SPAIN STATE STRUCTURE: [UNITARY=THE OPPOSITE OF FEDERATION]….SO, INDENPENDENTISTAS QUIEREN ROMPER LA ESTRUCTURA DEL ESTADO DE ESPANA

España en la actualidad, siguiendo la tradición desde 1812, es un Estado unitario, aunque descentralizado. Las Comunidades Autónomas, aunque posean un órgano legislativo propio, son corporaciones públicas de base territorial y de naturaleza política» (STC 25/81 de 14 de julio

<<COCOO V CCAA !!!!

MEDIOS PROPIOS Y COMPETENCIA EN ESPAÑA

medios propios (in-house providing)= la administración atiende a sus necesidades de suministro
de bienes, servicios u obras, recurriendo a sus propias capacidades en lugar de acudir
al mercado, pero, atraves de entidades instrumentales
 Que en lugar de hacer tender , licitación, esta entidad instrumental, hace el inhouse provision
Eg por rnes de seguridad o urgencia justificada) o a la mera búsqueda de eficiencia

<<cocoo to challenge: it should have been tendered

El artículo 32 de la vigente LCSP confirma que los poderes adjudicadores pueden usar otra persona
jurídica distinta a ellos, ya sea de derecho público o de derecho privado, previo encargo, (…) siempre que sea de «medio propio

los encargos que se realicen a estas entidades conceptuadas como medios propios no tendrán la
consideración de contratos por lo que LCSP no aplica.

Porque?: capacidad de autoorganización de las administraciones de acuerdo con la
libertad de organización....Su uso corrupto y excesivo , con las consecuencias negativas para el interés general.

siguiendo las directrices que fijan los tribunales europeos - la interpretación de las normas que permiten el recurso a
esta figura debe ser restrictiva, dado que nos encontramos ante una excepción a la regla general de procurement , clp

artículo 103 de la Ce: la Administración Pública, AP,sirve
con objetividad los intereses generales y actúa de acuerdo con los principios de eficacia, jerarquía,
descentralización, desconcentración y coordinación, con sometimiento pleno a la ley y al Derecho.

<<>>cocoo: AP CONSTANTLY violate 103 ce:
Para evitar la vviolacion del wpi mediante los recursos propios, la Ley de Defensa de la Competencia contiene tres tipos
fundamentales de infracciones 

El cma esp [cnmc] no es poder judicial, osea, no rige el principio de oportunidad en la actuación 
de las autoridades de competencia en el ordenamiento jurídico español y, por
lo tanto, no se permite la priorización de asuntos. Ello Impide a las autoridades de competencia
seleccionar asuntos , lo que contribuye a afianzar la requerida independencia en su actuación

Entre esos tipos se encuentran las conductas colusorias que prohíben los acuerdos entre operadores
económicos que falseen la competencia en los mercados (artículo 1 LDC) y las conductas desleales
que, por falsear la libre competencia afecten al interés público (artículo 3 LDC).
 (artículo 34 de la LDC: cma se encargará de «realizar informes sectoriales que incluyan propuestas de modificación del marco
 regulatorio, ayudas públicas, así como los informes sobre proyectos normativos»

Además, el artículo 5.4 de la Ley de creación de la CNMC establece un cauce de impugnación de las
actuaciones administrativas (o de las normas jurídicas con rango inferior a Ley) ya q puede
 impugnar actos de las Administraciones Públicas sujetos al Derecho administrativo
 y disposiciones generales de rango inferior a la ley de los que se deriven anticomps

Cnmc tiene la obligación de iniciar un procedimiento administrativo sancionador que terminaría en la
finalización de la conducta infractora e incluso en laimposición de sanciones.
También podría valorarse la posibilidad de realizar labores de promoción de la competencia informando
a la administración correspondiente de las implicaciones de la encomienda planteada o incluso
 impugnando determinados encargos

A. La fase más restrictiva
Las Directivas de contratación pública de 1992 y la
de 2004 ya establecían que su regulación no resultaba de aplicación a los «contratos públicos
 de servicios adjudicados por una autoridad contratante a otra autoridad contratante o a una colaboración de
autoridades contratantes en base a un derecho exclusivo que disfrutan en virtud a una ley, regulación
o disposición administrativa

 Osea, Solo si no existe mercado posible, no hay posibilidad de plantear una adjudicación competitiva.

En el asunto STADT HALLE (C-26/03), se planteaba la adjudicación directa de un contrato de tratamiento
de residuos por un municipio a una entidad cuyo capital era mayoritariamente, pero no íntegramente,
propiedad del propio poder adjudicador (una parte muy reducida era de propiedad privada) (18).

Held, «la adjudicación de un contrato público a una empresa de economía mixta sin licitación previa
 perjudicaría al objetivo de que exista una competencia libre y no falseada y al principio de igualdad de trato de los
interesados contemplado en la Directiva 92/50, ya
que, entre otras cosas, este procedimiento otorgaría a una empresa privada que participa en el 
capital de la citada empresa una ventaja en relación con sus competidores (§51)».

 la participación privada, incluso cuando es limitada, exige subcontratación y para ella debe respetarse el proceso competitivo

Caso: 
 encomienda se realizaba de manera directa a una sociedad anónima cuyo capital
pertenecía íntegramente a la Administración pública.
El Tribunal held: estará justificada la eliminación de la competencia si se trata de garantizar la subsistencia de este servicio público.

Casos:
El asunto Coname (C-231/03) responde a una cuestión prejudicial presentada por un tribunal italiano
por la adjudicación que un municipio italiano había
realizado a una compañía en la que la propia administración tenía una muy escasa participación para
la prestación de un servicio relacionado con la distribución de gas (20).
Held, una participación del 0,97 % es demasiado pequeña para permitir
tal control» 
El asunto Parking Brixen (C-458/03) aborda la concesión sin proceso competitivo de un municipio de la
gestión de dos aparcamientos de la ciudad a una empresa cuya propiedad le correspondía al 100%.
Una compañía privada impugna la situación ante los tribunales internos y ello da lugar a una nueva
respuesta del Tribunal de Justicia ....La Corte afirma que resultan de aplicación los principios de igualdad de trato, no discriminación
 y transparencia en las concesiones de servicios. Por ello se
puede concluir que la excepcionalidad de los medios propios se aplica también en supuestos en que
no sean de aplicación las directivas de contratación
pública ..Held, no existe control, y por lo tanto quedaría descartada la posibilidad de
realizar una adjudicación sin procedimiento competitivo.

caso Mödling (C-29/04), es un procedimiento de incumplimiento contra Austria (22).
En este supuesto un municipio austriaco decidió
crear un órgano independiente para la gestión ecológica de los residuos y las transacciones 
comerciales relacionadas con el citado sector. Por mediode un contrato de tiempo indefinido 
y a cambio de una determinada remuneración las actividades se
transfirieron a una compañía pública que decidió transferir el 49% de sus acciones a una compañía
privada. El nuevo ente comenzó a prestar servicios a otros municipios de su comarca.
En este supuesto el Tribunal : la existencia de capital privado excluye en sí misma la posibilidad
de considerar adjudicaciones directas a medios propios 

El caso Augusta contra Italia implicó declarar que el Estado no podía adjudicar sin proceso competitivo
un contrato para la compra de helicópteros militares y civiles a una entidad que no pertenece 100% a la
administración

En el asunto Carbotermo , held, la existencia de una compañía intermedia en
la gestión elimina la posibilidad de realizar adjudicaciones directas.

Caso fEMFO-TRAGSA que deriva de una cuestión
prejudicial presentada por el Tribunal Supremo español (27).
En este supuesto una empresa de gestión forestal denuncia a la empresa pública TRAGSA por realizar
un supuesto abuso de posición de dominio en el mercado afectado.
La empresa denunciada, TAGSA, tenía como accionista mayoritario al Estado y a las comunidades
autónomas como accionistas minoritarios y tiene como objeto social realizar trabajos confiados por
las administraciones u organismos públicos. Held, al ser TRAGSA una entidad que no puede negarse a aceptar
encomiendas de las diferentes administraciones y al fijarse sus tarifas por una comisión ministerial, debe
rechazarse la naturaleza contractual 

Held,solo podría considerarse medio propio una entidad que
no tiene capacidad de negociar libremente las condiciones de prestación del servicio
 por su dependencia de la o las administraciones a quienes se los presta 
Además, establece que la propiedad compartida de una entidad no resulta incompatible con la
exigencia de control análogo si los propietarios son entes públicos y si, aunque tengan participaciones
de muy escasa relevancia en el accionariado de la entidad, tienen capacidad de dar órdenes a la
entidad dependiente.

Correos tenía forma de sociedad limitada y la capacidad no solo de ampliar su objeto social sino de
rescindir el contrato que le vincula con la administración por lo que el Abogado General concluyó que el
control de la administración era demasiado limitado como para que esta entidad pudiera considerarse
un medio propio 

El Tribunal afirmó que este caso difería del supuesto
de TRAGSA ya que ésta era «un medio propio instrumental y un servicio técnico de la AP

 Según el Tribunal, «tan sólo en el supuesto de
que el convenio celebrado entre Correos y el Ministerio fuera en realidad un acto administrativo
 unilateral que impusiera obligaciones exclusivamente a
cargo de Correos,  podría llegarse a la conclusión de que no existe contrato
alguno y de que, por consiguiente, no resulta aplicable la Directiva 92/50» (§54).

asunto Econord:

 se plantea hasta qué punto una sociedad puede ser medio propio de varias administraciones cuando una de ellas posee el grueso
del capital de la entidad y el resto poseen una parte testimonial del mismo
El Tribunal, asumiendo q exista participación en el capital y en los órganos de dirección
y aclaró que «si bien es verdad que en caso de que varias administraciones públicas utilicen una entidad común para llevar
 a cabo una misión común de servicio público no es desde luego indispensable
que cada una de las administraciones públicas tenga por sí sola un poder de control individual sobre
la entidad de que se trate ,  no obstante, el Tribunal estableció que queda en manos
de las autoridades nacionales apreciar si el poder ejercido confiere control suficiente o no

Exigencias legales
El Legislador de la UE trató de zanjar la controversia jurisprudencial en el artículo 12 de  la Directiva 2014/24/UE  2014, «Un contrato
 adjudicado por un poder adjudicador a otra persona de Derecho público o privado, esta exempto de tener q aplicar esta Directiva, si:

-el poder adjudicador ejerza sobre la persona jurídica de que se trate un control análogo al que 
ejerce sobre sus propios servicios;

- más del 80 % de las actividades de esa persona jurídica se deben llevar a cabo en el ejercicio
de los cometidos que le han sido confiados por el poder adjudicador que la controla o por otras
personas jurídicas controladas por dicho poder adjudicador, y

-no existe participación directa de capital privado en la persona jurídica controlada, con
la excepción de las formas de participación de capital privado sin capacidad de control 
mayoritario ni minoritario que estén impuestas por las disposiciones legales nacionales, de conformidad con los Tratados, y 
que no ejerzan una influencia decisiva sobre la persona jurídica controlada.»

 resulta necesario que el poder adjudicador «ejerza una influencia decisiva sobre objetivos
estratégicos y decisiones significativas de la personajurídica controlada». Además, el control que realiza el poder adjudicador
puede realizarse de manera indirecta; es decir, que el control puede realizarse por una persona jurídica
que a su vez sea controlada por el poder adjudicador. La Directiva abre también la posibilidad a que se
realicen encargos por parte de la persona jurídica controlada al poder adjudicador o a otros medios
propios controlados que lo sean de la misma entidad. La excepción a esta posibilidad se verifica en
los supuestos en que exista participación directa de capital privado en la entidad a quien se adjudica el
contrato «con la excepción de las formas de participación de capital privado sin capacidad de control
mayoritario ni minoritario que estén impuestas por las disposiciones legales nacionales, de conformidad con los Tratados, y que no otorguen una
 influencia decisiva sobre la persona jurídica controlada».
La nueva regulación permite expresamente la encomienda a personas jurídicas de derecho Público o
privado sin que exista el citado «control análogo» si las exigencias mencionadas se verifican por un conjunto de poderes 
adjudicadores. Para ello resulta necesario que los órganos decisorios
de la persona jurídica estén compuestos por representantes de todos los poderes adjudicadores
 participantes. Sin embargo, resulta posible que cada representante actúe en nombre de varios poderes
adjudicadores o de todos los afectados. También se exige que los poderes adjudicadores ejerzan influencia decisiva sobre los objetivos estratégicos y
las decisiones significativas de la persona jurídica controlada. Sin embargo, la citada influencia puede
realizarse de manera conjunta.
Finalmente se exige que los intereses perseguidos por la persona controlada no sean contrarios a los
intereses de los poderes adjudicadores que la controlan.

La trasposición de la normativa referida en el ordenamiento español se realiza por medio de los
 artículos 32 y 33 de la LCSP

tanto el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea,  como el Tribunal Supremo español han confirmado la posibilidad de declarar
 la responsabilidad  de una entidad como facilitador en una infracción de competencia, aunque no opere en el mercado afectado ni
en mercados conexos, siempre que contribuya de manera decisiva y activa a la realización de una conducta anticompetitiva.

B. Posibles tipos infractores
a. La existencia de acuerdos contrarios a la competencia
El artículo 1.1 de la LDC establece que:
Se prohíbe todo acuerdo, decisión o recomendación colectiva, o práctica concertada
o conscientemente paralela, que tenga por objeto, produzca o pueda producir el efecto
de impedir, restringir o falsear la competencia en todo o parte del mercado nacional y, en
particular, los que consistan en:
a)La fijación, de forma directa o indirecta, de precios o de otras condiciones comerciales o de servicio.

b)La limitación o el control de la producción, la distribución, el desarrollo técnico o las inversiones.

c)El reparto del mercado o de las fuentes de aprovisionamiento.

d)La aplicación, en las relaciones comerciales o de servicio, de condiciones desiguales
 para prestaciones equivalentes que coloquen a unos competidores en situación
desventajosa frente a otros.

e)La subordinación de la celebración de
contratos a la aceptación de prestaciones suplementarias que, por su naturaleza
o con arreglo a los usos de comercio, no
guarden relación con el objeto de tales
contratos

CONCLUSIONES
Mejorar la calidad de las decisiones públicas e incentivar, de forma favorable a la competencia

La utilización eficiente de los recursos presupuestarios en los procesos de aprovisionamiento de bienes y
servicios en todas las esferas administrativas, es una de las tareas por las que deben velar las administraciones y las autoridades 
de competencia. Ello puede conseguirse empleando herramientas de promoción o de defensa.
La disuasión es uno de los objetivos fundamentales de cma,,, las funciones de defensa resultan más aptas para conseguirla.

Conseguir un empleo de los medios propios que se limite a los casos justificados por razones de eficiencia administrativa
 contribuiría  a reforzar el cumplimiento de los principios de publicidad, transparencia, estabilidad
 presupuestaria, control del gasto y eficiente utilización de los fondos que deben regir
el aprovisionamiento público, a mejorar la competitividad de la economía española y a los objetivos
generales de crecimiento y empleo.
Incrementar las exigencias de justificación y motivación de cada encomienda, orientar 
las encomiendas a costes, limitar las posibilidades de subcontratación o las encomiendas
 genéricas, de objeto muy amplio en los estatutos de las entidades o reducir
los plazos y las posibilidades de renovación, serían
modos de trabajar con los medios propios que fomentarían la eficacia de la labor administrativa y
contribuirían a proteger el interés general.
En cualquier caso, un empleo inadecuado de la figura que permita el encargo a entidades que no
cumplan con las exigencias legales detalladamente tasadas, puede ser tanto objeto de impugnación (si
se cumplen las exigencias procesales para realizarla) como de apertura de expedientes
 sancionadores por infracción de los artículos 1 o 3 de la LDC. De otro modo, la autoridad de competencia estará
desoyendo las exigencias establecidas en su normativa regulatoria y no estará cumpliendo
 adecuadamente sus funciones de fomento de la competencia y protección del interés general.

CLP IN THE AP  EN ESPANA:

Ley 15/2007, de 3 de julio, de Defensa de la Competencia («LDC») 
artículos 9 y 103.1 de la Constitución se establece el sometimiento general de los poderes públicos
 al ordenamiento jurídico. Dado que las normas de defensa
de la competencia están integradas en el ordenamiento jurídico español a través de la LDC, el
Reglamento de Defensa de la Competencia

Recent developments on the application of Competition Rules to the Public Sector:
The Spanish Competition Commission («CNC») has traditionally
considered that public authorities may breach competition rules only
when they act as economic operators in the market. However, in a
recent resolution the CNC has stated that conducts carried out by
public authorities in the exercise of their public powers may also be
deemed as competition law infringements.

 el apartado 2 del artículo 4 de la LDC establece que las normas de defensa de la
 competencia se aplicarán a las situaciones de restricción de la
competencia que sean causadas por la actuación de los poderes públicos o de las empresas públicas
cuando no cuenten con amparo legal. Dicho sometimiento ha sido confirmado por el Tribunal Supremo, 
que ha afirmado que el ejercicio de funciones públicas no exime a las Administraciones Públicas
de la obligación de cumplir las normas establecidas en la LDC y demás regulación de defensa de la competencia.

 las conductas  de las Administraciones Públicas que resulten contrarias a las normas de
defensa de la competencia podrán ser investigadas y, sancionadas por la CNC.ll

 excepción:

 Apartado 2 del artículo 4 de la LDC, se excluye la aplicación de las prohibiciones contenidas en la LDC a las
actuaciones de los poderes o empresas públicas que estén amparadas por ley. La interpretación de esta
excepción debe ser restrictiva. Solamente estarán exentas aquellas conductas que estén amparadas por
normas con rango de ley formal, pudiendo tratarse tanto de leyes estatales como de leyes autonómicas.

Por tanto, no quedarán exentas de la aplicación de las prohibiciones recogidas en la LDC las conductas
de las Administraciones Públicas que estén amparadas únicamente por normas de rango inferior a la
ley. Adicionalmente, la CNC ha entendido que esta exención legal debe ser expresa y clara, considerando que no cabe hablar
 de amparo legal sino en los casos en los que la ley permite expresamente una práctica objetivamente anticompetitiva.

 Resp penal de aps

 En primer lugar, justificaría la exención de responsabilidad penal del “Estado y las
Administraciones públicas territoriales” (gobierno central, gobiernos autonómicos,
municipios, diputaciones, ...) puesto que todas ellas ejercen las anteriormente identificadas
como “potestades de imperio”.

