COCOO CASES

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: LOUIS KAPLOV: WHY THE SNIPP/MAD SHOULD NEVER BE USED

how to be able to challenge cma/cat/plc/fca/top matoipo decision to (review/refer/block/clear/foc), and also their decision not to. <>p.7 :

-I need to estimate the ma.led.map. to do this i need to use the formulas for the two ed types: med and ced

-I need to argue that, to be able to decide which is the rma between (say) 2 markets, we need a mad (CRITERION=STANDARD) WHICH IS ALWAYS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND. Thus, there is no possible decision-making criterion. Thus, cma/plcs/regs…can never make INFORMED.DECISIONS

-GLOBAL LOOPHOLE: there is no cma guidelines of what ‘COMPETITIVE EFFECTS’ (COEs of the proposed matoipo) are needed for cma… to challenge). cocoos challenge: what is the cocon level that triggers cmas d2review or d2block?>> cocoo may choose between: cma failure to act, or cma should not have acted

There are two mad mechs:

-hmt
-postmerger hhi

many cocons escape review, due to :

excesivethres…..[exception: SOSBIS has no PIIN threshold -to start a review]
stealthcons

Thus, i dont need to challenge ec/cma….. i just need to tell the perpetrators:….ok, the State lets u go free…BUT…WE WILL MAKE U COMPENSATE ALL VICTIMS (ex.cocoos members)

EMA dislikes cocons becos they may block matoipos. matoipos are good, becos create value (synergies) and also becos disciplines the target’s ceos, giving them an exit strategy , as they are replaced by better ceos…this competition between ceos is positive for the economy….COCOOS USP: OFFER TARGET CEOS A GOOD EXIT STRATEGY

…but then… is there any way to find out if a matoipo should be blocked/cleared/reviewed/refered… or not ?:

Yes, the only way is by applying the INCO.TEST: test for INTERNAL CONSISTENCY <> legal certainty (HRA): cocoo will use the human rights to insist for the application of the inco.test, and will compare past cma/cat… similar.decisions (ex. regarding estimates of what would be the postmerger matoipo-price hikes, if the proposed matoipo is cleared) >>> so there is no need for me to be crunching numbers…is simpler for me to just compare decisions (easy with gpt)

-The 3 ONLY POSSIBLE SITUATIONS COCOO WILL EVER FACE.

-COURTS/CMAS PREFER THE SNIPP/MAD TESTS (to the inco.test) becos lets them free to decide (uswing an ex-post choice of mad)…ex: if they want to block, they just choose the narrow mad , and viceversa….COCOO V CMA/CAT…, ON BASIS THAT MAD CANNOT BE REASN.USED.

-THE UPP analysis is better than the (ssic=hmt=mad) test, to direcly assess UEs.

-in redefined markets(MARDs), is impossible to properly estimate map from shares>>using mard (market redefinition) would be unreasn.

SUMMARY

COCOO’S DEMOLISHING CHALLENGES TO DECISIONS BASED ON REDEFINED MARKETS (MAD/MARD):….COCOO WILL USE THE FACT THAT there are no coherent answers!:

HOW DO CMA.CAT STATE AND JUSTIFY THE FORMULA THAT TRANSLATES MAS INTO MAP, OR INTO COES (competitiveEffects) ?:

WHAT’S YOUR CRITERION FOR WHICH MAD IS BEST?

HOW CAN BE REASN STATED THAT SOME MAD IS BEST THAN OTHER, WITHOUT FIRST KNOWING:

-WHICH MAP INFERENCE/S FOLLOW FROM EITHER CHOICE, and

-WHICH MAP INFERENCE YIELDS CONCLUSIONS CLOSER TO THE TRUTH ABOUT MAP

HOW CAN YOU DET HOW CLOSE A MAP INFERENCE IS TO THE TRUTH ABOUT MAP, WITHOUT FIRST PROFERING A BEST MAP ESTIMATE

EULAW: SUSTUAS (ADP<>CLP). EC ON QUANTIFYING HARM IN CLP CLAIMS4DAMS (101+102 TFEU). HOW COCOO WILL JOIN AND PROMPT CMAS…(CMA CLP INVESTIGATIONS). COCOOS APPROACH (FRIENDLY OR ADVERSARIAL). QUANTIFYING ANTITRUST DAMS (regression analysis). DDREPORTS (steps.types.matoipo areas)

