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THE COCOO GROUP STRUCTURE     GPEs: THE COCOO ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE     

UK  CNMC  ESPANA    SPAIN.gdfol    GLOBAL.MJ    USA      EU 

gdfolder.proSPAIN    tests.steps.anchors.hooks 

prompt:

you are cocoo’s competition in house solicitor. cocoo’s goal is to find liability , whether strict liability or non strict liability in the spanish government and the relevant ministry, for the many arbitral awards against spain arising from companies harmed by Spain’s decisions regarding the ECT.  Therefore, we need to argue that Spain, as a nation, is distinct from the government, that is an Agent of Spain.  When Agents are reckless or negligent in their conduct they should be found liable and pay compensation to victims, not only under contract law (as in the ongoing arbitration proceedings against Spain) but also under Tort, because under Tort, we are able to seek damages for tort victims of the government’s decisions, for example for harmed consumers, competitors, and the wider public interest.    Your job, as in house solicitor, is to read the files attached and extract ALL information to help us build a strong case against the spanish government and relevant ministry for their decisions in connection with the ECT, build a strong case against the Spanish government and relevant ministries for liability under Tort law arising from arbitral awards related to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT):

### **1. Legal Basis for Tort Liability**
Under Spanish Tort law (Article 1902 of the Civil Code), liability arises from acts or omissions causing harm due to negligence or recklessness. Key elements to establish:
– **Duty of Care**: The government owed a duty to investors, consumers, and the public to regulate responsibly, ensuring compliance with international obligations (e.g., ECT) and avoiding foreseeable harm.
– **Breach of Duty**: Reckless regulatory changes destabilized the renewable energy sector, violating ECT protections (e.g., fair treatment, legitimate expectations).
– **Causation**: The regulatory changes directly caused financial harm (e.g., arbitral awards, legal costs) and public detriment (diverted climate/energy poverty funds).
– **Damages**: Quantifiable losses (€1.2B+ in awards, €101M in legal fees) and broader societal harm (undermined energy transition, inequitable burden on taxpayers).

—

### **2. Evidence of Governmental Negligence/Recklessness**
#### **a. Failure to Foresee Legal Consequences**
– The TNI report highlights Spain’s retroactive regulatory changes post-2008 crisis, which tribunals consistently deemed a breach of ECT obligations (21/27 cases lost). This indicates the government failed to conduct adequate legal risk assessments despite being an ECT signatory.
– The BIT with the Philippines (Art. 3-4) mirrors ECT protections (fair treatment, expropriation). Spain’s pattern of breaching similar treaty obligations suggests systemic negligence.

#### **b. Disregard for International Law**
– Tribunals in cases like *Canepa v. Spain* (ICSID Case No. ARB/19/4) rejected Spain’s jurisdictional objections (e.g., “lack of investment,” “abuse of process”), confirming the measures violated ECT standards. This underscores the government’s failure to align domestic policies with international commitments.

#### **c. Mismanagement of Public Funds**
– The TNI report notes Spain spent €101M on arbitration costs (average €4M/case) and faces €3B+ in pending claims. These funds were diverted from climate action and energy poverty alleviation, harming public interest.
– Spanish courts upheld the regulatory changes domestically, but tribunals found them internationally unlawful. This discrepancy shows the government prioritized short-term fiscal goals over long-term legal and financial risks.

—

### **3. Broader Harm to Public Interest**
– **Discriminatory System**: The ECT enabled foreign investors (89% financial speculators) to claim compensation, while domestic SMEs/cooperatives (75% of renewable investments) lacked recourse. This skewed the energy transition toward profit-driven entities, harming local stakeholders.
– **Climate Obstruction**: The TNI report warns the ECT protects €8B in Spanish fossil fuel assets. Future phase-out measures could trigger new claims, chilling climate policies (e.g., *Achmea* intra-EU objections ignored in ECT cases).

—

### **4. Overcoming Sovereign Immunity**
– **Commercial Exception**: If Spain’s regulatory acts are deemed commercial (e.g., managing energy markets), sovereign immunity may not apply.
– **Tortious Conduct**: Sovereign immunity does not shield intentional/reckless harm. Spain’s disregard for ECT obligations and taxpayer costs could meet this threshold.

—

### **5. Legal Strategy**
#### **a. Tort Claims Against Ministries**
– Target the **Ministry of Ecological Transition** and **Ministry of Industry** for designing/implementing reckless policies. Cite their awareness of ECT risks (e.g., prior arbitrations, EU directives against retroactive changes).
– Use the TNI report’s data on legal costs and awards to quantify damages.

#### **b. Public Interest Litigation**
– Argue harm to consumers (higher energy prices due to diverted funds) and competitors (unfair advantage to foreign investors). Reference the €1.2B awards as funds misallocated from Spain’s 2021 energy poverty budget (€242M).

#### **c. Precedent**
– While rare, cases like *Urgenda Foundation v. Netherlands* (climate negligence) show courts can hold governments liable for policy failures. Spain’s ECT mismanagement similarly jeopardized public welfare.

—

### **6. Key Documents Supporting the Case**
1. **TNI Report (2022)**:
– Spain’s 77% loss rate in ECT cases (21/27 awards).
– €1.2B+ in compensation, €101M in legal costs.
– Investors’ speculative nature (89% financial firms; 50% fossil fuel ties).

2. **Canepa v. Spain (ICSID, 2020)**:
– Tribunal’s dismissal of Spain’s jurisdictional objections, affirming ECT violations.
– Recognition of claimants’ investments despite Spain’s “shell company” arguments.

3. **Spain-Philippines BIT**:
– Illustrates Spain’s treaty obligations (fair treatment, expropriation), breached similarly under ECT.

—

### **Conclusion**
The Spanish government acted recklessly by enacting retroactive regulatory changes without mitigating ECT risks, causing direct financial harm and public detriment. A Tort case can hold ministries liable for negligence, seeking compensation for arbitral losses and broader societal damages. This approach shifts liability from the state (principal) to its agents (government bodies), leveraging tribunal findings and public financial data to prove recklessness.

The EU has taken the final step to exit the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), a multilateral trade and investment agreement applicable to the energy sector, which is not compatible with the EU’s climate and energy goals under the European Green Deal and the Paris Agreement.

Two written notifications have been sent by the Council and Commission to the Government of Portugal, which is the official depositary of the Treaty, notifying respectively the withdrawal of the European Union and Euratom. The withdrawals will take effect in one year. These notifications follow the agreement between EU Energy Ministers last month on the Commission’s proposals to pursue the withdrawal and Treaty modernisation in parallel.

This week, the Union and its Member States have also reached a formal agreement to put an end to the continuation of intra-EU arbitration proceedings under the ECT that are contrary to Union law. More specifically, the agreement is aimed at clarifying, for the benefit of courts and arbitral tribunals, that the arbitration clause provided in the ECT does not apply – and never has – in the relations between an EU investor and an EU country.

The agreement follows the Komstroy judgment, in which the Court of Justice held that the arbitration clause of the ECT must be interpreted as not applicable to disputes between a Member State and an investor from another Member State concerning an investment made by the latter in the first Member State. In other words, under Union law, within that framework, arbitration awards are invalid and as such unenforceable anywhere in the Union.

This judgment binds all Member States and their domestic courts. However, the clear case law of the Union courts has not always been respected by arbitral tribunals, which have continued to accept jurisdiction and hand down awards in intra-EU proceedings. The Member States, the EU and Euratom therefore decided to negotiate an agreement under public international law to settle this matter. The agreement clarifies, for the benefit of courts and arbitral tribunals, that the arbitration clause provided in the ECT does not apply in the relations between an EU investor and an EU Member State.

The Member States and the Union further agreed to accompany the closing of negotiations on the agreement with a Declaration on the legal consequences of the Komstroy judgment. That Declaration was signed on 26 June. The Declaration is effective as of its signature and will be later published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The inter se agreement is now subject to internal procedures leading to its signature and entry into force. For the Union and Euratom, the Commission is preparing the necessary proposals to authorise signature and adoption of the agreement.

Both texts reflect the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and are entirely in line with the established position of the Union as expressed on numerous occasions including in open court in third country jurisdictions. The Energy Charter Treaty Secretariat has been informed of this agreement.

Background

The Energy Charter Treaty is a multilateral trade and investment agreement applicable to the energy sector that was signed in 1994 and entered into force in 1998. The European Union is a Contracting Party to that Treaty, together with Euratom, 22 EU Member States (as of 26 June 2024), as well as Japan, Switzerland, Turkey and most countries from the Western Balkans and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with the exception of Russia and Belarus. In terms of the EU Member States, Italy unilaterally withdrew in 2015. France, Germany, Poland and Luxembourg have already exited the ECT. Slovenia, Portugal and Spain have also initiated a procedure of withdrawal.

The Commission has negotiated a modernisation of the ECT on behalf of the EU to bring it in line with the Union’s climate and energy goals, and its investment protection framework. However, due to a lack of majority support from the Member States, the EU has not yet voted for the modernisation of the ECT. The Commission has subsequently proposed for the EU, Euratom and the Member States to withdraw from the unmodernised Treaty, mostly due to concerns over protection of fossil fuels investments. Under the Belgian Presidency of the EU, last month an agreement was found with Member States to proceed with the withdrawal and the modernisation process in parallel.

At the same time, the Commission has been engaged with the Member States for years to clarify the legal context for disputes under the ECT. In October 2022, the Commission sent a Communication to the Council, the European Parliament and the Member States setting out its intention to open negotiations on an agreement between the Union, Euratom and the Member States in relation to the interpretation of the Energy Charter Treaty that would include, in particular, a confirmation that the Energy Charter Treaty does not apply intra-EU and therefore, it cannot serve as a basis for arbitration proceedings.

The Union joined the Energy Charter Treaty with partner countries around the world as part of its external energy policy. The offer to arbitrate disputes contained in that Treaty was never intended to supplant the system of judicial protection set up under the EU Treaties. In its Komstroy judgment, the CJEU recognised that this was the only proper way to interpret the Energy Charter Treaty.