En segundo lugar, también justificaría los supuestos de “Organismos Reguladores43,
Agencias estatales44y “Administraciones institucionales” equiparados con la
Administración pública territorial por ejercer algunas de las potestades públicas identificadas
anteriormente (sancionadoras, contratación pública, otorgamiento de subvenciones, etc...) no
vinculadas al territorio, sino en ámbitos de competencia temática y por ser formalmente
considerados por el art. 84.1 de la Ley 40/2015 como “organismos públicos vinculados o
dependientes de la Administración General del Estado”

En tercer lugar, también quedaría justificada la exención de responsabilidad penal de las
“Entidades públicas Empresariales”. El artículo 103 de la Ley 40/2015, de 1 de octubre, de
Régimen Jurídico del Sector Público define las EPE como “entidades de Derecho público, con
personalidad jurídica propia, patrimonio propio y autonomía en su gestión, que se financian con
ingresos de mercado, (...) y que junto con el ejercicio de potestades administrativas
desarrollan actividades prestacionales, de gestión de servicios o de producción de bienes
de interés público, susceptibles de contraprestación”. Aunque estos entes son organismos que

 la ratio legis del precepto –centrada en restringir la exención de responsabilidad penal del sector público empresarial– 
conduce a considerar la aplicación del régimen de “responsabilidad plena” a aquellas sociedades mercantiles que no
ejerzan “servicios de interés general” (SIG) en los términos definidos en el epígrafe anterior. A
ello contribuye el tenor gramatical del apartado 2 en el que específicamente se consideran
sólo incluidos dentro de él a las sociedades mercantiles que ejecuten políticas públicas o
presten servicios económicos de interés general por lo que puede deducirse la exclusión de las
que no lo hagan.
Así pues, atendiendo al concepto de “servicio de interés general” (SIG) –aclarado en el
epígrafe anterior– deberían quedar relegados al régimen general sociedades mercantiles
como, por ejemplo, Cesce chile dedicada a la actividad económica de prestación de seguros;
Cofivacasa cuyo objeto es la liquidación de patrimonio estatal; la Compañía española de
tabaco en rama, por dedicarse exclusivamente a la actividad económica de producción y venta
de tabaco; o el World Trade Center Barcelona, S.A., S.M.E. cuyo objeto social organización de
eventos y convenciones corporativas.
Por mucho interés público que persigan estas sociedades no puede compararse ninguna
de ellas con sociedades constituidas para asegurar la prestación de “servicios de interés
general” (SIG) como el suministro energético, las telecomunicaciones, el transporte público o
la sanidad, la educación y la vivienda.
Para terminar, debo aclarar que la definición propuesta también dejaría fuera del
concepto de “servicio de interés general” (SIG) y, en consecuencia, también fuera del régimen
de “responsabilidad limitada” todas aquellas actividades reglamentadas por razones de
interés general (farmacia, taxi, banca privada...).

Como hemos visto, considero fundamental identificar la ratio legis de la reforma de 2015
en el que se puede denominar “regreso al derecho penal” de las SMP y situarlo en el centro de
la interpretación penal del art. 31 quinquies para ofrecer una interpretación restrictiva de la
exclusión penal de los entes públicos empresariales.

A partir de ahí, y partiendo de la regulación administrativa para asegurar la coherencia y
la unidad del ordenamiento jurídico, basta con aplicar en puridad los criterios interpretativos
gramaticales y sistemáticos, pero identificando el fundamento penal de cada uno de los
regímenes de RPPJ ofrecido por el CP. En ese sentido, los conceptos de “potestades públicas” y
“servicios de interés general” permiten avanzar en un concepto relativamente autónomo del
derecho administrativo en la que focalizar el trato discriminatorio entre las diversas entidades
del sector público institucional.

Así, el ejercicio de “potestades administrativas” permite delimitar los entes a quienes el
apartado 1 del art. 31 quinquies excluye de responsabilidad penal, dejando fuera de su ámbito
de aplicación a fundaciones del sector público, los fondos sin personalidad jurídica, y las SMP
que de modo general no tienen atribuidas potestades públicas.

Por otro lado, el concepto comunitario de “servicio de interés general” permite excluir del
régimen de responsabilidad penal con penas limitadas a aquellas sociedades mercantiles
públicas que sólo desarrollan actividades económicas, quienes quedarían relegadas al régimen
general de RPPJ.

Sin embargo, la regulación penal no deja de plantear algunas contradicciones. Así, p.ej, se
ha advertido que si se ha llegado a disolver al Ayuntamiento de Marbella, qué problema
teórico habría en posibilitar la sanción penal de una EPE de actividad delictiva continuada74. A
esas contradicciones coadyuvan la falta de criterios racionales por parte de las
administraciones en la constitución de entes del sector público empresarial. Al margen del
abuso del recurso a las figuras empresariales para huir del derecho administrativo, también se
ha criticado la posibilidad de que las administraciones cedan potestades administrativas a las
sociedades mercantiles, planteándose en alguna ocasión hasta la inconstitucionalidad de esta
posibilidad por ser contraria a la noción de ap

 judicial review in Spain

Locus standi

Los intereses colectivos y los intereses difusos

La ampliación de la legitimación a los intereses colectivos, supraindividuales, «de categoría» o difusos es una cuestión que sigue abierta en la jurisprudencia, aunque cuenta hoy con el apoyo de los apartados b) e i) del art.19 LRJCA -EDL 1998/44323- y del art.15 LEC -EDL 2000/77463-.

El apartado b) -EDL 1998/44323- legitima a las «las corporaciones, asociaciones, sindicatos y grupos y entidades a que se refiere el artículo 18 que resulten afectados o estén legalmente habilitados para la defensa de los derechos e intereses legítimos colectivos».

El interés colectivo es distinto de la simple suma de unos intereses individuales. El interés colectivo afecta por igual y en común a todos los miembros del grupo de que se trate, y pertenece por entero a todos esos miembros. Se asemeja de esta forma al interés difuso, que pertenece también a una pluralidad de sujetos, pero que, a diferencia del interés colectivo, esa pluralidad no puede ser concretada en una colectividad determinada.

Los intereses colectivos pueden ser ejercitados por grupos, corporaciones o asociaciones, siempre que ostenten la representación necesaria de tales intereses para tener la legitimación de su defensa en el proceso  (18) y ostenten interés legítimo.

La LOPJ -EDL 1985/8754- lo expresa diciendo que los grupos o entes han de estar afectados o tener legalmente reconocida la defensa y promoción de los intereses colectivos. Según el art.7.3 LOPJ «los Juzgados y Tribunales protegerán los derechos e intereses legítimos, tanto individuales como colectivos, sin que en ningún caso pueda producirse indefensión. Para la defensa de estos últimos se reconocerá la legitimación de las corporaciones, asociaciones y grupos que resulten afectados o que estén legalmente habilitados para su defensa y promoción.»

Los intereses generales difusos corresponden, en principio, por igual a todos los ciudadanos y encuentran, normalmente, su reconocimiento jurídico en normas constitucionales especialmente relacionadas con la configuración del Estado social y democrático de Derecho (Const art.1 -EDL 1978/3879-).

La sentencia de 13-7-16 (Rec. 2542/15) -EDJ 2016/110795- es importante en este terreno porque niega legitimación a una asociación profesional de jueces y magistrados para impugnar un acuerdo del Consejo General del Poder Judicial, que declaraba en una situación administrativa de servicios especiales a un magistrado. Considera la Sala muy razonadamente que el interés que mueve a la recurrente no trasciende el mero interés por la legalidad y precisa que, conforme al art.19.1 b) la LRJCA -EDL 1998/44323- la legitimación que debe adornar a la asociación tiene que ser una legitimación por interés legítimo (19). La precisión es muy importante porque el interés legítimo es también necesario, conforme a la misma letra del art.19.1 b) LRJCA, para la defensa de intereses colectivos.

A la misma solución llega el Tribunal Constitucional. Además de las condiciones generales la STCo 102/2009 -EDJ 2009/72108- declara que «se ha visto exigiendo» […] «de este tipo de personas jurídicas en orden a impugnar actos o disposiciones administrativas que» […] «existe un interés profesional o económico que sea predicable de las entidades Asociativas recurrentes» (FJ 3).

La orientación actual de la jurisprudencia muestra una extraordinaria dosis de cautela en esta cuestión, subrayando que es casuística sin que sea aconsejable una afirmación ni una negación indiferenciada para todos los casos (20) lo que nos lleva a concluir que el problema sigue abierto a los matices que plantee cada caso y que, sin duda, planteará numerosos problemas en el futuro.

Hay una brillante y atrevida excepción: La sentencia del TCo 214/1991, de 11 de noviembre -EDJ 1991/10668-, ha abierto decididamente brecha en la legitimación que examinamos al reconocer, aparentemente sin vacilación, legitimación de un miembro de un grupo étnico o social determinado para recurrir en amparo, cuando se ofende el honor de todo el colectivo de que forma parte. Si la orientación que muestra esta resolución se confirma nuestro ordenamiento estará en vanguardia en el reconocimiento de la legitimación que se examina, aunque -preciso es reconocerlo- sufrirá el concepto procesal de legitimación que hemos venido empleando hasta la fecha.

La STS ya citada de 8-6-15 (Rec. 39/2014) -EDJ 2015/104390- es paradigmática en cuanto reconoce a una asociación ecologista, que tenía entre sus fines estatutarios la defensa y protección del medio ambiente, legitimación para impugnar un indulto en un delito contra la ordenación del territorio. La sentencia citada, que cuenta con un voto particular muy interesante, demuestra que la legitimación por interés legítimo se dilata en forma extraordinaria en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo cuando la cuestión sustantiva de fondo versa sobre materias cubiertas en el ámbito sustantivo por la acción popular. Podría decirse que la acción popular es atractiva de la apertura de la legitimación. En el mismo sentido de la sentencia de 8-6-15 se expresó la Sentencia de la Sección Quinta de la Sala Tercera de 3-12-01 (Casacion 5349/97) -EDJ 2001/52614- que extendió la legitimación por la acción pública reconocida en el Derecho urbanístico a una licencia de actividades cuando la temática esencial de impugnación de una actividad clasificada como molesta, insalubre nociva o peligrosa radicaba en el emplazamiento de dicha actividad, que se supeditaba en el caso a lo dispuesto en los planes de ordenación urbana, siendo así que en Derecho urbanístico rige la acción pública.

2. Legitimación para demandar el reconocimiento de una situación jurídica individualizada en el día de hoy

El art.28.2 LJCA de 1956 -EDL 1956/42- reservaba, como antes dijimos, la legitimación para pretender el restablecimiento de una situación jurídica individualizada a los titulares de un derecho subjetivo.

Hoy en día, la distinción entre pretensiones de anulación y de plena jurisdicción ha perdido nitidez, siendo traspasada sin problemas por nuestros Tribunales que superan, siempre que les es posible, las imprecisiones que pueden existir, con alguna frecuencia, en los suplicos de los escritos de demanda.

Como ha dicho en forma muy temprana la sentencia de la sec 4ª de la Sala Tercera de 15-6-92 -EDJ 1992/6293-, nuestro proceso contencioso-administrativo ha dominado con fortuna, incluso antes del mandato de tutela judicial efectiva que resulta del art.24.1 de la Norma Fundamental -EDL 1978/3879-, las barreras formalistas que discriminaban ambos tipos de pretensiones, por ser misión constitucional de la Jurisdicción amparar los derechos e intereses legítimos de quienes a ella acuden (21).

La distinción entre ambos tipos de pretensiones afecta, en estos casos, al fondo del asunto (22) y la respuesta también debe ser casuista. Es también una cuestión abierta a los matices jurisprudenciales para el futuro.

contencioso administrativo», en «Incidencia de la Constitución en los procesos contencioso-administrativos» Madrid, Consejo General del Poder Judicial, 1992, p. 158 ss. La jurisprudencia introdujo los conceptos de «interés directo ampliado» e «interés indirecto» dilatando jurisprudencialmente la legitimación hasta el concepto de interés legítimo que dimana de la Constitución.

8.- Como se sabe en Italia la distinción entre derecho subjetivo e interés legítimo ha servido tradicionalmente para discriminar el ámbito de las jurisdicciones ordinaria, que conoce de los derechos, y de lo contencioso, al que se encomiendan los intereses legítimos, en un sistema cuya única justificación deriva de la mera evolución histórica y de prejuicios ideológicos, pero que se ha reflejado en la misma Constitución (art.113) -EDL 1978/3879-. Vedi, por todos, la voz «Interesse» (dir. amm.), de Montesano, en la Enciclopedìa del Diritto.

9.- Cfr. R, Alessi «Pincipî di Diritto amministrativo», 3ª ed., Milán, Giuffrè, 1974, vol II, p. 553 a 578 y 752 a 760.

10.- Alessi lo define como posición subjetiva del hombre frente a la utilidad que le ofrecen determinados bienes o servicios idóneos para satisfacer sus necesidades, op.cit.; loc. cit., p. 557

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 (CE) devotes two central provisions to judicial review

• Article 106(1) CE, located in Part IV on government and administration, establishes that ‘The Courts control the power

to issue regulations and to ensure that the rule of law prevails in administrative action, as well as to ensure that the latter is subordinated to the ends which justify it’.

• Article 24(1) CE, right to effective judicial protection, which also includes protection against administrative action: ‘Every person has the right to obtain the effective protection of the judges and the courts in the exercise of his or her legitimate rights and interests, and in no case may he go undefended’

Judicial review is usually performed by specific courts fully integrated into the judiciary, the so-called jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa (administrative jurisdiction) = JCA

ACT ON THE JURISDICTION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Act 29/1998 of 13 july regulating the Jurisdiction for Judicial Review

Parties
Act 29/1998 of 13 july regulating the Jurisdiction for Judicial Review

The most significant new features are the precepts regulating locus standi.
Today judicial review is a useful instrument for a great many purposes: inter alia, defence of 
personal interest, defence of collective interests and any other legitimate
interests, including political interests; it is a mechanism for reviewing the
legality of lower levels of the administration, an instrument for defending
the autonomy of those same levels of the administration, a channel for the
defence of rights and liberties entrusted to certain public institutions and a
tool for the defence of the objective interest of the law in public interest
claims.
A distinction is made between multi- and single-judge courts in matters of
representation and defence. In proceedings in multi-judge courts, a 
barrister and solicitor are compulsory; in action in single-judge courts, a
barrister is optional, and a solicitor, compulsory. 

The jr reform finally allows for justice with regard to any illicit administrative
behaviour

Four types of judicial reviews are established, according to object:

A/-the jr of express or presumptive administrative acts;....Jr inadmissibility to challenge pb acts that confirm other final, 
consented acts.

B/-the jr of the legality of legislation

Diff: 
-direct jr [ of legislation] 
-Indirect jr [of the application of legislation on the grounds that the underlying legislation is
 faulty.] when it is that same court that conducts a dir and an indirect judicial review, the court will declare the general
 provision valid or quashed. When the competent court for indir jr is not the correct court to conduct a direct jr , the act 
introduces questions of illegality.

C/-the jr of administrative inaction; the claimant asks the court to sentence the administration to provide some due material
 performance or to adopt some express act in procedures initiated on an ex officio basis, where the mechanism of 
administrative silence is disallowed. Thus, citizens are girded with a legal instrument for combating administrative
 passiveness and delay. Jr only possible v . specific performances and acts that must be decided upon by a legal deadline
, and so any ruling finding for the claimant must strictly order the administration to discharge its obligations exactly as
 established. Judicial review by nature cannot furnish a remedy for all cases of administrative indolence, foot-dragging 
and ineffectualness. It can but guarantee exact compliance with the law.

D/-the jr of ultra vires material actions:  Jr of ultravires material actions. Material actions taken by the administration 
without the necessary legal coverage and injuring legitimate rights and interests of any sort can be combated by means of this 
judicial review. This particular sort of proceeding is by nature declaratory and prosecutory. At the same time, it might be said to
 seek an injunction, for precautionary measures .

For judicial review of administrative inaction, a complaint first must be filed at the administration offices; 

in judicial review of ultra vires action, the act allows an optional demand to be filed, also at the administration offices.

 But even when the aforementioned complaints and demands are dismissed, through silence or otherwise, subsequent
claims for judicial review of administrative inaction, are not proceedings
against the dismissal of earlier complaints and demands. ... these new actions (the complaint and the demand)d9not  partake of
the traditional nature of the claim for judicial review as an instrument of
examination. Nor can it be held that any failure to uphold all or part of a
complaint or a demand constitutes an authentic express or presumptive administrative act. 

What is sought is simply to give the administration the opportunity to settle the conflict and avoid the courts taking a hand.

 the rule allowing the single- or multi-judge bench , to suspend the processing of mass claims that all share
the same object and to decide instead upon one or more preferred claims selected from the mass. In this way, many other 
identical proceedings can be avoided, because the effects of the first ruling or rulings may be applied
to all the other cases in execution. 

VI. Procedure

 the introduction of a short procedure for certain matters valued at a defined sum beneath a certain cap.

 To settle proceedings quickly, the act places several powers in the hands
of the parties or the judicial authority, inter alia, the possibility of initiating a
claim by filing suit in court in some cases, the possibility of petitioning for
judgement without the need for evidence, a hearing or closing arguments
and the possibility of attempting conciliation. 

judgements sentencing the administration to do something, judgements
upholding demands for damages, judgements quashing general provisions
and judgements concerning discretionary action. 

Jr judges cannot rule upon the discretionary contents of the acts they quash. Logically, this rule is in
no way meant to curb the courts’ authority to extend their review of
discretionary acts to foce pb to submit to law

2. On the topic of appeals against jr judgements, 
when the heart of the matter has not been addressed, appeals safeguard he right to effective judicial protection. 
Appeals are also for the protection of fundamental rights

3.  the constitutional right to effective judicial protection entails the right to prompt
enforcement of the court decision. A refusal,whether express or implicit, to comply with a judgement constitutes an
attack on the Constitution.

The Constitutional Act on the Judiciary eliminated the government power
to suspend and ignore the enforcement of rulings. On the other hand, it
also opened the door to the expropriation of rights recognised by rulings
against the administration. It did not, however, specify the causes of public
and social interest WPI, that would make exercise of this power to expropriate
Pb rights legitimate. The act specifies three very welldefined sets of circumstances,
 Specailly the preservation of the free exercise of fundamental rights and public liberties.
 the act does accord the party concerned economic compensation for any unjustified delay; it provides against
execution in outward appearance only, declaring acts contrary to court
pronouncements null and void and establishing a rapid way of quashing
them; it specifies the possible ways of enforcing rulings that sentence the
administration to conduct some activity or order the performance of some
act; and it grants the courts the authority to exact penalties in order to
enforce orders, apart from the consequences of any criminal charges.

Two important new features:
 
1. the possibility of extending the effects of final rulings on personnel
matters and tax matters to non-party persons in an identical situation....to avoide class actions

2. The second new feature consists in granting
a judicial conciliation agreement the same force as a ruling for purposes of
enforcement of judgement. 

precautionary measures 
 precautionary justice forms part of the right to effective protection, as declared by the latest case law.
The rule is to take precautionary measures whenever execution of the act or
application of the provision may render the judicial review moot, but to do
so always on sufficient grounds, after weighing all the conflicting interests.
 suspension of the provision or act at issue, is no longer the only precautionary measure
possible. The act introduces the possibility of taking any precautionary
measure, including positive measures. There are no special restrictions,
given the common foundation shared by all precautionary measures

 Measures inaudita parte debitoris  (the party to appear in court at a later time
concerning the lifting, maintenance or modification of the measure taken),
are measures to be requested, prior to filing for judicial review of inaction or ultra vires
acts.