-How may (matoipo) SUSTUAS (<>agenda 2030) avoid being :

a cartel: when all 4 exconds apply. most cartels mappen in IMS with large demand fluctuations (as harder to detect: to go under the radar, cartels’ gws price hikes happen at different times) >> to identify a cartel, i must look for l.t.trends (of gws prices for all suspected plcs)
adp
ignored in MATOIPO assessments

*cocoo: only sustuas that ALSO bring a clp advantage should be cleared (ex more efficient engines)

-how EC quantifies harm in clp dams claims. <> techs to prove a cartel (the best is regres.analysis: spits out a counterfactual gws price (counterfactuals are by definition, uncertain)…regr.analysis may also be used to estimate the diff.in.diffs)

[cartel effect = prices during cartel – the counterfactual/diffindiffs gws prices (spat out by regr.analys) ]

cma: are cma…wpi decisons inconsistent with their intl.os (ex. paris agreem; clim.chang.act) ? yes, if a breach of HRA art 2 or 8

cocoo’s friendly/adversarial approach

2leg’s scope and purpose is in the ENs(uk) and in the RECITALs (eu)…. courts run the risk of deciding the lawfulness,scope, and purpose of 2leg, in terms of what purpose/scope should have been given by Parl. (in the enacting 1leg)…..to avoid this risk, i will request courts a SQO (suspended quashing order), so that Parl has time to look into it, and if Parl so decides, to allow the court to quash it (later on).

a JR based on ground 3*,

*ground 3 = UV = when 2leg is contrary to the enacting 1leg, the 2leg falls outside the powers delegated by parl, to the drafter of the 2leg. ex: reg/cma)

Diff:

the POT. existence of a cartel (must be proved with certainty). exception:
- courts should not expect a claimant to have access to the crucial data (that the def.has access to). Thus, claimant should be allowed full discovery, and to crosscheck the analysis of the Def’s experts
- FOCs: only loss+quantum need proving
Loss + Quantum: need not be proved with certainty, as it would violate the very object of Damages, becos estimating Dams requires building a counterfactual (ex. via Regr.Analys), which, by definition, is uncertain

DDR: steps; types; MATOIPO ddrs ( i will ddr the Target plc);

[Seller’s o2discl* > buyer’s o2DDR ] becos, when a seller withholds mat.info, the buyer is allowed to fail to DD (does not need to inspect the seller’s gws)….

*o2discl also includes the2disclALLwarranties: between the date of the sellers disclosure and completion date, the buyer may only find out of any new relevant events, if the seller discloses them…this time gap is covered by the Warranty mech….. >> huge uncertainty and risk for the seller (on what should be disclosed) >> most sellers choose to settle (Arb.tribs)

did cma.top…. fail to impose/enforce undertaking/s or SOIs?. if not, did the plcs comply?

I will ask cma…. to disclose the SFO’s they used in their decisions. The cma has proposed/implemented these recent changes:

notif.thres from 70m to 100m (annual plc TUR) >> ims stealthcons
a cma decis to impose an INME (interim meas, on a plc. ex: capping gws price until cma review completes), may now only be (cat) appealed via JR standard (not on merits standard).thus, is now much harder for the plc to win appeal against the INME. thus, there is no longer an incentive for plcs to drag the process…on the contrary, now their incentive is to speed it up

clp exceptions: (no cocon liab):

ipr ;
wpi >clp ex: ec used wpi ground, to fix (cocon) mobilephone charges euwide, to prevent the ripoff of consumers by individual eu member states
the teckal exemption: PUS donot need to mutually tender.

i will challenge the eu, to exclude from its procurem those non-eu plcs (ex morocan) if there is detriment to eu plcs/farmers…

i will challenge plcs with high BUP and (low MAP = high consum switch power), that fail to pass compensation benefits to consumers.