For More Information Energy Charter Treaty

The UK AND SPAIN confirm withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty after efforts to agree vital modernisation fail.:

Civil society organisations and parliamentarians from all political parties have been clear that the Energy Charter Treaty is an out-of-date agreement and undermines our efforts to tackle climate change. We welcome the UK’s decision to leave, which will strengthen global efforts to roll out cheap, clean renewable energy. Today, the UK joins 9 EU member states, including France, Spain and the Netherlands, in withdrawing from the treaty. The decision will support the UK’s transition to net zero and strengthen its energy security. Minister of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, Graham Stuart, said:

The Energy Charter Treaty is outdated and in urgent need of reform but talks have stalled and sensible renewal looks increasingly unlikely.

Remaining a member would not support our transition to cleaner, cheaper energy, and could even penalise us for our world-leading efforts to deliver net zero.

With £30 billion invested in the energy sector just since September, we continue to lead the world in cutting emissions, attracting international investment and providing the strongest legal protections for those who invest here

cocoo has o2:

1/scout all ec.cma.cnmc.doj decis >>  extract evidence.findings >> FOC4dams4.bsd (same case, different party/ies)

2/ 3PINT.JR + COMPLAINT (2 ec.cma.cnmc.reg.member) V  (privco/PUS/CMA/EC/reg/cnmc/Members) for their own decisions, or for failing to challenge others’ decisions, when such decision is (pot) either :

-UV decis (by cma.ec.cnmc.reg), becos enforces CLP, in a manner that is beyond the statutory powers delegated (by 1leg) to that reg/pus

-UNLAWFUL decis (by cma.ec.cnmc.reg), becos violates EULAW (Treaties…)

– unlawful undertaking agreement or conduct between direct or indirect competitors

3/complaint2 (euomb/ukparlomb) Omb decis is only a recommendation. no teeth.EX: COMPLAINT V THE EC.CMA.SOSBT… DECIS on any of my complaints listed

-EX:  (case:proSpain): cocoo complaints (to EC+cnmc) against the ECT agreement, and any related decisions that harm the signatories, like Spain. the ECT agreement IS CONTRARY TO CLP and eulaw, and promotes stealth.cons and cartel behaviour by the smaller fish that circle the sharks..COCOO: cocoo: some ect rules are incompatible with eulaw. consecuently, eu members that are also ect members, becos of the ect rules they must follow, sometimes are forced to commit uv/illegal decis. the claimants are privcos,little fish, that, to thrive, behave as a de-facto cartel ( an implied sust.ua that fails at least 1 of the 4Exempt.Conds.) + stealth.consolid. driver >> COCOO: IF EC ALLOWS ECT, EC WOULD BE ACTING U.V./ILLEGAL

-EX: (case:proGoogle): cocoo complaints against ad.rivals:  ECJ DECIS: gd.pdf.ecj.decis.24nov.vgoogle

The Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (The COCOO). UK Companies House Registration Number: 15466919. Address: 23 Village Way, Beckenham. Postcode: BR33NA.United Kingdom. Email: contact@cocoo.uk

06.01.2025

Letter of complaint

This Complaint pertains to state aid concerns related to compensation awarded under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is a multilateral agreement designed to promote and protect energy investments across borders. Below are the full details of the treaty: Date of Signature: December 17, 1994. Entry into Force: April 16, 1998.

Complainant:

The Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (The COCOO). UK Companies House Registration Number: 15466919 Address: 23 Village Way, Beckenham. Postcode: BR33NA. United Kingdom. Email: contact@cocoo.uk Phone: 07716601277

Identity and legal standing:

• Type: limited company
• Representation: The Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (The COCOO). UK Companies House Registration Number: 15466919 Address: 23 Village Way, Beckenham. Postcode: BR33NA. United Kingdom. Email: contact@cocoo.uk Phone: 07716601277
Our constitutional mandate is to quality-control, ex-officio, decisions by competition authorities, public bodies or firms, that could deter synergies and positive externalities, or harm competition, investment, consumer welfare or the public interest

Explain effect on competitive position:
The compensation awards granted under the ECT disproportionately favor specific investors in the energy sector, creating an uneven playing field. This distorts competition, affecting the broader European market and harming other energy companies that must comply with stricter regulatory frameworks without equivalent compensation.

5. Information regarding the Member State granting the aid

• Country: Spain
• Granting body: Central government of Spain

6. Information regarding the alleged aid measure

a) The alleged aid involves compensation payments to investors under ECT arbitration awards, funded through public resources. These payments provide financial benefits to specific companies in the renewable and fossil fuel sectors.
b) Purpose: To compensate for regulatory changes, including the repeal of favorable energy tariffs and incentives under Spain’s feed-in tariff system.
c) Amount: Estimated at €8 billion in total claims, with over €1.2 billion awarded so far.
d) Beneficiaries: Specific energy sector investors (e.g., E.ON, Antin, and others) who filed arbitration claims under the ECT.
e) Dates: Awards were issued between 2015 and 2024.
f) State aid notification: According to our knowledge, the state aid was not notified to the European Commission.

7. Grounds of complaint

a) Public resources: Compensation is paid from Spain’s state budget, directly involving public funds.
b) Selectivity: The awards benefit only specific investors in the energy sector, providing a selective advantage to those who pursued arbitration under the ECT.
c) Economic advantage: The compensation shields investors from losses due to regulatory changes, giving them an unfair financial benefit compared to competitors who did not receive similar compensation.
d) Distortion of competition: By providing selective compensation, the awards distort competition in the EU energy market, favoring specific investors over other energy producers, including those operating in compliance with Spain’s new regulations.
e) Effect on trade: These awards impact intra-EU trade by giving foreign investors competitive advantages in the Spanish and broader EU energy markets, undermining fair competition principles.

8. Compatibility of the aid

The aid is incompatible with the EU internal market because:

• It undermines the objectives of EU climate policies, including the European Green Deal, by preserving fossil fuel investments.
• It violates the principle of a level playing field by granting selective economic advantages.

9. Infringement of other EU rules

The awards infringe upon:

• Articles 107 and 108 TFEU (state aid rules).
• EU climate policy goals, such as the Paris Agreement and the European Green Deal.
• Achmea and Komstroy judgments, which deem intra-EU arbitration under the ECT incompatible with EU law.

10. Supporting documents

• Copy of the ECT.
• Text of Law 7/2021 (Climate Change and Energy Transition Act).
• Relevant arbitration awards and case summaries (e.g., E.ON v. Spain, Antin v. Spain).
• CJEU rulings in Achmea and Komstroy.

Declaration

LONDON, 06 JANUARY 2025

SIGNED: OSCAR MOYA LLEDO
DIRECTOR
THE COCOO

MAGIC :) SEABISCUIT.chatgpt   PROMPTKINGS   BUTTONS   MY.CHATS     my.BOTS   my STEPS    RESEARCH  ONGOING.CASES   GPEs+SITEMAP   HOOKER

GOOGLE CASE

google.all.cases.worldwide.PREISKEL.COM.TIMELINE     doj.cma v GOOGLE.apple.misleadingreports       coll.claim v google. cat.timeline      gd.FOLDER.pro.google    chatgpt.google        notes: theworld v adtech: google..

coco complaint (2 ec) , proGoogle v   ECJ DECIS: gd.pdf.ecj.decis.24nov.vgoogle  and ad.rivals

the cma has 2 open investigs on google:   (unlike cnmc or ec)>> cocoo can use an additional ground):

• GOV.UK.GOOGLECASE: THE CMA.DECIS.cocoo.complains
• ninvestig.cartel.google.meta.headerbidding

Google is currently facing legal challenges in both the UK and EU jurisdictions concerning its advertising technology practices.

United Kingdom:

• Ad Tech Collective Action LLP: This group has initiated a lawsuit against Google, alleging anti-competitive behavior in the online advertising market. The Competition Appeal Tribunal has permitted this £13.6 billion lawsuit to proceed.Reuters
• Consumer Voice: Led by Nikki Stopford, this organization has filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of UK consumers, seeking £7 billion in damages. The claim alleges that Google’s dominance in search and advertising has led to higher prices and reduced consumer choice.The Times

European Union:

• Over 30 European Media Companies: A coalition of more than 30 European news media organizations has filed a lawsuit against Google, seeking approximately €2.1 billion in damages. The lawsuit, filed in the Netherlands, alleges that Google’s advertising practices have harmed their businesses by limiting competition and innovation.Politico Europe
• Epic Games: The gaming company has filed an antitrust lawsuit against Google, alleging anti-competitive practices related to app distribution and payment processing on the Android platform. This lawsuit is part of a broader legal challenge by Epic Games against major tech companies’ control over app ecosystems.The Verge

Your Law Firm’s Letterhead]
[Date]

To:
Competition and Markets Authority
The Cabot
25 Cabot Square
London E14 4QZ

Subject: Formal Complaint Challenging CMA’s Provisional Findings on Google’s Ad Tech Practices

Dear Sir/Madam,

We represent Google LLC and its subsidiaries (“Google”) in relation to the CMA’s provisional findings dated 6 September 2024, alleging anti-competitive conduct in Google’s ad tech operations. We submit this letter to formally contest the Statement of Objections, highlighting legal, factual, and procedural grounds while addressing the substantial risks of negative externalities if penalties or structural remedies are imposed.

1. Legal and Factual Grounds to Challenge the CMA’s Decision

a. Challenge to the Exclusivity Clause Argument

Google’s revenue-sharing agreements (RSAs) with device manufacturers and browsers are not inherently anti-competitive but serve a vital role in providing a streamlined and user-friendly experience.

• Pro-Competitive Benefits:
  • RSAs allow Google to deliver a consistent, high-quality user experience by optimizing search integration across platforms.
  • The agreements generate significant revenue for partners like Apple, fostering innovation and improving the broader tech ecosystem.
• No Lock-In Effect:
  • Users retain the ability to switch default search engines on devices or browsers easily, demonstrating that Google’s dominance stems from user preference for its superior search capabilities.
• Precedent: In Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. (2006), the U.S. Supreme Court held that leveraging a dominant product does not automatically establish anti-competitive behavior unless coercion or harm to consumer choice is proven.

b. Default Bias as a Consumer Preference, Not Foreclosure

The CMA’s focus on “default bias” oversimplifies consumer behavior and misrepresents the competitive environment.

