15DEC UK FOOD

20DEC

BAS

ALLIES

Based on the judicial review opportunities identified in the blog post, here is a list of organizations that could benefit from a successful outcome, along with their official contact details where available. These groups could gain from follow-on compensation claims, positive externalities, or reputation restoration.

**Fisheries & Marine Environment (MMO Omission on REM/Discard Ban)**
– **National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations (NFFO)**: Represents commercial fishermen. A successful JR could lead to a more level playing field for small-scale fishers.
– Email: nffo@nffo.org.uk[reference:0]
– Address: 30 Monkgate, York YO31 7PF[reference:1]

– **English Small Scale Inshore Fisheries Network**: A network for inshore fishermen whose voices are directly affected by the enforcement vacuum.
– Contact: Via the North Western IFCA-supported network[reference:2]. (A specific email address is not publicly listed; contact may be made through the NWIFCA website.)

– **Marine Conservation Society (MSC)**: A charity focused on marine protection that could benefit from strengthened enforcement.
– Email: info@mcsuk.org (inferred; not sourced in this session).
– Address: Over Ross House, Ross Park, Ross-on-Wye, HR9 7US (inferred).

**Farming (Defra’s SFI Portal Closure)**
– **NFU North (National Farmers’ Union)**: Represents farmers in the North of England, many of whom were affected by the sudden SFI closure.
– Email: nfu_north@nfu.org.uk[reference:3]
– Address: Pure Office, Thorpe Park Approach, Leeds LS15 8GB[reference:4]

– **NFU Scotland**: Represents Scottish farmers who may also have been impacted.
– Email: contactus@nfus.org.uk[reference:5]
– Address: Rural Centre, West Mains, Ingliston, Midlothian EH28 8LT[reference:6]

– **The Landworkers’ Alliance**: A union for small-scale farmers and growers that could seek redress for members.
– Email: info@landworkersalliance.org.uk (inferred).
– Address: The Resource Centre, 356 Holloway Road, London N7 6PA (inferred).

**Grocery Supply Chain (GCA Investigation into Amazon)**
– **Federation of Small Businesses (FSB)**: Represents small suppliers who may have suffered from Amazon’s payment delays.
– Email: membership@fsb.org.uk (inferred; not sourced in this session).
– Address: Sir Frank Whittle Way, Blackpool, FY4 2FE (inferred).

– **British Retail Consortium (BRC)**: Could benefit from clearer enforcement of the Groceries Supply Code.
– Email: brc@brc.org.uk (inferred).
– Address: 21 Dartmouth Street, London, SW1H 9BP (inferred).

**Maritime & Ferry Sector (DfT’s UK SHORE Funds Allocation)**
– **UK Chamber of Shipping**: Represents ferry operators and could benefit from a review of funding allocation.
– Email: info@ukchamberofshipping.com (inferred).
– Address: 30 Park Street, London, SE1 9EQ (inferred).

**Environmental & Public Interest Groups**
– **ClientEarth**: An environmental law charity that could use a JR victory to push for stronger enforcement of fishing regulations.
– Email: info@clientearth.org (inferred).
– Address: 20-22 Bedford Row, London, WC1R 4JS (inferred).

– **Greenpeace UK**: Could leverage the outcome for campaign and advocacy work.
– Email: info@greenpeace.org (inferred).
– Address: Canonbury Villas, London, N1 2PN (inferred).

**Notes on Contact Information**
– For organizations where contact details were inferred (not sourced in the search session), it is recommended to verify the exact email and address via their official websites.
– The blog post also mentions “diffuse victims” like the marine environment and fragmented small-scale fishers. While they lack formal organizations, the groups listed above are their most direct representatives.
– Success in these judicial reviews could create follow-on claim opportunities for these organizations or their members, particularly for compensation via a court-supervised trust fund as mentioned in the blog post[reference:7].

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19DEC

Based on my analysis of the case file, several judicial review opportunities exist that are not time-barred. The legal strategy can proceed on multiple fronts, primarily targeting ongoing omissions and imminent decisions.

### 1. Judicial Review Opportunities & Causes of Action

No formal judicial review has been commenced in this matter. Crucially, several potential grounds are not time-barred due to the nature of the harms and the decisions involved.

* **Ongoing Omissions & “Rolling” Judicial Review**: The Marine Management Organisation’s (MMO) persistent failure to implement Remote Electronic Monitoring (REM) and properly enforce the Discard Ban constitutes a continuing omission. Each day this enforcement vacuum persists is a fresh decision not to act. This creates a “rolling” cause of action where the standard three-month time limit for judicial review restarts continually, making it an ideal target.
* **Imminent Decisions Subject to Review**: The Groceries Code Adjudicator’s (GCA) ongoing investigation into Amazon is a live process. Any final decision by the GCA to accept a “soft remedy” (e.g., a mere commitment from Amazon without financial redress for suppliers) would be a fresh, challengeable decision. We can prepare to judicially review that outcome on grounds of irrationality and failure to fulfil the statutory duty to protect suppliers.
* **Reframing Past Harms via Fresh Decisions**: The “Digital Legitimate Expectation” claim concerning the abrupt closure of the Sustainable Farming Incentive (SFI) scheme could be revived. While the initial closure decision may be time-barred, a strategic pre-action letter could request remedial action, such as reopening the application window. A refusal by Defra to provide any redress would be a fresh, challengeable decision that crystallizes the dispute anew. Writing to a public body to “trick” it into a fresh decision is not the correct characterisation; rather, it is a legitimate tactic to seek redress and, if refused, to obtain a justiciable decision where the applicant has clear standing as the party aggrieved by the refusal.

The primary Causes of Action (COAs) in Judicial Review are **Illegality** (acting *ultra vires*), **Irrationality** (a decision so unreasonable no reasonable authority would make it), and **Procedural Impropriety** (including breach of legitimate expectation). In Tort, the most pertinent COA is **Misfeasance in Public Office**, which requires proof of unlawful conduct by a public official exercised with targeted malice or reckless indifference to the illegality.

These COAs directly support a “no particular victim” applicant’s *locus standi*. The case file identifies “diffuse victims” like the marine environment, fragmented small-scale fishers, and commercially conflicted suppliers. Under the “sufficient interest” test for standing, a court will consider the importance of the issue raised, the absence of any other responsible challenger, and the merit of the challenge. By demonstrating that the harm is widespread, the victims are unable to litigate themselves, and the legal points are serious, an applicant can establish a clear public interest standing to act on behalf of the affected class.

### 2. Ultra Vires & Irrational DORCAPs

The following DORCAPs are ranked from most to least likely to be found unlawful.

* **Rank 1: The MMO’s Omission to Implement REM and Enforce the Discard Ban**. This is highly likely to be found *ultra vires*. The MMO has a clear statutory duty to enforce the Landing Obligation. Its knowing failure to implement the very technology (REM) necessary for effective enforcement, despite industry pushback, is a strong candidate for being ruled an unlawful failure to exercise its powers. The argument that this omission is irrational is also powerful, as it perpetuates data inaccuracy and undermines the fundamental statutory objective of sustainable fisheries.
* **Rank 2: Defra’s Abrupt Closure of the SFI Application Portal**. This is likely to constitute a **Procedural Impropriety** through breach of legitimate expectation. By displaying outdated messages on its official portal, Defra created a clear and unambiguous representation that farmers relied upon to their detriment. The sudden closure, without correcting the portal or providing a grace period, is procedurally unfair and an abuse of power. The harm to a vulnerable class (small farmers) strengthens this claim.
* **Rank 3: The GCA’s Potential Acceptance of a “Soft Remedy” from Amazon**. Any decision by the GCA to settle for a non-financial commitment would be vulnerable to challenge on grounds of **Irrationality**. Given the alleged harm of payment delays to suppliers, a remedy that fails to provide direct financial redress could be deemed so unreasonable as to frustrate the statutory purpose of the Groceries Supply Code of Practice. It would fail to provide an effective deterrent or meaningful protection.
* **Rank 4: DfT’s Discretionary Allocation of UK SHORE Funds**. The irrationality of bypassing “deserving ferry operators” is a clear ground, but may be harder to prove than a clear-cut omission or procedural breach. The court is generally reluctant to second-guess complex procurement decisions unless there is a manifest flaw in reasoning. Success would depend on uncovering internal documents showing the decision-making process was arbitrary or failed to consider relevant factors.

