17DEC ICAM

21DEC

BAS

This report provides a professional analysis of the potential judicial review opportunities involving the Madrid Bar Association, hereafter referred to as ICAM, and the relevant regulatory bodies in Spain. As requested, this analysis assumes that Spanish law aligns in substance with United Kingdom law, specifically the principles of the Competition Act 1998 and the standards of judicial review.

Introduction to the Wider Public Interest and Competition Law Framework

The following opportunities are evaluated through the lens of the Wider Public Interest, or WPI, balancing competition law goals such as lower prices and innovation against non-economic objectives like professional quality and consumer protection. A central theme in these opportunities is the doctrine of regulatory capture, where professional bodies may implement rules that benefit the profession at the expense of the consumer.

Judicial Review Opportunity One: ICAM Professional Fee Guidelines and Tariffs

Grounds for Review:

This opportunity concerns the legality of the fee guidelines issued by ICAM. Under both EU law and the equivalent Spanish competition framework, professional associations are considered undertakings when they engage in economic activity. The guidelines, even if framed as orientative, may constitute horizontal price-fixing or a decision by an association of undertakings that restricts competition.

Custom Balancing Act:

The balancing act here pits the goal of price competition against the perceived need to maintain service quality. ICAM traditionally argues that minimum or orientative fees are necessary to prevent a race to the bottom that would lead to mediocre services and a deterioration in professional standards. This aligns with the principle that information asymmetries in the liberal professions make it difficult for consumers to judge quality based solely on price. Conversely, the WPI argument for the claimant is that such tariffs create an incentive to overcharge and facilitate a transfer of welfare from consumers to producers without a clear democratic mandate. The challenge would argue that minimum fees cannot guarantee quality and that competition should be the primary regulator of the market unless a specific restriction is objectively justified and proportionate.

Judicial Review Opportunity Two: Regulatory Failure and Oversight by the Ministry of Justice

Grounds for Review:

This opportunity targets the Spanish Ministry of Justice or the General Council of Spanish Advocacy for failing their duty to supervise ICAM’s regulatory functions. The claim rests on the argument that the state has allowed a captured regulator to operate, where the professional body’s interests supersede the public interest. This includes the failure to adequately review and amend draft tariffs that do not account for the general interest.

Custom Balancing Act:

The conflict here is between member state sovereignty and the appropriate level of European or central intervention. The state may argue that professional self-regulation is a legitimate exercise of public power aimed at ensuring the administration of justice. However, the counter-argument is that such self-regulation has become a form of regulatory capture. The claimant must demonstrate that the oversight process is inadequate—for example, that the Ministry cannot independently amend fee drafts but must rely on the bar association itself. The balancing act requires the court to shift from a limited review of manifest errors to a more comprehensive review of whether the state is meeting its duty to prevent anti-competitive distortions.

Judicial Review Opportunity Three: Ultra Vires Actions via Delegated Acts

Grounds for Review:

This opportunity arises if ICAM or the government implements significant changes to the professional regime through delegated acts or bylaws rather than formal legislation. If these changes touch upon essential elements of the profession—such as the fundamental right to practice or the core structure of professional fees—they may be considered illegal.

Custom Balancing Act:

The balancing act involves weighing the efficiency of delegated regulation against the necessity of a democratic mandate. Courts have held that political choices involving conflicting interests must be made by the legislature. If a measure adopted by ICAM involves intense interference with competition or fundamental rights, a stricter proportionality test is required. The state may argue the need for technical expertise in professional regulation, but the claimant can argue that such essential elements cannot be delegated to a body that lacks democratic legitimacy, especially if the policy is sensitive or relates to high-level market structures.

Judicial Review Opportunity Four: Barriers to Entry and Membership Registration

Grounds for Review:

This opportunity concerns the specific refusal of registration or the imposition of overly restrictive entry requirements by ICAM. Such actions can be challenged as an abuse of a dominant position or a restrictive practice that limits the quantity of practitioners to protect the financial interests of existing members.

Custom Balancing Act:

The court must balance the WPI goal of ensuring professional competence through rigorous standards against the risk of creating artificial barriers to entry. While ICAM may justify its requirements on the grounds of quality control and the protection of the public, the claimant can argue that these measures are disproportionate and serve to insulate the incumbent members from competition. The balancing act requires evidence of whether the examination or registration process has sufficient guarantees to ensure it operates in the public interest rather than solely in the interest of the bar association.