CHAPTER ONE
Scope

Article 1
1. Single-and multi-judge administrative courts shall hear demands
entered in connection with the action of the public administration subject to
administrative law, in connection with general provisions of a rank below
that of act, and in connection with legislative decrees that overstep the
limits of sub-delegation.
2. For the intents and purposes of this act, public administrations shall be
understood to be:
a) The national state administration.
b) The administrations of the autonomous communities.
c) The entities belonging to local administrations.
d) The entities organised under public law that are dependent on or
linked to the state, autonomous communities or local entities.
3. Single- and multi-judge administrative courts shall also hear demands
entered in connection with:
a) Acts and provisions in matters of personnel, administration and
asset management subject to public law adopted by the competent
authorities of the Congress of Deputies, the Senate, the Constitutional
Court, the Court of Auditors and the Ombudsman, likewise by the
legislative assemblies of autonomous communities and the
autonomous community institutions analogous to the Court of Auditors
and the Ombudsman.

b) Acts and provisions by the General Council of the Judiciary and
administrative activity by governing bodies of single- and multi-judge
courts, in the terms of the Constitutional Act on the Judiciary.
c) Action by the election administration, in the terms of the Constitutional
Act on General Election Procedure.
Article 2
The jurisdiction for judicial review shall hear questions arising in connection
with:
a) Judicial protection of fundamental rights, regulated elements and
the fixing of such indemnities as prove to be in order, in connection
with acts of the government or the governing councils of autonomous
communities, regardless of the nature of the said acts.
b) Administrative contracts and acts preparing and awarding other
contracts subject to legislation on public administration contracting.
c) Acts and provisions decided in the exercise of public functions by
corporations organised under public law.
d) Administrative acts of review or oversight ordered by the concessiongranting administration with respect to acts 
ordered by the holders of
public service concessions that involve the exercise of administrative
powers granted to the said concession holders, likewise acts of the
concession holders themselves when such acts are amenable to direct
judicial review pursuant to the proper sector-specific legislation.
e) Financial liability of public administrations, regardless of the
nature of the activity or type of relationship from which the liability
stems. Public administrations cannot be sued on these grounds in
the civil or labour jurisdictions, even when they are concurrent with
private persons in inflicting the damage or hold liability insurance.
f) All other matters expressly assigned to this jurisdiction by an act.
Article 3
The following are not proper matters for the jurisdiction for judicial review:
a) Issues expressly assigned to the civil, criminal and labour
jurisdictions, even when related with public administration activity.
b) Judicial review of military discipline.
c) Conflicts of jurisdiction between the courts and the administration and
conflicts of attributes amongst bodies belonging to the same administration.
d) Direct or indirect appeals challenging tax legislation enacted under
special regional jurisdiction by the General Assemblies of the Historic
Territories of Álava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, which will be incumbent
upon the Constitutional Court exclusively, under the terms established
by additional provision five of its Constitutional Act.
Article 4
1. The competence of the jurisdiction for judicial review extends to the
hearing and deciding of references for preliminary rulings and incidental
issues not belonging to the jurisdiction for judicial review but directly
related with a claim for judicial review, save for references and issues of a
constitutional or criminal nature and the terms of international treaties.
2. The decision given shall have no effect outside the process in which it is
handed down and shall not be binding on the jurisdiction involved.
Article 5
1. The jurisdiction for judicial review cannot be postponed.
2. Bodies belonging to this jurisdiction shall conduct an ex officio
assessment to determine whether jurisdiction is lacking and shall decide
accordingly, following a ten-day period in which the parties and the
Prosecution Service may petition to be heard by the court.
3. At all events, such declarations shall be grounded and shall always
indicate the particular jurisdiction that is held to be competent. If the
applicant duly appears in that jurisdiction within one month of notice of the
resolution declaring lack of jurisdiction, the applicant shall be regarded as
having duly appeared on the date when the period for lodging applications
for judicial review began, if the applicant lodged the application according
to the instructions in the document giving notice of the act or the said
document was defective.

Bodies and competences

Article 6
The jurisdiction for judicial review is made up of the following bodies:
a)	Single-judge administrative courts.
b)	Single-judge central administrative courts.
c) Administrative divisions of superior courts.
d)	The Administrative Division of the National Court.
e)	The Administrative Division of the Supreme Court.
Article 7
1. The bodies of the jurisdiction for judicial review competent to hear a
matter shall also be competent for all connected incidental proceedings
and competent to enforce rulings handed down as indicated in Section
103.1
2. The competence of single-judge administrative courts and administrative
divisions cannot be postponed and must be observed by them to exist,
albeit an ex officio basis, following a ten-day period in which the parties
and the Prosecution Service may petition to be heard by the court
3. A declaration of lack of competence shall take the form of an order and
must be issued before a ruling is given. The proceedings shall be forwarded
to the competent body in the jurisdiction, where they shall take their course.
If competence is held by a court of a higher rank, a grounded statement
shall be appended and the decision of the higher court shall be observed.
Article 81
1. Single-judge administrative courts shall hear, in single or first instance,
under the terms of this act, claims for judicial review of acts of local entities
or entities and corporations dependent upon or linked to local entities. This
does not include challenges to development planning instruments.

2. Single-judge administrative courts shall moreover hear, in single or first
instance, claims for judicial review of administrative acts of autonomous
community administrations, save when the acts at issue come from the
autonomous community’s governing council and the object is:
a) Personnel issues, save where the issues refer to the creation or
termination of the service relationship of career civil servants.
b) Administrative penalties consisting in fines not in excess of 60,000
euros and discontinuation of activities or stripping of rights for a time
not exceeding six months.
c)	Financial liability claims for a sum not exceeding 30,050 euros.
3. Single-judge administrative courts shall hear, in single or first instance,
claims for judicial review of provisions and acts of the peripheral state and
autonomous community administrations, against acts of organisations,
bodies, entities or corporations organised under public law whose
competence is not nationwide and against the decisions of higher bodies
when they confirm in every particular decisions handed down by said
bodies in appeal, oversight or protection proceedings.
Exceptions shall be made for acts of a sum in excess of 60,000 euros
ordered by the peripheral state administration and national public
organisations whose competence is not nationwide, or when the acts are
ordered in the exercise of competences over public property, national
public works, condemnation under sovereign right of eminent domain or
special properties.
4. Single-judge administrative courts shall, moreover, hear all decisions on
matters of foreign citizens handed down by the peripheral state
administration.
5. It falls to single-judge courts to hear challenges to acts of district election
boards and challenges concerning the proclamation of candidacies and
candidates by any election boards, in the terms set in election legislation.
6. The contentious-administrative Courts will also hear requests for
warrants to enter homes and other places whose access requires the
consent of the owner, as long as this is needed for enforcement of acts of
the public authorities, unless they deal with the execution of measures for
the protection of minors agreed by the relevant Public Body.

 Jurisdiction for judicial review

Furthermore, the Contentious-Administrative Courts will be responsible for
judicial authorisation or ratification of measures that the health authorities
consider to be urgent and fundamental to public health and which involve
the deprivation or restriction of liberty or other fundamental right.
Moreover, the Contentious-administrative Courts will hear requests for
warrants to enter and inspect homes, premises, lands and means of
transport which have been agreed by the National Committee for the
Jurisdiction where such access and inspection requires the consent of the
owner and the latter opposes it or there is a risk of such opposition.
Article 92
1. The central contentious-administrative courts shall hear appeals brought
against administrative decisions concerning:
a) Staff matters, in first or sole instance, in the case of decisions issued
by ministers and junior ministers, except where they confirm, in appeal,
supervision or protection proceedings, decisions issued by lower
bodies, or they relate to beginning or ending the employment of career
civil servants, or to the matters set out in article 11.1.a) regarding
military personnel.
b) Appeals, in first or sole instance, against the decisions of central
bodies of the general state administration in the circumstances
provided for in section 2.b) of article 8.
c) In first or sole instance, contentious-administrative appeals brought
against general orders and decisions emanating from public bodies
having their own legal personality and state public sector entities
having authority throughout Spanish territory, subject to the provisions
of article 10, section 1, paragraph i).
d) In first or sole instance, appeals against decisions issued by
ministers and junior ministers concerning financial liability where the
amount claimed does not exceed 30,050 euros.
e) In first instance, decisions rejecting applications for political asylum.
f) In first or sole instance, decisions issued, in supervision proceedings,
by the Spanish Sports Disciplinary Committee concerning sports
discipline.

2. The central contentious-administrative courts shall have responsibility
for the authorisation referred to in article 8.2 of Law 34/2002, as well as
authorising the implementation of decisions issued by the Second Section
of the Intellectual Property Commission to interrupt the provision of
information society services or remove content that violates intellectual
property, in application of Law 34/2002, of 11 July, on information society
and e-commerce services.
3. The central contentious-administrative courts shall also hear the
proceedings provided for in article 12 a of Organic Law 6/2002, of 27 June,
on political parties.

Article 10 Competences of the administrative divisions of superior courts.
1. The administrative divisions of superior courts shall hear in single
instance claims for judicial review in connection with:
a) Acts of local entities and autonomous community administrations
that are not assigned to single-judge administrative courts.
b) General provisions issued by autonomous communities and local
entities.
c) The acts and provisions of the governing bodies of the legislative
assemblies of autonomous communities and autonomous community
institutions analogous to the Court of Auditors and the Ombudsman in
matters of personnel, administration and asset management.

d) Acts and decisions ordered by regional and local economic
administrative courts ending the economic administrative procedure.

e)	Decisions handed down by the Central Economic Administrative
Court in matters of devolved taxes.

f) Acts and provisions of provincial and autonomous community
election boards, likewise appeals made under election law against
election board resolutions about the proclamation of elections and
election winners and the proclamation of the presidents of local
corporations, in the terms of election legislation.

g) Accords between public administrations whose competences are
exercised within the territory of the autonomous community in question.

h) Prohibitions of assembly or proposed modifications of gatherings
as provided for in Constitutional Act 9/1983 of 15 July Regulating the
Right to Freedom of Assembly.

i) Acts and decisions ordered by bodies of the general state
administration whose competence is nationwide and whose institutional
level is lower than that of a minister or secretary of state, in matters of
personnel, special properties and condemnation under sovereign right
of eminent domain.
j) Acts and decisions of the autonomous community bodies competent
to apply the Act on Competition Defence.
k) Decisions handed down by the competent body settling appeals in
matters of contracting as provided for in Section 311 of Act 30/2007 of
30 October on Public Sector Contracts, in connection with contracts
included within the sphere of competence of autonomous communities
or local corporations.

l ) Decisions handed down by sub-national multi-judge administrative
courts for contract appeals.

m) Any other administrative actions not expressly assigned to the
competence of other bodies in this jurisdiction.

....

e) Appeals against decisions issued by the Commission for the
Surveillance of Terrorist Funding Activities and the authorisation of
extensions to the duration of the measures of that commission, in
accordance with the provisions of the law on the prevention and
freezing of terrorist funding.
f) Decisions issued by the central administrative court for contractual
appeals, except as provided for in article 10.1.k).
g) Appeals against decisions of the Bank of Spain, the Spanish
National Securities Market Commission and the Fund for Orderly Bank
Restructuring (FROB) issued in accordance with Law 11/2015, of 18
June, on the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and
investment firms.
h) Appeals brought by the Spanish National Markets and Competition
Commission to protect market unity.
2. It shall, in second instance, hear appeals against the orders and rulings
of the central contentious-administrative courts and those relating to
appeals against refusal of leave to appeal.
3. It shall hear appeals for judicial review of final rulings of the central
contentious-administrative courts.

4. It shall also hear disputes concerning jurisdiction arising between the
central contentious-administrative courts.

Article 12
1. The Administrative Division of the Supreme Court shall hear in single
instance claims for judicial review in connection with:
a) Acts and provisions of the Council of Ministers and Delegated
Government Committees.
b) Acts and provisions of the General Council of the Judiciary.
c) Acts and provisions in matters of personnel, administration and
asset management adopted by the competent authorities of the
Congress of Deputies, the Senate, the Constitutional Court, the Court
of Auditors and the Ombudsman.
2. It shall also hear:
a) All types of appeals to the Supreme Court, in the terms established
herein, and the corresponding motions for admission of denied
appeals.
b) Appeals to the Supreme Court and appeals for review filed against
decisions handed down by the Court of Auditors, under the terms of
the Act on the Operation of the Court of Auditors.
c) Appeals for review of final judgements handed down by the
administrative divisions of superior courts, of the National Court and of
the Supreme Court, save as provided for in Section 61.1.1. of the
Constitutional Act on the Judiciary.
3. Likewise it shall hear:
a) Claims presented in connection with acts and provisions of the Central
Election Board, likewise claims for judicial review of decisions on the
proclamation of election winners in the terms set in election legislation.
b) Claims presented against acts of election boards taken in the
procedure for the election of members of the governing chambers of
multi-judge courts, in the terms of the Constitutional Act on the
Judiciary.

Article 13

In applying the competence distribution rules contained in the preceding
sections, account shall be taken of the following criteria:

a) References made to the administration of the State, autonomous
communities and local entities encompass entities and corporations
dependent upon or linked to each such administration.
b) Competence assigned to single-and multi-judge courts for judicial
review of administrative acts includes competence concerning inaction
and actions performed ultra vires.
c) Save where expressly stated otherwise, the assignment of
competence by reason of subject matter prevails over the assignment of
competence by reason of the administrative body committing the act.

CHAPTER III
Territorial competence of singleand multi-judge courts

Article 14
1. Territorial competence of single-judge courts and superior courts shall
be found pursuant to the following rules:
First. Generally the court whose judicial district contains the central
offices of the body that issued the original provision or act challenged
shall be the competent court.
Second. For judicial review of acts of public administrations relating to
responsibility for public assets, personnel, special properties or
penalisations, either the court serving the judicial district that bounds
the applicant’s domicile or the court serving the domicile of the body
authoring the act challenged, at the applicant’s discretion.

Article 15
1. The Administrative Division of the Supreme Court shall be divided into
sections. The chief justice of each section shall be the chief justice of the
division or the most senior justice in the section, save in the event provided
for in Section 96.6, where the chief justice of the section shall be the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court.
2. To hear or deliberate and pass judgement, the attendance of the chief
justice and the following justices shall be necessary:
a) All justices in the section in appeals to the Supreme Court and
appeals for review.
b)	Four justices in all other cases.
3. For ordinary business, the attendance of the chief justice and two other
justices shall be sufficient.

The parties

c) The state administration, where it has the right or a legitimate
interest, to challenge decisions and orders of the administration of the
autonomous regions and public bodies linked to them, as well as those
of local bodies, in accordance with the provisions of local government
legislation, and those of any other public body that is not under its
supervision.
d) The administration of the autonomous regions, to challenge
decisions and orders that have a bearing on their autonomy, emanating
from the state administration or any other administration or public
body, as well as those of local bodies, in accordance with the provisions
of local government legislation.
e) Local bodies, to challenge decisions and orders that have a bearing
on their autonomy, emanating from the state administration or the
administration of the autonomous regions, as well as those of public
bodies having their own legal personality and linked to either, or those
of other local bodies.
f) The public prosecution service, to take part in proceedings as
established by law.
g) Public law bodies having their own legal personality and linked or
ancillary to any public administration, to challenge decisions or orders
that have a bearing on their aims.
h) Any citizen, acting in the name of the people, in the cases expressly
provided for by law.
i) Unions and legally constituted associations, in addition to those
affected and always with their consent, shall also be entitled to appear
to defend the right to equal treatment for men and women, where the
primary objective of those bodies is the defence of equal treatment for
men and women in relation to their membership.

Representation and defence of the parties

Article 23
1. Proceedings before a single-judge court, the parties may choose to be
represented by a court procedural representative and shall, in any event,
be advised by legal counsel...When the parties choose to be represented by legal counsel, said counsel
shall be notified of the proceedings.
2. In proceedings before a bench of judges, the parties must be represented
by a court procedural representative and by advised by legal counsel.

Article 25
1. Applications for judicial review are admissible in connection with
provisions of a general nature and express and alleged acts of the public
administration ending the administrative procedure, be they final or nonfinal, provided the non-final provisions
 or acts in question decide directly or indirectly on the merits of the case, find it impossible to continue the
procedure, place legitimate rights or interests in a defenceless position or
do irreparable injury to legitimate rights or interests.

2. Applications for judicial review of administrative inaction and material
action taken by the administration ultra vires are also admissible in the
terms established herein.
Article 26
1. In addition to direct challenges to provisions of a general nature,
challenges may also be admitted against acts performed in application of
provisions of a general nature, claiming that such provisions are not lawful.

Article 27
1. When an administrative court has handed down a final ruling finding the
contents of the applied general provision illegal, the question of illegality
must be put to the court competent to conduct the direct judicial review of
the provision, save as provided for in the two paragraphs below.
2. When the single- or multi-judge bench competent to conduct the judicial
review of an act grounded on the invalidity of a general provision is also
competent to conduct the judicial review of the general provision, the ruling
shall declare the general provision valid or quash it.
3. Without the need to pose a question of illegality, the Supreme Court shall
quash any general provision when, at any stage in proceedings, it hears a
claim against an act on the grounds of the illegality of the general provision
in question.
Article 28
Petitions for judicial review shall not be admitted against acts that are a
reproduction of other, previous, definitive, final acts or against acts
confirming acts that have gained consent through not having been
challenged in due time and fashion.
Article 30
In cases of ultra vires action, the party concerned may file a demand for
cessation of said action with the acting administration. If the demand is not
lodged or is not heeded within ten days of submission, a claim for judicial
review may be presented directly.

Demands of the parties

Article 31
1. The applicant may seek to have acts and provisions amenable to
challenge under the preceding chapter declared unlawful and rendered
void or quashed, as applicable.
2. The applicant may also seek acknowledgement of a legal situation
specific to an individual and appropriate measures for full reinstatement of
that situation, inter alia, payment for damages.
Article 32
1. When an application is made for judicial review of administrative inaction
under Section 29, the applicant may seek to have the court sentence the
administration to discharge its obligations pursuant to the specific terms in
which those obligations are established.
2. If the object of the petition is a material action constituting ultra vires
action, the applicant may seek to have the action declared unlawful and
quashed and may seek the other measures provided for in Section 31.2
where appropriate.
Article 33
1. Courts in the administrative jurisdiction shall pass judgement within the
limit of the demands submitted to them by the parties and the grounds of
the claim and the opposition.
2. The single- or multi-judge bench shall notify the parties if, in handing
down their ruling, they feel that the question brought before them may have
been incorrectly described by the parties due to the apparent existence of
other potential grounds on which the claim or the opposition could have
been based. The single- or multi-judge bench shall so notify the parties in
the form of an order advising the parties that final judgement is pending,
stating the potential grounds the court feels have been overlooked and
granting the parties a shared ten-day period in which to submit such
arguments as they see fit. The period for giving judgement shall be
suspended meanwhile. No appeal may be made against the aforesaid order.