• Behavioral Economics vs. Choice:
  • Users overwhelmingly choose Google for its superior search performance, not simply because of its preloaded status.
  • Studies indicate that even when presented with alternative search engines, users prefer Google due to its accuracy and relevance.
• Market Alternatives:
  • Rivals like Bing, Yahoo, and DuckDuckGo offer competitive options and have gained traction in specific niches (e.g., privacy-focused searches by DuckDuckGo).

c. High Costs of Replicating Google’s Infrastructure Highlight Natural Barriers, Not Anticompetitive Practices

The CMA’s findings disregard the substantial financial and technical investment required to replicate Google’s search infrastructure.

• Court Findings on Capital Expenditures:
  • The cost to replicate Google’s technical infrastructure is estimated at $20 billion in capital and $7 billion in annual operating costs.
  • These figures reflect the natural complexity of the search market rather than any artificial barriers imposed by Google.
• Precedent: In Verizon v. Trinko (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that natural barriers do not equate to anti-competitive conduct.

d. Revenue-Sharing Agreements (RSAs) as Common Industry Practice

RSAs are a standard mechanism across industries and serve to enhance efficiency and improve consumer experiences.

• Economic Justification:
  • These agreements lower costs for consumers while supporting the financial health of browser developers and device manufacturers.
  • They allow Google to reinvest in improving its search and ad technologies.
• International Precedent: In Intel v. Commission (Case T-286/09), the General Court recognized that exclusivity agreements should be evaluated in their economic context, emphasizing their pro-competitive benefits.

2. Procedural and Evidentiary Concerns

a. Flawed Counterfactual Analysis

The CMA’s findings rely on speculative counterfactuals that fail to account for the complexities of the digital advertising market.

• Recommendation: A more rigorous economic analysis should be conducted, incorporating data from other platforms such as Amazon and Meta to provide a balanced view of competition.

b. Absence of Demonstrable Consumer Harm

The CMA has not established any evidence of direct harm to consumers, a cornerstone of competition law. Instead, Google’s practices have lowered costs for publishers, sustained free content, and improved consumer choice.

3. Risks of Overregulation and Negative Externalities

a. Impact on Small Publishers and Advertisers

Structural remedies like forced unbundling could disrupt Google’s ecosystem, increasing costs and reducing ad revenue for small publishers.

b. Chilling Effect on Innovation

Interventions could stifle Google’s ability to innovate, slowing technological advancements in search and ad optimization.

• Precedent: In United States v. IBM (1969), overregulation in the tech industry was recognized as a potential inhibitor of innovation, leading to the case being dropped.

c. International Policy Misalignment

The CMA’s approach risks diverging from the U.S. DOJ and EU Commission, creating regulatory uncertainty and reducing the UK’s competitiveness in attracting tech investment.

4. Pro-Competitive Benefits of Google’s Practices

• Efficiency Gains: Google’s integrated ad tech stack reduces transaction costs and maximizes publisher revenue.
• Consumer Welfare: Google’s ad ecosystem sustains free or affordable digital content for millions of users.
• Market Innovation: Continuous improvements in AI-driven targeting benefit both advertisers and end-users.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In light of these arguments, we respectfully urge the CMA to reconsider its provisional findings and adopt a more balanced approach. We recommend:

1. Revisiting the market definition to reflect the full scope of competition.
2. Acknowledging the pro-competitive justifications of Google’s RSAs and integrated stack.
3. Exploring behavioral remedies, such as increased transparency, rather than structural interventions that could harm innovation and consumer welfare.

We remain committed to engaging in further discussions and providing additional evidence to assist the CMA in reaching a fair and proportionate resolution

The recent antitrust ruling against Google — the first major tech antitrust decision since Microsoft in 2001 — found the company guilty of anticompetitive practices. It also provided a wealth of information on arguably the most lucrative market in the technology space: search. Many questions still remain, like what penalties Google will have to pay, the possibility of court-mandated breakup of the company and the specifics of how such actions might unfold. Interestingly, some potential penalties may end up benefiting Google more than harming it (or hurting other competitors, such as Apple, more).

Google has already declared its intent to appeal the decision, so I expect this case to drag on for a while.

I had a chance to go through the full ruling this past week. In this post, I’d like to discuss some of the most interesting notes from the trial regarding Google and the search market as a whole.

SAMPLE LETTER OF COMPLAINT

The Registrar
Competition Appeal Tribunal
Salisbury Square House
8 Salisbury Square
London EC4Y 8AP

Re: Application for Permission to Intervene in Case Nos: 1572/7/7/22 & 1582/7/7/23

Dear Sir/Madam,

We write on behalf of the COCOO to seek permission under Rule 16 of the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 to intervene in the collective proceedings brought by Ad Tech Collective Action LLP against Alphabet Inc. and its subsidiaries (Google).

1. Identity of The COCOO

The Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (The COCOO). UK Companies House Registration Number: 15466919 Address: 23 Village Way, Beckenham. Postcode: BR33NA.United Kingdom. Email: contact@cocoo.uk Phone: 07716601277
Our constitutional mandate is to quality-control, ex-officio, decisions by competition authorities, public bodies or firms, that could deter synergies and positive externalities, or harm competition, investment, consumer welfare or the public interest
COCOO is uniquely positioned to offer insights into how these proceedings will impact competition, innovation, and market efficiency.

2. Title of the Proceedings

The present proceedings are titled:
• Case Nos: 1572/7/7/22 and 1582/7/7/23
• Parties: Ad Tech Collective Action LLP (Proposed Class Representative) v Alphabet Inc., Google LLC, Google Ireland Ltd., and Google UK Ltd.

3. Address for Service

COCOO designates [Your Legal Representative’s Name] of [Firm Name], [Address], as its representative for these proceedings.

4. Issues Affecting COCOO

The allegations against Google focus on self-preferencing and vertical integration in its ad tech stack, raising questions about competitive dynamics in this sector. These claims, if upheld, could have significant negative consequences for publishers, advertisers, and consumers by disrupting an ecosystem that relies on innovation, interoperability, and efficiency.

5. Position in Support of Google

COCOO supports Google’s position and will focus on the following:

Undermining Class Certification
• Key Argument: Emphasize the lack of concrete and robust counterfactual scenarios. Claimants must prove a common loss across the proposed class, but the dynamic nature of ad auctions and varied publisher practices undermine this assertion.
• Strengthening with UK Context: Highlight the challenges claimants face in certifying an opt-out class under the Consumer Rights Act 2015. The Tribunal should reject speculative economic models that lack real-world substantiation, as evident from prior UK cases like Merricks v Mastercard​​.
2. Challenging Market Definition and Dominance
• Key Argument: Argue that the claimants narrowly define the market as “open web display ads” to artificially inflate Google’s dominance.
• Strengthening with UK Context: Introduce evidence that UK publishers use a range of ad platforms (e.g., Meta, Amazon) in addition to Google, highlighting vibrant competition. Stress that applying a rigid market definition risks misaligning UK competition policy with global norms​​.
3. Pro-Competitive Justifications
• Key Argument: Google’s practices result in innovations that improve auction efficiency and generate higher revenues for publishers.
• Strengthening with UK Context: Reference the French Competition Authority’s decision where Google’s proposed commitments were seen as restoring competitive market functioning. Stress that applying similar remedies in the UK ensures consistency without undermining economic efficiency​​.
4. Attacking Methodology and Quantification of Damages
• Key Argument: Claimants rely on speculative damages models that do not account for real-world complexities in ad auctions.
• Strengthening with UK Context: Use expert evidence to show how UK publishers might have benefited from Google’s innovations, offsetting alleged losses. Highlight flaws in using aggregated models to infer damages for heterogeneous publishers​​.
5. Leveraging Google’s Previous Commitments and Compliance
• Key Argument: Google has demonstrated goodwill by adhering to commitments accepted by the French Competition Authority, improving interoperability and transparency.
• Strengthening with UK Context: Stress that imposing additional remedies in the UK risks overregulation and could harm small publishers by increasing operational complexity. Emphasize that Google’s ongoing commitments should suffice to address concerns without disrupting the market​​.
Broader Implications for UK Competition Policy and Economy
• Risk of Overregulation: Highlight that a decision against Google could embolden interventionist policies by the CMA, deterring foreign investment and innovation​.
• Economic Impact: Point out that structural remedies could disproportionately harm small UK publishers, reducing their competitiveness and threatening content diversity.

To develop a strategy for defending Google in these collective proceedings related to its alleged anticompetitive practices in ad tech, we need to focus on:
• Undermining the Class Certification: Emphasize the technical and legal deficiencies in the claimant’s methodology for proving class-wide harm, such as the lack of robust counterfactuals and reliance on speculative damages models​​​.
• Challenging Market Definition and Dominance: Argue that the market definitions provided by the claimants are overly narrow or artificial, thereby challenging the assertion of Google’s dominant position​​.
• Highlighting the Pro-Competitive Justifications: Stress that Google’s integration of its platforms, such as DFP and AdX, results in efficiency gains and better outcomes for publishers and advertisers​​.
• Attacking Methodology and Quantification of Damages: Criticize the claimant’s reliance on flawed economic models that lack real-world data and fail to properly estimate damages​​.
• Building on Previous Settlements and Compliance: Reference Google’s commitments in similar cases (e.g., the French Competition Authority) and highlight ongoing compliance efforts to show goodwill and mitigate allegations of willful misconduct​​.