Conclusion

These judicial review opportunities represent a strategic effort to use competition law as a democratic tool to ensure the rule of law in professional markets. By challenging the jurisdictional scope of professional associations and the adequacy of state oversight, claimants can force a re-evaluation of whether current regulations truly serve the wider public interest or merely protect the economic interests of a captured regulator. Each case will require a detailed proportionality test to determine if the anti-competitive effects are truly necessary to achieve legitimate non-economic goals.

ALLIES

Based on the case details from the provided URL and the non-time-barred Judicial Review opportunities previously identified, here is a list of entities that would directly benefit from a successful JR. These groups stand to gain from follow-on compensation claims, positive regulatory changes, or reputational restoration.

### Potential Beneficiaries of a Successful Judicial Review

**1. Individual Lawyers and Law Firms Excluded from the Market**
This group includes lawyers who were allegedly sanctioned or excluded for not adhering to ICAM’s illegal “Fee Criteria.” A successful JR forcing ICAM to pursue the clawback (*acción de regreso*) would:
* **Strengthen follow-on damages claims**: A court finding that ICAM acted irrationally by not clawing back the fine from responsible officials bolsters civil claims from lawyers who suffered lost income.
* **Contact Point**: While individual emails are not available, a collective or association of affected lawyers may exist. The FOI request to ICAM asks for records of such complaints, which could help identify them.

**2. Consumer Rights Organizations**
Groups representing citizens and businesses who paid inflated legal fees due to the anti-competitive price list.
* **Organization**: **Organización de Consumidores y Usuarios (OCU)**
* **Reason for Benefit**: A JR that results in a “Risk Disclosure Statement” order or declares the state’s oversight failure would aid their advocacy for consumer restitution and systemic reform in professional services.
* **General Contact**: They can be contacted via their website form for legal or competition matters. A public address is: OCU, Calle Albarracín, 21, 28037 Madrid, Spain.

**3. Business and Commercial Client Associations**
Associations representing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and large corporations, who are frequent users of legal services and bore the cost of inflated fees.
* **Organization**: **Confederación Española de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa (CEPYME)**
* **Reason for Benefit**: Success in the JR against the Ministry of Justice for oversight failure could lead to reforms preventing similar cartels, directly reducing future legal costs for their members.
* **General Contact**: Contact via their website. Address: CEPYME, Calle Diego de León, 50, 28006 Madrid, Spain.

**4. Spanish Competition Law Associations and Legal Academics**
Groups like the “Asociación Española para la Defensa de la Competencia” or university law faculties.
* **Reason for Benefit**: A successful JR creating a novel declaration of principle on the “socialization of fines” or regulator inaction would be a significant legal precedent. It would enhance their reputation, provide case studies, and strengthen their standing in policy debates.

**5. Other Spanish Regional Bar Associations (Colegios de Abogados)**
Bar associations outside Madrid (e.g., Barcelona, Valencia).
* **Reason for Benefit**: A JR that forces a reform of the national legal framework (LEC) would remove the risk of them facing similar allegations and sanctions. It would restore the profession’s reputation by clearly separating legitimate guidance from illegal price-fixing.
* **Example Contact – Il·lustre Col·legi d’Advocats de Barcelona (ICAB)**:
* **Email**: `info@icab.cat`
* **Address**: Carrer de Mallorca, 283, 08037 Barcelona, Spain.

**6. Public Interest Litigation NGOs**
Organizations focused on transparency and government accountability.
* **Organization**: **Civio**
* **Reason for Benefit**: A court order for a published “Risk Disclosure Statement” aligns perfectly with their mission. Winning the JR on grounds of procedural unfairness or lack of transparency would be a tactical victory for their methods.
* **General Contact**: Via their website’s contact form.

### Strategic Recommendations for Engagement

When contacting these entities, frame the benefits in terms of their specific interests:
* For **consumer and business groups**, emphasize the concrete outcome of **potential compensation funds and future cost reductions**.
* For **legal professionals and academics**, highlight the opportunity to **shape precedent and clarify ethical professional rules**.
* For **other bar associations**, focus on the **reputational repair and systemic risk removal** a successful JR would achieve.