3. This same sequence shall be observed where certain precepts of a
general provision are directly challenged and the court feels it necessary
to extend the procedure to other connected or consequential precepts of
the same provision.

Joinder

Article 34
1. Claims presented in connection with the same act, provision or action
may be joined.
2. Claims referring to several acts, provisions or actions shall also be
joined when some claims are a reproduction, confirmation or execution of
others or some other direct connection exists between the claims.
Article 35
1. The plaintiff may include in the suit as many demands as meet the requirements
indicated in the preceding section.
2. If the court clerk finds joinder inappropriate, the clerk shall so inform the
court, which, if appropriate, shall order the party to file the claims separately
within thirty days. Should the party fail to do so, the judge shall deem that
claim in whose respect orders were not followed to have lapsed.

Article 40
1. The court clerk shall set the amount of claims for judicial review once
the written claim and written reply have been made, in which the parties
may state their opinion as to amount in the form of petitions after the
principal petition.
2. Otherwise the court clerk shall instruct the applicant to set the amount,
granting a period not in excess of ten days in which to do so. After this
period, should the applicant have failed to do as instructed, the court clerk
shall hear the applicant and thereafter decide accordingly.
3. When the defendant disagrees with the sum set by the applicant, the
defendant shall so state in writing within ten days. The court clerk shall
decide accordingly. In this case the court shall definitively settle the
question in its ruling.
4. The party aggrieved by the decision stipulated in the paragraph above
may submit a motion for admission of a denied appeal on the grounds that
the amount was not properly set, if the amount was cause for finding the
party’s appeal to the Supreme Court not properly prepared or not admitting
the party’s appeal to the Supreme Court for doctrine unification or the
party’s appeal to the next higher court.
Article 41
1. The amount of the claim for judicial review shall be determined by the
economic value of the applicant’s demand.
2. When there are several applicants, the economic value of the demand
presented by each shall be heeded instead of the sum of all applicants’
demands.

3. In joinders or extensions, the amount shall be determined by the sum of
the economic value of the demands of the claims joined or extended.
However, this shall not entitle demands for a lesser amount to the possibility
of appeal to the next higher court or to the Supreme Court.

Procedure in first or single instance

Sub-chapter 1. Preliminary proceedings

Article 43
When the administration that authored an act petitions for judicial review to
quash that act, it must have first declared the act injurious to the public
interest.
Article 44
1. In litigation between public administrations, claims for judicial review
may not be filed in administrative proceedings. Nevertheless, when one
administration files for judicial review against another, the former may
first instruct the latter to repeal the provision, annul or revoke the act,
cease or modify the material action or initiate the activity it is obligated to
perform....When the contracting administration, the contractor or third parties
endeavour file for judicial review of decisions taken by the administrative
bodies whose task it is to decide upon special appeals and complaints in
matters of contracting to which public sector contract legislation refers,
they shall file the claim directly and without the need for any demand or
administrative appeal.

2. The instructions must be addressed to the competent authority in
writing, giving grounds, specifying the provision, act, action or inaction.
The instructions must be issued within two months of the publication of
the rule or the time when the instructing administration gained or could
have gained knowledge of the act, action or inaction.

3. The instructions shall be held to have been rejected if the recipient fails
to reply within one month of receipt.

4. An exception is made for provisions of legislation on local government
concerning these matters.

Article 45
1. Claims for judicial review shall be initiated in a written application that
merely cites the provision, act, inaction or action constituting the challenged
ultra vires operation and petitions that the claim be held to have been filed,
save when this act provides otherwise.
2. This application shall be accompanied by:
a) The credentials of the person appearing on behalf of the party,
save where said credentials are attached to the proceedings for
another claim pending before the same court, in which case a certificate
may be requested, to be attached to the case records.
b) The document or documents accrediting the legal standing of the
plaintiff when that standing has been gained by inheritance or by any
other title.
c) The copy or transcript of the provision or express act at issue in the
application, or identification of the file to which the act belongs or the
official periodical in which the provision was published. If the object of
the application is administrative inaction or operation ultra vires,
mention shall be made of the authority or office to which the object is
attributed, the file in which the object originated and any other
particulars that might aid in sufficiently identifying the object of the
requested judicial review.
d) The document or documents accrediting compliance with the
requisites for taking legal action for legal persons under the applicable
rules or statutes, save where such accreditation is incorporated or
inserted as pertinent within the body of the application mentioned in
subparagraph a) above.
3. The court clerk shall examine ex officio the validity of the party’s
appearance as soon as the application has been submitted. If the court
clerk deems it valid, the clerk shall admit the claim. If the documents stated
in the paragraph above are not enclosed or the documents submitted are

incomplete, and generally whenever the court clerk deems that the
requisites set by this act for the party’s valid appearance are not met, the
clerk shall immediately instruct the claimant to remedy the failure, giving
the claimant a ten-day period in which to do so, failing which the court shall
declare the proceedings closed.
4. Claims against action harmful to the public interest shall be initiated in
the form of a suit lodged as per Section 56.1, which shall precisely stipulate
the person or persons sued and their central offices or domicile if known.
This suit shall be accompanied by all events by the declaration confirming
that the act is harmful to the public interest, the administrative file and, if
applicable, the documents in subparagraphs 2.a) and 2.d) of this section.

5. Claims for judicial review of a general provision, act, inaction or ultra
vires operation in which there are no interested third parties may also be
initiated by means of a suit in which the challenged provision, act or
conduct shall be specified and the grounds for its unlawfulness shall be
given. The suit shall be accompanied by the appropriate documents from
amongst those provided for in paragraph 2 of this section.

Article 46

1. The period for filing for judicial review shall be two months long, counting
from the day following the date of publication of the challenged provision
or notification or publication of the express act ending administrative
proceedings, if any. Otherwise the period shall be six months long and
shall be counted, for the applicant and other possible parties concerned,
as of the day following the date when the alleged act occurred according to
the rules specific to the alleged act.

2. In the events provided for in Section 29, the two months shall be counted
as of the day following the expiration of the periods indicated in the said
section.

3. The period for filing for judicial review of an ultra vires action shall be
ten days long, counting as of the day following the date when the period
established in Section 30 ends. Where there is no demand for cessation,
the period shall be twenty days long as of the date when the administrative
ultra vires action began.

4. The period for filing for judicial review shall be counted as of the day
following the date when notice is served of the express decision on the
optional appeal for administrative reversal or when the said appeal must
be held to have been presumed dismissed.

5. The period for filing for judicial review of action harmful to the public
interest shall be two months long, counting from the day following the date
of the declaration confirming that the act is harmful to the public interest.

6. In litigation amongst administrations, the period for filing for judicial
review shall be two months long, save where otherwise established by
law. When preceded by the instructions regulated in the first three
paragraphs of Section 44, the period shall be counted from the day
following the date when notice of an express resolution is received or the
instructions are presumed to be rejected.

article 47
1. Once the provisions of Section 45.3 have been complied with, on the
following working day, if requested by the claimant, the court clerk shall call
for the filing of the claim to be announced and shall forward the official
communication for publication by the competent authority (notwithstanding
payment of costs by the claimant) in the appropriate official periodical for
the territorial scope of competence of the authority committing the
administrative activity at issue in the claim. The court clerk may also call for
publication on an ex officio basis, should the clerk see fit.
2. If the claim is initiated by means of a suit under Section 45.5 and the suit
is filed against a general provision, the announcement of the filing of the
suit must be published. The announcement shall give fifteen days for
anyone having a legitimate interest in upholding the lawfulness of the
challenged provision, act or conduct to appear. After this period, the court
clerk shall serve notice of the suit and the documents thereto attached,
that a reply may be given first by the administration and subsequently by
any other defendants who have appeared.

Article 48
1. When issuing orders as provided for in paragraph 1 of the preceding
section, or by means of proceedings if publication is not necessary, the
court clerk shall instruct the administration to dispatch the administrative
file and order the administration to serve the summonses provided for in
Section 49. The file shall be demanded from the body that authored the
challenged provision or act or the body to which the inaction or ultra vires
operation is attributed. An authenticated copy of files processed in earlier
stages or phases of proceedings shall always be made before returning
the files to their office of origin.
2. The file shall not be requested in the case in paragraph 2 of the preceding
section, the competence granted in paragraph 5 of this section
notwithstanding.
3. The file must be dispatched within the non-extendable period of twenty
days, counting from the date when the letter from the court is entered in
the general register of the recipient authority. The judicial authority shall be
informed of the letter’s entry in the general register.
4. The original file or a copy thereof shall be sent in full, with its pages
numbered, authenticated where appropriate, accompanied by a table of
contents (likewise authenticated) listing the documents therein contained.
The administration shall always keep the original or an authenticated copy
of the files it sends. If the file is requested by several courts, the
administration shall dispatch authenticated copies of the original or of the
copy it has kept.
5. Where judicial review of the provision is initiated by means of a suit, the
court may call for the preparatory file, on an ex officio basis or at the
request of the plaintiff. Having received the file, the court clerk shall display
the file to the parties for five days, to enable them to formulate their
arguments.
6. Classified documents under official secrets legislation shall be removed
from the file under a grounded decision, and it shall be so stated on the
table of contents and at the spot in the file once held by the removed
documents.
7. Should the file submission period expire and the full file not have been
received, the instructions shall be reissued. If the file is not dispatched
within ten days counted as provided for in paragraph 3, responsibility shall
be traced and the court clerk shall serve an admonition personally giving a
period for entering arguments, after which the court shall fine the responsible
authority or employee a periodic penalty payment of between three hundred
and one thousand two hundred euros. The fine shall be repeated every
twenty days until instructions have been complied with.
Should there be good reason for it to be impossible to determine which
individual authority or employee is responsible, the administration shall be
held responsible, without prejudice to the possibility of passing the fine on
to the responsible party.
8. Court orders concerning files referred to in the paragraph above are
amenable to petitions for reconsideration in the terms set in Section 79.
9. Definitive fines not voluntarily paid shall be enforced by judicial means
of collection.
10. Should the first three periodic penalty payments be fined and the full
file not yet have been dispatched, the court shall so inform the Prosecution
Service, without prejudice of the possibility of continued fining. The
instructions whose neglect could give rise to the third periodic penalty
payment shall contain the appropriate admonition.

Sub-chapter 3. Summonsing of the defendants and admission of the claim
Article 49

1. Within five days of being taken, the decision to dispatch the file shall be
reported to all parties appearing as parties concerned in the file, citing
them to appear as defendants within the period of nine days. Service shall
be conducted under the provisions of the act regulating common
administrative procedure....In applications for judicial review of decisions taken by the administrative
bodies whose task it is to decide upon special appeals and complaints in
matters of contracting to which public sector contract legislation refers, any
persons other than the applicant who appeared in the administrative
appeal shall be summonsed as defendants and instructed to appear as
defendants within nine days.

2. When all notifications have been served, the file shall be sent to the court,
including proof of the summons or summonses served, save where they could
not be served within the period set for dispatching the file, in which case the
file shall be dispatched without delay and proof of summons shall be dispatched
when all summonses have been completed.

3. On receipt of the file, the court clerk shall ascertain whether all due
notices for service of summons have been given, in view of the result of
the administrative actions and the contents of the application and attached
documents. Should the clerk find the summonses incomplete, the clerk
shall order the administration to serve the summonses necessary to
ensure the defence of the interested parties who can be identified.

4. When it has proved impossible to serve a summons on an interested
party at the address of record, the court clerk shall order the appropriate
edict inserted into the official periodical for the territorial sphere of
competence of the authority that committed the administrative activity at
issue in the application. The persons summonsed through edicts may
appear up to the time when they must be officially notified to reply to the suit.

5. In the event provided for in Section 47.2, the terms of the said section
shall be observed.

6. Summonses of defendants in judicial review of action harmful to the
public interest shall be served in person within a nine-day period.

Article 50
1. The summons of the administration shall be deemed served through the
court’s petition for the file.
2. Public administrations shall be held to have appeared in proceedings
when they dispatch the file.
3. Legally summonsed defendants may appear in the proceedings within
the period granted. Should they do so later, they shall be deemed a party to
the unprecluded proceedings. Should they fail to appear correctly, the
procedure shall continue and it shall be out of order to serve any notifications
of any sort on them, in the courtroom or elsewhere.

Article 51
1. After examining the administrative file, the single-judge court or division
shall declare the application inadmissible when it unequivocally and
manifestly observes that:
a)	The court holds no jurisdiction or competence.
b)	The applicant holds no legal standing.
c) The application has been filed against an activity not amenable to
challenge.
d)	The period for filing applications has expired.

2. The single-judge court or division may refuse to admit the application
when other, substantially identical claims have been dismissed in final
ruling. In this latter case the refusal shall mention the dismissal decision or
decisions
3. When an ultra vires action is challenged, the single-judge court or
division may also refuse to admit the application if it were evident that the
administrative action was taken within the competence of and in conformity
with the rules of procedure established by law....Likewise, when failure by the administration to discharge the obligations
referred to in Section 29 is challenged, the application shall not be admitted
if it is evident the administration has no specific obligations with respect to
the applicants.
4. Before pronouncing judgement on nonadmission, the single-judge court
or division shall inform the parties of its grounds, whereupon the parties
shall have a shared ten-day period to argue as they see fit, enclosing any
documents that are in order.
5. The appeals provided for in this act may be filed against a nonadmission
order. An admission order is not amenable to appeal, but this shall not
preclude the presentation of any other grounds of inadmissibility at a later
time in proceedings.
6. When nonadmission is declared under paragraph 1. a) of this section,
the terms of Sections 5.3 and 7.3 shall be observed.

Sub-chapter 4. Claim and reply
Article 52
1. When the administrative file has been received by the court and the
summonses have been checked and where necessary completed, the
court clerk shall have the file delivered to the claimant for presentation of
the suit within twenty days, save in any of the events in Section 51, in
which case the clerk shall report to the court, which shall decide accordingly.
When the claimants are several, even if not acting under a single director,
the suit shall be lodged simultaneously by them all. The file delivered shall
be the original or a copy.
2. If the suit is not submitted in due time, the single-judge court or division,
acting ex officio, shall declare the suit lapsed. Nevertheless, the statement
of claim shall be admitted and shall have the proper legal effects if
submitted before the end of the day when notice of the order was served.

Article 54
1. When the suit has been filed, the court clerk shall serve the suit, including
delivery of the administrative file, on the defendant parties who have
appeared, giving them twenty days to reply. If the suit was filed without the
administrative file’s having been received, the court clerk shall summons
the defendant administration to reply, admonishing it that the reply shall
not be admitted unless accompanied by the said file.

2. If counsel for the defendant administration deems that the provision or
administrative action under judicial review may be unlawful, counsel for
the defence may petition for twenty days’ suspension of proceedings in
order to inform the defendant administration of counsel’s considered
opinion. The court clerk shall issue orders accordingly after hearing the
defendant.

3. The defendant administration shall be the first defendant to lodge its
reply. When other defendants apart from the administration are to reply,
they shall all lodge their replies simultaneously, even if not acting under a
single director. In this case it shall not be in order to deliver the administrative
file, which shall be put on display at the Judicial Office, but to deliver
instead a copy of the administrative file at these defendants’ expense.

4. If the defendant administration is a local entity and has failed to appear
in proceedings despite having been summonsed, the defendant
administration shall nevertheless be served with the suit and given a
period of twenty days in which to appoint a representative in court
proceedings or to inform the judicial authority in writing of the grounds on
which it deems the plaintiff’s demand undeserving

Article 55
1. If the parties deem that the administrative file is incomplete, they may,
within the period for filing their suit or reply, petition for the missing items to
be demanded.
2. The petition to which the paragraph above refers shall cause the period
at issue to be suspended.
3. The court clerk shall take the pertinent decision within three days. When
the administration re-dispatches the file, it must flag the added documents
in the table of contents to which Section 48.4 refers.

Article 56
1. In the statement of claim and the defendant’s reply, the findings of fact,
considerations of law and arguments presented shall be duly separated.
Such grounds as in order may be put forth to support the arguments
presented, regardless of whether such grounds have been laid before the
administration.
2. The court clerk shall conduct an ex officio examination of the suit and
instruct the claimant to correct any defects within a period not in excess
of ten days. After correction, the court clerk shall admit the suit. Otherwise
the court clerk shall report to the judge, who shall decide as to its
admission.
3. The parties shall enclose with their statement of claim or reply the
documents on which their right is directly grounded. If such documents are
not in the parties’ power, the parties shall name the file, office, records or
person in whose power the documents lie.
4. After the statement of claim and reply, the parties shall be allowed no
additional documents beyond those found in cases of civil action.
Nevertheless, before the parties are called to appear before the court or to
submit closing arguments the plaintiff may additionally submit documents
whose object is to upset arguments contained in the replies to the suit and
that highlight disagreement over the facts.

Article 57
The court clerk shall declare the lawsuit ready for judgement forthwith
save where the single- or multi-judge bench exercises the competence
conferred in Section 61 in the following events:
1st If, after the principal petition, the plaintiff petitions also for judgement
to be given without the need to admit evidence or to hold a hearing or
to submit closing arguments and the defendant does not oppose this
petition.
2nd If in the statement of claim and the defendant’s reply there is no
petition to admit evidence or to hold a hearing or to submit closing
arguments, save where the single- or multi-judge bench, under
exceptional circumstances, in view of the nature of the case, decides
in favour of a hearing or written closing arguments.
In the two events above, if the defendant petitions for nonadmission of the
claim, the plaintiff shall be served notice and given a five-day period in
which to lodge any arguments the plaintiff deems appropriate on the
possible cause of nonadmission, and the lawsuit shall be declared
concluded forthwith.

Sub-chapter 5. Preliminary pleas
Article 58
1. Within the first five days of the period for replying to the suit, the
defendants may plead such grounds as may show the court to lack
competence or the claim to be inadmissible under Section 69. Such
grounds, save that of lack of competence, may nonetheless be argued in
the reply, even if dismissed as a preliminary plea.
2. To make use of this proceeding, the defendant administration must
attach the administrative file if it has not forwarded the file already.

Article 59
1. The court clerk shall serve the prior pleas to the plaintiff, who shall have
five days in which to correct any defects.
2. When the service period has been completed, any incidental proceedings
scheduled shall follow.

3. A ruling dismissing preliminary pleas shall not be amenable to appeal
and shall order the defendant to reply to the suit within the period
remaining.
4. A ruling upholding preliminary pleas shall declare the claim for judicial
review inadmissible. Once the ruling is final, the court clerk shall order the
administrative file returned to its office of origin. If lack of jurisdiction or
competence is declared, the term set in Sections 5.3 and 7.3 shall be
observed.