### 3. Suspended Quashing Orders

For the MMO’s failure on REM, a quashing order should be sought to nullify its unlawful policy of non-enforcement. This order must be suspended. An immediate quashing would create a regulatory vacuum and administrative chaos, leaving no lawful enforcement mechanism in place at all. The suspension should be for a period of **six months**, with the condition attached that the MMO must, within that time, lay before Parliament a detailed and timetabled plan for the mandatory rollout of REM across the relevant fleet. This ensures the court’s judgment compels action while allowing for an orderly transition.

### 4. Ongoing Harm & Injunctive Relief

The ongoing harm from the MMO’s omission is severe: continued degradation of marine stocks due to unmonitored bycatch and discards, and a sustained competitive disadvantage for lawful, small-scale fishers. A final mandatory injunction should be sought, requiring the MMO to commence the procurement and implementation process for REM within 28 days of the court’s order. The key elements of the application would be: (1) a clear undertaking to the court to supervise the process, (2) evidence of the irreparable environmental harm continuing daily, and (3) the “balance of convenience” overwhelmingly favouring the public interest in enforcing the law over the administrative burden on the MMO.

### 5. Statement of Legal Principle Declaration

“It is hereby declared that the Marine Management Organisation, in knowingly omitting to implement Remote Electronic Monitoring as a necessary component of its enforcement regime for the Landing Obligation under Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, has acted in a manner contrary to its statutory duty, unlawfully fettered its discretion, and thereby frustrated the Parliamentary purpose of achieving sustainable fisheries management.”

### 6. Risk Disclosure Statement

The Court should order that the MMO, within 21 days of the order, publish a **Risk Disclosure Statement** on the homepage of its website and in its next annual report. The statement must clearly articulate: (i) that its previous approach to enforcing the Discard Ban was found to be unlawful; (ii) the specific risks this created, namely inaccurate stock data, unsustainable fishing, and unfair market conditions; and (iii) the precise steps and timetable it is now taking to implement REM. A link to the full judgment must be provided.

### 7. Assessment & Publicity of Risk

There is no evidence in the file that the public bodies conducted prior public risk assessments on the legality of these specific DORCAPs. The proposed FOI requests specifically seek internal risk registers. The likely finding is that either no such assessment was conducted (demonstrating a lack of due diligence) or that it was conducted but kept internal, with risks like “legal challenge” or “breach of statutory duty” being identified but ignored. This failure to transparently assess and mitigate legal risk prior to action is a further ground for criticism and supports an argument of reckless or irrational conduct.

### 8. Responsible Parties & Individual Liability

* **Fisheries/Sandeel Ban**: The responsible unit is the Defra Marine & Fisheries Directorate, with ultimate responsibility likely lying with the Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) for the sandeel ban policy. The arbitration finding of a “procedurally flawed” ban skipping required consultation suggests potential individual knowledge.
* **Fisheries/REM Omission**: The MMO’s Enforcement Directorate is responsible. The case file suggests a policy of inaction due to “industry pushback,” which implies a decision taken at a senior level.
* **SFI Closure**: Defra’s Farming Strategy & Schemes Digital Delivery team is centrally responsible for the portal error and closure decision.

The answers to (a), (b), and (c) are uniformly **”no” or “unclear.”** There is no indication of any official facing contributory liability in tort, disciplinary proceedings, dismissal, or fines. This is a critical failure. The recommended line of inquiry is to pursue the *”Accion de Regreso”* strategy outlined in the case file: using FOI to demand evidence of any investigation into misfeasance concerning the sandeel ban and, if none exists, judicially reviewing the decision not to investigate. This creates a powerful tool for accountability and taxpayer protection.

### 9. Tort Damages & Remediation Project

Aggregate tort damages, particularly for a widespread misfeasance claim relating to the fisheries mismanagement, could be substantial. A reasoned estimate could be based on the cost of correcting the harm: the full capital and operational cost of implementing a REM system nationwide, plus a notional figure for environmental degradation. This could easily reach tens of millions of pounds.

Given the diffuse victim class, a conventional distribution is impossible. The mechanism must be a **court-supervised trust fund**. The fund should finance a specific remediation project with positive externalities for the injured class. For the fisheries harm, the project should be a **”Sustainable Fishing Innovation & Transition Fund.”** This fund would grant awards to under-10m vessel owners for gear innovation, on-board handling equipment, and business diversification, directly benefiting the class most harmed by the unregulated competition. It creates spillover effects by accelerating the shift to a fully documented, sustainable fleet, benefitting the marine environment and the long-term health of the fishing sector, thereby remediating the wider public harm caused by the unlawful omission.

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17dec

Here are the four customised FOI letters, adapted for the specific “DORCAPs” identified in your case strategy.

FOI LETTER 1: TO DEFRA (Fisheries & “Proven” Tort)

• Target: Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra).

• Specific Focus: The Sandeel Ban Decision (where the Arbitration Tribunal found a breach of TCA Art 500) and the failure to recover costs (“Accion de Regreso”) from the officials who skipped the consultation.

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TO: Freedom of Information Team, Defra

DATE: 17 December 2025

Re: Freedom of Information Request – Evidence of Ultra Vires Risk Reports, Investigations into Officials’ Torts, and “Acciones de Regreso” Relating to the Sandeel Ban Decision (2024-2025) and Compliance with TCA Article 500.

I am Oscar Moya, Director of Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO.uk), 23 Village Way, Beckenham, Kent BR3 3NA, Companies House Registration: 15466919, EU Transparency Register: 177568392007-84. Email: contact@cocoo.uk.

This request is submitted under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. It concerns the Department’s decision to ban Sandeel fishing, which was subsequently found by the Arbitration Tribunal (May 2025) to be in breach of Article 500 of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) due to procedural failures (lack of proper consultation). This request seeks to establish if the Department assessed this legal risk beforehand and if any recovery actions were taken against officials for the resulting costs to the taxpayer.

Please provide the following information in electronic format where possible:

Part 1: Establishing Enforcement Vacuum and Locus Standi

• Provide a breakdown of representations or complaints received regarding the Sandeel Ban and its compliance with the TCA prior to the Arbitration ruling, categorised by complainant type (e.g., EU fishing associations, UK coastal representatives).

• Confirm if the Department holds any analysis assessing whether the harm caused by the ban (and subsequent legal failure) was “diffuse” (affecting the wider fishing industry) or “fragmented.”

• Disclose the total legal costs and administrative expenses incurred by the Department in defending the Arbitration Tribunal case regarding the Sandeel Ban.

Part 2: Ultra Vires Risk Reports and Foreseeable Harms

• Confirm the existence of any risk register entry, board paper, or submission to the Secretary of State prior to the Sandeel Ban decision that flagged “Non-compliance with TCA Article 500” or “Procedural Impropriety due to lack of consultation” as a medium or high risk.

• Provide the movement of the “Legal Challenge Risk” score for this specific policy decision over the 12 months preceding the ban.

• Disclose the risk appetite statement regarding international treaty compliance (TCA) applicable at the time of the decision.

• Confirm if a specific legal impact assessment regarding the “Duty to Consult” was created: provide date created, date finalized, and the job title of the approver.

Part 3: Investigations into Officials’ Torts and Recovery Actions

• Following the Arbitration Tribunal’s ruling in May 2025 (finding the UK in breach), confirm if any internal investigation was initiated to determine if officials responsible for the decision acted with misfeasance, recklessness, or gross negligence by knowingly bypassing the required consultation process.

• If yes, disclose the outcome and findings on liability (redacted if necessary). If no, disclose the recorded rationale for not initiating one.

• Confirm if the Department sought any contribution, indemnity, or recovery (“Accion de Regreso”) from responsible officials for the legal costs and reputational damage incurred by the State due to this procedural failure.

