g., the CMA) to publish, within 21 days, a “Public Interest Risk Disclosure Statement” on the homepage of its website and in its next annual report. The statement must: (i) acknowledge the specific unlawfulness found by the Court; (ii) describe in plain terms the risks created to consumers and competition; and (iii) outline the concrete steps being taken to remediate the issue, with timelines. It must remain publicly accessible for no less than two years.

### Assessment & Publicity of Risk

The solicitor’s FOI requests are explicitly designed to uncover this. The requests ask for internal risk registers, legal advice summaries, and board papers regarding the ultra vires and irrationality risks of the key DORCAPs. The very fact that these questions must be asked via FOI strongly suggests that no such assessments were made public, if they exist at all. A **failure to conduct a proper prior risk assessment** is a further ground for challenge, demonstrating a lack of due diligence and a failure to take relevant considerations into account, falling within procedural impropriety.

### Responsible Parties & Individual Liability

The specific units responsible are: (a) the VMD’s **Authorisations Unit** (for the SIC policy and environmental omission); and (b) the CMA’s **Market Investigation Team** for the veterinary services study.

Based on the file, the answer to questions (a) through (c) is a clear **”no.”** No internal investigations into misfeasance, contributory liability, disciplinary proceedings, dismissals, or fines are noted. This line of inquiry must be pursued aggressively. The FOI requests explicitly ask about investigations into officials and “acciones de regreso” (recovery actions). Establishing a pattern of impunity for decision-makers is critical for seeking more invasive personal remedies and deterring future misconduct.

### Tort Damages & Remediation Project

A reasoned estimate for aggregate tort damages, focusing on consumer overcharging, could reasonably be in the **mid-hundreds of millions of pounds**. This is based on a notional annual overcharge per pet-owning household extrapolated across the UK population.

Given the unidentifiable class of victims, a cy-près or similar mechanism is essential. I propose the creation of a **”Veterinary Consumer and Environmental Remediation Fund.”** The damages would be paid into this independent trust.

The Fund would finance two key initiatives: First, a **national public education programme** on responsible parasiticide use, pet medication cost transparency, and owner rights. Second, a **grant scheme for independent veterinary practices** to support business resilience and alternative, environmentally sustainable service models. This directly benefits the sector harmed by corporate consolidation and creates positive externalities by empowering consumers, supporting SME vets, and reducing environmental pollution—thus meaningfully remediating the very harms the torts caused.

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17dec

Here are the 5 Customised FOI Letters drafted specifically for the key regulators involved in the UK Veterinary Pharma case.

Each letter applies the Model Template but adapts the specific “DORCAP” (Decision, Omission, Regulation, Conduct, Action, Policy) to match the distinct statutory duties and alleged failures of that specific body.

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1. TO: VETERINARY MEDICINES DIRECTORATE (VMD)

Subject: Focus on the “Ultra Vires” Import Bans (SIC) and Environmental Omission (Fipronil).

To: The FOI Officer

Veterinary Medicines Directorate (VMD)

Woodham Lane, New Haw

Addlestone, Surrey, KT15 3LS

By Email: postmaster@vmd.gov.uk / foi@defra.gov.uk

Date: 17 December 2025

Re: Freedom of Information Request – Evidence of Ultra Vires Risk Reports regarding Special Import Certificates (SIC) & Environmental Risk Assessments

I am Oscar Moya, Director of Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO.uk), 23 Village Way, Beckenham, Kent BR3 3NA. Companies House: 15466919.

This request is submitted under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. It focuses on the DORCAPs:

1. The Decision/Policy to refuse Special Import Certificates (SICs) for EU veterinary medicines where a UK-licensed equivalent exists (the “Protectionist Policy”).

2. The Omission to require individual Environmental Risk Assessments (ERAs) for prophylactic companion animal parasiticides (e.g., Fipronil/Imidacloprid).

Part 1: Establishing Enforcement Vacuum and Locus Standi

• Provide a breakdown of complaints or appeals received in the last 3 years regarding the refusal of SICs, categorised by complainant type (e.g., Independent Vet Practices vs. Wholesalers).

• Disclose any internal analysis regarding the price differential between UK-licensed products and the EU alternatives requested via SIC (confirming if the “harm” to vets/consumers is known).

• Confirm if any Judicial Review has been commenced against the VMD regarding the SIC regime or Environmental Assessments in the last 3 years.

Part 2: Ultra Vires Risk Reports and Foreseeable Harms

• Confirm the existence of any risk register entry or board paper that flagged the restriction of trade, competition distortion, or Ultra Vires risk arising from the strict enforcement of the SIC “Hierarchy of Medicines.”

• Disclose any internal legal advice summary or risk assessment regarding the “Improper Purpose” risk (i.e., using safety regulations to protect the commercial exclusivity of UK license holders).