(a) Economic Efficiency and Total Welfare (Motta’s Framework)
• Key Point: Motta’s framework highlights that competition policy should aim to maximize total welfare, considering both consumer and producer surplus.
• Defense Argument: Google’s vertically integrated ad tech stack reduces transaction costs, enhances real-time bidding, and ensures seamless ad delivery, which collectively boost efficiency and benefit publishers and advertisers. Unbundling these services would likely disrupt these efficiencies, leading to higher costs and reduced functionality for smaller players.
• Illustration: Use case studies demonstrating how SMEs benefit from Google’s integrated services, which they cannot replicate independently due to cost and complexity constraints.
(b) Dynamic Efficiency and Innovation Incentives
• Key Point: Dynamic efficiency drives long-term innovation and market competitiveness, an aspect crucial to the fast-evolving digital advertising sector.
• Defense Argument: Google’s integration fosters innovation in AI-powered ad optimization, benefiting both publishers and advertisers. Remedies like forced separation could stifle this innovation, harming the market in the long term.
• Illustration: Highlight Google’s innovations in targeting algorithms, which have increased ad relevance and consumer engagement, showing how these innovations would slow under restrictive remedies.
(c) Counterfactual Challenges and Methodological Flaws
• Key Point: Counterfactual analysis is vital in competition cases but must be robust and realistic.
• Defense Argument: The PCR’s counterfactuals assume an idealized, highly competitive market without substantiating how competition would naturally evolve without Google’s alleged abuses. They fail to account for network effects, economies of scale, and the competition from platforms like Meta and Amazon.
• Illustration: Use Motta’s analysis to critique these assumptions and provide alternative scenarios that reflect the complexities of digital markets.
(d) Two-Sided Market Dynamics and Consumer Welfare
• Key Point: Digital advertising markets are two-sided, where efficiencies for advertisers indirectly benefit consumers through free or lower-cost services.
• Defense Argument: Google’s ability to optimize ad delivery benefits consumers by supporting free platforms like YouTube and Search. Remedies disrupting this balance risk reducing consumer welfare through higher advertising costs and less innovation.
• Illustration: Present data showing how lower ad costs on Google’s platforms sustain free consumer services and incentivize content diversity.
Contribution to the Tribunal’s Deliberation
COCOO’s intervention will provide:
• Economic Analysis: Evidence-based assessments of vertical integration and its benefits.
• Critique of PCR’s Models: Addressing the speculative and flawed methodologies in the counterfactual scenarios and damages calculations.
• Policy Implications: Highlighting the risks of disproportionate remedies, such as overregulation, which could harm the UK’s digital economy and competitiveness.
Scope of Intervention
COCOO will focus on:
• Economic Impact: The effect of proposed remedies on market efficiency, especially for SMEs.
• Counterfactual Feasibility: Critiquing the PCR’s economic models and damages methodology.
• Policy Considerations: Balancing competition enforcement with the need for innovation and global competitiveness.

(a) Economic Efficiency and Total Welfare (Motta’s Framework)

Massimo Motta emphasizes that competition policy should maximize total welfare, balancing consumer and producer surplus. Google’s vertical integration generates significant efficiency gains by reducing transaction costs, enhancing real-time bidding, and facilitating seamless ad delivery. Remedies such as unbundling risk harming these efficiencies, which could reduce total welfare by increasing operational complexity and costs for smaller market players.

(b) Dynamic Efficiency and Innovation Incentives

Google’s integration of ad tech services fosters dynamic efficiency by enabling continuous innovation, particularly in AI-driven ad optimization. Motta highlights the risk of chilling effects on innovation when competition enforcement targets practices that enhance efficiency and benefit consumers. Disruptive remedies could slow innovation and harm both publishers and advertisers reliant on Google’s tools.

(c) Counterfactual Challenges and Methodological Flaws

The PCR’s claims rest on speculative counterfactual scenarios that assume a highly competitive market without Google’s alleged abuses. These counterfactuals fail to account for the complexity of digital advertising markets, including network effects, economies of scale, and competitive pressure from alternative platforms (e.g., Meta, Amazon). Motta’s work underscores the need for robust economic evidence when assessing counterfactuals, which is lacking in this case.

(d) Two-Sided Market Dynamics and Consumer Welfare

Digital advertising operates in a two-sided market, where efficiencies on the advertiser side indirectly benefit consumers through lower prices and free services (e.g., Google Search, YouTube). Remedies that undermine Google’s ability to optimize both sides of the market could lead to higher costs and reduced consumer welfare.

6. Contribution to the Tribunal’s Deliberation

COCOO’s intervention will assist the Tribunal by:

• Providing economic analysis of vertical integration benefits, drawing on Motta’s arguments to demonstrate how these efficiencies support publishers, advertisers, and consumers.
• Critiquing speculative counterfactuals and damages methodologies presented by the PCR, offering a grounded perspective on market realities.
• Assessing the proportionality of proposed remedies, advocating for less intrusive measures that preserve market efficiency while addressing competition concerns.

7. Scope of Intervention

COCOO will limit its intervention to the following areas:

• The economic impact of proposed remedies on market efficiency, particularly for SMEs.
• The adequacy and feasibility of the PCR’s counterfactual scenarios and damages analysis.
• Broader policy implications, including the risks of overregulation and reduced global competitiveness for the UK’s digital economy.

Conclusion

For the reasons outlined above, COCOO respectfully requests permission to intervene. Our unique perspective and expertise will provide valuable insights into the complexities of this case, supporting the Tribunal in its deliberation and contributing to a fair resolution.

We remain at the Tribunal’s disposal to provide further information or clarification.

Yours faithfully,

[Your Full Name]
[Your Position]

On behalf of COCOO

Enclosures:
• Statement of Interest
• Supporting Documents

The COCOO
The Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (The COCOO). UK Companies House Registration Number: 15466919 Address: 23 Village Way, Beckenham. Postcode: BR33NA. United Kingdom. Email: contact@cocoo.uk Phone: 07716601277
Our constitutional mandate is to quality-control, ex-officio, decisions by competition authorities, public bodies or firms, that could deter synergies and positive externalities, or harm competition, investment, consumer welfare or the public interest

==================================

COCOOs STEPS

*since im not abogado, ni abogado autonomo (sole practitioner), but inhouse solicitor >>  PROMPTsteps: 1/identify potential points of law and points of fact where EU law could assert jurisdiction 2/identify potential points of law and points of fact where UK law could assert jurisdiction. 3/browse the internet to find more points of fact and of law, and precedents, etc,  to find more information about legal cases or investigations regarding any of the parties involved in our  complaints, or in the same issuies of our complaints. 4/redraf the  complaints, each of them highlighting the eu jurisdiction, the uk jurisdiction, and the spanish jurisdiction of lasw could be asserted in each complaint.

1/ IDENTIFY PERPETRATORS:    by sending NRLAS (denuncias/complaints…) to cmas/plcs, which are carefully DRAFTED IN A SUBTLE WAY, to press the responder into giving CLARIFICATIONs and NEW INSIGHTS, AND NEW  INTERPRETATIONs OF A POINT OF LAW OR OF FACT  >> ideally try to force A DECISION-MAKING RESPONSE, containing (even more ideally) a new FOI* >> FOC…. *NEW.FOIS (finding of infringement >> BINDING) can be found not only in ‘PROPER’ cnmc.cma decisions (that follow investigation)….but FOIS may also be found (less likely) in any cnmc.cma letter (ex.reply to a denuncia), and are equally BINDING.       Also, THE sa.ECA report states: that EC is failing their duty to implement transparency laws (ex to show if a given SA is lawful or not), because the only way to implement them is filing infringement procs (v.Members that breach eulaw), but EC is failing to file them and therefore cannot possibly know if its decisions are correct (ex. a EC decision to grant SA is lawful or not, or a EC decis as to wether a given SA is lawful or not, or a EC decis as to whether the SA was lawfully used or not)……COCOO:  THE CNMC IS ALSO FAILING TO IMPLEMENT TRANSP.LAWS

2/ who is the clp.breaching-UA-party, that is contractually liable for the fees & costs of arb?: my target

3/cocoo to linkedin + X.GROK, to recruit (as Members of cocoo and/or class) the clp victims (of my target)

4/cocoo to PAP for mass.arb, on behalf of cocoo’s members and of class members

…….but be careful not to: interfere with the defendant’s contracts with suppliers/clients  .  not to seek settlements lower than the cost of arb.filing.fees, but true intent to go to arb…..ex: law firm Zaiger, PAP to bring numerous antitrust arbitration cases (mass.arb) on behalf of Steam customers, but : Valve Corporation v. Zaiger, LLC:  In 2023, Valve sued law firm Zaiger, alleging that it attempted to extort settlements + suit against a litigation financier for Zaiger over the funding of a social media campaign to recruit Steam users as clients. Valve alleged that they improperly interfered with its contracts with Steam customers and abused the arbitration process by signing up clients with the intent of obtaining settlements slightly lower than the cost of arbitration filing fees, rather than arbitrating their claims. Valve said that it was targeted due to the terms of the Steam Subscriber Agreement, in which Valve would be responsible for the fees and costs associated with arbitration. In September 2024, Valve changed its Steam Subscriber Agreement to require disputes to proceed in court, with no option of arbitration

5/KEEP CHASING THE NON.REPLIES ! >> ONLY ONCE WE GET A FINAL REPLY TO OUR NRLA (COMPLAINT/DENUNCIA/OBS…) WE WILL APPROACH MEDIA ALLIES (ex iustitia europa) WITH READYMADE PIECES OF NEWS  how2turnNRLAS.2.NEWS

6/ making (non-alleged) accusations in a response to a formal public consultation provides more protection against defamation claims compared to making the same accusations, say, in a public newspaper…..However, it’s important to note that this protection is not absolute. You should still ensure that your accusations are based on factual evidence and are relevant to the consultation topic. Malicious or knowingly false statements could still potentially lead to legal issues. so always use: ”alleged”…..why PUB.CONS.give partial immunity for defamation?:  Qualified privilege: Responses to official consultations are typically covered by qualified privilege, which offers a defense against defamation claims as long as the statements are made without malice and are relevant to the consultation6.  Public interest: Consultations are designed to gather information on matters of public interest. Courts are more likely to view statements made in this context as part of legitimate public discourse6. Limited audience: Consultation responses usually have a more limited and specialized audience compared to public newspapers, potentially reducing the risk of reputational damage2. Expectation of robust debate: In the context of policy consultations, there’s an expectation of frank and open discussion, which may provide some leeway for stronger statements1.