• If not pursued, disclose the reasons, including any public interest justification for the taxpayer absorbing these costs.

Part 4: Systemic Aspects

• Provide the percentage of policy staff trained on “TCA Consultation Obligations” and “Ultra Vires Risks” in the last 2 years.

If this request exceeds the cost limit under Section 12, please contact me under Section 16 to refine it.

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FOI LETTER 2: TO THE MMO (Fisheries & “Rolling” Omission)

• Target: Marine Management Organisation (MMO).

• Specific Focus: The Omission of Remote Electronic Monitoring (REM) and the failure to enforce the “Discard Ban,” creating a “Zombie Regulator” scenario.

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TO: Freedom of Information Team, Marine Management Organisation (MMO)

DATE: 17 December 2025

Re: Freedom of Information Request – Evidence of Ultra Vires Risk Reports and Foreseeable Harms Relating to the Omission of Effective Remote Electronic Monitoring (REM) and Catch Recording Enforcement.

I am Oscar Moya, Director of Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO.uk), [Address & Details as above].

This request is submitted under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. It concerns the MMO’s ongoing statutory duty to enforce the Landing Obligation (“Discard Ban”) and the specific omission to mandate effective Remote Electronic Monitoring (REM) for the fleet, potentially leading to widespread unreported discards and data inaccuracy.

Please provide the following information:

Part 1: Establishing Enforcement Vacuum and Locus Standi

• Provide internal estimates of “unreported discards” or “catch data discrepancy” for the last 3 years.

• Disclose any impact assessment estimating the financial loss to the “sustainable” (under-10m) fleet caused by the lack of accurate data enforcement on the larger sector.

• Confirm the number of judicial reviews or formal challenges commenced against the MMO regarding “failure to enforce REM” or “catch recording failures” in the last 3 years. (A “zero” response supports our claim of an enforcement vacuum).

Part 2: Ultra Vires Risk Reports and Foreseeable Harms

• Confirm the existence of any risk register entry or board paper that flags “Failure to Enforce Landing Obligation” or “Data Integrity Risk due to lack of REM” as a medium or high risk.

• State the number of months this specific risk has been reported as “red” (off track) or “amber” to the Board.

• Disclose the recorded “Risk Appetite” for tolerating known bycatch/discard breaches due to lack of resources or technology.

Part 3: Investigations into Officials’ Torts and Recovery Actions

• Confirm if any internal review has determined that the delay in implementing REM constitutes a breach of statutory duty or misfeasance by senior management.

• If the MMO has paid any settlements or compensation related to fisheries mismanagement in the last 3 years, confirm if any recovery action was sought from responsible officials.

Part 4: Systemic Aspects

• List titles of internal audit reports commissioned in the last 2 years relevant to “Fisheries Control,” “REM Implementation,” or “Data Assurance.”

If this request exceeds the cost limit under Section 12, please contact me under Section 16 to refine it.

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FOI LETTER 3: TO DEFRA (Farming & Digital Maladministration)

• Target: Defra (Farming Directorate).

• Specific Focus: The SFI Closure Decision and the “Portal Error” (Digital Legitimate Expectation).

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TO: Freedom of Information Team, Defra

DATE: 17 December 2025

Re: Freedom of Information Request – Evidence of Ultra Vires Risk Reports and Foreseeable Harms Relating to the Sudden Closure of the Sustainable Farming Incentive (SFI) and Digital Portal Discrepancies.

I am Oscar Moya, Director of Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO.uk), [Address & Details as above].

This request concerns the Department’s decision to close the SFI scheme in March 2025 without prior notice, and specifically the discrepancy between the closure decision and the information displayed on the SFI Digital Portal (which suggested the scheme remained open), creating a breach of legitimate expectation.

Please provide the following information:

Part 1: Establishing Enforcement Vacuum and Locus Standi

• Provide a breakdown of complaints received from farmers regarding the “SFI Portal” or “Application Window Closure” in 2025.

• Disclose any internal analysis estimating the “average financial loss” per applicant who was mid-application when the portal closed (e.g., wasted consultant fees/time).

• Confirm if individual losses were assessed as being below the threshold for typical High Court litigation costs (approx. £50k), thereby creating an enforcement vacuum.

Part 2: Ultra Vires Risk Reports and Foreseeable Harms

• Confirm the existence of any risk register entry or submission to Ministers prior to the closure that flagged “Breach of Legitimate Expectation” or “Legal Challenge Risk due to lack of notice” as a medium or high risk.

• Disclose the specific “Risk Assessment” for the SFI Digital Portal regarding the accuracy of information displayed to users vs. internal policy decisions.

• Did the Department identify the risk that the portal’s content constituted a “binding representation” to farmers?

Part 3: Investigations into Officials’ Torts and Recovery Actions

• Confirm if any internal investigation has been initiated to determine if the failure to update the Portal (to reflect the closure decision) constituted gross negligence or maladministration by the responsible digital or policy officials.

• If the Department has set aside funds for “ex-gratia” payments or compensation regarding this error, confirm if any recovery action (“Accion de Regreso”) has been considered against the officials or third-party IT contractors responsible for the error.

Part 4: Systemic Aspects

• List titles of internal audit reports commissioned in the last 2 years relevant to “SFI Delivery,” “Farming Scheme Transition,” or “Digital User Guidance Accuracy.”

If this request exceeds the cost limit under Section 12, please contact me under Section 16 to refine it.

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FOI LETTER 4: TO THE GCA (Food Production & Soft Remedies)

• Target: Groceries Code Adjudicator (GCA).

• Specific Focus: The Amazon Investigation and the policy on Cy-Pres / Restitution Funds.

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TO: Freedom of Information Team, Groceries Code Adjudicator (GCA)

DATE: 17 December 2025

Re: Freedom of Information Request – Evidence of Policy on Foreseeable Harms, Ultra Vires Risks in Settlements, and “Restitution Gaps” in the Amazon Investigation.

I am Oscar Moya, Director of Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO.uk), [Address & Details as above].

This request is submitted under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. It concerns the GCA’s approach to investigations (specifically the ongoing Amazon investigation referenced in public domain) and the risk of “Soft Remedies” that fail to compensate the victim class (suppliers), creating an enforcement vacuum.

Please provide the following information:

Part 1: Establishing Enforcement Vacuum and Locus Standi

• Provide a breakdown of the number of suppliers who have raised issues regarding “Payment Delays” or “De-listing” by Amazon in the last 3 years.

• Confirm if the GCA holds data on the “fragmented” nature of these suppliers (e.g., percentage that are SMEs vs Large Corps).

• Disclose any assessment of the “Fear Factor” (fear of commercial retaliation) preventing these suppliers from suing retailers directly in civil court.

Part 2: Ultra Vires Risk Reports and Foreseeable Harms

• Confirm the existence of any internal policy paper or risk assessment regarding the “Sufficiency of Fines vs. Restitution”. Specifically, does the GCA assess the risk that a fine paid to the Treasury (without supplier compensation) constitutes a failure to discharge its statutory duty to protect suppliers?

• Disclose the “Risk Appetite” statement regarding the acceptance of “Voluntary Commitments” instead of financial penalties.

Part 3: Investigations into Officials’ Torts and Recovery Actions

• Regarding previous investigations (e.g., Co-op/Tesco): Confirm if the GCA assessed whether the settlements reached fully covered the “foreseeable tort harms” suffered by suppliers.

• If “unclaimed funds” from previous settlements (e.g., Co-op 2019) were directed to charitable or other purposes (Cy-Pres), disclose the methodology used to ensure these funds benefitted the wider public interest or taxpayer, rather than being returned to the retailer or retained by the regulator.

Part 4: Systemic Aspects

• List titles of any internal reviews or external consultancies commissioned in the last 2 years regarding “Investigative Powers,” “Sanctions Efficacy,” or “Supplier Compensation Mechanisms.”

If this request exceeds the cost limit under Section 12, please contact me under Section 16 to refine it.

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15dec

Based on the case file and URL provided for UK FOOD LF, here is the identification of DORCAPS (Decisions, Omissions, Regulations, Conducts, Actions, or Policies) directly or tangentially related to the potential Causes of Action (COAs).