• Regarding Environmental Omissions: Disclose the risk rating (Red/Amber/Green) associated with “River Pollution from Companion Animal Parasiticides” on the VMD Risk Register over the last 24 months.

Part 3: Investigations into Officials’ Torts and Recovery Actions

• Confirm if any internal investigation has been initiated to determine if officials responsible for maintaining the SIC ban—despite knowledge of excessive UK pricing—acted with misfeasance or failure to assess competition harms.

• If the VMD has paid legal costs or settlements related to challenges against SIC refusals, confirm if recovery actions (acciones de regreso) were considered against the decision-makers responsible for the refusal.

Part 4: Systemic Aspects

• Provide the percentage of VMD staff trained on Competition Law and Public Law (Ultra Vires risks) in the last 2 years.

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2. TO: COMPETITION AND MARKETS AUTHORITY (CMA)

Subject: Focus on the “Soft Remedies” and Failure to Investigate Stealth Consolidation.

To: The Information Access Team

Competition and Markets Authority

The Cabot, 25 Cabot Square

London, E14 4QZ

By Email: general.enquiries@cma.gov.uk

Date: 17 December 2025

Re: Freedom of Information Request – Risk Reports regarding the “Veterinary Services Market Investigation” and “Soft Remedies”

I am Oscar Moya, Director of COCOO.uk.

This request focuses on the DORCAPs:

1. The Decision (Provisional Oct 2025) to propose behavioral remedies (Transparency/Prescription Fees) rather than structural remedies (Divestment/Price Controls).

2. The Omission to investigate the “Stealth Consolidation” (acquisitions below notification thresholds) by large corporate groups prior to 2024.

Part 1: Establishing Enforcement Vacuum and Locus Standi

• Provide a breakdown of consumer complaints regarding “Veterinary Pricing” received in the last 3 years. Include internal estimates of the “Total Consumer Detriment” (aggregate harm) calculated during the Market Investigation.

• Confirm if the CMA has assessed the “Rational Apathy” factor (i.e., that individual pet owners lose too little to sue individually) in its decision-making process for remedies.

Part 2: Ultra Vires Risk Reports and Foreseeable Harms

• Confirm the existence of any risk register entry or “Remedies Working Group” paper that flagged the risk that behavioral remedies (transparency) would be ineffective at reducing prices (Red/Amber rating).

• Disclose any internal assessment of “Regulatory Failure” or “Reputational Risk” associated with not pursuing divestments in the veterinary sector.

• Disclose the risk appetite statement regarding “Intervention in Private Markets” used during the Vet Investigation.

Part 3: Investigations into Officials’ Torts and Recovery Actions

• Confirm if any internal review has been initiated to determine if the scope of the investigation was artificially narrowed to exclude “Stealth Consolidation” due to lobbying or resource constraints (recklessness regarding statutory duty).

• If the CMA’s decision is successfully challenged in the CAT (Competition Appeal Tribunal) requiring a remittal, confirm if there is a policy to review the conduct of the Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) for the case.

Part 4: Systemic Aspects

• List titles of internal audit reports commissioned in the last 2 years relevant to “Market Investigation Effectiveness” or “Remedy Design.”

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3. TO: ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (EA)

Subject: Focus on the “Zombie Regulator” Omission regarding River Pollution.

To: National Customer Contact Centre

Environment Agency

PO Box 544

Rotherham, S60 1BY

By Email: enquiries@environment-agency.gov.uk

Date: 17 December 2025

Re: Freedom of Information Request – Evidence of Omission Liability regarding Fipronil/Imidacloprid Pollution

I am Oscar Moya, Director of COCOO.uk.

This request focuses on the DORCAP:

The Omission to prosecute, regulate, or issue abatement notices regarding the pollution of waterways by companion animal parasiticides (Fipronil/Imidacloprid), despite evidence of Environmental Quality Standards (EQS) breaches.

Part 1: Establishing Enforcement Vacuum and Locus Standi

• Provide a count of reports/representations from NGOs (e.g., River Action, Angling Trust) regarding “Pet Flea Treatment Pollution” in the last 3 years.

• Confirm if the EA views the “Diffuse” nature of this pollution (millions of individual dogs swimming) as a barrier to enforcement actions.

Part 2: Ultra Vires Risk Reports and Foreseeable Harms

• Confirm the existence of any risk register entry flagging “Regulatory Gap” or “Failure to Meet Water Framework Directive Targets” specifically due to veterinary chemicals.

• Disclose any internal correspondence or board papers discussing the division of liability between the EA (pollution) and the VMD (product licensing). Is there a “Risk of Legal Challenge” entry regarding this jurisdictional gap?