HOOKER 1:  whats the foc?

scout all ec.cma.cnmc.doj decis >>  extract evidence.findings >> FOC4dams4.bsd (same case, different party/ies)

HOOKER 2:  i love to 3pint

ON 17.JAN, I GET MY LPC >> COCOO.LTD  >> WRITE COMPLAINTS +  FILE 3PINT APPLICATION (samnote) + MEDIATION OFFER + PRO-BONO NON-RESERVED LEGAL ADVICE OFFER

FILTER 1:  BOTS

  PERPLEXITY(use the app)  watson (Nightwish12@)   copilot  GEMINI  wp.genie   ARCHIVED.gpts : clp.expert.gpt    ma consulltant.gpt      ma advisor     inv.research.analysis     competitor analysis       ec.dg compet cases     DD guide    DD.detective    mato science insights     sellside comparisons     compet.gpt     benchmarking.stats.assistant   global competitiveness     ind.insights     analyst pro    market analysis agent     data dynamo   researcher     compet.economics     algorithm ace     clp market research  GPT(PLUGIN)SURF   justclaim + lawbot

FILTER 3: MY.gd.DOCS >> best files

–MLEX.CASES ( all files that support my filed complaints.observs) :    all.filed.complaints    all.filed.observations

practice.areas     research.TOOLS    cocoo.WEB.FILES   UNZIPPED.1-6   UNZIPPED.7-12    UNZIPPED.13-19   UNZIPPED.20-25

FILTER 4 :  MY.gd.SCANS:

-PDFS:   SCANS.wp

-INDIV.JPGS:    BRO1 (folder) >> best files

STEPS.1  STEPS.2    MIMINDS      v.mad.mas1(1+5)    v.mad.mas.2(3+14)   REL.MA       STEALTH.CONS   error.prefs  U.V.   eu.hookers   adr   CAT.ECJ   clp.JR.eu   cma.ec.cnmc.fsb   consumer.law   contract.law  DDREPORTS.how2behave   EU.DAM.DIR   FCA.valuations   sqal+funding  nigeria.arb.spanish.problems    L+      THE.LITIG.GLASSBALL    MACOCON.IDENTIFICATION   SPAIN

-EU.complaints about state aid misuse: COMP-State-Aid-Complaints@ec.europa.eu
EU.legal claims for damages: Tort claims against the Commission are filed with the General Court of the European Union.Use the e-Curia system for online submission. no emailed letters of claim allowed.Ensure your application is thorough, addressing liability, damages, and causality.Representation by a qualified eu.member (not a sol.) lawyer is mandatory

1/scout all ec.cma.cnmc.doj decis >>  extract evidence.findings >> FOC4dams4.bsd (same case, different party/ies)

2/ 3PINT.JR + COMPLAINT (2 ec.cma.cnmc.reg.member) V  (privco/PUS/CMA/EC/reg/cnmc/Members) for their own decisions, or for failing to challenge others’ decisions, when such decision is (pot) either :     EC.complaint.form = for complaints not to do with CLP…BECAUSE THOSE :Make a complaint about unlawful state aid.    AND/OR    Tell us about suspected breaches of competition rules.

• -UV decis (by cma.ec.cnmc.reg), becos enforces CLP, in a manner that is beyond the statutory powers delegated (by 1leg) to that reg/pus
• -UNLAWFUL decis (by cma.ec.cnmc.reg), becos violates EULAW (Treaties…)
• – unlawful undertaking agreement or conduct between direct or indirect competitors

3/complaint2 (euomb/ukparlomb) Omb decis is only a recommendation. no teeth.EX: COMPLAINT V THE EC.CMA.SOSBT… DECIS on any of my complaints listed

4/ complaint v ecj.cat decis, arguing that the ecj decision, or its implementation, negatively impacts competition, innovation, or consumer welfare. While this won’t directly challenge the ECJ’s decision, it could influence how the Commission approaches similar cases or remedies

5/ complaint.v.EC:     To submit a complaint directly against the European Commission, you can utilize the following contact methods:

• Email: For antitrust and competition-related complaints, you can contact the Directorate-General for Competition at comp-greffe-antitrust@ec.europa.eu.     Competition Policy
• Online Complaint Form: For general complaints concerning potential breaches of EU law by the Commission, you can fill out the online form available at https://ec.europa.eu/assets/sg/report-a-breach/complaints_en/index.html.

redress at eu.national level

.The European Commission:If you believe an EU country has infringed EU law by: implementing a measure (adopting a law or regulation or taking administrative action),failing to take a given measure, or engaging in a given practice, you can lodge a complaint with the European Commission

The European Ombudsman :The European Ombudsman investigates complaints from individuals, businesses and organisations about maladministration by EU institutions, bodies and agencies

The European Parliament : You can submit a petition to the European Parliament about the application of EU law

European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) : You can report fraud involving EU funding/EU staff to OLAF

eu.login.cocoo:  Nightwish12@@12    contact@cocoo.uk    >>   EU.markets  >> EU.access.market.db.users      >>   EU.mta: mytrade.assistant       EU.mta.TOOLBOX      EU.search.ITAs.with.non.eu.markets    EU.investm.DISPUTES.search       EU.tariffs

rival.entry.COMPLAINT.2.Access2Markets.team

complaints.re.SEP (single entry point)   :  The SEP, Single Entry Point, is the first point of contact for all EU stakeholders who are facing potential trade barriers in third countries or who find non-compliance with sustainability rules related to Trade and Sustainable Development or the Generalised Scheme of Preferences.  To help you find your way, the Single Entry Point has developed two complaint forms, one on market access/trade barriers and one on sustainability issues – as well as step-by-step guides to completing them. For matters relating to the Anti-Coercion Instrument and to submit relevant information please visit Anti-Coercion Instrument Single point of contact. The Single Entry Point can support you when you are preparing your complaint – you can contact the Single Entry Point directly on trade-single-entry-point@ec.europa.eu

6/ Petitioning the European Parliament, highlighting potential broader implications of the (ecj…) decision on innovation, SMEs, or consumer welfare. While this doesn’t affect the ecj judgment, it may lead to a policy review.   PETITIONS.uk    PETITIONS.uk.contact    EU.CITIZENS.INITIATIVES    

 EU.SOLVIT : if you as an EU citizen or business face obstacles in another country because a public authority isn’t doing what is required under EU law …… SOLVIT can help..SOLVIT reminds the authorities in question what your EU rights are and works with them to solve your problem.

eu.petitions.login  adiv@.. pw=Nightwish12@   sec.question: maria  un=adivinorum   

-eu.petitions:  EU legislation wrongly implemented or applied within your Member State. a petition cannot be to disagree with a court decision.

    eu.petitions.SEARCH     gd.r2petition.eumembers.parlms.pdf   as cocoo.ltd is based in UK, is not allowed to file a eu.parl.petition….but, I, can as an EU citizen….and will reference COCOO’s research and analysis as supporting evidence to strengthen the petition. every EU citizen and all natural or legal residents of the Member States have had the right to submit a petition to the European Parliament, in the form of a complaint or a request on an issue that falls within the European Union’s fields of activity. Petitions are examined by Parliament’s Committee on Petitions.  Petitioners wishing to appeal a decision on their petition should send an e-mail to peti-secretariat@europarl.europa.eu instead of submitting a new petition.

-eu.Ombudsman, Ms Emily O’Reilly (click here):   for maladministration within EU institutions.bodies, which affects you personally

complaining

B.1/• complaint (2cma) v cma decision (ex:did cma condemn google?) >> later on, i can use the cma decis to FOC4dams4.bsd,  in a different case…ex: sept.24: cma decis: SOS issued to Google:  the Statement of objections sets out how Google may have broken competition law by using its dominance to favour its own ad tech services in open-display advertising.  The CMA will now carefully consider representations from Google before reaching its final decision.
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-objects-to-googles-ad-tech-practices-in-bid-to-help-uk-advertisers-and-publishers

B.2/• -complaint (2cma/ec/DOJ) v any other U.V./illegal decis/omis by a regulator/PUS (ex: cocoo v reg/pus decis, on basis that is U.V./illegal becos enforces clp in a manner that is beyond the statutory powers conferred (by 1leg) to that reg/pus
– Later on, I have the option to start a different (but parallel) case. both have in common the same cma/ec decis. In this new case, I FOC4dams4.BSD (breach.stat.duty)….-ex: sep.24: ec decis to issue SOS to Google….email to antitrust.complaints@usdoj.gov   to complaint about a possible antitrust usa violation or potential anticompetitive activity,

ex:US DOJ v Google (Search): 5 August 2024 – Judge Mehta’s ruling that Google illegally maintained a monopoly in online search.[1] Google is planning to appeal the decision, which could impact the timings of the case…..-ex:US DOJ v Google (Ad Tech): This is the second DOJ case currently unfolding against Google but this time against its abuses in the Ad Tech industry

B.3/• -complaint  (2ec) v member decis that violates EULAW >> later on, i can use the ec decis to FOC4dams4.bsd,  in a different case

CNMC.suger.y.quejas     Email: gabinete@cnmc.es    Contacts: Cani Fernández Vicién. President. Tel: +34 914 329 601 / 602 Email: cani.fernandez@cnmc.es  Email: presidencia@cnmc.es  Marisa Tierno Centella. Director General for Competition. Tel: +34 917 876 841 / 842. Email: marisa.tierno@cnmc.es   Email: dc@cnmc.es  Joaquín López Vallés Director of the Advocacy Department . Tel: +34 917 876 950 / 951. Email: joaquin.lopez@cnmc.es  Email: dp@cnmc.es

EX: CNMC/SPANISH.PUS DECISIONS AGAINST GOOGLE >> THE CNMC ESTA INVESTIGANDO GOOGLE. DESDE JUN.2024 TIENE UN máximo de 18 meses para la instrucción del expediente y para su resolución.La CNMC inicia un expediente sancionador contra Google por posibles prácticas anticompetitivas que afectarían a editoriales de publicaciones de prensa y agencias de noticias españolas. Las conductas investigadas podrían suponer la explotación abusiva por parte de Google de su posición de dominio en el mercado español.• El abuso analizado consistiría en la imposición de condiciones inequitativas a las editoriales de publicaciones de prensa y agencias de noticias españolas. • Las prácticas investigadas también incluirían posibles actos de competencia desleal que podrían afectar al interés público por falsear la libre competencia.  La CNMC ha iniciado un expediente sancionador contra Google LLC, Google Ireland Ltd., Google Spain, S.L. (Google) y contra su matriz Alphabet Inc., por prácticas restrictivas de la competencia prohibidas por los artículos 2 y 3 de la Ley 15/2007, de 3 de julio, de Defensa de la Competencia (LDC) y en el artículo 102 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea (TFUE) (S/0013/22). Por una parte, la CNMC investiga una serie de prácticas que podrían suponer un abuso de la posición de dominio de Google con respecto a las editoriales de publicaciones de prensa y agencias de noticias establecidas en España. En particular, estas prácticas consistirían la posible imposición de condiciones comerciales no equitativas a las editoriales de publicaciones de prensa y agencias de noticias establecidas en España para la explotación de su contenido protegido por derechos de propiedad intelectual….Por otra parte, las conductas investigadas también incluirían prácticas que constituirían actos de competencia desleal que podrían falsear la libre competencia con afectación al interés público. Estas prácticas podrían infringir el apartado tercero del artículo 129 bis del Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1996, de 12 de abril, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley de Propiedad Intelectual, y podrían suponer la explotación de la situación de dependencia económica respecto a Google en que se encontrarían las editoriales de publicaciones de prensa y agencias de noticias establecidas en España.  Este expediente tiene su origen en una denuncia recibida en la CNMC por parte del Centro Español de Derechos Reprográficos (CEDRO).  A la vista de dicha denuncia y de la información recabada en el marco de la fase de información reservada, la Dirección de Competencia de la CNMC considera que existen indicios racionales de la comisión, por parte de Google, de posibles infracciones de los artículos 2 y 3 de la LDC, así como del artículo 102 del TFUE. La incoación de este expediente no prejuzga el resultado final de la investigación. Se abre ahora un periodo máximo de 18 meses para la instrucción del expediente y para su resolución por la CNMC.