The responses to the FOI requests you send will be crucial. Evidence of widespread consumer complaints or a group of aggrieved lawyers will make your approach to these organizations much more compelling.

Would you like a tailored draft for an initial contact email to one of these specific beneficiary groups?

JRS

Based on my review of the case materials, I can confirm that the core unlawful “Fee Criteria” (DORCAP) have already been subject to full judicial review and final annulment by the Supreme Court. The primary limitation period for challenging that specific 2021 decision has likely expired.

However, your strategic focus on **ongoing harms and fresh decisions** is correct and uncovers several viable, non-time-barred avenues for judicial review and tort action. The key is shifting the litigation target from the *original illegal act* to the *continuing failures and consequential decisions* of the responsible public bodies.

### 1. Non-Time-Barred Causes of Action & Standing

The following causes of action arise from ongoing or fresh DORCAPs and support a “no particular victim” standing:

* **Judicial Review (Grounds: Illegality & Irrationality)**: The failure of ICAM, the CNMC, and the Ministry of Justice to take consequential actions post-Supreme Court ruling constitutes ongoing unlawful omissions.
* **ICAM’s Failure to Pursue *Regreso* (Clawback)**: ICAM’s omission to initiate a clawback procedure against its responsible board members under Article 36 of Law 40/2015 is a continuing failure. It is arguably *ultra vires* and irrational (*Wednesbury* unreasonable), as it socializes a penalty for intentional misconduct among the membership, directly contradicting the deterrent purpose of competition law and principles of public financial responsibility.
* **Regulators’ Failure to Enforce & Supervise**: The CNMC’s failure to monitor whether the fine was clawed back from individuals, and the Ministry of Justice’s failure to exercise disciplinary oversight or reform the defective legal framework, are reviewable omissions. These constitute irrational and unlawful failures to give full effect to a final court judgment.

* **Tort (Misfeasance in Public Office)**: This is the most pertinent tort. The evidence suggests ICAM board members knowingly implemented a price-fixing scheme under the guise of public authority. The ongoing refusal to personally account for the fine could evidence the “targeted malice” or “conscious abuse of power” required for this tort, causing ongoing financial harm to the collective.

* **Standing (*Locus Standi*) for a “No Particular Victim” Applicant**: An organization like COCOO can assert standing by demonstrating a “sufficient interest” in this matter of public law. The interest arises from:
* The **diffuse nature of the harm** (to all legal consumers and competing lawyers).
* The **systemic regulatory failure** and “enforcement vacuum” you identified.
* A **public interest in the proper administration of justice** and competition law.
* The specific role of seeking to compel performance of a public duty (the clawback). By submitting the drafted FOI requests, you are directly engaging with the authorities, and any refusal you receive would be a fresh, challengeable decision that further bolsters your standing as an aggrieved party.

### 2. Ultra Vires & Irrational DORCAPs (Ranked)

1. **ICAM’s Omission to Initiate *Acción de Regreso* (Clawback)**: This is the most compelling target. It is highly likely *ultra vires* as it frustrates the statutory purpose of Article 36 LRJSP, which aims to protect public funds and impose personal liability for serious fault. It is also profoundly irrational, as it forces the victimized collective (lawyers) to pay for the fine levied against them, nullifying the penalty’s deterrent effect.
2. **Ministry of Justice’s Omission to Reform the LEC or Take Disciplinary Action**: This is a strong candidate for irrationality. Following a final Supreme Court ruling that a public body (ICAM) abused a statutory power, the supervising Ministry’s failure to correct the enabling law or discipline the body is a Wednesbury-unreasonable policy omission, perpetuating systemic risk.
3. **CNMC’s Omission to Monitor the “Socialization” of the Fine**: This is a clear failure to secure the full effectiveness of its own sanction. By not investigating who bore the final cost of the fine, the CNMC neglected its duty to ensure penalties are effective and dissuasive, a core part of its statutory mission.

### 3. Suspended Quashing Orders

Seek a quashing order to nullify **ICAM’s implicit or explicit decision *not* to pursue the clawback**. This order should be suspended for **90 days**. The suspension is vital to avoid legal chaos, allowing ICAM’s internal governance bodies a strict but orderly deadline to convene and lawfully institute the clawback proceedings against the responsible former board members. The condition attached must be that ICAM provides the applicant and the court with certified proof of the initiation of the procedure within 60 days.