• State the number of months “Chemical Status of Rivers” has been reported as “Red” / “Off Track” due to pesticides/parasiticides.

Part 3: Investigations into Officials’ Torts and Recovery Actions

• Confirm if any internal investigation has probed whether the decision not to enforce against water companies or issue warnings was due to “Resource Rationing” (potentially Ultra Vires if statutory duties are mandatory).

• If the EA has faced legal costs in defending inaction on river quality, was any recovery sought from officials who deprioritised this specific pollutant?

Part 4: Systemic Aspects

• List titles of internal research or audit reports regarding “Emerging Contaminants” or “Veterinary Medicines in Water” from 2023-2025.

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4. TO: INFORMATION COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE (ICO)

Subject: Focus on “Data Bartering” and Privacy Violations.

To: Information Access Team

Information Commissioner’s Office

Wycliffe House, Water Lane

Wilmslow, Cheshire, SK9 5AF

By Email: icoaccessinformation@ico.org.uk

Date: 17 December 2025

Re: Freedom of Information Request – Regulatory Inaction regarding Veterinary Data Monopolies

I am Oscar Moya, Director of COCOO.uk.

This request focuses on the DORCAP:

The Omission to investigate or enforce GDPR compliance regarding the large-scale harvesting and commercialisation of client data by Veterinary Corporate Groups (e.g., IVC, CVS, Mars) and initiatives like “VetCompass.”

Part 1: Establishing Enforcement Vacuum and Locus Standi

• Provide a breakdown of complaints received regarding “Veterinary Practices” and “Data Misuse” or “Lack of Consent” in the last 3 years.

• Confirm if the ICO considers the harm per individual (loss of pet medical privacy) to be “Low Financial Value,” contributing to a lack of private litigation.

Part 2: Ultra Vires Risk Reports and Foreseeable Harms

• Confirm the existence of any risk register entry regarding “Sector-Specific Data Monopolies” or “Algorithmic Pricing based on Private Data” in the veterinary/medical sector.

• Disclose any impact assessment regarding the “Secondary Use” of veterinary clinical data for pharmaceutical pricing strategies.

Part 3: Investigations into Officials’ Torts and Recovery Actions

• Confirm if any internal investigation has assessed whether the ICO has failed its statutory duty by ignoring the systematic data scraping in the veterinary industry compared to the human health sector.

Part 4: Systemic Aspects

• Provide the percentage of staff trained on “Competition implications of Data Protection” (i.e., how data monopolies distort markets).

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5. TO: DEFRA (Core Department)

Subject: Focus on “Procurement Waste” regarding the Market Study.

To: Defra Information Rights Team

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

Seacole Building, 2 Marsham Street

London, SW1P 4DF

By Email: defraframeworks@defra.gov.uk

Date: 17 December 2025

Re: Freedom of Information Request – Procurement Risks and Conflicts of Interest in Veterinary Market Research Tenders

I am Oscar Moya, Director of COCOO.uk.

This request focuses on the DORCAP:

The Decisions regarding the procurement, tendering, and award of contracts for the “Veterinary Market Study,” “Estudio de Mercado,” or related consultancy services between 2023 and 2025.

Part 1: Establishing Enforcement Vacuum and Locus Standi

• Disclose the total value of contracts awarded to external consultancies for the Veterinary Market review.

• Confirm if any complaints were received from rival bidders regarding the tender process or “Conflict of Interest” allegations.

Part 2: Ultra Vires Risk Reports and Foreseeable Harms

• Confirm the existence of any risk register entry flagging “Conflict of Interest” regarding the selected consultants (e.g., consultants having prior relationships with the ‘Big Six’ vet corporates or Pharma giants).

• Disclose the risk score for “Procurement Challenge” or “Value for Money” related to these specific contracts.

Part 3: Investigations into Officials’ Torts and Recovery Actions

• Confirm if any internal investigation has been initiated to determine if procurement officials failed to declare conflicts of interest or followed “VIP Lane” procedures for these awards.

• If the contracts failed to deliver usable regulatory data (resulting in the “soft remedies”), was any action taken to recover fees from the consultants or sanction the procurement officers for negligence (“Waste of Public Funds”)?

Part 4: Systemic Aspects

• List titles of internal audit reports regarding “Procurement Compliance” or “Consultancy Spend” in the Animal Health directorate.

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15dec

Based on the comprehensive review of the provided case files, here is the identification of DORCAPS (Decisions, Omissions, Regulations, Conducts, Actions, and Policies) mapped to the possible COAs (Causes of Action).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF COAs

The case relies on a dual-front legal strategy targeting both Public Sector Bodies (regulatory failure/capture) and Private Corporations (market abuse).