-tools: porter’s 5 foces; IMS segmentation; benchmarking; competitor analysis; CCA (comparable co. analysis) by BIWS (Excel templates and courses); Industry.architecture.

-smartphone ind. example

-uk.green.book: psdr (pus disc rate) = future outcomes must be discounted (wrt present ones)

– finSTATmanip (ex. in matoipos)

-VALUATIONS:

MA accounting;

fsb inquiry (notif thresh LOOPHOLES) ;

How2value matoipos:

ec value = gws value; sh value (rises); exchange value (timevalueOFmoney)
non ec value . ex: cons welfare should have priority over plc’s ec ints.

MA assumptions

matoipo vals (ex. P&R)

i will monitor any remedies/conds/undkins imposed on completed matoipos…have, ever since, (not) being any market developms that mean the plc is still in position and incentive to exclude competitors?

FCA:

o2monitor that plcs set proper sps…ow >> cocon > less ipo sp>>more share cap for issuing plc.
o2monitor the AMM (asset manag market) = ipo bookbuilding action (ipoba) : assetmanagers compete for ipo shares…but, if they get ININ (ex bookbuilding tacitly disclosed by the bidding conduct/intention) >> SIL=lbo=anic.presumption (unless whistle or exitmarket) + cocon >> less ipo sp >> more ECAP (equity=share) capital) for the issuing plc

ipos generate more value than matos. Thus, a privco that wants to mato (instead of ipo:to become plc), is tacitly saying that will accept a lower val, because lacks the pot.to become a plc.

ipos: vals; risks

merger arbitrage (marb)

sp.val:

i will make an UPP (unfair prejudice petition) to courts: is a petition for court to estimate sp value, on the basis that myself (usually a min.sholder) would be unfairly prejudiced, if the sp vale estimated by the plc goes ahead. a court’s sp val is always lower becos is based on ‘fair value’ not on ‘market value’. court may also order that the shares be purchased (by the plc or some members) so the plc’s capital is reduced. My UPP will be surely granted if there are ceo breaches of fiduc.duties (ex ceos paying themselves bonuses while not paying dividends) , or if the plc is a quasipartnership.
case: oneill v philips: describes the sort of sp.val offer, which, if refused by the UPP petitioner, his petition can be struck out.
there are 3 possible basis for sp.val:
- assets
- earnings (typical)
- discounted cashflow
- LOM (level of the multiplier) = time2ROI. this is the best sp.val basis to use, but very hard to evidence

A BO is he who he has the r.2enjoy the income of the interests (in shs/securities/debentures/derivatives(csd)).

The BO of the incomes, and the BO of the underlying assets (ex shares), could belong to diff. people.

BOs use 3 poss ways to conceal such interests :

emptyholdings (EHs)
beneficial holdings (BHs)
HO (hidden.ownerships)
cbos (custodian bos); nominees; clearinghouses…..they hold the shs on behalf of the bos, in a TRUST. 3 types of trust:
- implied: a/by consideration, or b/by prop.estoppel (so an uncond.promise is complied.ow:tort)
- constructive
- express (ex. cocoo.uk charity)

the above cause: cois + cocons + could breach existing conditions/remedies/undertakings offered by the plc to cma…

-Ways to uncover BOs:

bot ( bo test)
uk.cos.hse: psc or psi register. failure to declare a psc or a psi, is a crim.offence.
uk.cos.hse: roe (reg.overseas.entities)
a person with >/ 1% voting rights >>o.2notif, in tender offers.
csds are AGGREGATED (to other holdings) to estimate the notif.thresh.
o.2disc, if voting rights >/ 3%

-list of clp and wpi harms caused by HOs <> can the market itself be wpi harmed? (ex harm to pot/actual investor confidence)

Research on Tesla’s market (using yahoo fin.data): FORMULAS to calculate ratios + OI + EPs + porter’s 5

2 law types:

sust.law = sole juris of cjeu =ecj
proc.law = sole juris of member states

BA:

1- cost of unpredictability/legaluncert (of the cma/court outcome) >> cost of over/under deterrance.
2- cost of error: indepth investig>> higher accuracy (of cma/court outcome) >> higher legal/admin costs (by cma/courts/plcs)

the indir.clp.goal, BAs in favour of 1…. The dir.clp.goal (‘more ec.approach), BAs in favour of 2, which is wrong but is what court/cmas like..

clp rules are a spectrum between 2 poles:

min.differentiation [ex. psr (perserule)]. the facts are only lightly analysed >> more errors >> more predictability >> more deterrance. This is CLP’S INDIRECT GOAL. should be the most important clp goal, but is ignored by cmas/courts. it is the absence of errors (ET1 or ET2), because is EA (enforcement accuracy)+ EP (enforcm predictability)

max.diff [ex. ror (ruleofreason): the facts are deeply analysed >> less errors >> less predictability >> less deterrance, and more admin and legal costs (to both society, and to parties). This is CLP’S DIRECT GOAL. is the preferred by cmas/courts. I think todays clp rules are overdiff’d becos bring very low predictability , which violates legalcert/fairtrial (HRA)….but, then, why cmas/courts prefer the direct clp goal?: becos is easier to apply, and becos they wrongly asume that plcs are always able to predict (the decision outcome)

‘Error’ = bad enforcm decis. Error is not the risk of over/under deterrance. Thus, is misleading to say (as most say), that:

ET1 = BLOCK >> risk of overdeterrance = the cost of the preventeted benigh plc conduct (which is passed onto consumers). this is preferred by cmas/courts. Since deadweightlosses cannot be remedied expost, where there are deadweightloosses, Deterrance is of the utmost importance !.
ET2 = CLEAR >> risk of underterrance

-did expert/ceo fail to report coi/bo/cbo/psc… ?

-cma.ec has o2actDEOFICIO (becos they bear the onus of bop and pop)…so i just need to put them on notice (by filing complaint)

-euclp: liab found, even if no – clp effect, or even if has + clp effects…. why?: sil = lbo, if the ua [OBJECT = large pot for – clp effects], harms clp…this is wrong, becos kills the eu’s overarching goal (common.market: requires plcs to colab/ie (ex. sustuas))

-tfeu: 101: (collusion=cartels):

-tfeu 102: (adp= cap.2.pot.distort.clp) >> dominant plcs have o2activelypreventADP (la mujer del cesar no solo debe ser fiel, sino tb parecerlo). ex: sign.MAS in a given gws market or geomarket. ex: deviant marketing. ex: restricting prod or innov.

cocoo: collusion, dominance….are CONCEPTS (platonic+relative.ex:chair). adp=concept of advantageous.power… ex to find if the banana price is unfair, i need to compare it to the underlying ec.value of a bananna. I also need to compare it to the plc’s MAS: can consumers switch?, must the plc keep competing to keep its MAS?…. iow, a plc could adp with just a MAS of, say 20%….or may not adp, with a MAS of , say, 60%

prompts: is it pot/actual adp or cartel? >>is vertical or horiz? >> there’s LBO (SIL), or LBE? >> bop >> pol/pop >> evidence spectrum >> ET1/ET2

cocoo: those prefering ET1s, (as do ecj.cmas), are stealing the ‘invisible hand’…even more so when applying sil…. ex: cjeu (t-mob case): t-mob was guilty unless it could prove itself to be innocent (which could not do). tmob received unsolicited <> usp info, and did not use it…but did not exit nor whistled

ET2s are better becos cause price hikes >> more plcs entry >> higher compet

presump.types:

POL (the concrete that builds SOP) .CRIM.sop (beyond.reas.doubt). CIVIL.sop = BOP (of production; of persuasion; tactical). In eu.clp, cmas/ec always bear the onus of the POL+SOP. When SOP is lowered >> more ET1s>> uncertainty/unpredictab >> plcs overdeterred >> no ies nor sustuas >> violates eus overaching.goal (common.market)
POF (silogismo=inference) (ex. POP)

cocoo: presumps should ONLY be used if there is suffic evidence…ow: deters the common market + unfair + unreas….becos deters sustuas and + ies/colabs (between plcs)

ua types:

horiz = between pot/actual competitors
vertical: ec: o2BA the EFFECTs of ALL vert.uas….unles there is sil=LBO (the ua object is to violate clp…becos of its large pot.for -effects)…the uk has moved from sil, to a sop of dorc (duty.reas.care)

-appeal process from EC decis.