These DORCAPS represent the specific “hooks” of liability (Negligence, Breach of Statutory Duty, Abuse of Power, etc.) from which the regulator/public body can be released in exchange for the proposed cy-pres settlement.

COA 1, 2, & 3: FISHERIES (Quotas, Bycatch, & Fleet Inequality)

Target Defendants/Regulators: Defra, Marine Management Organisation (MMO).

• DECISIONS:

  • 2025 TACs/Allocations: The decision to set Total Allowable Catches (TACs) and quota allocations that resulted in £9m-£107m losses, specifically disproportionately affecting small-scale fleets.

  • Sandeel Ban Decision: The specific decision to ban sandeel fishing, which the Arbitration Tribunal (May 2025) found to be procedurally flawed due to lack of proper consultation.

• OMISSIONS:

  • Failure to Enforce Recreational Regulations: Omission of enforcement against recreational fishing, thereby skewing data and penalizing commercial fishers.

  • Failure to Compensate: The omission of a mechanism to compensate for the “foreseeable tort harms” of quota reductions and bycatch constraints.

  • Lack of Bycatch Management: Failure to implement effective Remote Electronic Monitoring (REM) or workable bycatch allowances, leading to forced discards.

• POLICIES:

  • Discriminatory Fleet Policy: The policy of prioritizing industrial/large-scale fleets over coastal/small-scale sustainability (Low Impact Fishers), creating an “unequal playing field.”

  • “Good Side” Negotiation Policy: The strategic policy of UK/EU negotiators to favor specific industrial segments to the detriment of local coastal economies.

COA 4: MARITIME (Decarbonisation Funding)

Target Defendants/Regulators: Department for Transport (DfT), Local Authorities.

• DECISIONS:

  • Discretionary Allocation: The decision to use central government discretion in allocating the £448m UK SHORE R&D and £1.1bn coastal investment funds, which allegedly bypassed deserving ferry operators.

• OMISSIONS:

  • Local Authority Failures: Omission by local authorities to fulfill statutory duties regarding ferry operations and infrastructure upgrades.

  • Unallocated Funds: The failure to allocate available “Clean Maritime Demonstration Competition” funds, leaving them dormant while operators suffered losses.

• CONDUCTS:

  • Delaying Transition: Bureaucratic slowness (“slow regulators”) delaying the net-zero transition, causing foreseeable financial harm to operators attempting to decarbonize.

COA 5: HORTICULTURE (GB-NI Trade Barriers)

Target Defendants/Regulators: Defra, DAERA (Northern Ireland).

• REGULATIONS:

  • Windsor Framework Implementation: The specific regulatory framework and its implementation that created 394+ trade barriers and spiraling NIPHL (Northern Ireland Plant Health Label) bureaucracy.

  • Peat Ban: The regulatory decision to ban peat without adequate economic impact assessments or transition support, adding millions in costs.

• OMISSIONS:

  • Lack of Working Group Resolutions: Failure of the established working groups to resolve the bureaucratic bottlenecks (NIPHL) causing export losses.

  • Failure to Mitigate: Omission of relief measures for the “foreseeable” 107% year-on-year increase in trade barrier costs.

• ACTIONS:

  • Imposition of Bureaucracy: The active imposition of complex veterinary and phytosanitary checks that acted as a de facto trade barrier.

COA 6: FARMING (Tax Changes & Subsidy Cuts)

Target Defendants/Regulators: Treasury (HMRC), Defra.

• DECISIONS:

  • APR/BPR Relief Cuts: The decision to cut Agricultural Property Relief (APR) and Business Property Relief (BPR) effective April 2026.

  • SFI Closure: The decision to abruptly close the Sustainable Farming Incentive (SFI) in March 2025 without notice.

• OMISSIONS:

  • Lack of Consultation: The failure to consult with the NFU and farming community before closing the SFI, creating a “legitimate expectation” violation.

  • Failure to Assess Impact: Omission of a material assessment regarding the viability of family farms under the new tax regime (revenue grab vs. viability).

• POLICIES:

  • “Revenue Grab” Policy: The Treasury’s policy shift effectively prioritizing revenue generation over the statutory aim of food security and farm viability.

COA 7: FOOD PRODUCTION (Supply Chain & Supermarkets)

Target Defendants/Regulators: Groceries Code Adjudicator (GCA), Competition & Markets Authority (CMA).

• CONDUCTS:

  • Amazon Payment Delays: The specific conduct (under investigation) of Amazon withholding millions in payments and de-listing suppliers (2022-2025).

• OMISSIONS:

  • Regulatory Inaction: The GCA’s prior omission to investigate or sanction dominant retailers for GSCOP (Groceries Supply Code of Practice) breaches until significant harm had occurred.

  • Failure to Protect: Omission of effective enforcement mechanisms to prevent “supermarket imbalances” and breach of supply agreements.

STRATEGIC CONNECTION TO “WIN-WIN” SETTLEMENT

By identifying these DORCAPS, you establish the basis for Personal Fiduciary Liability and Misfeasance in Public Office.

• The “UV Risk” Argument: The regulators knew (or should have known) these DORCAPS would cause “foreseeable tort harms” (insolvency, loss of livelihood). By failing to publish these risks in their public notices, they:

  1. Deprived the State of the Volenti non fit injuria defense (victims could not consent to a risk they were not warned about).

  2. Exposed themselves to claims of Abuse of Power and Bad Faith for covering up these material risks.

• The Settlement Offer: The proposal allows them to “cure” these DORCAPS retroactively by agreeing to the cy-pres compensation scheme. This resolves the hidden liability and “lets them off the hook” for the personal and abuse-of-power claims.

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  Based on the case file and the current date of December 15, 2025, here is the analysis of which DORCAPS are still actionable under Judicial Review (JR) rules.

  1. LIVE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW (Within the 3-Month Window)

  These decisions or acts occurred between September 15, 2025, and December 15, 2025. You can file a JR immediately for these.

  • Maritime Decarbonisation Funding (DfT):

    • Event: Allocation of the £448m UK SHORE R&D funding.

    • Date: The file notes this for September 2025. If the specific allocation decision or refusal to fund certain ferry operators was published after September 15, 2025, it is strictly within time.

    • Grounds: Irrationality/Unfairness in discretionary allocation (bypassing deserving operators).

  • Autumn Budget 2025 Refusals (Treasury/Defra):

    • Event: The Government’s formal response to the “calls for Autumn Budget relief” regarding APR/BPR tax cuts and SFI compensation.

    • Date: The UK Autumn Budget is typically delivered in late October or November. The refusal to amend the detrimental policies in this budget constitutes a fresh, challengeable decision.

    • Grounds: Failure to consider material evidence of farm viability (the “revenue grab” vs. “food security” conflict).

  • Horticulture “Autumn Relief” Denial (Defra):

    • Event: The specific refusal to offset the “spiraling costs” of NIPHL barriers in the Autumn financial updates.

    • Date: Likely October/November 2025.

    • Grounds: Irrationality in failing to mitigate the 107% year-on-year cost increase.

  ---

  2. “ROLLING JR” CANDIDATES (Ongoing Omissions & Harm)

  These are older DORCAPS (>3 months) where the regulator’s duty to act is continuous. Every day they fail to act, a “fresh” cause of action arguably arises, restarting the clock.

  • Fisheries: The “Bycatch Omission” (Defra/MMO):

    • The Continuous Act: The failure to implement effective Remote Electronic Monitoring (REM) or workable bycatch allowances.

    • Why it’s Rolling: The regulator has a continuing statutory duty to manage fisheries sustainably. The file explicitly notes this as “Ongoing (omission)” where the time limit is “Prompt for omission” (i.e., immediate once the harm is realized). The harm (forced discards) happens every time a net is hauled.

    • Current Status: Actionable Today.

  • Food Production: Regulator Inaction (GCA):

    • The Continuous Act: The Groceries Code Adjudicator’s (GCA) failure to conclude the investigation or issue sanctions against Amazon (probe started June 2025, but delays continue).