Sub-chapter 6. Evidence
Article 60
1. Petitions for admission of evidence may be made only in the principal
petition, the defendant’s reply or complementary pleas. Such documents
must contain an orderly account of the points of fact to which the evidence
refers and the means of proof proposed.
2. If new facts of material relevance to the ruling on the case are revealed
by the defendant’s reply, the claimant may petition for the admission of
evidence and specify the means of proof proposed within five days of
service thereon of the defendant’s reply, without prejudice to the claimant’s
entitlement to exercise the right to furnish documents under paragraph 4
of Section 56
3. Evidence shall be admitted when there is disagreement upon facts that
are of importance for deciding the lawsuit in the court’s opinion. If the
object of judicial review is an administrative or disciplinary penalty,
evidence shall always be admitted where there is disagreement over the
facts.
4. Evidence shall be handled under the general rules established for civil
proceedings, and shall be examined within thirty days. Nevertheless,
evidence examined after that deadline for reasons not attributable to the
party submitting it may be considered.
5. Divisions may delegate all or any of the evidence presentation
proceedings to one of their justices or to a single-judge administrative
court, and the administration’s representative in the proceedings may in
turn delegate the authority to be party to the submission of evidence to a
civil servant of the administration.

6. At the giving of expert testimony, the judge shall, at the petition of any of
the parties, grant a period not in excess of five days for the parties to
request clarifications of the expert’s opinion.
7. In accordance with procedural laws, in those procedures in which the
plaintiff’s arguments claim the existence of actions that were discriminatory
by reason of sex, it shall fall to the defendant to prove that the measures
taken were non-discriminatory and proportional.
For the purposes of the provisions of the paragraph above, the court may,
at the request of a party, call for a report or opinion from the competent
public authorities, should the court feel it to be useful and pertinent.

Article 61
1. The single-or multi-judge bench may rule ex officio to admit evidence
and may order the submission of such evidence as the court deems
pertinent to ensure the wisdom of its decision.
2. When the evidence period has ended, until the lawsuit is declared ready
for judgement, the court may also rule to have any evidence proceedings
submitted that it deems necessary.
3. The parties shall be party to any evidence submitted under the two
paragraphs above.
4. If the single- or multi-judge bench makes use of the court’s authority to
call for evidence submission ex officio and the parties have no opportunity
to argue the point at the hearing or in their written closing arguments, the
court clerk shall inform the parties of the result of evidence submission.
The parties shall then have five days in which to argue as they see fit
about the scope and importance of the evidence.
5. The judge may decide ex officio, after hearing the parties, or else at the
request of the parties, to extend the effects of expert testimony to connected
procedures. For the application of the rules on court costs in connection with
the cost of such testimony, all parties to the action to which it has been decided
to extend the effects of the testimony shall be held to be parties, and the cost
of the testimony shall be prorated amongst the persons awarded the costs of
the said action.

Sub-chapter 7. Hearing and closing arguments
Article 62
1. Save where provided otherwise in this act, the parties may petition for a
hearing, for the submission of closing arguments or for the lawsuit to be
declared ready for judgement forthwith.
2. Said petition must be formulated after the principal petition in the statement
of claim or the defendant’s reply or made in writing and submitted within five
days of the date of notice of the ruling proceedings declaring the evidence
period concluded.
3. The court clerk shall issue orders accordingly when both parties submit
the same petition. Otherwise the court clerk shall only order a hearing or
the submission of closing arguments when the petition is made by the
plaintiff or, after the submission of evidence, when the petition is made by
either party. This shall be without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph
4 of Section 61.
4. If the parties have not lodged any petitions whatsoever, the judge or
court may, in exceptional circumstances, in view of the nature of the case,
rule to hold a hearing or to receive closing arguments.

Article 63
1. If a hearing is ordered, the court clerk shall schedule the hearing in strict
order of case seniority, with the exception of cases referring to matters that
must take preference due to lapse of offence or a grounded decision by
the court based on exceptional circumstances. When ready for judgement,
such preferential cases may be placed before those that have not yet been
scheduled. In scheduling hearings, the court clerk shall likewise heed the
criteria established in Section 182 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
2. At the hearing the parties shall be recognised in the proper order and
allowed to state their case succinctly. The judge or chief justice of the
division, in person or through the reporting justice, may invite counsel for
the defence of the parties, before or after the oral reports, to specify the
facts and to descend to particulars or to enter clarifications or rectifications
in order to define the object of debate.
3. The hearing shall be recorded on a medium fit for recording and
reproducing both sound and picture. The court clerk must take the
electronic document in which the recording is embodied into safekeeping.
The parties may request copies of the original recordings at their own cost.

4. Provided that the necessary technological means are available, the
court clerk shall guarantee the authenticity and completeness of anything
recorded or reproduced by applying thereto a recognised electronic
signature or other security system that offers similar guarantees under the
law. In this case the court clerk need not be present at the hearing, save
where the parties have so requested at least two days prior to the hearing,
or where the court clerk considers it necessary make an exception and
attend in view of the complexity of the case, the number and nature of the
items of evidence to be submitted, the number of parties, the possibility of
the occurrence of unrecordable incidents or the attendance of other equally
exceptional circumstances justifying the court clerk’s presence. In that
event the court clerk shall draw up a brief record pursuant to the paragraph
below.

5. If the mechanisms of guarantee provided for in the paragraph above cannot
be used, the court clerk must set down the following particulars in the record:
number and class of procedure; place and date; duration, persons in attendance;
pleas and arguments of the parties; decisions made by the single- or multijudge bench;
 likewise any circumstances and incidents that could not be
recorded on the regular medium. The recordings of the sessions shall be
attached to this record.

6. When the recording media provided for in this section cannot be used
for any reason, the court clerk shall draw up a record of each session,
stating therein with the necessary breadth and detail the pleas and
arguments of the parties, any incidents and complaints and the decisions
taken
7. The record provided for in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this section shall be
drawn up in computerised form. It may not be handwritten save on those
occasions when the courtroom where the proceedings are held has no
computer facilities. In these cases, at the conclusion of the session, the
court clerk shall read out the record, making therein such corrections as
demanded by the parties and considered fit by the clerk. This record shall
be signed by the court clerk after the judge or chief justice, the parties,
their representatives or counsel and any experts.

Article 64
1. When the court calls for closing arguments, the parties shall present
succinct arguments about the facts, the evidence submitted and the
considerations of law on which their demands are based.
2. The submission period shall be ten successive days for plaintiffs and
defendants, being simultaneous for each of these groups of parties if in either
group more than one person has appeared not acting together under a single
representative.
3. The day for voting and sentencing shall be scheduled in the order stated
in paragraph 1 of the preceding section.
4. When the hearing has been held or the closing arguments have been
submitted, the single- or multi-judge bench shall declare that the lawsuit is
ready for judgement, save where the single- or multi-judge bench makes
use of the authority referred to in paragraph 2 of Section 61, in which case
said declaration shall be made immediately after the conclusion of
evidence submission as ordered.

Article 65
1. Questions not brought up in the statement of claim or the defendant’s
reply cannot be introduced at the hearing or in the closing arguments.
2. When the single- or multi-judge bench sees fit to allow grounds relevant for
the judgement yet different from the grounds pleaded to be discussed at the
hearing or in the closing arguments, the single- or multi-judge bench shall
notify the parties by means of an order, giving them ten days to be heard on
this respect. This order shall not be amenable to appeal.
3. The plaintiff may petition at the hearing or in the closing arguments for
the ruling to contain a particular pronouncement upon the existence and
amount of damages for which compensation is sought, if the proved
damages are already a matter of record in the case.

Article 66
Direct claims for judicial review of general provisions shall take preference,
and once concluded they shall be voted upon and judged before any other
claims for judicial review, regardless of instance or stage, save for the
special process for the protection of fundamental rights.

Sub-chapter 8. Ruling
Article 67
1. The ruling shall be handed down within the period of ten days of the
lawsuit’s being declared ready for judgement and shall decide upon all
questions disputed in the proceedings
2. When the single- or multi-judge bench observes that the ruling cannot
be handed down within the set period, the single-or multi-judge bench
shall cite due grounds and shall schedule a specific later date on which to
give judgement, notifying the parties accordingly

Article 68
1. The ruling shall give one of the following judgements:
a)	Nonadmission of the claim for judicial review.
b)	Upholding or dismissal of the claim for judicial review.
2. The ruling shall moreover contain the appropriate award of costs.
Article 69
The ruling shall declare the claim or any of the causes of action inadmissible
in the following cases:
a)	Where the administrative court has no jurisdiction.
b)	Where the claim has been filed by a person who is incapable,
not duly represented or without legal standing.
c)	Where the object is provisions, acts or actions not amenable to
challenge.
d)	Where the claim concerns res judicata or the same case is pending
in another court.
e)	Where the initial statement of
fashion.

Article 70
1. The ruling shall dismiss the claim when the challenged provision, act or
action is lawful.

2. The ruling shall uphold the claim for judicial review when the provision,
action or act commits any legislative infraction, including détournement du
pouvoir.
“Détournement du pouvoir” is understood to be the exercise of
administrative powers for purposes other than those set by legislation.
Article 71
1. When the ruling upholds the claim for judicial review:
a) It shall declare the protested provision or act unlawful and quashed
in full or in part or shall order the challenged action stopped or modified.
b) If the claimant sought acknowledgement and reinstatement of a
legal situation specific to an individual, the ruling shall acknowledge
the said legal situation and take such measures as necessary for the
full reinstatement of the said legal situation.
c) If the measure consists in issuance of an act or performance of a
legally binding action, the ruling may set a period for compliance with
judgement.
d) If a demand for damages is upheld, the right to redress shall at all
events be declared, indicating likewise who is obligated to pay
compensation. The ruling shall also set the amount of the compensation
when asked expressly by the claimant to do so and sufficient proof is a
matter of case record. Otherwise the bases for determining the amount
shall be established and the definitive specification of the amount shall
be deferred until the judgement execution period.
2. Judicial authorities may not determine how the precepts of a provision
must be worded to replace quashed general provisions and may not
determine the discretionary contents of quashed acts.
Article 72
1. A ruling declaring a claim for judicial review inadmissible or dismissed
shall have effects amongst the parties only.
2. Quashing of a provision or act shall have effects for all persons affected.
Final rulings quashing a general provision shall have general effects as of
the date of publication of the judgement and the quashed precepts in the
same official periodical where the quashed provision was published. Final
rulings quashing an administrative act affecting an indeterminate multiple
number of persons shall also be published
3. Upholding of claims for acknowledgement and reinstatement of a legal
situation specific to an individual shall have effects amongst the parties
only. Nevertheless, such effects may be expanded to third parties in the
terms set in Sections 110 and 111
Article 73
Final rulings quashing a precept of a general provision shall not by
themselves affect the efficacy of final administrative acts or rulings applying
that precept before the quashing order takes general effect, save in the
case where the quashing of the precept means the exclusion or reduction
of penalties not yet fully executed.

Sub-chapter 9. Other modes of procedure termination
Article 74
1. The claimant may abandon the claim at any time prior to issuance of
judgement.
2. In order for abandonment by the representative in court to take effect, it
shall be necessary for the claimant to confirm abandonment or for the
representative to be authorised to abandon the claim. Should the public
administration abandon the proceedings, a certified copy of the resolution
made by the competent authority pursuant to the requirements set by the
pertinent laws or regulations must be submitted.
3. The court clerk shall notify the other parties, and in public interest claims
the clerk shall also notify the Prosecution Service. If after a five-day period
the parties and, where applicable, the Prosecution Service approve of the
abandonment or fail to oppose it, the court clerk shall hand down a decree
declaring the procedure terminated and ordering the case dismissed and
the administrative file returned to its office of origin.
4. In other events, or when damage to the public interest is observed, the
clerk shall report to the judge or court, which shall decide accordingly.
5. If the claimants are several, the procedure shall continue with respect to
those who have not abandoned the claim.

6. Abandonment shall not necessarily earn an award of costs.
7. When the claimant abandons the claim because the defendant
administration has fully recognised the claimant’s demands in administrative
proceedings, and afterwards the administration dictates a new act fully or
partially revoking the recognition, the plaintiff may ask that the procedure
be resumed as of its former state and extended to include the act of
revocation. If the single- or multi-judge bench sees fit, it shall grant the
parties a shared period of ten days in which to enter complementary pleas
concerning the revocation.
8. When a claim under appeal to the next higher court or to the Supreme
Court has been abandoned, the court clerk shall forthwith declare the
procedure terminated by decree, ordering the case dismissed and the
proceedings received from the court of origin returned.
Article 75
1. The defendants may accept the claimant’s demands, complying with the
requirements set in paragraph 2 of the preceding section.
2. When the defendants have accepted the claimant’s demands, the
single- or multi-judge bench shall forthwith hand down a ruling in agreement
with the claimant’s demands, save where that would be a clear violation of
law. In this latter case the judicial authority shall notify the parties of the
reasons why the parties may oppose the upholding of the demands and
give the parties a shared ten-day period in which they may petition to be
heard by the judicial authority. Subsequently the judicial authority shall rule
as it deems lawful.
3. If the defendants are several, the procedure shall continue with respect
to those that have not accepted the claimant’s demands.
Article 76
1. If, after a claim for judicial review is filed, the defendant administration
fully recognises the claimant’s demands in administrative proceedings,
any of the parties may so inform the single- or multi-judge bench when the
administration fails to do so.
2. The court clerk shall order a shared five-day period in which the parties
may petition to be heard by the court. After checking the parties’ allegations,
the single- or multi-judge bench shall hand down an order declaring the
procedure terminated and shall order the case dismissed and the
administrative file returned, if the recognition does not clearly violate the
law. Otherwise the court shall hand down a ruling according to law.
Article 77
1. When the trial deals with matters amenable to compromise, and
particularly when the trial concerns the estimating of sums, in proceedings
in first or single instance, after the suit and the reply thereto have been
lodged, the single- or multi-judge bench may, acting ex officio or at the
request of a party, submit to the parties for their consideration the
opportunity to acknowledge facts or documents, likewise the possibility of
reaching an agreement ending the controversy.
The representatives of the defendant public administrations shall need the
correct authorisation to engage in such transactions, under the rules
regulating the resolution of action by them.
2. Proceedings shall not be suspended during the conciliation attempt
save where all parties so request. The conciliation attempt may be made
at any time prior to the day when the lawsuit is declared ready for
judgement.
3. If the parties reach an agreement implying the disappearance of the
controversy, the single- or multi-judge bench shall hand down an order
declaring the procedure finished, provided that the agreement terms are
not manifestly unlawful or injurious to the public interest or third-party
interests.

Short procedure

Article 78
1. Single-judge administrative courts and single-judge central administrative
courts for judicial review utilise the short procedure to hear cases within
their competence arising over public administration personnel, foreign
citizens, non-admission of applications for political asylum, doping in sport,
and all matters involving sums of 30,000 euros or less.

2. Judicial review shall be initiated by filing suit, enclosing the document or
documents on which the plaintiff grounds his or her right and the documents
provided for in Section 45.2
3. After the suit is submitted, where the court clerk finds the court to hold
jurisdiction and objective competence, the clerk shall admit the claim.
Otherwise the clerk shall report to the court, which shall decide accordingly.
After the suit is admitted, the court clerk shall order notice served on the
defendant, summons the parties to a hearing at a fixed date and time and
instruct the defendant administration to dispatch the administrative file at
least fifteen days prior to the date for which the hearing is scheduled. In
scheduling hearings the clerk shall heed the criteria established in Section
182 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
That notwithstanding, if in the claim the claimant requests a ruling with no
need for evidence or hearing, the court clerk shall serve notice thereof on
the defendants to enable them to reply within twenty days, including
therein the admonishment referred to in Section 54, paragraph one. The
defendants may request a hearing within the first ten days of the term
allowed for responding to the claim. In such case, the court clerk shall
summons the parties to the hearing as laid down in the preceding
paragraph. Otherwise, the court clerk shall proceed as stipulated in Section
57, closing the case with no further formalities once a ruling has been
delivered, unless the judge exercises the powers attributed thereto under
Section 61.
4. After the administrative file is received, the court clerk shall send it to the
plaintiff and the interested parties who have appeared, to enable them to
submit arguments at the hearing.
5. After all or some of the parties have appeared, the judge shall declare
the hearing in session. If the parties fail to appear or if only the defendant appears, the single- or
multi-judge bench shall deem the plaintiff to have abandoned the claim for
judicial review and shall award costs to the plaintiff. If only the plaintiff
appears, the single- or multi-judge bench shall order the hearing to proceed
in the defendant’s absence.
6. The hearing shall begin with the claimant’s statement of the fundamental
points of the claimant’s requests or ratification of the statements made in
the statement of claim.

7. Forthwith the defendant may put to the court such arguments as in the
defendant’s best interest, commencing with any questions concerning
jurisdiction, objective and territorial competence and any other fact or
circumstance that may hinder the valid prosecution and conclusion of
the proceedings by means of a ruling on the merits of the case.

8. After the defendant has been heard on these questions, the judge shall
issue a decision. If the judge orders the trial to continue, the defendant may
ask to have the defence’s disagreement made a matter of record. The
claimant may do the same if the judge, in deciding upon any of the said
questions, should decline to allow the case to be heard by another singleor multi-judge court or deem that the
 claim for judicial review should be
declared inadmissible.

9. If in the arguments the defendant has challenged the suitability of the
procedure due to the amount at issue, the judge shall, before the
submission of evidence or the closing arguments, as the case may be,
urge the parties to reach an agreement on the point. If no agreement is
forthcoming, the judge shall decide and shall apply the appropriate
procedure for the amount that the judge has determined. The judge’s
decision shall not be amenable to appeal.

10. If the procedural questions to which the paragraphs above refer do
not arise, or if such questions arise and the judge decides to proceed
with the trial, the parties shall be allowed to speak in order to establish
clearly the facts on which their demands are based. If there is no
agreement on the facts, evidence shall be proposed. Once the evidence
that is not impertinent or pointless has been admitted, such evidence
shall be submitted forthwith.

11. When it is gathered from the parties’ arguments that all defendants
agree to the plaintiff’s demands, that the controversy is purely legal, that
no evidence is proposed or that all evidence proposed is inadmissible, and
that the parties do not wish to submit closing arguments, the judge shall
issue a formal observation in that sense, and if no party offers opposition
the judge shall hand down a ruling without further delay.
When opposition is offered, the judge shall decide. Where the judge
upholds the opposition, the hearing shall proceed as regulated in the
paragraphs below. Where the judge dismisses the opposition, this shall be
stated in the ruling handed down as provided for in the paragraph above
as a special pronouncement, before the judge decides upon the merits of
the case.