### 4. Ongoing Harm & Injunctive Relief

The **ongoing harm** is the continued “socialization” of the penalty: the €459,024 fine, plus accruing interest, remains an unlawful charge on the collective membership’s funds, and the responsible individuals enjoy impunity.

**Draft Elements for an Interim Mandatory Injunction**: We will apply for an order compelling ICAM to, within 21 days, convene its governing body to vote on a resolution to initiate the *acción de regreso*. The grounds are that the balance of convenience heavily favors prevention of further financial damage to the collective, and there is a serious issue to be tried regarding ICAM’s unlawful omission. Damages would not be an adequate remedy for this continued misfeasance.

### 5. Statement of Legal Principle Declaration

“It is hereby declared that the Ilustre Colegio de la Abogacía de Madrid (ICAM), as a public corporation, acted unlawfully by failing to initiate a procedure for the personal reimbursement (*acción de regreso*) of the €459,024 competition law fine from the members of its Governing Board responsible for approving the unlawful Fee Criteria, and that such omission contravenes the mandatory principle of personal financial responsibility for serious fault as established in Article 36 of Law 40/2015 of the Public Sector Legal Regime.”

### 6. Risk Disclosure Statement Court Order

The court should order ICAM to publish, within 14 days of the order, a clear **Risk Disclosure Statement** on the homepage of its website and in its next official bulletin/membership communication. The statement must: (1) Acknowledge the Supreme Court’s finding that the Fee Criteria constituted an illegal price-fixing agreement; (2) Disclose that the fine was paid from collective funds; (3) State the ongoing financial risk to members from follow-on damages claims; (4) Outline the steps now being taken to seek reimbursement from the individuals responsible. This publication must remain in place for 6 months.

### 7. Assessment & Publicity of Risk

The FOI requests directly ask for pre-2021 internal legal risk assessments. If ICAM’s response is that **no such assessment existed**, this is a major failure of governance and a further ground for criticism, demonstrating a reckless disregard for the legality of its actions. If an assessment **did exist and warned of the risk**, and was ignored, this is powerful evidence of *dolo* (intent) or *culpa grave* (serious negligence) for the tort of misfeasance. The very act of suppressing or ignoring such a report would be a distinct, reviewable failure.

### 8. Responsible Parties & Individual Liability

The **specific responsible unit** is the **ICAM Governing Board (Junta de Gobierno)** in office during the approval and defense of the illegal Fee Criteria, led by the Dean (Decano).

* (a) **Contributory Liability in Tort**: No information suggests individuals have been held liable. This is a core investigative gap.
* (b)/(c) **Disciplinary Proceedings/Dismissals**: The FOI to the Ministry of Justice seeks this. A “no” answer would reveal a catastrophic oversight failure.

**Strong Recommendation**: This line of inquiry is paramount. The absence of personal consequences is the heart of the enforcement vacuum. The tort of misfeasance must be pursued against the identified officials, and disciplinary complaints should be filed with the Ministry of Justice. The threat of personal liability is the most potent tool for behavioral change.

### 9. Tort Damages & Remediation Project

* **Aggregate Tort Damages Estimate**: A reasoned starting point is **€1.5 – €2 million**. This is not just the CNMC fine (€459k), but a multiplier to account for: (1) The cost of clawback legal proceedings; (2) A notional per-capita harm to Madrid lawyers excluded from the market; (3) A sum for the “consumer surplus” lost by legal clients who overpaid.
* **Distribution Mechanism & Remediation Project**: Given the diffuse victim class, damages should be paid into a **Consumer Justice and Legal Innovation Fund**, administered by an independent trust.
* **Justification & Positive Externalities**: This fund would remediate the broader sector harmed by anti-competitive practices. It could finance: (1) **Public legal education** on fair legal costs, directly benefiting consumers; (2) **Grants for legal tech startups** developing transparent, cost-effective legal service models, breaking down the cartelized market structure; (3) **Pro bono litigation support** for strategic competition law cases. This transforms a penalty into a force for market correction, transparency, and innovation, creating spillover benefits that repair the systemic harm.

My professional advice is to immediately file the drafted FOI requests. The responses (especially refusals or admissions of inaction) will provide the fresh, evidence-based decisions necessary to ground these proposed judicial review claims and fortify your standing.