-list of main eu.clp decided cases, with comments

-how eu.clp is gradually becoming like us.clp

elp

plcs failig the GHC (carbon emiss) protocol, are debarred (cannot tender, and any won tender, becomes void). i will challenge:

the plc partners (of the tortfeasor plc)
tortfeasor nation’s sovereign rights (to det own policies and priorities)
tortfeasor’s failure to (properly) BA
tortfeasor’s plc/nation failure of D.2alert ICC, of poss crimes v. humanity

question types <> JR

(<> see the 5 pozzolanic pples to further help me differentiate them)

a. qol = pol = questions of law: courts have monopoly to interepret, and may even overrule a PUS* qol decis

*PUS: here, means any demo.legit (ex parl/min/gov)….

* pus have no r.2BA between unlawful options.

b. qof = questions of fact: pus has monopoly (to decide qofs)…but courts (JR) may set.it.aside, only if there is a wed.unreas eol (error of law). ex: the question whether the facts may apply to a different law/reg, or to neither, is a qof >> courts have no juris.

c. mixed questions: good lawyers apply diff. poss. interprets to a single fact

JRs are hard to win, (and the TL is only 1 month) becos the SOP is not based on the merits, but on wed.unreas >> is best to engage PUS at lobbying/pub.cons level (to offer my usp.DDR: alternatives, etc)

the CAT’s JR: only case types: 1,4,7 are judged on the merits (but using JR pples)

casetype1 = appeals v cma decision, and appeals wrt cma decis. Locus: ua participant
casetype4 = (v sosbis, or v ofcom decis)
casetype7 = (v ofcom decis wrt to eu mob.roaming Regs)

any pus (demolegit) decis (ex. to award a ppp, or to create/amend a rule or Reg) has 2 ingredients:

–motivation, with sufficient reasoning…ow: JR: void wed.unreas decis….. but note that pus are allowed errors.of.judgm….ex: jr may only void those decisions that fail to reflect political support for the BA that pus must make. ex: JR cannot control if the pus political statements are true or complete. ex: jr voided a ppp award, becos the pus had failed to consider all poss options and procedures, like not building the bridge.

– justification (so that the decis is not Arbitrary (raw.politics). ow: JR. pus must exp.ain all facts supporting the decis. ex did the Regulator act within the delegated scope to enact 2leg? if not: jr (uv) <> see EN (uk) / Recitals (eu). A pus offering just tech.data as the justification >> jr >> void. Did some int.group/lobby have more weight than others, over the decis? >> jr>> void , becos pus have o.2treat all submitted reports/cons, with equal respect….ow: ui (undue.infl) >>jr>>void. pus also have o.2explan and o.2BA the predicted impact (of proposed decis), wrt all other poss.alternatives. pus also have o.2 identify the policy preferences used (to justify the decis), so that it can be held politically liable, if needed.

appgs (ex: join the adr appg). i must request breakdown of appg fundings and discl of Accs.

eu.clp.lobbying

ITAS.LOBBYING <> wto

matoipo threshold types: <> COPs (ubos/pscs/cbos…) AGGREGATE (towards the thresholds):

mcr kicks in if there is a ‘decisive influence over other co/s’ (even if is just due , say, to acquis of min.shold or veto rights)
when the legit.int. of a memberestate could be at risk, that member may block an EC cleared matoipo … the viceversa case has no caselaw yet, but surely is possible.
RMS = uk.vol.notif.thresh = 70 m annual TUR, or min 25% (gws supply in uk)
ipos: 30% target voting rights, or if triggers one of the 3 wpis: nsia; mediaplur; (health?)

sp.VAL methods

1 page summary of (8 above):

direct.clp.goal = detectance >> et1s (specially with sils) violate the eu pple that cjeu has sole juris to interpret subs.law…and members have sole juris to interpret proc.law
indirect.clp.goal = deterrance

spills (2 page summary)

govs/banks/plcs…. liab for :

aiding & abetting
facilitating (clp …violations)
failing to challenge bus.partners