12. In short trials evidence shall be submitted in the same fashion as in
ordinary trials, insofar as not incompatible with the steps of the short trial.
13. Questions to be put when examining the parties shall be proposed
orally, without admitting written interrogatories.
14. Documents containing written questions and cross-questions shall not
be admitted for securing oral evidence. When the number of witnesses is
excessive and, in the view of the judicial authority, the witnesses’
statements may constitute pointless repetition of testimony concerning
matters that have been made sufficiently clear, the judicial authority may
limit the number of witnesses at its discretion.
15. There shall be no objection to witnesses. Only in the closing arguments
may the parties make observations with respect to witnesses’ personal
circumstances and the veracity of witnesses’ statements.
16. In the taking of expert testimony, the general rules on the selection of
experts by random drawing shall not be applicable.
17. Parties may appeal against the judge’s decisions to refuse evidence or
to admit evidence denounced as obtained in violation of fundamental
rights by filing a petition for reconsideration at once, to be substantiated
and decided upon forthwith.
18. Should the judge deem that there is some relevant evidence that
cannot be submitted at the hearing and no mala fides on the part of the
person burdened with furnishing the evidence is involved, the judge shall
suspend the hearing. The competent court clerk shall immediately
schedule the place, date and time for resuming the hearing without the
need to give further notice.
19. After the submission of any evidence and any closing arguments, and
after hearing legal counsel, the persons who are party to the case may, if
the judge pleases, give any oral statements they feel advisable for their
defence at the conclusion of the hearing, before the hearing is terminated.
20. The judge shall hand down a ruling within ten days of the hearing.

Appeals against procedural decisions

Article 79
1. Petitions for reconsideration may be filed against writs and orders not
amenable to appeal to a higher court or to the Supreme Court. Nevertheless
the challenged decision shall be put into effect save where the judicial
authority decides otherwise ex officio or at the request of a party.
2. Appeals for reversal are not admitted against decisions expressly
excepted from such appeals herein, nor against orders deciding upon
appeals for reversal or petitions for clarification of certain points.
3. Petitions for reconsideration shall be filed within five days counting from
the day following the date of notification of the challenged decision.
4. When the petition is filed in due time and fashion, the court clerk shall
serve copies of the document on the other parties, who shall have a shared
period of five days in which to challenge the petition should they see fit.
After the said period, the judicial authority shall decide by an order within
the third day.
Article 80
1. Orders handed down by single-judge administrative courts and singlejudge central administrative courts in 
proceedings heard in first instance in the following cases are open to appeal with devolutive effects:
a) Orders ending separate proceedings for precautionary measures.
b) Orders given in execution of judgement.
c) Orders declaring nonadmission of the claim for judicial review or
making the claim impossible to continue.
d) Orders given on the authorisations provided for in Section 8.5.
e) Orders given in application of Sections 83 and 84.

2. Appeals to the next higher court filed against orders handed down by
single-judge administrative courts and single-judge central administrative
courts in the events stated in Sections 110 and 111 shall be governed by
the same appeal admission rules as the ruling whose extension is sought.

3. Appeals to the next higher court concerning orders of single-judge
administrative courts and single-judge central administrative courts shall
be processed as established in section 2 of this chapter.
Sub-chapter 2. Ordinary appeals to the next higher court

Article 81

1. The rulings of single-judge administrative courts and single-judge central
administrative courts shall be amenable to appeals to the next higher
court, save where the following cases are concerned:

a) Cases involving sums of 30,000 euros or less.
b) Cases concerning election matters included in Section 8.4.

2. The following rulings shall always be amenable:

a) Rulings declaring the appeal inadmissible in the case in
subparagraph a) of the paragraph above.
b) Rulings handed down in the procedure for the protection of
fundamental personal rights.
c) Rulings deciding upon litigation amongst public administrations.
d) Rulings deciding upon indirect challenges to general provisions.
Article 82
Appeals to the next higher court may be filed by the persons who hold
legal standing under this act as plaintiff or defendant.
Article 83
1. Appeals to the next higher court are admissible with both devolutive and
suspensive effects, save where this act provides otherwise.

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of the paragraph above, the judge may
at any time, at the request of the interested party, take the pertinent
precautionary measures to ensure execution of the ruling, heeding the
criteria established in Chapter II of Title VI.
Article 84
1. The filing of an appeal to the next higher court shall not forestall
provisional execution of the challenged ruling.
The parties favoured by the ruling may request provisional execution.
When injury of any nature may stem from provisional execution, the
appropriate measures to avoid or palliate such injury may be taken.
Likewise a bond or some security may be demanded to cover liability. In
that event provisional execution may not take place until the bond or
measure is complete and accredited in the case records.

2. The bond shall be furnished as established in Section 133.2.
3. Provisional execution shall not be ordered when it may cause irreversible
situations or damage impossible to redress.
4. The parties shall have a shared five-day period in which they may
petition to be heard by the court. The judge shall decide on provisional
execution at the end of the following five days.
5. When the party requesting provisional execution is a public
administration, it shall be exempt from furnishing a bond.
Article 85
1. The notice of appeal shall be filed with the court that handed down the
ruling at issue, within fifteen days of the date of notice, in a well-reasoned
document that must contain the arguments on which the appeal is based.
If at the end of fifteen days no notice of appeal has been filed, the court
clerk shall declare the ruling final.
2. If the submitted notice meets the requirements set in the paragraph
above and refers to a ruling amenable to appeal, the court clerk shall hand
down a decision admitting the appeal, against which decision there can be
no appeal, and shall notify the other parties accordingly. The other parties
shall have the shared period of fifteen days in which to mount an opposition.
Otherwise, the court clerk shall inform the judge, who may, should the
judge see fit, deny admission by means of an order. Motions for admission
of the appeal thus denied may be filed and must be substantiated as
established in the Code of Civil Procedure.
3. In the notice of appeal and opposition thereto, the parties may ask for
the admission of evidence refused or not duly submitted in first instance
for reasons not attributable to the parties. In the proceedings to which
Section 23.3 refers, civil servants shall give in the said documents an
address for notifications in the venue of the competent administrative
division.
4. Where the defendant deems the appeal to have been unduly admitted,
the defendant must so state in the opposition. In that case the court clerk
shall notify the appellant of this argument, giving the appellant five days.
The defendant may also, in the same document, concur in the appeal,
reasoning the points on which the defendant believes the ruling is
injurious to the defendant. In that case the court clerk shall give notice of
the opposition to the appellant, allotting a ten-day period for the sole
purpose of opposing the defendant’s concurrence in the appeal.

5. After the periods to which paragraphs 2 and 4 above refer have ended,
the court shall refer the case records and the administrative file, in the
company of the documents filed, to the higher court, ordering the parties to
be summonsed to appear within thirty days before the competent
administrative division. That division shall decide on the disputed admission
of the appeal or evidence.

6. When the division deems the evidence to be in order, the parties shall
be summonsed to the submission of the evidence.

7. In the notice of appeal and opposition, the parties may ask the judicial
authority to schedule a hearing, to receive closing arguments or to declare
the lawsuit ready for judgement forthwith.

8. The court clerk shall decide if a hearing is to be held. If so, the court
clerk shall schedule the hearing or shall schedule the presentation of
closing arguments, if requested by all the parties or if evidence has been
submitted. When the hearing has been held or the closing arguments have been
submitted, the court clerk shall declare that the lawsuit is ready for
judgement.
9. The division shall hand down a ruling within ten days of the declaration
that the lawsuit is ready for judgement.
10. When the division revokes on appeal a challenged ruling declaring a
claim for judicial review inadmissible, the division shall rule upon the merits
of the case of judicial review at the same time.

Sub-chapter 3. Appeals to the Supreme Court
Article 866

1. Rulings passed at first instance by the Contentious-Administrative
Courts and those passed in single instance or on appeal by the
Contentious-Administrative Division of the High Court and the Contentious
Administrative Divisions of the Supreme Courts of Justice will be open to
an appeal for judicial review at the Contentious-Administrative Division of
the Supreme Court.
In the case of rulings passed in the first instance by the ContentiousAdministrative Courts, only sentences containing 
doctrine which is deemed
to be seriously damaging to general interest and which is liable to have an
extended effect may be appealed.
2. Rulings passed in proceedings protecting the fundamental right to meet
and contentious-electoral processes are excepted from the provisions of
the previous section.
3. Rulings that, being open to judicial review, have been passed by the
Contentious-administrative Division of the Supreme Courts of Justice will
only be open to appeal at the Contentious-administrative Division of the
Supreme Court if the appeal is based on an infringement of Spanish or
European Legislation which is a relevant and determining factor in the
judgment being challenged, as long as they have been appropriately
invoked in the proceedings or considered by the ruling Division.
Where the appeal is grounded on an infringement of legislation issued by
the Autonomous Community, jurisdiction will be held by a Section of the
Contentious-administrative Division that is based at the Supreme Court of
Justice made up of the President of that Division, the President or
Presidents of the other Contentious-administrative Divisions and, as
appropriate, the Sections within them, who may not be more than two in
number, and such Senior Judges of that Division, of Divisions, as may be
needed to make up a total of five members.
If the Contentious-administrative Division, or Divisions, has more than one
Section, the Governing Division of the Supreme Court of Justice will, for
each court year, establish sittings in accordance with which the Section
Presidents will occupy the posts as regulated in this section. This will also
be established for all the Senior Judges who serve the Division or Divisions.

4. Decisions of the Court of Auditors in matters of accounting liability will
be open to judicial review in the cases provided for in its Organisational
Act.

The preparatory writ must, in separate sections with headings expressing
what is contained in them:
a) Show compliance with the requirements for form in the time for
filing, legitimacy and the fact that the ruling being challenged can be
appealed.
b) Identify the legislation or jurisprudence considered to be infringed
precisely, justifying that they were referred to in the proceedings, or
taken into consideration by the Court in question, or that the latter
must have observed them even though they were not referred to.
c) If the infringement is in relation to legislation or jurisprudence relating
to procedural acts or guarantees that occurred without a defence,
proof that rectification of the Court’s misdemeanour or transgression
was requested at the time, if there was an appropriate procedural time
for this.
d) Justify that the alleged infringements were relevant and determining
factors in the decision taken in the ruling being appealed.
e) Justify, in the event that this was passed by the Contentiousadministrative Division of the Supreme Court of Justice, that the
allegedly infringed legislation falls within Spanish or European Union
Law.
f) In particular, grounds, with sole reference to the case, that one or
any of the cases exist that, in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of
the preceding article, provide an insight into the objective interest in
judicial review and the suitability of a ruling from the ContentiousAdministrative Division of the Supreme Court of Justice.

3. If the preparatory writ is not submitted with a period of thirty days, the
ruling or order will be final and will be declared as such in a decree from
the Court Clerk. A direct appeal for review, as regulated in article 102 a of
this Act, is the only remedy against this decision.

4. If, although submitted on time, it does not comply with the requirements
imposed in paragraph 2 of this article, a grounded order will take the
appeal for judicial review as not having been prepared, refusing to summon
the parties and remit to the Supreme Court. The only remedy against this
order is to lodge a complaint which will be in the form provided for in the
Civil Procedure Act.

5. If the requirements demanded in paragraph 2 are complied with, the
Division, in an order which will sufficiently reason its concurrence, will
accept the appeal for judicial review as prepared, summoning the parties
to appear within a period of thirty days before the Contentious-administrative
Division of the Supreme Court, along with referral to the latter of the original
orders and the case record. If it considers it appropriate, it will also issue a
succinct, grounded opinion on the objective interest of the appeal in
creating jurisprudence, which it will attach to the writ of referral.

6. The appellant may not lodge any kind of appeal against the order
declaring the appeal for judicial review as prepared, but may contest its
admission when appearing before the Supreme Court, if this is done within
the summons period.

Non-admission to proceedings of an appeal for judicial review will entail
an award for costs against the appellant, with this award being limited to a
part of them or a maximum amount.
Article 9112
1. Filing the appeal for judicial review will not prevent provisional execution
of the challenged ruling.
The parties favoured by the ruling may request provisional execution.
Where this may cause damages of any nature appropriate measures may
be agreed to prevent or palliate such damages. Likewise, a bond or
guarantee may be demanded to cover them. Provisional execution may
not take place until the bond or measure agreed is in place and accredited
on the case records.
2. The bond shall be furnished in accordance with the provisions of article
133.2 of this Act.
3. The Court of origin shall refuse provisional execution where this may
create irreversible situations or cause damages that are impossible to
redress.
4. When an appeal for judicial review is held to be prepared, the Court
Clerk shall make a certified copy of the case records and the decision
appealed against for the purposes provided for in this article.

Article 9213
1. Once the appeal is admitted, the Court Clerk for the Admissions Section
of the Contentious-Administrative Division of the Supreme Court will issue
a measure of organisation which will refer acts to the relevant Section of
that Division for processing and ruling and in which the appellant will be
advised that there is a thirty day deadline, from the date of notification, to
submit the writ lodging the appeal for judicial review to the Secretariat of
the relevant Section. During this period the procedural steps and case
records will be on display at the Court office.

2. If the deadline expires without submission of the notice of appeal, the
Court Clerk will declare the appeal lapsed and order the return of the
proceedings to the Division of origin. The only appeal that may be lodged
against this declaration is that provided for in article 102 a of this Act.

3. The notice of appeal must, in separate sections with headings expressing
what is contained in them:
a) Give a reasoned statement as to why the legislation or jurisprudence,
as identified in the preparatory writ, have been infringed, without
including others which were not considered at that time. An analysis
must be made of the Supreme Court judgments which, in the opinion
of the party, express such jurisprudence to justify their applicability to
the case; and
b) Specify the purpose of the claims made by the party and of the
rulings requested.
4. If the notice of appeal does not comply with the requirements of the
preceding paragraph, the Section of the contentious-administrative division
of the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to rule on the appeal will agree to
hear the appellant regarding the non-compliance detected and, without
further proceedings, will pass a ruling refusing to admit it if, after the
hearing, it is understood that the non-compliance was certain. This will
impose the costs arising on the party and such imposition may be limited
to some part of them or a maximum figure.
5. Otherwise, it will be agreed to send the notice of appeal to the party or
parties appealed against and in person so that they may oppose the
appeal within the common deadline of thirty days. During this period the
procedural steps and case records will be on display at the Court office.
The statement of opposition may not seek non-admission of the appeal.

6. Once the deadline has passed, whether or not statements of opposition
are submitted, the Section with jurisdiction to rule on the appeal, de oficio
or at the request of any of the parties made by additional requests in the
notice of appeal or statement of opposition, will agree a public hearing,
unless the nature of the matter makes this unnecessary in which case it
will declare that the appeal is concluded and awaiting voting and ruling.
The indication of the day that the hearing will be held or when the voting
and ruling will take place will respect the schedule which, giving priority to
appeals in order of receipt, has been established.

7. When the nature of the matter makes it necessary, the President of the
Contentious-administrative Division of the Supreme Court, de oficio or at
the request of the Senior Judges of the Section indicated above, it may be
agreed that public hearings or acts of voting and ruling take place before a
Plenary session of the Division.

8. The relevant Section, or Plenary session of the Division in the case
provided for in the preceding paragraph, will pass judgment within ten
days after deliberation on voting and ruling.

Procedure to ensure market unity:  Article 127 a30

1. Where the National Markets and Competition Commission considers
that any order, decision, act, inactivity or patently unlawful act of any public
authority is contrary to freedom of establishment or movement according
to the terms of Law 19/2013, on Ensuring Market Unity, it may bring the
contentious-administrative appeal regulated in this chapter.
2. The time limit for bringing a contentious-administrative appeal to ensure
market unity shall be two months in accordance with sections 1 to 3 of
article 46. Where the appeal is brought at the request of an economic
operator, the two-month time limit shall be calculated from when the
request is submitted to the National Markets and Competition Commission.
Article 127 b31
1. On the day that the appeal to ensure market unity is brought by the
National Markets and Competition Commission, or on the following day,
the clerk of the court shall urgently summons the relevant administrative
body, enclosing a copy of the application, to send the file containing the
reports and information requested in the appeal within five days of receiving
the summons, with an official warning in relation to the provisions of article
48.
2. Failure to send the administrative file within the time limit established in
the preceding section shall not hold up the proceedings.
3. The clerk of the court shall inform the applicant regarding the file and
other procedural steps, so that the applicant may within the wholly fixed
time limit of ten days give proper form to the claim and accompany it with
the appropriate documents. If the administrative file is received after the
claim has been drawn up, the parties shall be granted the additional
procedural step of pleadings.
4. Once the claim has been drawn up, the clerk of the court shall notify the
defendants, so that, on presentation of the file, they can submit their
statement of defence within the wholly fixed time limit of ten days and
accompany it with the documents they consider appropriate.
5. The procedural step relating to the statement of defence having been
completed, on the following day the court shall decide regarding the
interlocutory stage of proceedings in accordance with the general rules
laid down in this law and subject to the provisions of article 57. In no event
shall the time allocated to examining evidence exceed twenty days.

Title V: Special procedures

6. Once the proceedings have concluded, the court shall issue its decision
within five days. The decision must uphold the appeal where the order, act
or decision incurs any infringement of law that affects freedom of
establishment or movement, including the misuse of powers.
In accordance with the provisions of article 71, the decision upholding the
appeal must imply correction of the infringing conduct, as well as
compensation for any harm and loss, including lost earnings, caused by
that conduct.
In matters where there may be no subsequent appeal, the court may
summon the parties to appear in order to issue its decision orally, setting
out verbally the reasoning on which its decision is based, ruling on the
grounds for the appeal and the defence case and delivering its ruling, in
accordance with the provisions of articles 68 to 71.
Failure to appear by all or any of the parties shall not prevent the sentence
being issued orally.
As regards recording and documenting the appearance, the provisions of
article 63 shall apply.
Where the decision has been issued orally, the clerk of the court shall
issue a certificate containing all the pronouncements of the ruling,
expressly stating its final nature and the administrative act to which it
refers. The certificate shall be issued within five days with the parties being
notified.
The above certificate shall be recorded and added to the court’s record
book of decisions. The video recording of the appearance shall be
combined with the proceedings.
7. During the proceedings, any economic operator having a direct interest
in the contested decision, act or order being overturned and who has not
appealed against it independently may apply to take part as an appellant.
The operator’s application will be decided by means of an order, after a
hearing with the parties, within five days.
Where the operator is granted leave to take part, the proceedings shall not
begin again from the start, but the operator shall be considered a party to
the proceedings for all legal purposes and may defend the claims submitted
or those submitted by the operator himself, where procedure allows him
the opportunity to do so.
The operator may use the appropriate appeals against any decisions he
considers detrimental to his interests, even where the National Markets
and Competition Commission or other parties to the proceedings are in
agreement with them.
8. The contentious-administrative division of the national high court shall
allow any proceedings to be heard jointly with those brought by the
National Markets and Competition Commission where they are initiated by
an economic operator before that or any other court and are brought
against the same order or act and based on the infringement of freedom of
establishment or movement in accordance with the provisions of this law.

9. For all legal purposes, these appeals shall be handled has a matter of
priority.

10. As regards anything not provided for in this chapter, proceedings to ensure
market unity shall be governed by the general rules contained in this law.
Article 127 c32

1. The National Markets and Competition Commission may in its application
request the suspension of the contested order, act or decision, as well as
any other precautionary measure to ensure the decision is effective.