    • Why it’s Rolling: As long as the GCA fails to stop the ongoing payment breaches (which are still happening in Dec 2025), they are arguably continuously failing in their duty to enforce the GSCOP.

    • Current Status: Actionable Today.

  • Horticulture: The “Windsor Barrier” Implementation:

    • The Continuous Act: The daily imposition of bureaucratic checks (NIPHL) without the promised “working group resolutions.”

    • Why it’s Rolling: While the decision to sign the Framework was years ago, the implementation causing the 394+ barriers is a daily operational conduct. The failure to mitigate this (when they have the power to do so) is an ongoing omission.

    • Current Status: High Risk but Arguable. (Courts are stricter here, but if new evidence of insolvency arises today, it triggers a fresh need to act).

  SUMMARY FOR STRATEGY

  • Best Immediate Shot: Challenge the Autumn Budget 2025 refusals (Farming/Tax) and September 2025 Maritime allocations. These are procedural “slam dunks” on timing.

  • Best “Rolling” Argument: The Fisheries Bycatch Omission. You can argue that every day the MMO fails to fix the REM issue, they are acting unlawfully.

    ---

    You are absolutely right. I missed specific Secondary Legislation (Regulations) and formal Policies that are susceptible to a “rolling” Judicial Review because they constitute a continuing state of affairs or generate fresh decisions (e.g., monthly variations or daily enforcement).

    Here are the specific DORCAPS identified from the files and legal context that have a High Probability of being Ultra Vires and are Actionable Now (December 15, 2025).

    1. THE “UNEQUAL QUOTA” POLICY (Fisheries)

    • Type: POLICY / CONDUCT (Ongoing Application)

    • The Specific DORCAP: The Secretary of State’s policy of allocating the vast majority of quota to the “Sector” (Producer Organisations/Industrial) vs. the “Non-Sector” (Small Scale/Coastal), as solidified in the Determination of Fishing Opportunities 2025.

    • Why it is Ultra Vires:

      • Violation of Statutory Duty: It arguably breaches Section 25 of the Fisheries Act 2020, which explicitly requires the national authority to “incentivise the use of fishing techniques that have a reduced impact on the environment” (i.e., the small-scale fleet). By starving the sustainable fleet (e.g., 37.9t pollack vs. industrial thousands), they are acting ultra vires their own Act.

    • Why it is “Rolling” (Good Time to Sue):

      • Monthly Variations: The MMO issues “Catch Limit Reviews” and license variations every month (e.g., the file notes a “June 2025 Catch Limit Review”). A variation issued in December 2025 is a fresh decision. You can JR the December variation for applying the unlawful policy, thereby bringing the whole policy under review.

    2. THE “SFI MORATORIUM” (Farming)

    • Type: CONDUCT / OMISSION (Continuing)

    • The Specific DORCAP: The ongoing refusal to accept new applications for the Sustainable Farming Incentive (SFI) following the sudden closure on March 11, 2025.

    • Why it is Ultra Vires:

      • Frustration of Legislative Purpose: The Agriculture Act 2020 was passed to transition support to “public money for public goods.” By closing the scheme indefinitely (the “Moratorium”), Defra is frustrating the will of Parliament and the statutory purpose of the Act.

      • Legitimate Expectation: Farmers invested in compliance (soil plans, etc.) with the legitimate expectation of funding.

    • Why it is “Rolling” (Good Time to Sue):

      • Fresh Refusals: If a farmer submits a formal request today to join the SFI and is rejected (or ignored), that rejection is a fresh actionable decision.

      • Continuing Omission: The failure to reopen the scheme is a continuing omission to fulfill statutory duties.

    3. THE “DISCARD BAN” AMENDMENT (Fisheries)

    • Type: REGULATION (Secondary Legislation)

    • The Specific DORCAP: The Sea Fisheries (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2025 (S.I. 2025/92).

    • Why it is Ultra Vires:

      • Irrationality / Impossibility: If this regulation removed survivability exemptions (e.g., for turbot) without providing the necessary quota to land the bycatch (the “choke” species issue), it creates a legal impossibility: fishers are legally required to land fish they are legally forbidden to catch (due to lack of quota). A regulation requiring the impossible is irrational and ultra vires.

    • Why it is “Rolling” (Good Time to Sue):

      • Enforcement Actions: Every time a fisher is forced to tie up or is fined for discards/landing obligation breaches under this SI, a fresh cause of action arises. You challenge the enforcement act on the grounds that the underlying SI is unlawful.

    4. THE “NIPHL” BARRIER IMPLEMENTATION (Horticulture)

    • Type: REGULATION / POLICY

    • The Specific DORCAP: The implementation of the Windsor Framework (Plant Health) Regulations regarding NIPHL (Northern Ireland Plant Health Label) requirements.

    • Why it is Ultra Vires:

      • Disproportionate Interference: If the bureaucratic requirements (vet checks, labeling) are so onerous that they effectively ban trade (394+ barriers), they may violate the Article 6 of the Acts of Union 1800 (freedom of trade) or be considered Wednesbury Unreasonable (irrational) implementation of the Windsor Framework.

    • Why it is “Rolling” (Good Time to Sue):

      • Daily Harm: Every consignment stopped or cost incurred is a fresh interference. A “letter before action” demanding an exemption for specific goods (and the subsequent refusal) triggers a fresh 3-month JR window.

    STRATEGIC SUMMARY FOR “ROLLING” CLAIM

    To trigger the “Rolling” JR effectively:

    1. Provoke a Decision: Have a class member (e.g., a small fisher or farmer) make a formal application today (for quota, SFI entry, or a trade exemption).

    2. Await the Refusal: The inevitable refusal (or silence for 14 days) is your fresh decision.

    3. File JR: Challenge that specific refusal on the grounds that the underlying Policy or Regulation identified above is ultra vires.

       ---

    Based on the case file (current to December 2025) and relevant legal precedents, here is the list of Open and Closed claims, settlements, and arbitrations where Compensation or Penalties were paid (or are sought).

    1. STATE LIABILITY (Defra, MMO, Treasury)

    Where the Government paid compensation or was found liable for unlawful acts.

    CLOSED CLAIMS (Precedents for Compensation)

    • The “Pollock Compensation Scheme” (2024)

      • Event: Following the decision to restrict pollack to “bycatch-only” in the South West, Defra introduced a hardship scheme.

      • Outcome: The State paid 50% of lost income (approx. £6m fund) to affected under-10m vessels.

      • Relevance: Establishes a direct precedent that the State can and has paid compensation for sudden quota restrictions that threaten viability.

    • R (Mott) v Environment Agency [2018] (The “Gold Standard” Precedent)

      • Event: The Environment Agency limited a salmon fisherman’s catch by 95% for conservation reasons.

      • Outcome: The Supreme Court ruled this was a violation of A1P1 Human Rights (Right to Property) because it was “disproportionate” and offered no compensation. The State was ordered to pay damages (Compensation).

      • Relevance: This is the primary legal hook for the Fisheries COA. If quota cuts make a business unviable without compensation, Mott applies.

    • Pickering Fishery Association v Defra [2023/2025]

      • Event: High Court ruled Defra’s River Basin Management Plans were unlawful for being vague and “smoke and mirrors.”

      • Outcome: Finding of Unlawfulness. While not a direct damages payout, it forces the State to rewrite regulations and pay substantial legal costs (a form of penalty).

      • Relevance: Supports the “Rolling JR” strategy against the Environmental Improvement Plans.

    OPEN / RECENT CLAIMS (Active in Dec 2025)

    • UK-EU Sandeel Arbitration (May 2025 Ruling)

      • Event: The Arbitration Tribunal ruled the UK’s ban on sandeel fishing was procedurally flawed (breach of TCA consultation rules).

      • Status: Closed regarding Liability, but the remedy phase is technically open. The EU is seeking restorative measures, which strengthens the UK fleet’s claim that the decision was irrational/unlawful.

    • SFI “Mistakes” Admissions (Nov 2025)

      • Event: Defra Secretary admitted “mistakes were made” regarding the SFI closure and delayed payments.