B.4/• -complaint  (2ec) v privco/pus.ec… decis that violates CLP >> later, i can use the ec decis to FOC4dams4.bsd,  in a different case
-EX:  (case:proSpain): cocoo complaints against the ECT agreement, as IS CONTRARY TO CLP…, as it promotes stealth.cons and cartel behaviour by the smaller fish that circle the sharks >> COCOO: IF EC ALLOWS ECT, EC WOULD BE ACTING U.V./ILLEGAL
-EX: (case:proGoogle): cocoo complaints against ad.rivals:  ECJ DECIS: gd.pdf.ecj.decis.24nov.vgoogle

COCOO: the claimants are privcos,little fish, that, to thrive, behave as a de-facto cartel ( an implied sust.ua that fails at least 1 of the 4Exempt.Conds.) + stealth.consolid. driver

B.5/• I COMPLAIN V EC =  complaint (2ec) v ec decision >> later, i can use the ec decis to FOC4dams4.bsd, in a different case
-EX: cocoo complaints to ec for its decis: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-objects-to-googles-ad-tech-practices-in-bid-to-help-uk-advertisers-and-publishers

B.6/• -complaint2 (euomb/ukparlomb) v privco/pus…that violates CLP or EU.uk LAW…but first, i need to complain to the eu.privco/pus. Omb decis is only a recommendation. no teeth.
EX: COMPLAINT V THE EC.CMA.SOSBT… DECIS on any of my complaints listed

to hooker is to choose the cocoo’s ‘attack.strat’ that best fits any chosen case (ex i chose to defend google)….but, cocoo, instead of defending google directly (ex: intervening or advising the parties under a services contract), cocoo instead, chooses to file a complaint to claim damages for the wpi/ee/clp, in a particular matter that stems from the Google case….that way, i dont need to tackle/locus the Google case directly, but a ramification that stems from it that I can use to both defend (indirectly) Google…but also to try to get dams for victims.

-uk:  in uk, in order to complain v DECISION/act of gov/pus, i visit:  gov.uk.ALL.GOV  and choose the relevant culprit:  cabinet office, cma, sosbt, ombudsman, etc…..and complain directly to it.   ex: complaints.2.cma/fca  >>  general.enquiries@cma.gov.uk      REPORT2CMA.CLP.PROBLEMS     GOV.UK.report.issue.2.CMA   FCA.complaints.xls

-eu:  – complaints v eu Acts (ex: ec decis)?  –complaints (to ec) v Memberstates’ (pot) eulaw violations,?   –COMPLAINTS.4.eu.CLP.dams.V. EU.pus(EC…)/EU.privcos      –complaints.2.EU.omb

1- i choose my goal = to defend google. [cocoos opinion: some sust.uas  (ex. the EFT, in energycos v. spain) (ex: the regs that allow cos to claim against google promote the generation of sustuas that are truly cartels) are a cartel… if they fail either of the 4 ExemptionConditions]

2-to implement my goal, i choose this strategy, by following the worldwide.google.CASES.TIMELINE >>

PROCEDURE

Third parties do not have standing to challenge a cma.ec.pus decision that is not final, (like issuing a SO = deciding to start an investigation)…However, interested third parties can submit comments or evidence to the CMA during its investigation.

• complaint (2cma) v cma decision (did cma condemn google?) >> later on, i can use the cma decis to FOC4dams4.bsd,  in a different case
ex: sept.24: cma decis: SOS issued to Google:  the Statement of objections sets out how Google may have broken competition law by using its dominance to favour its own ad tech services in open-display advertising.  The CMA will now carefully consider representations from Google before reaching its final decision.
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-objects-to-googles-ad-tech-practices-in-bid-to-help-uk-advertisers-and-publishers

• -complaint (2cma/ec) v any other U.V./illegal decis/omis by a regulator/PUS (ex: cocoo v reg/pus decis, on basis that is U.V./illegal becos enforces clp in a manner that is beyond the statutory powers conferred (by 1leg) to that reg/pus
– Later on, I have the option to start a different (but parallel) case. both have in common the same cma/ec decis. In this new case, I FOC4dams4.BSD (breach.stat.duty)
-ex: sep.24: ec decis to issue SOS to Google

https://www.justice.gov/atr/complaint-center:
-ex:US DOJ v Google (Search): 5 August 2024 – Judge Mehta’s ruling that Google illegally maintained a monopoly in online search.[1] Google is planning to appeal the decision, which could impact the timings of the case.
-ex:US DOJ v Google (Ad Tech): This is the second DOJ case currently unfolding against Google but this time against its abuses in the Ad Tech industry

• -complaint  (2ec) v member decis that violates EULAW >> later on, i can use the ec decis to FOC4dams4.bsd,  in a different case
EX: CNMC/SPANISH.PUS DECISIONS AGAINST GOOGLE>>EX: THE CNMC ESTA INVESTIGANDO GOOGLE. DESDE JUN.2024 TIENE UN máximo de 18 meses para la instrucción del expediente y para su resolución.La CNMC inicia un expediente sancionador contra Google por posibles prácticas anticompetitivas que afectarían a editoriales de publicaciones de prensa y agencias de noticias españolas. Las conductas investigadas podrían suponer la explotación abusiva por parte de Google de su posición de dominio en el mercado español.
• El abuso analizado consistiría en la imposición de condiciones inequitativas a las editoriales de publicaciones de prensa y agencias de noticias españolas.
• Las prácticas investigadas también incluirían posibles actos de competencia desleal que podrían afectar al interés público por falsear la libre competencia.
La CNMC ha iniciado un expediente sancionador contra Google LLC, Google Ireland Ltd., Google Spain, S.L. (Google) y contra su matriz Alphabet Inc., por prácticas restrictivas de la competencia prohibidas por los artículos 2 y 3 de la Ley 15/2007, de 3 de julio, de Defensa de la Competencia (LDC) y en el artículo 102 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea (TFUE) (S/0013/22). Por una parte, la CNMC investiga una serie de prácticas que podrían suponer un abuso de la posición de dominio de Google con respecto a las editoriales de publicaciones de prensa y agencias de noticias establecidas en España. En particular, estas prácticas consistirían la posible imposición de condiciones comerciales no equitativas a las editoriales de publicaciones de prensa y agencias de noticias establecidas en España para la explotación de su contenido protegido por derechos de propiedad intelectual.
Por otra parte, las conductas investigadas también incluirían prácticas que constituirían actos de competencia desleal que podrían falsear la libre competencia con afectación al interés público. Estas prácticas podrían infringir el apartado tercero del artículo 129 bis del Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1996, de 12 de abril, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley de Propiedad Intelectual, y podrían suponer la explotación de la situación de dependencia económica respecto a Google en que se encontrarían las editoriales de publicaciones de prensa y agencias de noticias establecidas en España.
Este expediente tiene su origen en una denuncia recibida en la CNMC por parte del Centro Español de Derechos Reprográficos (CEDRO).
A la vista de dicha denuncia y de la información recabada en el marco de la fase de información reservada, la Dirección de Competencia de la CNMC considera que existen indicios racionales de la comisión, por parte de Google, de posibles infracciones de los artículos 2 y 3 de la LDC, así como del artículo 102 del TFUE. La incoación de este expediente no prejuzga el resultado final de la investigación. Se abre ahora un periodo máximo de 18 meses para la instrucción del expediente y para su resolución por la CNMC.