4 tort types: negl; recklessn; intent; (sli=lbo=rdo)

sli <> clp :

horiz.uas have sli >> no BA.

contrib.negl (of the agent) is a poss defence, to an sli claim (v the ppal)

how to challenge settlements !

tl = 3 yrs from coa, or from knowledge. 2 types of knowledge: actual/constructive

ex. accountant gives inv.advice, and client losses money in the inv >> TL clock only starts ticking when the claimant knew that the losses were attributable to the bad advice

co tur analysis <> matoipo thresholds

MJ matoipos:

reviews: tur may be doublecounted if more than 1 country takes juris over the same tur. thus, the sum of all the tur in all these countries, may be more than the plcs global tur. < > use my ‘where2notify tool’
filings: it falls under mcr :
- acquis of min.sholds; or JVs, between indep.cos, where one of them ends up with less selfcontrol
- matos=indep.cos brought under

control types: are crucial, becos affect: TUR, MAS, and the clp impact (of the proposed matoipo/jv/min.shold)

sole: exs: veto.rights; min.sh with r.to appoint ceo; majority of voting.rights
joint
common: mato

Are the plc/s (involved in the matoipo/jv/min.shold) subject also to pot. cartel or adp in such countries?…and subject to : foreign investor approval?, and subject to regulator’s approval, or other approvals in those countries?

I will also find out if the cmas of those countries have discretion to review below notif threshs.

Was the decis of the cma… made by use of their discret.power, outside of the 2leg (EN/preamble) ‘s SCOPE?…if yes >> cat(jr) >> uv >> void decis. [ex. decis NOT to review/refer some (actual/pot) matoipo/jv/min.shold.acquis.

cocoo (3pint) will insist on having PRENOTIF.DISCUSSIONS with the cma…, to get the proposed (matoipo/jv/min.shold.acqui) STRUCTURE, MODIFIED, on the basis that there are mat.pot.compet.issues….thus, the plc tries to avoid to be referred (phase2) (takes long time to the big cost of the plc/s) <> cocoo will also request interim measures (to give incentive to the plcs to speed up the process, and not to delay it).

VIP: ISSUES that cmas…look at (to block or clear)

cma…decis >> i can FOC (v other plcs)

gov has o.2public.consults (and to help themselves get more demolegit) >> cocoo will USP for :

shadowing (via the oecd acn secretariat)
inclusion in gov.delegations
sitting at mediation tables
advising gov on reg/leg

convince them that i can mobilise masses/coll.focs >> bigger whitemail power

in usa, no locus is needed, for anyone to claim v a noncompliant plc/pus, when the authorities fail to do it <> uk jr case: mag v sosbis, for failing to refer to cma a proposed matoipo

i will petition the appending of wpi clauses, to itas/wto/inv.agreems, by using the MAI (multilat.agreem on investms)

cocoo will help implement CSR (corp social resp) and offer publicity of plcs good deepds (good reput)

i will insist to worldbank…, that plcs requesting loans/debt.relief, must show proof , as condition, proof of involving local communities in their programs….not to pollut, and to compensate any victims…

i will petition for gov. action , by using s.301 petition (usa) or the tbr (tb reg) in eu.

i will complain (to wto…)…there are 2 dbs of such complaints: mad (eu) and nte (usa)

GLOBALISATION: 1 page summary + WTO litig/cases . clp <>IP . spills. finansialisation. cocoo to lobby (wto, spain, eu…), not sending money, but offering legal opinions, to show the merits of pot. cases (nation v nation)…as they have little litig resources and expertise….my advice will remind them of their o.2defend the wpi >> o2choose cases that challenge SYSTEMIC TBS (that afffect many plcs, gws, consumers…)

-ec media contacts

-cocoo to offer mediation/settlement, wrt:

eupilot (faster than ecip)
solvit.network (for indiv.redress)
ecip (ec infringm.proceeds): ec has o2ensure the proper applic of eulaw by members. 2 ecip types:
- systemic(structural)
- particular …ex. ec law TRANSPOSITIONS (by members)