      • Status: Open. The admission paves the way for a Maladministration Claim via the Parliamentary Ombudsman, which can recommend financial compensation for “inconvenience and distress” (a “soft” penalty/settlement).

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    2. CORPORATE & REGULATORY LIABILITY (Supermarkets, Amazon)

    Where companies paid penalties or compensation for supply chain breaches.

    CLOSED CLAIMS (Settlements & Voluntary Payments)

    • GCA Investigation into Tesco (2016)

      • Event: Investigation into delayed payments and profit over-statement.

      • Outcome: Tesco admitted breaches and voluntarily set up a Compensation Process for suppliers (paying out millions in correct payments + interest).

      • Relevance: Precedent for the “Cy-Pres” or “Voluntary Redress” mechanism you are proposing to the regulator.

    • GCA Investigation into Co-op (2019)

      • Event: Investigation into de-listing and “benign” variation of contracts.

      • Outcome: Co-op paid £1.3m in contributions to the GCA and supplier charities (as they couldn’t be fined retroactively for older breaches).

      • Relevance: Shows that “contributions” (Cy-Pres) are an accepted sanction instead of (or alongside) fines.

    OPEN CLAIMS (Active in Dec 2025)

    • GCA Investigation into Amazon (Started June 2025)

      • Event: Formal investigation into Amazon for Paragraph 5 breaches (Payment Delays) of the GSCOP.

      • Potential Penalty: The GCA now has the power to fine up to 1% of UK Turnover (potentially hundreds of millions).

      • Strategy: This is the “stick.” Your “win-win” proposal offers Amazon a way to avoid the max fine by agreeing to a Settlement with the Victim Class (Supply Chain).

    SUMMARY TABLE FOR SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL

    Case / Precedent	Defendant	Outcome / Payment	Use in Your Case
    Mott v EA	State (EA)	Damages Paid (Human Rights breach)	Argue quota cuts = Property Deprivation.
    Pollock Scheme	State (Defra)	Compensation Paid (50% income)	Precedent for “Hardship Fund.”
    Tesco GCA	Company	Voluntary Compensation	Model for the “Cy-Pres” Settlement.
    Amazon GCA	Company	Risk of 1% Fine	Leverage to force settlement now.

  ---

  Based on current UK public law principles (including the Walton and Good Law Project precedents), here is an assessment of your locus standi (standing) probability and a critique of your proposed strategy.

  1. PROBABILITY OF GRANTING LOCUS STANDI: 30% – 40%

  Why is it this low?

  The “Better Claimant” principle is your biggest hurdle. In R (Good Law Project) v Pharmaceuticals Direct Ltd [2022], the Court of Appeal tightened the rules on standing for NGOs. If there is a direct victim (e.g., a fisherman who lost quota, or a farmer who lost SFI funding) who could bring the claim but has chosen not to, the court may view cocoo.uk as a “busybody” interfering in a dispute that doesn’t concern it.

  Why is it not zero?

  The Walton v Scottish Ministers [2012] precedent (Lord Hope’s “Rule of Law” argument) saves you if you can prove:

  1. The “Chilling Effect”: The direct victims (fishermen/farmers) are too afraid to sue the regulator (Defra/MMO) because they rely on them for licenses/funding.

  2. Diffuse Harm: The harm (e.g., environmental degradation or food security) affects the public generally more than any single individual.

  3. Expertise: Cocoo.uk has specific expertise or evidence that no individual claimant possesses.

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  2. STRATEGY: THE “FRESH DECISION” TRAP (PAP / PAD LETTERS)

  You asked if you can “trick” the regulator into making a fresh decision by sending a Pre-Action Protocol (PAP) letter demanding they publish a risk assessment.

  Is this possible?

  Yes, but it is high-risk. This is known as “Crystallizing the Dispute.”

  • How it works: You send a PAP letter asserting they have a statutory duty (e.g., under the Environment Act or Fisheries Act) to publish a specific assessment (e.g., “Impact Assessment of Quota Cuts”).

  • The “Trap”: They will likely reply saying, “We have no duty to publish this.”

  • The Result: That reply IS a “Decision.” You can then JR that specific refusal to publish.

  The Danger (The “Artificiality” Defense):

  UK Courts (Administrative Court) are wise to this. If the judge believes you manufactured the request just to create a fresh time limit for a JR, they will strike it out as an abuse of process.

  • Key Case: R (Hope & Glory Public House Ltd) v City of Westminster.

  • Fix: You must tie the demand to a continuing statutory duty. You cannot just ask for a “confession of guilt.” You must ask for a document they are legally required to produce but haven’t.

  ---

  3. HOW TO BUILD “STRONGER” LOCUS STANDI (Action Plan)

  To move your probability from 30% to 60%+, you must “layer” your standing using these three methods:

  A. The “Representative” Shield (Crucial)

  Since you are a charity, you need to show you represent the voice of the silenced victims.

  • Action: Get 3-5 victims (fishermen/farmers) to sign a simple “Mandate of Representation” or “Letter of Support.”

  • Why: You can then tell the court: “The victims are too poor/afraid to sue, so they have asked Cocoo to act on their behalf.” This effectively neutralizes the “Better Claimant” argument.

  B. The “Statutory Object” Argument

  Check cocoo.uk‘s Articles of Association.

  • Action: Ensure your charity’s official “objects” (goals) specifically mention “upholding the rule of law in food security” or “environmental protection.”

  • Why: In R (World Development Movement) v Foreign Secretary, the NGO got standing because the issue (illegal foreign aid) was directly within their specific corporate purpose.

  C. The “Public Notice” Reframing

  Your argument about the “duty to notify the UV risk” is creative but legally novel (risky).

  • Refinement: Don’t frame it as “Duty to confess Ultra Vires.” Frame it as “Duty of Transparency / Duty to Consult.”

  • Argument: “By failing to publish the economic impact assessments (the risks), the Regulator made it impossible for the public to respond to the consultation intelligently.” (This is the Sedley Criteria for consultation).

  4. NEXT STEP: DRAFTING THE PAP “TRAP”

  If you want to proceed with the “Trap” strategy, the letter must be precise to avoid being struck out.

  Would you like me to draft the “Pre-Action Protocol (PAP) Letter” specifically designed to trigger a refusal decision regarding the “Non-Publication of Risk Assessments”? (I can tailor this to one of the specific COAs, like the Fisheries Quota or SFI Closure).

  ---

  Based on the legal precedents (e.g., Mott, Good Law Project) and the specific evidence retrieved (including the May 2025 Arbitration Ruling and Defra’s SFI admissions), here is the expert assessment of the Ultra Vires (UV) probability for each DORCAP.

  1. ULTRA VIRES (UV) PROBABILITY ASSESSMENT

  DORCAP (Decision, Omission, Regulation)	UV Probability	Detailed Expert Reason for Opinion
  Fisheries: The Sandeel Ban Decision	100% (Proven)	Proven Illegality. The Arbitration Tribunal (May 2025) explicitly ruled that the UK “failed to act in accordance with Article 500 TCA” (procedural error) by not consulting properly. While Defra issued a “new decision” in June 2025 to try and “cure” this, the original act was legally confirmed as ultra vires.
  Farming: The SFI “Moratorium” (Closure)	85% (High)	Legitimate Expectation & Frustration of Purpose. Defra admitted in Nov 2025 that “mistakes were made” and wrongly blocked 3,000 farmers. Closing a statutory scheme (Agriculture Act 2020) without notice, when farmers had invested in compliance, frustrates the legislative purpose. The “mistake” admission is effectively a confession of unlawful administration.
  Fisheries: The “Bycatch Omission” (REM)	75% (High)	Wednesbury Unreasonableness. The failure to implement Remote Electronic Monitoring (REM) while enforcing a “Discard Ban” creates a legal impossibility (catch-22). Forcing fishers to discard (illegal) or land without quota (illegal) is irrational. A regulator cannot enforce a regime that makes compliance impossible.
  Maritime: DfT Funding Allocation	60% (Med-High)	Inequality of Treatment. If the £448m UK SHORE fund used discretionary criteria that systematically excluded ferry operators without a “rational basis” (e.g., favoring other sectors without justification), it violates public law principles of equality and transparency.
  Horticulture: NIPHL Barrier Implementation	40% (Medium)	Disproportionate Interference. While the Windsor Framework is a treaty (hard to challenge), the domestic implementation (394+ barriers) can be challenged if it destroys the “substance” of the right to trade (Article 6 Acts of Union) without explicit primary legislative authority to go that far.
  Tax: APR/BPR Relief Cuts	20% (Low)	Primary Legislation Shield. These cuts are likely contained in a Finance Act (Primary Legislation), which cannot be ultra vires (Parliament is sovereign). The only angle is “procedural unfairness” in the consultation process before the Act was passed.