• Public Sector COAs: Negligence, Misfeasance in Public Office, Breach of Statutory Duty, Ultra Vires acts, and State Liability (Responsabilidad Patrimonial del Estado).

• Private Sector COAs: Abuse of Dominant Position (Competition Law), Anti-competitive Agreements (Cartels), Unfair Competition, and Consumer Protection violations.

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DORCAPS ANALYSIS

1. DECISIONS (Official choices made by authorities or defendants)

• Related COA: Negligence / Breach of Statutory Duty (Public Sector)

  • CMA’s Classification Decision: The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) decided to classify COCOO’s formal competition complaint as a mere “information request” rather than a substantive investigation. This procedural decision is cited as evidence of a failure to fulfill their statutory mandate.

  • Prioritization Decisions: The strategic decision by UK regulators to exclude veterinary pharmaceuticals from “budgetary priorities” despite high-level risks identified by the National Audit Office (NAO).

• Related COA: Ultra Vires / State Liability

  • Exclusionary Determinations: Decisions by Spanish health authorities (Ministry of Health/AEMPS) to interpret regulations in a way that strictly prohibits veterinarians from dispensing certain medicines, a decision argued to lack a solid technical basis and contradict EU free competition principles.

2. OMISSIONS (Failures to act where action was required)

• Related COA: Negligence / Misfeasance in Public Office

  • The “Enforcement Gap”: A systemic omission where regulators (CMA, Defra, CNMC) have failed to investigate the veterinary pharma sector despite evidence of market failure.

  • Lack of Parliamentary Scrutiny: The specific omission of veterinary competition issues from parliamentary debates (House of Lords/Commons) despite general animal welfare discussions.

  • Policing Failures: The National Crime Agency (NCA) failing to produce specific enforcement reports on the illicit trade of veterinary medicines, despite evidence of black markets (South Asia/Eastern Europe links).

  • Data Transparency Failure: The failure of the UK government to include veterinary medicine pricing in regional economic impact reports (Levelling Up agenda), ignoring the financial burden on farmers.

3. REGULATIONS (Rules or laws cited or allegedly violated)

• Related COA: Ultra Vires / Regulatory Capture

  • Spanish Royal Decree 666/2023: Specifically cited as a regulation that, while regulating antibiotics, imposes further distribution limitations that damage the veterinary profession’s economic model.

  • Dispensing Prohibitions: National regulations in Spain and the UK that prevent veterinarians from dispensing prescriptions (creating a “pharmacy monopoly”).

  • Import Restrictions: Post-Brexit import regulations (Certificate of Special Import) that create non-tariff barriers, disproportionately affecting smaller generic competitors and protecting incumbents.

4. CONDUCTS (Behaviors of the parties involved)

• Related COA: Abuse of Dominant Position / Anti-competitive Agreements

  • “Stealth Consolidation”: Corporate conduct by large veterinary groups and pharma giants (e.g., buying up independent practices) without declaring mergers to avoid regulatory scrutiny (specifically keeping acquisitions below SEC/CMA reporting thresholds).

  • Excessive Pricing: The conduct of maintaining veterinary medicine prices at 300-400% of the cost of equivalent human medicines.

  • “Evergreening” & Patent Thickets: Strategic conduct to artificially extend patent lives and file clusters of patents to block generic entry.

  • Lobbying Influence: Heavy lobbying expenditure (e.g., by Pfizer, Bayer) at EU and national levels, linked to the “Regulatory Capture” allegation.

5. ACTIONS (Specific steps taken)

• Related COA: Unfair Competition / Abuse of Process

  • Vexatious Litigation: Pharmaceutical incumbents taking specific legal actions to harass or delay generic competitors (e.g., “pay-for-delay” tactics).

  • Tying/Bundling: Actions revealed in “Dawn Raids” (e.g., Zoetis investigation) where companies allegedly tie the sale of essential products to other less desirable ones to lock in clinics.

• Related COA: Evidence of Awareness (Supporting Misfeasance claims)

  • COCOO’s Filings: The specific actions of filing complaints with the CMA, CNMC, and requesting public contracts, which prove the authorities were notified and aware of the issues, turning their subsequent inaction into potential misfeasance.

6. POLICIES (Official stances or rules of organizations)

• Related COA: Breach of Legitimate Expectation

  • Contradictory Stances: The policy of “Animal Health Protection” (Defra/Ministry of Health) which contradicts the actual policy of allowing high drug prices that reduce access to care.

  • Priority Policies: Internal policies of the CMA/CNMC that de-prioritize veterinary pharmaceutical investigations in favor of other sectors, despite the “essential” nature of these goods.

  • Opaque Ownership: Policies allowing the use of complex corporate structures (violating FATF/Transparency International standards) to hide beneficial ownership and obscure market concentration.

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