• -complaint  (2ec) v privco/pus.ec… decis that violates CLP >> later, i can use the ec decis to FOC4dams4.bsd,  in a different case
-EX:  (case:proSpain): cocoo complaints against the ECT agreement, as IS CONTRARY TO CLP…, as it promotes stealth.cons and cartel behaviour by the smaller fish that circle the sharks >> COCOO: IF EC ALLOWS ECT, EC WOULD BE ACTING U.V./ILLEGAL
-EX: (case:proGoogle): cocoo complaints against the google ad.rivals (the claimants are privcos,little fish, that, to thrive, behave as a de-facto cartel ( an implied sust.ua that fails at least 1 of the 4Exempt.Conds.) + stealth.consolid. driver

• I COMPLAIN V EC =  complaint (2ec) v ec decision >> later, i can use the ec decis to FOC4dams4.bsd, in a different case
-EX: cocoo complaints to ec for its decis: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-objects-to-googles-ad-tech-practices-in-bid-to-help-uk-advertisers-and-publishers

• -complaint2 (euomb/ukparlomb) v privco/pus…that violates CLP or EU.uk LAW…but first, i need to complain to the eu.privco/pus. Omb decis is only a recommendation. no teeth.
EX: COMPLAINT V THE EC.CMA.SOSBT… DECIS on any of my complaints listed above

complaints v eu Acts (ex: ec decis) 

notes. cocoo.O2.COMPLAIN.V.EUACTS <>    gd.pdf. ACT4ANNULM = COMPLAINT.V.EUACT   <>   trade.defence.investigs.EC  

complaints (to ec) v Memberstates’ (pot) eulaw violation 

EC.complaints  >> dam.claims at both national and eu level: 

COMPLAINTS.2.get.CLP.dams    V   EU INSTITS (EC…)OR EU.COS 

TL:2MONTHS     REPORT.cocons.claim.damages      REPORT.cocons.eu.claim.damages  >> ex:  search.eu.DAM.CLAIMS.spain 

clp violations: ADP, CARTELS, M&As, S.A.   problem: the website only gives a FORM for illegal.S.A.claim>> eu.S.A.claim.form.sample    eu.dams.claimform.pdf.completed    >> I amend that form and email it ( if is a clp complaint) the EC:    comp-greffe-antitrust@ec.europa.eu

-S.A.:   EC.has o2.monitor S.A. HOW TO FILE COMPLAINT ABOUT ILLEGAL SA (STATE AID):   notes.COMPLAINT.form V ILLEGAL SA   pdf.complaint.v.illegal.SA.form   https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/complaints_en   >>   sa.complaint.form >> email it to: stateaidgreffe@ec.europa.eu    The EU rules generally prohibit state aid (which take various forms such as grants, interest and tax relief, loan guarantees) because they risk putting certain businesses at an advantage over their competitors, thereby distorting competition. State aid may be permitted in the following cases: help for small businesses, promoting entrepreneurship, research, development and innovation, regional development, risk capital, job creation, protecting the environment

-if you are unsure about the problem, you can contact the European Commission at: comp-market-information@ec.europa.eu

– tl: 5 years (since you first learnt about the infringement) for victims of cartel.ADP, to claim damages, or 1 year after a cma’s decision on the infringement becomes final (in some cases, member states may give you more than 1 year).

-There is a legal presumption that cartels.adps, cause harm.

-Passing-on of overcharges:   Even if you are an indirect customer of an infringer, you can claim compensation for any overcharge that has been passed on to you by an infringer’s direct customer, e.g. a reseller of the cartelised goods.  Although you must demonstrate the amount of harm your business suffered in this way, you are helped by the legal presumption of passing-on. An example of the passing-on of overcharges could be when a loss is passed on to others: the business makes a payment, and seeks a repayment – the business then passes this on as a liability to its customers.

-Can I bring a case before a national court?: The obligation of Member States to notify planned State aid to the Commission (‘standstill obligation’) has direct effect, which means that parties affected by State aid granted in disregard of the standstill obligation (‘unlawful aid’) can bring direct action before national courts. Therefore, natural or legal persons whose interests have been adversely affected by the alleged unlawful aid can pursue the matter before the national courts, which must assess the case regardless of the existence of any parallel procedure before the Commission. Actions before national courts can offer an important means of redress, which can bring immediate relief to the complainant affected by unlawful State aid. Remedies available before national courts include: preventing the payment of unlawful aid; recovery of unlawful aid (regardless of compatibility); recovery of illegality interest; damages for competitors and other third parties; and interim measures against unlawful aid.

-Co-infringers: All firms participating in a cartel or another anticompetitive agreement are liable for the entire damage. You, as the claimant, can choose who you want to sue for compensation. A co-infringer can obtain a contribution from another co-infringer if they have paid more compensation than their relative share. That share and the criteria on which it is based will be decided by the court according to national law.

-Mergers: Companies of a certain size (starting at EUR 2.5 billion of combined aggregate worldwide turnover) doing business in the EU and wishing to merge must ask the European Commission for approval – irrespective of where their headquarters are located. Approval of the merger will depend on the market share that the merged company would have in the EU

COMPLAINTS TO THE EU.OMBUDSMAN 

after my complaint has exhausted, i can complain to the ombud:  EU.OMBUDSMAN.maladmin.COMPLAINT.FORM.pdf    EU.OMBUDS.how2complain :  OMBUD.complaints are for Maladministration = when an institution or body fails to act in accordance with the law, or the principles of good administration, or violates human rights. Maladministration can include administrative irregularities, unfairness, discrimination or the abuse of power, for example in the managing of EU funds, procurement or recruitment policies. It also includes the failure to reply, or the refusal or unnecessary delay in granting access to information in the public interest. The European Ombudsman cannot investigate complaints against national, regional or local administrations in the Member States, even when the complaints are about EU matters. The Ombudsman cannot investigate matters that are subject to legal proceedings.   Ombud.decisions are only recommendations. cannot be enforced.

SPAIN.complaints.petitions

cnmc.pnc.BUSCADOR:concentrac.conductas.reclamaciones

CONSULTATIONS:    COCOO O2.send.CONSULT.RESPONSE:   Whenever there is:  (a/ cma invitation to comment (IC), or  b/CMA.ec ISSUE STATEMENT (IS = initial theories on pot/poss competition and remedies), the parties are invited to provide submissions >>COCOO MAY ISSUE CMA.ec with a (usp=deofficio) CONSULTATION RESPONSE. i can use (as drafts) , csos submissionos(to IS and IC)   

UK.complaints.petitions 

to complain about the cma just email: general.enquiries@cma.gov.uk  REPORT2CMA.CLP.PROBLEMS     GOV.UK.report.issue.2.CMA

PETITIONS.uk    PETITIONS.uk.contact  FCA.complaints.xls

EU.petitions: r2petition.eumembers.parlms.pdf   eu.petitions.login  adiv@.. pw=Nightwish12@   sec.question: maria  un=adivinorum

EU.consultations: ec.gc public.consultations.SEARCH >> cocoo to participate:  have.your.say   RqBHNRBHJ! o;JoaXciNj  >> upcoming.open.PUB.CONS: search:competition >> ex: upcoming.consult.VEH.BLOCK.EXEMPT.REG  +  CALL4EVIDENCE.form    eu.PUBL.CONSULT.feedback     eu.OPEN.publ.consultations     DELIB.citizen.CONSULT    search.uk.policypapers.CORP.consults    AI.uk.publ.consult.OPEN      delib Simulator offers citizens the POWER to BA >> COCOO with demolegit >> polit power.        EC.public.consultations   

conclusion:

-cocoo.ltd (my employer and client), offers Google…,:

A/Fee sharing contract:   if my work generates any fees for your co/firm, then we split those fees, say 50/50….or

B/a a contract (no NDA)  between cocoo.ltd and Google:

– cocoo.ltd’s provides:

1/pro-bono legal opinion (Legal advice is not an RLA, and includes advice as to the merits of any intended legal action, as well as the merits of ongoing formal legal action in the courts or tribunal, such as an issued claim in the civil courts)

2/  our 3pint proposal (not as part of the contract)

– Google satisfies cocoo.ltd’s expenses, capped at £4k (fees incurred by cocoo.ltd contracting COCOO CHARITY (a third-party to the contract))…oscar = (Agent + employee inhouse solicitor) of cocoo.uk.charity, which then charges my legal fees to cocoo.ltd, and then cocoo.td claims them from Google

LawWorks considers that the writing of a letter before action, or indeed any other step prior to
commencing formal proceedings, would not amount to “the conduct of litigation” in which case in-house
solicitors are permitted to undertake such activities. It is only once proceedings have been commenced
that litigation can be “conducted”. Thereafter, the general thrust of the relevant case law (see below)
is that “ancillary functions”, i.e. formal steps in the proceedings, such as the service of a claim form or
disclosure, come within the ambit of “the conduct of litigation” and should not be undertaken. Formal
steps also include activities such as costs budgets, the preparation of witness statements, interim
applications and hearings, as well as any other formal step in proceedings.  However, informal activities such as general letter
writing, even after the commencement of formal proceedings, would appear to be unlikely to come
within the meaning of “the conduct of litigation” and can be undertaken by in-house lawyers (see the case law: In Agassi v Robinson [2006] 1 WLR 2126, it was held that a restricted view must be taken of the meaning of the phrase “the right to conduct litigation”, as section 20 of the Solicitors Act 1974 created a criminal offence for an unqualified person to act as a solicitor

-Apart from limited exceptions, namely immigration work (see the restrictions contained in the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999) and certain debt and consumer advice (regulated by the FCA))

-Legal advice includes advice as to the merits of any intended legal action, as well as the merits of
ongoing formal legal action in the courts or tribunal, such as an issued claim in the civil courts.

RLAs =  the “exercise of a right of audience”(advocacy);  • the conduct of litigation;  • reserved instrument activities (i.e.
preparation of certain conveyancing; • probate activities; • notarial activities; and • the administration of oaths.

COCOO (my employer and client) is not authorised specifically to provide legal services by SRA >> only WAYS that, i, as Solicitor (no PII), can be employed by COCOO, to provide services and support COCOO:

• A/-work ‘in house’ providing legal advice to you as their employer
• B/- provide legal services to others such as companies within your group, or
• C/-solicitors can deliver non-reserved legal services to the public, from within a business not regulated by a legal services regulator >> I can provide services to the public (external indiv.commercial clients) on COCOO’S behalf, as AGENT(employee) >> SRA ADVICE TO COCOO, as my employer, IF I AM IN CASE C/ :  The solicitor can provide any type of legal service except:

• • Reserved legal services to the public – see Can my business be authorised?
  • Immigration work – unless your business is separately authorised by the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner
  • Claims management services – unless your business is separately authorised for these services by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
  • Certain financial services or activities – unless your business is separately authorised for these by the FCA.

What can you say to clients and potential clients about the solicitor and your business?

Although the solicitor will be personally regulated by us, it is important that you (COCOO) do not either deliberately or inadvertently give the impression that your business is regulated by us. So, whilst you can, for example, state on your website that you employ X solicitor and that they are authorised and regulated by the SRA in their personal capacity, it should be made clear that this authorisation and regulation does not apply to your firm, to the services that you offer more widely or to work carried out by others.

A solicitor has a number of duties surrounding information they are required to give to their clients (for example as to how the services are regulated, the regulatory protections available the right to complain and the costs of the case) and you will find it helpful to read our separate guidance to solicitors on this topic “Unregulated organisations – client information”.

Does the solicitor require a practising certificate?

If the solicitor is held out as such or is carrying out reserved activities in house directly for you (COCOO), they must obtain an annual ‘practising certificate’ from us – see our guidance.