17DEC

FOIS

Here are the three customised FOI requests (Solicitudes de Acceso a la Información) drafted strictly according to your Model, but adapted for the ICAM / Costas Case.

You should send these via the Transparency Portal (Portal de Transparencia) of each entity or via their general registry (REC/Orve).

1. TARGET: ICAM (Ilustre Colegio de la Abogacía de Madrid)

Focus: The “Regreso” (Clawback) of the €459,024 fine from the Board Members who approved the illegal criteria.

[Copy and Paste into ICAM Transparency Portal / Email: transparencia@icam.es]

Asunto: Solicitud de Acceso a Información Pública – Evidencias sobre [Criterios de Honorarios/Costas] y la Acción de Regreso de la Multa CNMC

Escribo en nombre de Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO.uk), una organización benéfica dedicada a la protección del Interés Público General (Wider Public Interest). Intervenimos en fallos regulatorios donde el daño es difuso y existe un “vacío de ejecución” (enforcement vacuum).

Esta solicitud se realiza para evaluar la respuesta corporativa ante el DORCAP (Decisión, Omisión, Regulación, Conducta, Acción o Política) referenciado: la redacción, aprobación y defensa de los “Criterios Orientadores de Honorarios” declarados ilegales por el Tribunal Supremo (Sentencias 1684/2022 y 1749/2022) y sancionados por la CNMC (Expediente SAMAD/09/2013).

Al amparo de la Ley 19/2013, de transparencia, solicito la siguiente información:

PARTE 1: ESTABLECIMIENTO DEL “VACÍO DE EJECUCIÓN”

  • Demografía de Afectados: Desglose el número de quejas o impugnaciones de tasaciones de costas recibidas en los últimos 5 años en las que se alegara la aplicación indebida de baremos o listas de precios, categorizadas por si el reclamante era abogado colegiado o ciudadano consumidor.

  • Historial de Litigios: Confirme si se han recibido reclamaciones de responsabilidad patrimonial o daños y perjuicios de colegiados excluidos del mercado o sancionados deontológicamente por no seguir dichos criterios en los últimos 3 años.

PARTE 2: LEGALIDAD Y RIESGO (Controles de Gobernanza)

  • Evaluación de Riesgo Ultra Vires: Revele si existe en las actas de la Junta de Gobierno algún informe jurídico (interno o externo) previo a 2021 que alertara sobre el riesgo de que los “Criterios” infringieran la Ley de Defensa de la Competencia (LDC) o fueran ultra vires.

PARTE 3: CIRCUNSTANCIAS ESPECÍFICAS – LA TRAMPA DEL “REGRESO” (CRUCIAL)

Solicito confirme si el ICAM ha incoado el ‘Procedimiento de exigencia de responsabilidad’ (Acción de Regreso) conforme al Art. 36 de la Ley 40/2015, para recuperar la multa de 459.024 € pagada a la CNMC de los patrimonios personales de los miembros de la Junta de Gobierno responsables de su aprobación.

  1. Si la respuesta es ‘NO’, facilite la copia del acuerdo o informe jurídico que justifique cargar dicha sanción al presupuesto general (cuotas de los colegiados) en lugar de exigir el reintegro a los administradores causantes de la infracción por dolo o culpa grave.

PARTE 4: ASPECTOS SISTÉMICOS Y PISTA DE AUDITORÍA

  1. Auditoría Interna: Facilite los informes de la Comisión de Auditoría o Control Presupuestario que analicen el impacto de la sanción de la CNMC en las cuentas anuales y si se ha provisionado el riesgo de demandas masivas de indemnización.

Atentamente,

Oscar Moya | Director, COCOO.uk

2. TARGET: CNMC (Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia)

Focus: Vigilancia (Monitoring) of the fine payment and preventing the “socialisation” of the penalty.

[Copy and Paste into CNMC Transparency Portal / Sede Electrónica]

Asunto: Solicitud de Acceso a Información Pública – Vigilancia de la Sanción ICAM (Expte. SAMAD/09/2013) y Cumplimiento de Sentencia

Escribo en nombre de COCOO.uk, investigando el cumplimiento efectivo de las resoluciones de competencia y la disuasión real de las multas.