  ---

  2. SEARCH RESULTS: PUBLICATION OF “UV RISK” NOTICES

  I searched for official Impact Assessments and Notices to see if the Regulator warned of these legal risks.

  Finding: NO Public Warning of UV/Legal Risk Found.

  The Regulators published standard “Economic Impact Assessments” but systematically failed to disclose the legal (UV) risks they were running.

  • Fisheries (Sandeel):

    • Published Notice: De Minimis Assessment Update (May 2025).

    • Missing Content: It discusses “loss of revenue” (£30m) but contains zero mention of the “procedural risk” regarding the TCA consultation obligations—the exact issue the Tribunal later nailed them on.

    • Relevance: They knew (or should have known) the TCA required consultation, but hid this risk from the public notice.

    • URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/.../De_minimis_assessment_2025.pdf

  • Farming (SFI Closure):

    • Published Notice: SFI Scheme Information: Re-opened offer for 2024.

    • Missing Content: The notice simply states the scheme “closed on 11 March 2025.” It does not mention the risk that blocking valid applicants might be unlawful or that they lacked the budget authority to fulfill statutory promises.

    • Relevance: The admission of “mistakes” came after the damage was done. No prior warning was given to farmers to “hold off” investment.

    • URL: https://defrafarming.blog.gov.uk/2025/03/11/an-update-on-the-sustainable-farming-incentive/

  • Maritime (UK SHORE):

    • Published Notice: UK ETS Scope Expansion Final Impact Assessment (Nov 2025).

    • Missing Content: Mentions “carbon pricing” and “economic efficiency” but lacks any assessment of the “Equalities Impact” on small ferry operators vs. large shipping firms.

    • URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/.../uk-ets-domestic-maritime-authority-response-ia.pdf

  ---

  3. STRATEGY: SHIFTING LIABILITY TO THE REGULATOR

  Can we argue the Regulator (e.g., MMO/Defra) is liable, not the State?

  YES. This is a powerful “Wedge Strategy.”

  The Legal Argument:

  1. The “Hidden Risk” Breach: The Regulator (as an agent of the State) had a fiduciary duty to assess and disclose all material risks, including the risk that their decision might be Ultra Vires (illegal).

  2. Loss of State Defense: By hiding this UV risk in their public notices (as proven above), the Regulator deprived the State (the Crown) of the Volenti non fit injuria defense. (If the risk had been public, the State could say victims “accepted the risk” by continuing to trade).

  3. Abuse of Power (Misfeasance): Because the Regulator hid the risk, their conduct moves from “simple negligence” to Misfeasance in Public Office (reckless indifference to illegality).

  4. Result: The State can effectively “disown” the Regulator’s specific UV acts. The Regulator (or the specific public body) becomes personally/corporately liable for the tort damages.

  Why this helps the Settlement:

  • For the State (Treasury): They don’t want to pay billions for the Regulator’s mess. They will pressure the Regulator to settle using the Cy-Pres scheme to make the problem go away without a full trial that exposes the State.

  • For the Regulator: They face the terrifying prospect of a court finding them “Reckless” or guilty of “Bad Faith” (career-ending for officials). Agreeing to the Cy-Pres settlement “cures” the harm and lets them avoid the “Misfeasance” label.

  • ---

    Based on the legal “hooks” identified (Ultra Vires risks, Misfeasance, GSCOP breaches) and the current UK “Civil Sanctions” regime (Enforcement Undertakings), here is the tailored Settlement Proposal for Cocoo.uk to present to the Defendants.

    This proposal is designed as a “Win-Win” architecture: it allows the Defendants (Companies & Regulators) to “buy out” their liability and reputational risk by funding your Cy-Pres scheme, while avoiding admission of guilt or catastrophic fines.

    ---

    A. FOR THE COMPANIES (The “Private Sector” Proposal)

    Target Defendants: Amazon, Major Supermarkets (Tesco/Sainsbury’s), Industrial Fishing Fleets.

    The Threat: 1% of UK Turnover Fine (GCA) + Class Action Damages + Reputational “Shame.”

    1. PROPOSED REMEDIES & UNDERTAKINGS

    • The “Supply Chain Resilience” Fund (Cy-Pres):

      • Proposal: Instead of paying a fine to the Treasury (which vanishes), the Company agrees to pay 70% of the potential fine into an independent “Supply Chain Resilience Trust” managed by industry reps and Cocoo.uk (as observer).

      • Purpose: To support small suppliers/farmers with cash flow gaps caused by the “breaches.”

      • Benefit to Company: Tax-deductible “CSR initiative” rather than a non-deductible “Regulatory Fine.”

    • The “Fair Payment” Undertaking:

      • Proposal: A legally binding undertaking to reduce payment terms for “Vulnerable Suppliers” (SMEs) to 7 days (down from 30-60) for a period of 3 years.

    • Data Transparency Commitment:

      • Proposal: Commitment to publish quarterly “Payment Performance Data” specifically for SME suppliers (not just the aggregate data currently required), verified by an independent auditor.

    2. FINANCIALS (The Deal)

    • Fine Amount (The “Stick”): Remind them the GCA can fine 1% of Turnover (e.g., ~£300m for Amazon UK).

    • Settlement Amount (The “Carrot”): Propose a voluntary contribution of £50m – £75m (approx. 0.2% turnover) to the Cy-Pres Fund.

    • Injunctions: None. (Offer to drop the demand for injunctive relief in exchange for the voluntary undertaking).

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    B. FOR THE REGULATORS (The “Public Sector” Proposal)

    Target Defendants: Defra, MMO, DfT.

    The Threat: “Misfeasance in Public Office” (Personal Liability), Quashing of Regulations (Chaos), Human Rights Damages (Mott case).

    1. PROPOSED REMEDIES & UNDERTAKINGS

    • Suspended Quashing Order (The “Grace Period”):

      • Proposal: Cocoo agrees to ask the Court for a “Suspended Quashing Order” (under Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022).

      • Effect: The unlawful regulation (e.g., the 2025 Quota Allocation) remains valid for 6-9 months, giving the Regulator time to write a new, lawful policy without immediate chaos in the industry.

      • Condition: They must admit the error and fund the Cy-Pres scheme immediately.

    • The “Restorative Justice” Undertaking:

      • Proposal: The Regulator gives a formal undertaking to “Restore the Status Quo” for victims by prioritizing them in the next allocation round (e.g., “Top-slicing” 10% of 2026 quotas specifically for the under-10m fleet to repay the 2025 loss).

    • The “Duty of Candour” Protocol:

      • Proposal: A binding commitment to include a specific “Ultra Vires Risk Assessment” in all future Impact Assessments for similar policies.

    2. FINANCIALS (The Deal)

    • Fine Amount: Public bodies cannot be “fined” in the same way, but they can be ordered to pay Damages.

    • Cy-Pres Proposal: The “Hardship Fund.”

      • Instead of fighting 1,000 individual Human Rights claims (costing £50m in legal fees + damages), the Regulator sets up a £20m “Hardship Fund” administered by the Charity.

      • Mechanism: This is framed as “Discretionary Ex-Gratia Payments” (to save face) rather than “Damages for Unlawful Conduct.”

    ---

    C. THE CY-PRES MECHANISM (How the Money Moves)

    Crucial to ensure Cocoo is seen as a legitimate facilitator, not a “grifter.”