2. Where suspension of the contested order, act or decision is requested,
it shall occur automatically, once the appeal has been granted leave to
proceed and without requiring guarantees in relation to any kind of
detriment that may result. The administration whose act is the subject of
the appeal may apply for the suspension to be lifted within three months of
it being ordered, provided that it can prove that its continuance could result
in serious disruption to the general interest or those of a third-party, which
the court shall consider in detail.
Once the application has been submitted, the National Markets and
Competition Commission shall be notified so that, within ten days, it can
make appropriate submissions with a view to the continuance or lifting of
the suspension in light of the conflicting interests.
Once the above procedural step has been concluded, the court shall
decide what it considers appropriate by means of order within five days.
3. Applications for any other precautionary measure shall be handled as
provided for in Title VI, Chapter II.

Procedure for a court order extinguishing a political party

Article 127 d34
1. The procedure for a court order extinguishing a political party shall be
governed by the provisions of article 78, with the following special features:
a) The claim must specify which of the grounds contained in article 12
a. 1 of Organic Law 6/2002, of 27 June, on Political Parties, the
application for the court order extinguishing the party is based on.
b) The claim must be submitted within two months from the day
following the expiry of the time limit indicated in article 12 a. 2 of the
same law.
c)	Where the ruling orders the extinction of the party, the register shall
be notified so that the registration of the party can be cancelled.
2. The public prosecution service shall be a party to the proceedings.

Deadlines

Article 128
1. Deadlines may not be extended. Once they have expired, the appropriate
court clerk shall hold the right to have expired and the step in proceedings
not used to have been forfeited. Nevertheless, the appropriate document
hall be admitted and shall have its legal effects if it is submitted within the
day when notice of the decision is served, save where deadlines for
preparing or filing claims are concerned.
2. During the month of August, the deadline for filing for judicial review and
all other deadlines provided for in this act shall be prorogued, save for the
procedure for the protection of fundamental rights, wherein the month of
August shall be a working month.
3. In urgent cases or when the circumstances of the case make it
necessary, the parties may petition the judicial authority to declare nonworking days working days in the procedure 
for the protection of fundamental rights or in incidental proceedings for suspension or other
precautionary measures. The single- or multi-judge bench shall hear the
other parties and decide via court order within three days. The judicial
authority shall at all events declare as requested when refusal to do so may cause irreversible injury.

CHAPTER II
Precautionary measures

Article 129

1. The persons concerned may petition for precautionary measures to be
taken to ensure ruling efficacy at any stage in the process.

2. If a general provision is challenged and suspension of the legal force of
the challenged precepts is requested, the petition must be made in the
application for judicial review or the statement of claim.

Article 130

1. After a circumstantiated evaluation of all the conflicting interests, the
precautionary measure may be ordered only when execution of the act or
application of the provision may render judicial review moot.

2. The precautionary measure may be refused when serious disturbance
of general or third-party interests may ensue, which disturbance the singleor multi-judge bench shall weigh
 considering the circumstances.
Article 131
Incidental proceedings for precautionary measures shall be separate
proceedings. Hearing of the opposing party shall be ordered by the court
clerk within a period not exceeding ten days. A deciding order shall be
given within the following five days. If the defendant administration has not
yet appeared, the hearing shall be held with the agency that committed the
activity challenged.
Article 132
1. Precautionary measures shall remain in force until a final ruling is given
ending the procedure in which the measures were set, or until the said
procedure is terminated for any of the causes provided for in this act.
Nevertheless, precautionary measures may be modified or revoked during
the course of the procedure should the circumstances under which they
were taken change.
2. Precautionary measures may not be modified or revoked because of
progress made during the proceedings towards analysing the questions of
form or legal merits of the case being debated, nor because of modification
of the criteria the single- or multi-judge bench applied to evaluate the facts
in deciding upon the incidental proceedings for precautionary measures.
Article 133
1. When any injury of any nature may stem from a precautionary measure,
the appropriate measures to avoid or palliate the said injuries may be
taken. Likewise a bond or some security may be demanded to cover
liability.
2. The bond or security may be furnished in any fashion admitted by law.
The precautionary measure shall not be put into effect until the bond or
security is furnished and accredited in the case records or until there is a
record of compliance with the measures ordered to avoid or palliate the
injuries to which the paragraph above refers.
3. When the measure has been lifted by a ruling or for any other reason,
the administration, or the person claiming the right to redress for damages,
may apply for such redress to the same judicial authority through incidental
proceedings within the year following the date when the measure is lifted.
If no such petition is lodged within the said period, such petitions are
waived or the right is not proved, the security shall be released.
Article 134
1. The proper administrative body shall be notified of the order containing
the measure and shall issue orders for immediate compliance. The
provisions of Chapter IV of Title IV shall be applicable with the exception of
Section 104.2.
2. Any suspension of the validity of general provisions shall be published
pursuant to the provisions of Section 107.2. The same terms shall be
observed when the suspension refers to an administrative act affecting an
indeterminate number of different persons.
Article 135
1. When the parties allege the existence of especially urgent circumstances,
the single- or multi-judge bench may resolve as follows, without hearing
the opposing party.

Court costs

Article 13935
1. In the first or single instance, the court, when ruling or issuing an order
on appeals or incidents that were brought before it, costs will be imposed
on the party who has seen their claims dismissed unless it deems, and
reasons as such, that the case presented serious doubts on facts or on
legal principle.
Where claims are partially allowed or disallowed, each party shall pay the
costs associated with its actions and one half of any communal costs,
unless the court, on duly reasoned grounds, imposes costs on just one of
them on the basis that their action was taken, or their appeal lodged, in
bad faith or recklessly.

2. In appeals, costs will be awarded against the appellant if the appeal is
completely dismissed, unless the court, on duly reasoned grounds, finds
attendant circumstances justifying not making the award.

3. In an appeal for judicial review costs will be awarded in accordance with
the provisions of article 93.4.
4. An award for costs may be in full, partial or up to a maximum amount.
5. To exact costs awarded against private persons, the Administration to
which costs are owed will use enforced recovery proceedings where no
voluntary payment is forthcoming.
6. Costs will never be awarded against the Public Prosecution Service.
7. Costs of proceedings will be regulated and set in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Procedure Act.

Appeals against certain decisions, rulings and orders
The following are appealable:
1. Administrative decisions made by the Bank of Spain that are not
susceptible of ordinary appeal and rulings of the minister for economic
affairs to settle ordinary appeals against decisions of the Bank of Spain, as
well as orders made by the aforesaid entity, directly, in sole instance,
before the contentious-administrative division of the national high court, in
accordance with the provisions of Law 13/1994, of 1 June, on the autonomy
of the Bank of Spain.
2. Administrative decisions made by the National Securities Market
Commission that are not susceptible of ordinary appeal and rulings by the
minister for economic affairs to settle ordinary appeals against decisions
issued by the National Securities Market Commission, as well as orders
made by the aforesaid entity, directly, in sole instance, before the
contentious-administrative division of the national high court.
3. The rulings and decisions of the chairman and board of the National
Competition Commission (Comisión Nacional de la Competencia), directly,
in sole instance, before the contentious-administrative division of the
national high court.
4. The decisions of the arbitration board governed by Organic Law 3/1996,
of 27 December, partially amending Organic Law 8/1980, of 22 September,
on the funding of the autonomous regions, directly, in sole instance, before
the contentious-administrative division of the national high court.
5. The decisions and orders issued by the Spanish Data Protection Agency
(Agencia Española de Protección de Datos), National Markets and
Competition Commission, Economic and Social Council (Consejo
Económico y Social), Cervantes Institute, Nuclear Safety Council (Consejo
de Seguridad Nuclear), Universities Council (Consejo de Universidades)
and the Second Section of the Intellectual Property Commission, directly,
before the contentious-administrative division of the national high court.
6. Resolutions of the Ministry for the Economy and Competitiveness
resolving appeals against decisions of the Institute of Accountancy and
Paragraph 6 is added by final provision 3 of Law 22/2015, of 20 July.
Section 7 is repealed and section 5 is amended by the repealing provision and final provision 2,
respectively, of Law 3/2013, of 4 June.

DIFF:

• DCHO. DE DANOS [EG RESP.PATRIMONIAL DE LAS ADMIN.PUBLS]
• DCHO DE COMPETENCIA

CNMC = UK CMA

El Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad [= UK SOSBIS]

encargado de la propuesta y ejecución de la política del Gobierno en materia económica y de reformas para la mejora de la competitividad, de desarrollo industrial y de la pequeña y mediana empresa, de investigación científica, desarrollo tecnológico e innovación en todos los sectores, de política comercial y de apoyo a la empresa, así como del resto de competencias y atribuciones que le confiere el ordenamiento jurídico.

 Son órganos superiores del Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad:

• a) La Secretaría de Estado de Economía y Apoyo a la Empresa.
• b) La Secretaría de Estado de Comercio.
• c) La Secretaría de Estado de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación.

4. Dependen directamente del titular del departamento los siguientes órganos directivos:

• a) La Secretaría General de Industria y de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa, con rango de Subsecretaría.
• b) La Subsecretaría de Economía, Industria y Competitividad.

La Administración Pública como infractora de las normas de competencia¿Aplicación extensiva o racional?

• responsab. de la AP por favorecer la distorsión de la libre competencia

Ley 40/2015, de 1 de octubre, de Régimen Jurídico del Sector Público

La responsabilidad patrimonial de las APs

Arti­culo 32. Principios de la responsabilidad.

1. Los particulares tendrán derecho a ser indemnizados por las Administraciones
Públicas correspondientes, de toda lesión que sufran en cualquiera de sus bienes y
derechos, siempre que la lesión sea consecuencia del funcionamiento normal o anormal de
los servicios públicos salvo en los casos de fuerza mayor o de daños que el particular tenga
el deber jurídico de soportar de acuerdo con la Ley.
La anulación en vía administrativa o por el orden jurisdiccional contencioso administrativo
de los actos o disposiciones administrativas no presupone, por sí misma, derecho a la
indemnización.

2. En todo caso, el daño alegado habrá de ser efectivo, evaluable económicamente e
individualizado con relación a una persona o grupo de personas.

3. Asimismo, los particulares tendrán derecho a ser indemnizados por las
Administraciones Públicas de toda lesión que sufran en sus bienes y derechos como
consecuencia de la aplicación de actos legislativos de naturaleza no expropiatoria de
derechos que no tengan el deber jurídico de soportar cuando así se establezca en los
propios actos legislativos y en los términos que en ellos se especifiquen.
La responsabilidad del Estado legislador podrá surgir también en los siguientes
supuestos, siempre que concurran los requisitos previstos en los apartados anteriores:

a) Cuando los daños deriven de la aplicación de una norma con rango de ley declarada
inconstitucional, siempre que concurran los requisitos del apartado 4.
b) Cuando los daños deriven de la aplicación de una norma contraria al Derecho de la
Unión Europea, de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el apartado 5.

4. Si la lesión es consecuencia de la aplicación de una norma con rango de ley declarada
inconstitucional, procederá su indemnización cuando el particular haya obtenido, en
cualquier instancia, sentencia firme desestimatoria de un recurso contra la actuación
administrativa que ocasionó el daño, siempre que se hubiera alegado la inconstitucionalidad
posteriormente declarada.

5. Si la lesión es consecuencia de la aplicación de una norma declarada contraria al
Derecho de la Unión Europea, procederá su indemnización cuando el particular haya
obtenido, en cualquier instancia, sentencia firme desestimatoria de un recurso contra la
actuación administrativa que ocasionó el daño, siempre que se hubiera alegado la infracción
del Derecho de la Unión Europea posteriormente declarada. Asimismo, deberán cumplirse
todos los requisitos siguientes:
a) La norma ha de tener por objeto conferir derechos a los particulares.
b) El incumplimiento ha de estar suficientemente caracterizado.
c) Ha de existir una relación de causalidad directa entre el incumplimiento de la
obligación impuesta a la Ap responsable por el Derecho de la Unión Europea y el
daño sufrido por los particulares.

6. La sentencia que declare la inconstitucionalidad de la norma con rango de ley o
declare el carácter de norma contraria al Derecho de la Unión Europea producirá efectos
desde la fecha de su publicación en el «Boletín Oficial del Estado» o en el «Diario Oficial de
la Unión Europea», según el caso, salvo que en ella se establezca otra cosa.

7. La responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado por el funcionamiento de la Administración
de Justicia se regirá por la Ley Orgánica 6/1985, de 1 de julio, del Poder Judicial.

8. El Consejo de Ministros fijará el importe de las indemnizaciones que proceda abonar
cuando el Tribunal Constitucional haya declarado, a instancia de parte interesada, la
existencia de un funcionamiento anormal en la tramitación de los recursos de amparo o de
las cuestiones de inconstitucionalidad.
El procedimiento para fijar el importe de las indemnizaciones se tramitará por el
Ministerio de Justicia, con audiencia al Consejo de Estado.

9. Se seguirá el procedimiento previsto en la Ley de Procedimiento Administrativo
Común de las Administraciones Públicas para determinar la responsabilidad de las
Administraciones Públicas por los daños y perjuicios causados a terceros durante la
ejecución de contratos cuando sean consecuencia de una orden inmediata y directa de la
Administración o de los vicios del proyecto elaborado por ella misma sin perjuicio de las
especialidades que, en su caso establezca el Real Decreto Legislativo 3/2011, de 14 de
noviembre, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley de Contratos del Sector
Público.

Artículo 33. Responsabilidad concurrente de las Administraciones Públicas.
1. Cuando de la gestión dimanante de fórmulas conjuntas de actuación entre varias
Administraciones públicas se derive responsabilidad en los términos previstos en la presente
Ley, las Administraciones intervinientes responderán frente al particular, en todo caso, de
forma solidaria. El instrumento jurídico regulador de la actuación conjunta podrá determinar
la distribución de la responsabilidad entre las diferentes Administraciones públicas.

2. En otros supuestos de concurrencia de varias Administraciones en la producción del
daño, la responsabilidad se fijará para cada Administración atendiendo a los criterios de
competencia, interés público tutelado e intensidad de la intervención. La responsabilidad
será solidaria cuando no sea posible dicha determinación.

3. En los casos previstos en el apartado primero, la Ap competente para
incoar, instruir y resolver los procedimientos en los que exista una responsabilidad
concurrente de varias APs, será la fijada en los Estatutos o reglas de
la organización colegiada. En su defecto, la competencia vendrá atribuida a la
AP con mayor participación en la financiación del servicio.

4. Cuando se trate de procedimientos en materia de responsabilidad patrimonial, la
Ap competente a la que se refiere el apartado anterior, deberá consultar
a las restantes Aps implicadas para que, en el plazo de quince días, éstas
puedan exponer cuanto consideren procedente.

Artículo 34. Indemnizacion
1. Son indemnizables las lesiones producidas al particular provenientes de daños
que éste no tenga el deber jurídico de soportar de acuerdo con la Ley. No serán
indemnizables los daños que se deriven de hechos o circunstancias que no se hubiesen
podido prever o evitar según el estado de los conocimientos de la ciencia o de la técnica
existentes en el momento de producción de aquéllos, todo ello sin perjuicio de las
prestaciones asistenciales o económicas que las leyes puedan establecer para estos casos.
En los casos de responsabilidad patrimonial a los que se refiere los apartados 4 y 5 del
artículo 32, serán indemnizables los daños producidos en el plazo de los cinco años
anteriores a la fecha de la publicación de la sentencia que declare la inconstitucionalidad de
la norma con rango de ley o el carácter de norma contraria al Derecho de la Unión Europea,
salvo que la sentencia disponga otra cosa.

2. La indemnización se calculará con arreglo a los criterios de valoración establecidos en
la legislación fiscal, de expropiación forzosa y demás normas aplicables, ponderándose, en
su caso, las valoraciones predominantes en el mercado. En los casos de muerte o lesiones
corporales se podrá tomar como referencia la valoración incluida en los baremos de la
normativa vigente en materia de Seguros obligatorios y de la Seguridad Social.

3. La cuantía de la indemnizacion se calculará con referencia al día en que la lesión
efectivamente se produjo, sin perjuicio de su actualización a la fecha en que se ponga fin al
procedimiento de responsabilidad con arreglo al Índice de Garantía de la Competitividad,
fijado por el Instituto Nacional de Estadística, y de los intereses que procedan por demora en
el pago de la indemnización fijada, los cuales se exigirán con arreglo a lo establecido en la
Ley 47/2003, de 26 de noviembre, General Presupuestaria, o, en su caso, a las normas
presupuestarias de las Comunidades Autónomas.

4. La indemnización procedente podrá sustituirse por una compensación en especie o
ser abonada mediante pagos periódicos, cuando resulte más adecuado para lograr la
reparación debida y convenga al interés público, siempre que exista acuerdo con el
interesado.

Artículo 35. Responsabilidad de Derecho Privado 
Cuando las Administraciones Públicas actúen, directamente o a través de una entidad de
derecho privado, en relaciones de esta naturaleza, su responsabilidad se exigirá de
conformidad con lo previsto en los artículos 32 y siguientes, incluso cuando concurra con
sujetos de derecho privado o la responsabilidad se exija directamente a la entidad de
derecho privado a través de la cual actúe la Administración o a la entidad que cubra su
responsabilidad.

Sección 2.ª Responsabilidad de las autoridades y personal al servicio de las APS

Artículo 36. Exigencia de la responsabilidad patrimonial de las autoridades y personal al
servicio de las Administraciones Públicas.
1. Para hacer efectiva la responsabilidad patrimonial a que se refiere esta Ley, los
particulares exigirán directamente a la Administración Pública correspondiente las
indemnizaciones por los daños y perjuicios causados por las autoridades y personal a su
servicio.
2. La Administración correspondiente, cuando hubiere indemnizado a los lesionados,
exigirá de oficio en vía administrativa de sus autoridades y demás personal a su servicio la
responsabilidad en que hubieran incurrido por dolo, o culpa o negligencia graves, previa
instrucción del correspondiente procedimiento.
Para la exigencia de dicha responsabilidad y, en su caso, para su cuantificación, se
ponderarán, entre otros, los siguientes criterios: el resultado dañoso producido, el grado de
culpabilidad, la responsabilidad profesional del personal al servicio de las Administraciones
públicas y su relación con la producción del resultado dañoso.
3. Asimismo, la Administración instruirá igual procedimiento a las autoridades y demás
personal a su servicio por los daños y perjuicios causados en sus bienes o derechos cuando
hubiera concurrido dolo, o culpa o negligencia graves.

4. El procedimiento para la exigencia de la responsabilidad al que se refieren los
apartados 2 y 3, se sustanciará conforme a lo dispuesto en la Ley de Procedimiento
Administrativo Común de las Administraciones Públicas y se iniciará por acuerdo del órgano
competente que se notificará a los interesados y que constará, al menos, de los siguientes
trámites:

a) Alegaciones durante un plazo de quince días.
b) Práctica de las pruebas admitidas y cualesquiera otras que el órgano competente
estime oportunas durante un plazo de quince días.
c) Audiencia durante un plazo de diez días.
d) Formulación de la propuesta de resolución en un plazo de cinco días a contar desde la
finalización del trámite de audiencia.
e) Resolución por el órgano competente en el plazo de cinco días.

5. La resolución declaratoria de responsabilidad pondrá fin a la vía administrativa.

6. Lo dispuesto en los apartados anteriores, se entenderá sin perjuicio de pasar, si
procede, el tanto de culpa a los Tribunales competentes.