Al amparo de la Ley 19/2013, de transparencia, solicito información sobre la fase de vigilancia del Expediente SAMAD/09/2013 (Sanción al ICAM):

PARTE 1: ESTABLECIMIENTO DEL “VACÍO DE EJECUCIÓN”

  • Eficacia de la Multa: ¿Posee la CNMC algún informe o expediente de vigilancia que verifique quién pagó efectivamente la multa de 459.024 €? Buscamos evidencia de si la CNMC comprobó que la multa no fuera “socializada” entre las víctimas (los colegiados a través de cuotas), lo cual anularía el efecto disuasorio.

PARTE 2: LEGALIDAD Y RIESGO

  • Reincidencia: Desglose el número de denuncias recibidas contra el ICAM por hechos similares (recomendación de precios o baremos encubiertos) después de la Resolución de julio de 2021.

PARTE 3: CIRCUNSTANCIAS ESPECÍFICAS – LA TRAMPA DEL “REGRESO”

  • Interacción con el Regulador: Confirme si la CNMC ha enviado algún requerimiento o recomendación al Ministerio de Justicia o al propio ICAM instando a la depuración de responsabilidades individuales de los directivos, para evitar que la infracción de competencia sea financiada por el colectivo profesional.

PARTE 4: ASPECTOS SISTÉMICOS

  • Vigilancia de Publicaciones: Facilite copia de los informes de la Subdirección de Vigilancia que acrediten que el ICAM ha eliminado efectivamente todos los baremos y algoritmos de precios de su web y comunicaciones internas, en cumplimiento de la resolución.

Atentamente,

Oscar Moya | Director, COCOO.uk

3. TARGET: MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA (Secretaría General Técnica / Transparencia)

Focus: Oversight Failure regarding the “Costas” system and lack of disciplinary action against the Bar.

[Copy and Paste into Ministerio de Justicia Transparency Portal]

Asunto: Solicitud de Acceso a Información Pública – Responsabilidad del Estado en el sistema de Tasación de Costas (Caso ICAM/CNMC)

Escribo en nombre de COCOO.uk, evaluando fallos regulatorios en el sector legal que afectan al derecho de defensa y la libre competencia.

Esta solicitud se refiere al DORCAP del Ministerio: el mantenimiento de una normativa procesal (LEC) que delegaba en los Colegios (ICAM) la emisión de “criterios” que resultaron ser un cártel de precios ilegal, según el Tribunal Supremo.

Al amparo de la Ley 19/2013, solicito:

PARTE 1: ESTABLECIMIENTO DEL “VACÍO DE EJECUCIÓN”

  • Quejas Ciudadanas: Número de quejas recibidas en el Ministerio sobre honorarios de abogados “excesivos” o “abusivos” justificados en los baremos del ICAM en los últimos 5 años.

PARTE 2: LEGALIDAD Y RIESGO

  • Evaluación de Riesgo Normativo: ¿Existe algún informe de la Abogacía del Estado o de la Comisión General de Codificación posterior a la sanción de la CNMC (2021) que analice la necesidad de reformar urgentemente la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil para retirar a los Colegios la competencia de emitir “Criterios de Honorarios”, dado el riesgo probado de infracción ultra vires?

PARTE 3: CIRCUNSTANCIAS ESPECÍFICAS – LA TRAMPA DEL “REGRESO” Y DISCIPLINA

Solicito confirmación sobre medidas disciplinarias:

  1. ¿Ha abierto el Ministerio de Justicia o algún órgano dependiente algún expediente informativo o disciplinario contra el ICAM o sus directivos tras la confirmación por el Tribunal Supremo de la infracción “muy grave” de la Ley de Defensa de la Competencia?

  2. Si la respuesta es negativa, explique si existe algún criterio de política pública para no fiscalizar a las Corporaciones de Derecho Público incluso cuando son condenadas en firme por alterar el mercado legal.

PARTE 4: ASPECTOS SISTÉMICOS

  • Comunicaciones con la UE: Revele si ha existido correspondencia entre el Ministerio y la Comisión Europea (DG Competition o DG Justice) referente a las infracciones de competencia de los Colegios de Abogados españoles y el cumplimiento de la Directiva de Servicios.