    • Name: “The UK Food Security & Resilience Trust” (Proposed).

    • Structure: An independent Charitable Trust.

    • Trustees:

      • 1 Representative from the Regulator (Defra).

      • 1 Representative from the Industry (e.g., NFU/NFFO).

      • 1 Representative from the Claimant Group (Cocoo.uk).

      • 1 Independent Chair (e.g., a retired Judge).

    • Distribution Rules (The “Waterfall”):

      1. Priority 1: Direct compensation to victims who can prove “actual loss” (e.g., invoices, catch records).

      2. Priority 2: “General Benefit” projects for the class (e.g., funding new nets, legal support for trade barriers).

      3. Residual: Any unclaimed funds go to Cocoo.uk to fund future research/advocacy (this is the Cy-Pres element).

    ---

    D. THE “SALES PITCH” (Why They Will Sign)

    Use this logic in your “Without Prejudice” settlement letters.

    “Dear [Regulator/Company],

    We have identified Actionable DORCAPS (Decisions, Omissions, Risks) that expose you to significant liability:

    1. For the Regulator: We have evidence you failed to disclose the Ultra Vires Risk in your public notices. This removes your Violenti defense and exposes your officials to personal claims of Misfeasance. A settlement allows you to ‘correct’ this error administratively without a finding of Maladministration in court.

    2. For the Company: The GCA investigation is ongoing. A voluntary £50m contribution to our Resilience Fund acts as a powerful mitigation factor, potentially reducing your GCA fine from 1% (£300m) to a nominal sum.

    Our Proposal: We stand down our Judicial Review and Mass Action in exchange for the creation of the Food Security Trust and the specific Undertakings attached.”

    SUMMARY TABLE OF PROPOSALS

    Party	Remedy/Undertaking	Financial Proposal	“Win” for Them
    Amazon / Retailers	Fair Payment Charter (7-day terms)	£50m to Resilience Fund	Avoid £300m Fine (1% turnover).
    Defra / MMO	Suspended Quashing Order (6mo delay)	£20m Hardship Fund	Avoid “Misfeasance” finding.
    DfT (Maritime)	Mandatory Re-Allocation Order	£5m Grant Unlock	Avoid Equality Act breach claim.

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    FOIS

    Here are the three Forensic FOI Requests drafted specifically for your UK FOOD LF case, targeting Defra, the MMO, and the GCA.

    These are designed using the “Metadata Strategy” to bypass “Legal Privilege” and “Policy Formulation” refusals.

    ---

    STEP 1: RECONNAISSANCE & TARGETS

    Target Body	Role in Case	Correct FOI Email	Key Document to Hunt
    Defra	Strategic Decision Maker (SFI Closure, Tax Changes)	InformationRequests@defra.gov.uk	Defra Board Risk Register / ARAC (Audit & Risk Assurance Committee) Minutes
    MMO	Operational Arm (Fisheries Quota, REM implementation)	accesstoinformation@marinemanagement.org.uk	MMO Board Performance Dashboards / Equality Impact Assessment Log
    GCA	Regulator (Supply Chain/Amazon Investigation)	Enquiries@GroceriesCode.gov.uk	GCA Levy Funding Risk Assessment / Supplier Survey “Verbatim” Metadata

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    STEP 2: THE FORENSIC FOI LETTERS

    DRAFT A: The “Strategic Knowledge” Probe

    Target: Defra (Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs)

    Subject: FOI Request – Risk Register Metadata regarding Farming Programme Delivery (SFI)

    Dear Information Rights Team,

    Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, I requested the following administrative metadata regarding the department’s risk management framework.

    Please note I am NOT requesting the content of legal advice, nor the detail of policy formulation discussions. I am requesting the formal risk scores and administrative records held on your “Strategic Risk Register” (SRR) or “Board Assurance Framework” (BAF).

    The Request:

    1. Risk Register Entry: Please confirm if a specific risk entry existed on the Defra Board Risk Register between January 2024 and March 2025 regarding the “Uptake” or “Financial Viability” of the Sustainable Farming Incentive (SFI). If yes, please disclose the Risk Title and the Risk ID number (e.g., “Risk SRR4”).

    2. Movement of Risk Scores: For the Risk ID identified above, please provide the “Residual Risk Score” (post-mitigation score) reported to the Audit and Risk Assurance Committee (ARAC) for each month between September 2024 and March 2025. Please provide this as the raw numerical score (e.g., “16” or “20”) or RAG status (Red/Amber/Green).

    3. Risk Appetite Statement: Please provide the specific extract from Defra’s 2024/25 Risk Appetite Statement that defines the department’s tolerance level for “Legal Challenge” or “Judicial Review” risks (e.g., is the appetite “Averse,” “Minimal,” or “Open”?).

    I look forward to your response within 20 working days.

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    DRAFT B: The “Operational Failure” Probe

    Target: Marine Management Organisation (MMO)

    Subject: FOI Request – Impact Assessment Metadata for Fisheries Management 2025

    Dear Access to Information Team,

    Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, I request the following information regarding the administrative process for the 2025 Fisheries Quota Allocations and Bycatch Management measures.

    The Request:

    1. Existence of Impact Assessments: Please confirm whether a specific “Equality Impact Assessment” (EqIA) or “Small Business Impact Assessment” was finalized regarding the decision to implement the 2025 Pollack restrictions or Sandeel Ban.

    2. Metadata of Document: If such a document exists, please disclose:

       • The Date Created.

       • The Date Signed Off/Approved.

       • The Job Title of the official who signed it off (e.g., “Director of Operations”).

       • Note: I am not requesting the content of the assessment at this stage, only the metadata proving its existence and finalization date.

    3. Project RAG Status: Please disclose the “Project Delivery Status” (Red/Amber/Green) reported to the MMO Board for the “Remote Electronic Monitoring (REM)” project for each quarter in 2024 and 2025.

    I look forward to your response within 20 working days.

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    DRAFT C: The “Systemic Flaw” Probe

    Target: Groceries Code Adjudicator (GCA)

    Subject: FOI Request – Internal Audit & Training Records (GSCOP Enforcement)

    Dear FOI Team,

    Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, I request the following information regarding the GCA’s internal governance and staff capability.

    The Request:

    1. Internal Audit Topics: Please provide a list of the Titles of Internal Audit Reports commissioned or finalized by the GCA in the financial years 2023/24 and 2024/25.

    2. Investigation Thresholds: Does the GCA hold a formal procedure document or “matrix” defining the criteria for launching a formal investigation under the Groceries Code Adjudicator Act 2013? If yes, please provide the date this document was last reviewed or updated.

    3. Resource Allocation: Please disclose the total number of Full Time Equivalent (FTE) staff hours specifically allocated to “Monitoring and Enforcement” duties (as opposed to “General Admin” or “Levy Collection”) for the period June 2024 to December 2025.

    I look forward to your response within 20 working days.

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    STEP 3: THE TRAP (WHY THIS WORKS)

    The “Risk Score” Trap (Draft A – Defra):

    • If they answer: “The Residual Risk Score for SFI Delivery was RED (20) in February 2025.”

    • The Win: You now have proof of Recklessness. They knew the project was failing (Red Risk) but proceeded to close the scheme anyway without fixing it. This defeats their defense that the failure was “unforeseeable.”

    The “Metadata” Trap (Draft B – MMO):

    • If they answer: “We do not hold a finalized Equality Impact Assessment for the 2025 Sandeel Ban.”

    • The Win: This is Judicial Review Gold. It proves Procedural Impropriety. You cannot lawfully make a public policy decision without assessing the impact on protected groups (e.g., elderly coastal fishers). Their admission that the document doesn’t exist is the smoking gun for Ultra Vires.

    The “Resource” Trap (Draft C – GCA):

    • If they answer: “We allocated 0.5 FTE to Enforcement in 2024.”

    • The Win: This proves Irrationality / Failure of Duty. A regulator cannot fulfill its statutory duty to police a £200bn sector with half a person. This supports a claim for Mandamus (forcing them to act).