Every month,ec publishes the : PACKOF.INFRINGM.DECIS (v members), and must always be based on wpi grounds

<> COCOO TO EEAC V member tortfeasors/ec…. + cocoo to FOC ec/ecj decis + cocoo to trigger the RLCM

<> COCOO TO PETITION:

THE ‘EXPLANATORY.NOTES’ that members must send EC (on how they transposed eulaw to natlaw)
to the PCEUP (PETITIONS COMMITTEED OF EU.PARL) anything i could think of

-list of spains ongoing transposition ecips + list of ongoing ec reviews (pot ecips)

ec’s 2023 rol report: reminders and recomms to spain:

reminders (of ongoing ignored ecips):
- no progress on separating the role of the FGE (prosec.gen) from gov
- no progress on the priority request to renew the CGPJ, among other, to modify the appointment system of its members
- no progress on shortening the excessive length of invest and presec of high level corrupt cases
recomms: exs:
- improve coi rules <> OCI (ofic de conflt.int): gov keeps ignoring ecip request to reinforce the indep of oci.
- parl.oci: despite the parlmember’s o.2PUBLIC their instit agendas (portal de transp de congreso), parl members still dont do it, specially on meetings with lobbys/int.groups.

COCOO TO complain for non-compliance (ex. failure to discl, or to give enough detail)

every year, top exec.officials need to make ‘ASSET.DECLARATION’ in boe <> COCOO TO MATCH WITH DBS (UBOS, PSCS…)

EEA = AUSTRIA, SWEDEN, FINLAND. have their own clp rules. but their only scope is trade issues between ec and eea members. ecj caselaw is relevant to interpret eea.clp, but must follow the : efta (eea.clp.court) and the esa (eea.cma)

there are many clp agreements and regulations between [ec/eea/othernations]…victims (priv.parties) of these, may claim compens. in natcourts. ex: many developing countries are victims of :

these agreemes and regs….which even create intl.TBs (ex. high agricultural tariffs)
intl.plc.cartels, that ec/cmas fail to block

however, due to corruption, developing nations keep voting (in the wto) against a WTO.CLP.AGREEMENT = THE HOLY GRAIL = COCOO’S MAIN GOAL, becos, without it, the nations/plcs tortfeasors keep violating clp with impunity and no investigations

EC/ECJ CLP CASE SEARCH : keywords.

-are the eu grants (ex SA) to members, compatible with the eus overriding goal (common.market)?: many are not >> cocoo to press the ec to raise OBJECTIONS

-SMALL ecj claims may accept LIPs

-matoipo eu.reviews:

plcs have o.2notify EC (unlike in uk.cma), if: common.dimension + concentratioin
ecj’s dg may :
- review
- not review
- refer the reviw to member’s cmas, on basis of: subsidiary pples, or 1stopshop

ex: ecj.gc decis 2022:

despite the fact that spain has ley jca art.31: [pus docas can be requested to be declared nul/unlawful and to get compens/restit] , when spanishlaw violates eulaw, the victims may only get redress under very hard to comply condits and TLS….thus, spain is failing to properly transpose eulaw…and failed the ecip. ecj used the 2 pples that limit the soverignty of members, to condemn spain:

- pple.effectiveness (abs.pple): violated becos victims have it nearly impossible to claim redress.
- pple.equivalence (relative.pple): protects against discrim between violation-types. spain makes it harder fr courts to find spain liable under eu law, than under the CE (constit.esp) <> [my paper: the best mech to uncover violations (easier than accs/formulas) is to look for CONSISTENCY amongst ec.cma…decis in very similar cases <> legal certainty (hra) r.2fair trial <> unpredictability generated by ET1s]

LIST OF ECJ SENTENCES v spain (past and ongoing). ex. air pollution, radiation…

MADE.REALMA.EC

EU.DAMS.DIR

EU

CLP STRATEGIES

CLP PROMPTS

APP.OC.OS

ALP

ADR.ASSIGN.NOV.

1-13

11111.snitch.types