Atentamente,

Oscar Moya | Director, COCOO.uk

CASE: ICAM “BAREMOS” (LEGAL FEES & COSTAS)

1. IDENTIFY ALL PROVEN FOIGS (FINDINGS OF INFRINGEMENT)

  • The Proven FOIG: The Ilustre Colegio de la Abogacía de Madrid (ICAM) was found to have infringed Article 1 of the LDC (Spanish Defence of Competition Law) by engaging in a collective recommendation of prices.1

     

  • Specific Conduct: The drafting, publication, and application of the “Criterios orientadores de honorarios” (Fee Criteria) for the appraisal of costs (tasación de costas). Although disguised as “criteria,” the CNMC and Courts found they operated as fixed price lists (Baremos), preventing lawyers from competing on price and effectively setting minimum fees for litigation work.

  • The Sanctioning Resolution:

    • Authority: CNMC (National Commission on Markets and Competition).2

       

    • Date: 22 July 2021.

    • Fine: €459,024.

    • Finality: This finding became final and non-appealable after the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) dismissed ICAM’s appeal.

  • Dates & Time Limits to Claim:

    • Date of Finality (Start of Clock): December 19, 2022 (Judgment 1684/2022) and December 23, 2022 (Judgment 1749/2022).3

       

    • Limitation Period: 5 Years (under the Damages Directive/Article 74 LDC).

    • Deadline to Claim Damages: December 19, 2027.

2. IDENTIFY THE POSSIBILITIES THAT THESE FOIGS COULD HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY AN ULTRAVIRES/UNLAWFUL DORCAP FROM THE REGULATOR OR ANOTHER PUBLIC BODY.

  • Identity of the “Regulator/Public Body”: In this unique case, ICAM itself acts as the Public Regulator (Corporación de Derecho Público) for the legal profession in Madrid.

  • The “DORCAP” (The Unlawful Act): The “Criterios de Honorarios” (Fee Criteria) drafted by the ICAM Board (Junta de Gobierno).

    • Was it Ultra Vires? YES. ICAM claimed they were legally mandated to produce these criteria by the Civil Procedure Law (LEC) to calculate court costs. However, the Courts ruled that ICAM acted ultra vires (exceeding its powers) because the law only allowed “criteria” for appraisal, not exact price lists that eliminated competition. ICAM used its public regulatory power to enforce a private cartel-like structure.

  • Was this DORCAP Judicially Reviewed? YES.

    • The “DORCAP” (the Criteria and ICAM’s defense of them) was reviewed and annulled by:

      1. The CNMC (Administrative Review, 2021).

      2. The Audiencia Nacional (Judicial Review, 2022).

      3. The Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court, Dec 2022).4

         

    • Outcome: The Supreme Court established jurisprudence (Sentencia 1684/2022) declaring that Bar Associations cannot establish rules that lead to a direct quantification of fees, confirming the “DORCAP” was unlawful.5

       

3. HAS THE STATE PAID [VIA SETTLEMENTS, ARBITRATIONS, ETC.] ANY REDRESS OR FINE OR COMPENSATION TO THE FOIG VICTIMS? IF YES, WAS THERE ANY DISCIPLINARY INVESTIGATION AND REGRESO PAYMENTS?

  • State Compensation to Victims: NO.

    • The State (Ministry of Justice or Economy) has not paid compensation to the victims (which include clients who overpaid “costas” and lawyers like those in the Reincorporación group who were excluded from the market).

    • Current Status: Victims must file standalone civil lawsuits (“Follow-on actions”) against ICAM to claim damages for lost opportunity or overpayments.

  • Disciplinary Investigation (Regreso): NO/NEGLIGIBLE.

    • Regreso: Under the Public Sector Legal Regime Act (LRJSP, Art. 36), when a Public Administration (ICAM is one) pays a fine due to the “intent or serious negligence” (dolo o culpa grave) of its authorities, it must seek reimbursement (acción de regreso) from the specific officials responsible (the Dean and Board Members who approved the illegal Criteria).

    • Outcome: There is no public record that ICAM has initiated an acción de regreso against the specific Board Members (Junta de Gobierno) to recover the €459,024 fine paid to the CNMC. The fine was likely paid from the general budget (members’ fees), effectively passing the penalty onto the victims (the lawyers themselves) rather than the perpetrators.

Next Step for You

Would you like me to draft a specific “Letter of Claim” (Reclamación Patrimonial) tailored to initiate the Acción de Regreso against the ICAM Board Members, or a claim for damages based on the Supreme Court’s 2022 ruling?

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