What about holding money on behalf of clients?

A solicitor working in your business is not allowed to hold client money in an account in their personal name. “Client money” will include:

• Money that clients pay you on account of your charges or third-party costs (such as fees for expert reports)
• Any damages that your client receives as part of a settlement of a case
• The assets of an estate that is being administered by your firm
• Any other money that you are holding on your client’s behalf to complete a transaction or for investment purposes.

Therefore, you should not, for example, ask clients to pay money to a bank account held by the solicitor in their name either on their own behalf or on behalf of your business, as this would place the solicitor in breach of the rule. This does not prevent the solicitor from being a signatory to a bank account held by your business in its own name.

What about professional indemnity insurance?

A solicitor working in your business will not be subject to the SRA’s compulsory professional indemnity insurance requirements. Since you will be vicariously liable for their actions as your employee, and since the solicitor will wish to ensure that their work is covered, you will want to consider how best to do so; and for example ensure that their work is included in your business’s own insurance policy. Solicitors you employ are required to inform any external clients of the insurance arrangements in place, prior to working with them.

What if there is a complaint about a solicitor?

Under the SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors, RELs and RFLs solicitors have a duty to establish and maintain, or participate in, an adequate system of complaints handling and to inform clients about how to complain under that system. So, if you do not already have one, your business will need to set up a complaints procedure if you want to employ a solicitor who will be dealing with external clients. The clients will need to be told who to complain to about the solicitor and how that complaint will be dealt with.

If they are not satisfied with the result of that complaint, or if it has not been resolved within eight weeks, clients have the right to take any complaint about the standard of service offered by the solicitor to the Legal Ombudsman. The solicitor must tell clients about this right both at the time of engagement and when any complaint is made. If it upholds a complaint the Legal Ombudsman has a range of options available to it, including ordering a solicitor to reduce a bill or to pay compensation. As well as looking at the substance of the complaint, the Legal Ombudsman will look at the way in which the complaint has been handled, and this will be a factor in the decisions it takes, including whether to charge the solicitor the case fee for the matter.

What other obligations on the solicitor should you take account of as an employer?

All solicitors are subject to the SRA Principles. These include the duties to act with honesty and integrity and in the best interests of clients.   Another key principle is the obligation to act “with independence.” Of course, this includes providing you and your clients with independent advice. However, this duty also means that the solicitor cannot act for you as their employer (or “client”) or for external clients in a way that compromises their independence.   Solicitors must also act with integrity, and for example, have a duty not to mislead the court or other third parties. This will override any duty they may have to follow your or any external client’s instructions.

Those principles which safeguard the wider public interest take precedence over a client’s interests, including COCOO’S interest as my employer. The solicitor must inform the client (COCOO)

All solicitors are also bound by the SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors:

• A duty to maintain their competence and professional knowledge and that of any individuals they manage as well as to keep their understanding of legal, ethical and regulatory obligations up to date (paragraphs 3.3 and 3.6). For this to be effective, a solicitor will need to have access to resources for ongoing ethical and professional development. If you are a large organisation employing a number of lawyers, it may be beneficial for you to provide some of these resources in house. However, there are a number of ways in which support can be supplied externally. For example, you can pay for solicitors to go on external training, to achieve additional accreditations (such as those organised in particular specialisms by the Law Society¹ or others), to be part of a professional network² or to have access to online resources such as up to date case reports.
• A duty not to mislead the court and others (see above).
• A duty not to act for a client where they have an actual or potential conflict of interest with that client (paragraph 6.1) and not to act for two clients where they are unable to act in the best interests of each due to an actual or potential conflict of interest unless certain conditions are met (paragraph 6.2).
• Keeping the affairs of clients confidential (paragraph 6.3)

-i must ask SRA to add also cocoo.ltd as employer.    both cocoo.uk.charity and cocoo.ltd are unregulated firms, doing unreserved work, registered with the SRA as such

-how lawyers ask for advice from other lawyers:   be careful to remove anything that could breach client confidentiality

SRA:        We consider that NDAs should not be used routinely. An NDA is improperly used if is a means of preventing, or seeking to impede or deter a person from:

• co-operating with a criminal investigation or prosecution
• reporting an offence to a law enforcement agency
• reporting misconduct, or a serious breach of our regulatory requirements to us, or making an equivalent report to any other body responsible for supervising or regulating the matters in question
• making a protected disclosure under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998
• making any disclosure required by law
• making a proper disclosure about the agreement or circumstances surrounding the agreement to professional advisers, such as legal or tax advisors and/or medical professionals and counsellors, who are bound by a duty of confidentiality.

NDAs must not include or propose clauses known to be unenforceable or use warranties, indemnities, and claw back clauses in a way which is designed to, or has the effect of, improperly preventing or inhibiting permitted reporting or disclosures being made. For example, asking a person to warrant that they are not aware of any reason why they would make a permitted disclosure, in circumstances where a breach of warranty would activate a claw back clause.

NDAs or other terms in an agreement which contains an NDA, must not stipulate, or give the impression to the person expected to agree the NDA, that reporting, or disclosure as set out above is prohibited.

Any attempt to prevent a person from complaining or providing information to us will be a breach of your regulatory obligations. A practitioner who uses an NDA improperly or behaves in a way that is in breach of their regulatory obligations is at risk of disciplinary action by us.

Continue reading →

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< MAGIC.eu   MAGIC.spain   MAGIC.uk   types >> TBS >>   NRLA.tbs >> LIVE.NRLAs >>  LIVE.RLAs 

HOOKER.gdfol    LIVE.CASES.gdfol    pdfs.RESEARCH.gdfol

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   PROMPTKINGS  BOTS.prompts  GPEs     my.BOTS   bot.magic.rules:   after archiving or closing a session, gpt is reborn….so i need to reattach and paste the info (above).  ask gpt to add its configuration instructions, and all our chat contents, into the memory api, in particular the info that emerges from my scanned.pdfs  markings and handwritten notes and graphics.A    I DIE AND REBIRTH WITH EVERY SESSION >>   AT THE END OF EVERY DAY, I EXPORT (gpt>settings>datacontrols>exportdata>ZIPautoemailed2me)…then, move it to its gdfolder. then, i can delete the archivedchats >>   AT THE START OF EVERY DAY, I CAN ATTACH THAT FILE TO GPT….. [AN EVEN BETTER ALTERNATIVE, IS TO NOT ATTACH FILES TO AIS, BUT PASTE LINKS (Ex from my public JUSTPASTE.IT LINKS), becos that way, every time i start a new session, is easier to refeed the data

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GLOBAL    EU.AUDITOR.search.publications    NOTES.TB.examples    IEU    FINEXTRA.COM >> EPP.search   >> EPP Group position papers

ELP    agenda2030.legalstatus.pdf      cocoos inquiry into AG.2030      AG2030.fulltext.pdf    globalisation.notes    agenda2030.notes 

  mb:EU.weekly.news   mb: eu.weekly.sanctions.update>>download.pdf   19.12.24      milberg.FOCOLS

The time limit to submit a complaint (formally called an action for annulment) to  (GCEU) is 2 months and 10 days from the date of publication of the decision or notification to the affected party. Difference Between a Complaint (Annulment Action) and an Appeal

1. Complaint=Annulment Action (Article 263 TFEU):
   • Filed directly with the General Court to annul a specific *EU.ACT (ex the EC decis approving the Bulgarian sa scheme).
   • Grounds include:  Lack of competence; Breach of procedural requirements; Misuse of powers; Violation of EU law
   • If successful, the decision is annulled and rendered void.
2. Appeal (Article 256 TFEU):
   • If the General Court issues a judgment on the annulment action, the losing party may appeal the decision to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
   • Appeals are limited to legal grounds (e.g., errors of law in the General Court’s decision).
   • Time Limit for Appeal: 2 months from the notification of the General Court’s judgment.

A complaint against the Commission’s decision can be brought on the following grounds:

1. Lack of Competence: The Commission acted outside its legal authority.
2. Infringement of Essential Procedural Requirements: The approval process was flawed (e.g., insufficient assessment, lack of transparency).
3. Breach of EU Law: The decision violates substantive or procedural EU law.
4. Misuse of Powers: The Commission acted with improper motives or in bad faith

*EU.ACT:

Under Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), certain EU acts can be challenged via an action for annulment before the General Court of the European Union (GCEU). The provision outlines which acts can be subject to judicial review. Here’s the complete list:

1. Legislative Acts

• These are laws adopted by the European Parliament and the Council following the legislative procedure (ordinary or special).
• Examples: Regulations, directives, and decisions adopted as formal legislation.

2. Acts of EU Institutions, Bodies, Offices, or Agencies

• Non-legislative acts adopted by:
  • European Commission (e.g., state aid approvals, competition decisions).
  • Council of the European Union (e.g., decisions on sanctions).
  • European Parliament (e.g., resolutions or administrative acts).
  • European Central Bank (ECB) (e.g., monetary policy decisions).
  • European Union agencies or bodies (e.g., ECHA, ESMA, EFSA).
• These acts must produce legal effects for third parties.

3. Decisions Addressed to Specific Persons

• Individual decisions directly affecting Member States, companies, or individuals.
• Examples:
  • A Commission decision approving state aid for a specific Member State (like Bulgaria’s €590 million grant).
  • Decisions imposing fines on companies for violating competition law.

4. Acts of General Application

• These are regulations, directives, or decisions that are not addressed to specific individuals but affect them indirectly.
• They must:
  • Produce binding legal effects.
  • Be of general application across the EU or a sector.
• Examples: General regulations on renewable energy targets, climate action policies, or financial regulations.

5. Acts Adopted by Bodies that Infringe Procedural Rules

• Acts that were adopted without following the required legal procedure.
• Example: A decision taken by the Commission without adequate consultation or transparency.

Acts That Cannot Be Challenged

1. Preparatory Acts: Acts leading up to the adoption of final measures (e.g., draft proposals).
2. Recommendations and Opinions: These are non-binding instruments.
3. Internal Acts: Measures with no legal effects outside the EU institution.

Summary Table: EU Acts Subject to Complaint

To challenge any of the above acts, it must produce legal effects and directly impact the applicant.

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