Artículo 37. Responsabilidad penal.
1. La responsabilidad penal del personal al servicio de las Administraciones Públicas, así
como la responsabilidad civil derivada del delito se exigirá de acuerdo con lo previsto en la
legislación correspondiente.
2. La exigencia de responsabilidad penal del personal al servicio de las Administraciones
Públicas no suspenderá los procedimientos de reconocimiento de responsabilidad
patrimonial que se instruyan, salvo que la determinación de los hechos en el orden
jurisdiccional penal sea necesaria para la fijación de la responsabilidad patrimonial.

Vox ha presentado este viernes ante el Tribunal Supremo una querella contra el presidente del Gobierno, Pedro Sánchez, y todos los miembros de la denominada mesa de diálogo con Catalunya por presuntos delitos de conspiración para la rebelión, sedición, prevaricación y malversación de caudales públicos.

el sistema español de responsabilidad penal de persona jurídica es una responsabilidad por hecho propio ( STS 154/2016, de 29 de febrero y 221/2016, de 16 de marzo); acumulativa o dual; directa y restringido, pues únicamente puede exigirse responsabilidad penal a una persona jurídica respecto de aquellos delitos en que expresamente así se haya previsto en las disposiciones del Libro II del Código Penal, estándose ante un sistema de númerus clausus.

La responsabilidad penal directa del artículo 31 bis CP puede exigirse aunque el autor material persona física concreta responsable no haya sido individualizada o no haya sido posible dirigir el procedimiento contra ella (artículo 31 ter CP).

VOX se ha querellado contra la representante electoral de VOX en Tenerife, por los delitos de administración desleal, contemplado en el artículo 252 CP; delito electoral, artículo 139.1 de la LOREG; y delito con ocasión de impedir el ejercicio de derecho cívicos reconocidos por la Constitución y las leyes del artículo 542 del Código Penal.

esta mujer oculto que cuatro candidatos habían renunciado a ir en listas, por acta notarial. De hecho, no se comunicó a la Junta Electoral hasta media hora antes de que acabara el plazo legal. Es por ello que la formación a la que Rodríguez representaba no tuvo tiempo de reaccionar.

Si bien VOX envió los argumentos necesarios a la Junta Electoral, así como una candidatura alternativa, que no fue aceptada; y la Fiscalía ha reconocido que Rodríguez se extralimitó en sus funciones y vulneró con fraude el derecho de participación de VoX, el TC decidió, una vez más, desentenderse del asunto; en un nuevo destrozo a la Justicia, porque  la acción de Rodríguez ha causado un perjuicio a un candidato y a la formación, que se concreta en no poder concurrir al proceso electoral con vulneración de derechos fundamentales de ambos, y del derecho a la participación política. Y es que sin la participación de la representante electoral, no hubiera sido posible conseguir el objetivo: boicotear la candidatura de VOX

PPS FINANCING AND REGISTRATION.   LIST/DATABASE OF PPS IN SPAIN.

PROCEDURE FOR GRANTS AND AID PROCESSED BY THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

                                                      PSYCHOLOGY / MENTE DEL ESTADO Y MENTE DE SUS INDIVIDUOS

the lower the functional connectivity between the thalamus and precuneus, the stronger the relationship between the thalamus 
and a belief in communism. 

this study examined whether individual differences in the belief of participants in communism 
were associated with ToM abilities*

*ToM is the ability to infer and understand another's mental state (the beliefs, 
thoughts, intentions and feelings of another),
 and use this information to explain and predict human behavior

-At the behavioral level, we found a belief in communism to be significantly correlated with ToM abilities.

<> COCOO: BELIEVE IN COMMUNISM (BIC) IS THE UNCONSCIOUS OBSESION WITH HUMAN BEHAVIOUR, 
THAT INVOLVES THE UNCONSCIOUS CHANNELING OF INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THEIR  EMPATHY TOWARD OTHERS,
 , IN ORDER TO CONSCIOUSLY JUSTIFY,  EXPLAIN AND, EVEN PREDICT, HUMAN BEHAVIOUR

.SOCIALISTS USE THEIR [EMPATHY=JESUS] AS A FARMER , SEMI-UNCONSCOUSLY, GIVES LIFE TO A LAMB[EMPATHY=JESUS] 
AND RAISE IT..ONLY...
TO LATER KILL IT/EAT IT/TREASON IT...TO OBTAIN PROFIT/INFORMATION, THAT PROFITS THEM BECAUSE IS USED TO
SATISFY THEIR SUBSCIONSCIOUS OBSESSION WITH HUMAN BEHAVIOURS, AND THEIR DESIRE TO MOLD IT TO MATCH THEIR BIC..
BECAUSE THE SOCIALIST BECOMES A JONKIE ADDICTED TO INFORMATION, AS IT TRANSLATES INTO PROFIT...THE PROFIT COMES
 FROM THEIR 
CONSCIOUS MANIPULATION OF THEIR VICTIM [THE INDIVIDUAL/ORG/NATION/MINISTRY ETC], WHOSE INFORMATION HAS BEEN
 'EMPATHYCALLY'EXTRACTED' = EE
BY THE SOCIALIST, IN ORDER TO BRAINWASH HIS VICTIMS, AND ACHIEVE POWER OVER THEM

<> THE SACRIFICE OF THE SON OF GOD [SINLESS LAMB] = JEWS NOT USING THEIR EMPATHY AS A SOURCE OF SELFLESSNESS, 
BUT INSTEAD AS A SOURCE OF GREEDENESS. THUS, THEY TREASON EMPATHY[JESUS], LIKE JUDAS, MILKING EMPATHY FOR
 INFORMATION, 
TO KILL EMPATHY ONCE AND FOR ALL...SO THAT NO MORE GODS CAN TELL THE STATE WHAT TO DO...
- COMUNISM'S OVERARCHING GOAL, IS EMPATHY....BUT ....NOT GRATIOUSLY OUT OF GOODNESS.....INSTEAD, COMUNISTS ONLY
 GIVE LIFE AND
 THEIR LAMB[EMPATHY]
CHOOSE TO SACRIFICE OF THE LAMB[EMPATHY], AS THEY TREASON THE LAMB, 
, INNOCENT OF ALL SIN, 

-DEMOCRACY'S OVERARCHING GOAL IS FREEDOM OF MARKET, INDIVIDUALITY, SPEECH, ETC

NOW WE CAN UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOCIALISTS, HAVE A DIFFERENT CONCEPT OF FREEDOM, EQUALITY, ...
 THEY FOLLOW ONLY IMMEDIATE
AND PERMANENT POWER AND CASH, FOR A MINORITY OF PEOPLE IN POWER...= LA DICTADURA DEL PROLETARIADO 

Apathy and the Birth of Democracy: The Polish Struggle

Apathy

from the Greek words meaning "without feeling," =

political apathy is revealed
by attitudes and an absence of expected activity. When people cease to care
about political life, withdraw from obligations to civil society, and perform
entirely nominal or rote acts-or none at all-in political institutions or
organizations, apathy is indicated.

IN SOCIALIST NATIONS, seventy percent of the respondents
asserted that they could not understand what was happening in politics. 
disaffection with socialism, is not, itself, either apathy or dissent, but is the raw
material out of which nothing good (from a nondemocratic regime's
standpoint) would develop. 

authoritarian systems including Communist ones are likely to prefer apathy as the
immediate consequence of disaffection; apathy connotes less of an imminent
threat to political stability.
autocrats like sanchez, to promote apathy, use coercion (arrest, incarceration, or exile of dissidents) and
covert penetration of intellectual, artistic, labor
 

WRON attempted to deflect workers from political activity,
promising an improvement in the economy and attempting to buy off certain
strategically located groups such as coal miners with large wage increases
and expanded fringe benefits. From the regime's point of view, political
apathy was better than political opposition.
Such an "anti-involvement" tendency is a source of worry for the post-Communist government. 

socialist Citizens feel more like observers than insiders in the political
process, despite the introduction of representative institutions. 
the People Delegate authority to the government, Solidarity leadership, and the Catholic 
church hierarchy, 

socialist citizens suffer sheer fatigue and depression. 
but the Socialist tactic of promoting Apathy ,backfired, for the political apathy
meant that no one any longer cared enough to seek solutions to
Poland's crises

now, postcomunist poland society is still passive, apathetic 
that will need to gradually awaken.. To muster up enough energy to see beyond
immediate self-oriented familial goals, thus creating common good [wpi]

<> cocoo: the main enemy of wpi/clp etc, is socialisms' blindness to anything other
 than self-oriented familiar goals....postcom poland is gradually starting to see again.

DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION
PSYCHIATRY AS A TOOL FOR COERCION/REPRESSION IN POST-SOVIET COUNTRIES

During the 1960-1980s in the USSR, psychiatry was turned into a tool of repression. Soviet
psychiatry was cut off from world psychiatry and developed its own - highly institutional
and biologically oriented, providing â scientific justification for
declaring dissidents mentally ill. Since the collapse of the USSR there have been frequent
reports of persons hospitalized for non-medical reasons

Many conditions which would probably be
diagnosed elsewhere as depressive disorders, anxiety disorders, hypochondriacal or personality
disorders. were diagnosed instead as slowly progressive schizophrenia

Socialism & feminism, the terrible twins

The charity done in humility, “Letting not the left hand know what the right hand doeth,” has been turned by Socialism into a vainglorious way of endowments from rich corporations/individuals /csis….The modest love of God and man, has been displaced by egotistical feminists leading a malicious net of charities whose only true goal is to crush all efforts to relieve suffering, hunger and distress by
personal contact and independent giving.

When a citizen gives to a charity , the charity keeps most of the money. Moreover, Charities prevent the citizends from the brotherly direct contact with the poor.

The trusts [redes corruptas disenadas para esconder el dinero del crimen/corr, y para la globalizacion del mundo], consolidating many industries into one, displaced many workers and reduced the relative wages, while increasing the cost of living. The man of the family being unable to make a living for the entire family, women were forced into work outside the home, and the ties of home became weakened…With these home ties weakened, idealism decreases and humanity, instead of looking upward for an ideal state, look downward to the earth on material things only…Socialistic conceptions of only the material, eliminating the spiritual good, and Feminism arose in the place of womanhood and motherliness. Feminism is a twin sister of Socialism, and has all its “unmoral” principles. Feminism proposes the financial, industrial and domestic independence of women from men.

There must be a revulsion from this condition, or else the world will be chaotic.

Socialism proposes to reduce the individuality of the citizen,his free will, and to prevent him from owning private property, so that he becomes entirely dependent on the Socialistic State, who false promises, in turn, to feed him up. The dominant note in Socialism, Feminism is the escaping of labor and of the duties of motherhood,  as a consequence of the disobedience of Adam and Eve….Socialism and its twin, Femisim, are 2 evil spirits that have in common materialistic infidelity, and their common motto is, “No God, no Master.”

Socialism stands for revolution, denying that reform is possible: The existing conditions, industrial, financial, religious and economic, are objected to by Socialists who declare that these conditions must all be absolutely annihilated, and not subject to reform

Socialism is based on the false premise Evolution is contradictory to God, and therefore that there is no life after the death of flesh, consequently there will be no afterlife consequences for being evil…That God being non-existent could never have given man any moral laws…socialism is atheistic, not having any definite morals or ethical principlesin Socialism, the Ten Commandments are null and void, there is no such thing as natural rights or moral law, and this nullifies the doctrine of the Declaration of Independence/ CE, that men have the inalienable right to life [EG SOCIALISM ADVOCATES FOR ABORTION, WHICH IS THE MOST COWARD FORM OF MURDER], property, liberty and the pursuit of happiness…[NO SON LIBERTARIOS, SINO LIBERTICIDAS]

It is an enemy of private property and of the family. It is disloyal to all forms of government, except that it advocates: —an international co-operation of all men in all conditions / globalisation

<> cocoo: socialism’s globalisation would be the main source of man-made climate change, if it existed…but there is no scientific evidence for this… the 2030 agendas are a new tool used by Socialists to further destroy the economies of the nations, to design ever larger pockets of poverty, so that they can keep getting their votes in exchange for more crumps that they drop from their banquets table, to the purportedly impoverished populations that lay under, thanking them for forever providing for them.

The principles of Socialism are uncharitable in that they desire to abolish all forms of true charity, and of private
hospitals, by holding that charity or private hospitals, originate from the unequal distribution of
wealth, which is robbery, [<> cocoo: rather than the fruits of free competition = evolution]…Therefore, hospitals, as benevolent institutions, have never been erected under Socialism anywhere in the world.

<> COCOO:

Socialism tries to makes us believe that Evolution and God are incompatible. Socialists are unable to feel the spirit of God, because their hearts are hardened by the absence of the spirit of God in them. Satan blindfolds them so they cannot realise that evolution is the way God expresses Himself, and unable to know that, when a less fit individual perishes, is because it is His Will, and that death only exists from our limited frame of reference, there is no death not from His frame of reference, nor from the frame of reference of those flesh perished on Earth.

Socialism says that humans should not be ruled, as animals, by SOF [Survival of the Fittest ] and selfappoints itself as the saviour of the less fit, while acusing the Capitalist system as being a cruel system based on the SOF ….this argument is false: Socialism confuses free competition with [perfect competition = SOF], and therefore decides to fully advocate for the polar opposite to Free competition, ie, for a monopoly of the state…..The Truth is that Capitalism does NOT defend [SOF=Perfect Competition], because Perfect Competition has been proven to destroy as much EW/WPI, as monopolies do….Capitalism only defends free competition, and accepts that some Regulations are needed to prevent the abuse of a few over the People. But these limitations on free competition must be few, so as not to suffocate free competition.  It has been proven, throughout history, that free competition generates both EW and WPI. Instead, Socialism has been proven to consistently destroy EW/WPI.  As Free Competition multiplies EW/WPI, it is then able to offer Societies with a wealthy Welfare State that all citizens enjoy, thus protecting the less fit from extinction [as in evolution]. Instead, Socialism, wanting from the outset to protect and integrate with equality the less fit, destroys EW/WPI, which brings about the gradual extinction of the fit, and the liberties of all.

the bible says: The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God…The Socialist says, “Live your own life, get pleasure; there is no future accountability.”

Socialism makes two demands:

a. the “Immediate Demand = SOCIALISM,”:

the public ownership of waterworks, telegraphs, railroads and other like utilities, and are not essentially Socialistic, for any voter or any party may advocate such measures without being Socialistic….But these state owned institutions (mail, telephone, telegraph, railroad services) are not Socialistic institutions, as is eroneously assumed. The institutions are exploited by the state, according to the
same capitalistic principles as if they were privately owned. Neither the officials or the workmen
are particularly benefitted by them. The state does not treat them differently from a private
employer. …. These are not Socialists, but capitalistic actions…But the Socialist leaders deceive the People, making them believe that these are socialist actions, for brainwashing them into the doctrines of International Socialism

b. the “Ultimate Demand = COMUNISM:

The “Ultimate Demand” of Socialism is that all means of production: [lands, mines, forests, and the
tools of production], and the means of distribution, shall be owned by the Social State. That all people
shall be employed by the state, clothed by the state and fed by the state.
Under Socialism there would be no choice of work and the worker could do nothing but the labor
assigned to him by the Governing Committee. There would be no private property or capital. The
family as now known would cease to exist—for all buildings would be common property, and
families could remain in one house only so long as permitted by the Governing Committee.
Leading Socialists have demanded the abolition of the family, falsely decrying it as the root of
capitalism, saying that, so long as husband and wife formed families with children, they had the motive
to accumulate property or “capital,”.  Another false reason given to destroy the family is that so long as a wife is dependent on a husband for support, she is a “sex slave” and cannot leave him at her will and be sexually or economically free.
To abolish this “slavery” they propose to make all women “economically free;” that is, that the
Socialist State shall furnish all women with work independent from the home, and have her
recompense separate and apart from the control of the husband.
To this end they propose state nurseries for the infants, where the baby will get Socialistic state milk
in a Socialistic state bottle, administered by a state nurse. All this is done to liberate the mother
from “sex slavery,” that she may not depend on the father of her child for support. This is done to
destroy the “family,” which is, in the Socialists’ view, an institution established by religion to promote
capitalism

Diff:  democracy / socialism:

• socialism: minorities have NO rights which the (ruling) majority are bound to respect, because what is wrong for an individual to do, is NOT wrong for a majority to do …Socialistic methods are those of the thief : They claim that confiscation of private property by the authority of a majority is right, but when done by an individual it is wrong.Socialism destroys free will (with no right to vote) in favour of the collective social will, turns citizens into animals/slaves…under Socialism, the state owning an controlling all the natural resources, all the means of transportation, the entire educational system, and being the dictator and underpayer of compensation to all individuals, making citizens absolutely dependent on the state, without any personal ability to obtain raw materials with which to labor for himself, or not being able to find any market for any product which he possibly might manufacture

• democracy: minorities have rights which the (ruling) majority are bound to respect, because what is wrong for an individual to do, is also wrong for a majority to do 

 SOCIALISM AND SCIENCE

A/ NEWTON’S clockwork universe of “matter and motion.”= the future can be calculated,if we had all possible info…  Einstein’s Relativity goes even further in this line: ‘all possible futures already preexist. therefore, free will is an illusion created by evolution….thus, citizens are not morally responsible for wrongdoings, but should be civilly and criminally liable and,  kept in jail, because:

a/to prevent further risk to society 

b/the prosecutors may also argue that they also lack free will not to incarcerate the wrongdoers, or to praise the gooddoers

c/ to prevent a person/gob from changing morality [eg from moral to immoral , or viceversa]. eg. Sanchez.

B/ quantum mechanics:  2 main interpretations:

a. copenhagen interpretation:  not even the universe knows what’s gonna do next. …thus, the future does not exist, but is constantly improvised by God/universe….not by us…there is no free will.

b. many worlds interpretation: the reason why all experiments tell us that not even the universe knows what’s gonna do next, is because our frame of reference is limited to perceiving this Universe only… access to that information is impossible (thanks to the limitation imposed by the speed of light, we cannot calculate the future, thus the universe/God has so designed/evolved the speed of light in order to protect Himslef from having to constantly branch itself into even further numbers of parallel histories…imagine, i could calculate my future, so i can change it…it would force the universe to branch into 2 new universes, and so on…)…..The many worlds interpretation of QM, states that there are indeed many parallel universes constantly branching from one another (but not due to our Will to change a future that we have calculated)…Instead, God/Multiverse’s frame of reference (located within the Light …such an infinite FOR is possible because, within light, there is obviously speed of light, which is Eternal Time relative to our time), is the perception of all possible, past, present and future, universes at once. From this overarching frame of reference, there is total certainty of what each individual universe will do next…since, they all are interconnected, and so there is a balance of events between all universes….Therefore, the calculation of the future is only possible from God/Multiverse FOR, never from our FOR…. Thus, we really have no free will

C/ Neuroscience: has proven that we lack free will..

Conclusion:

socialists are correct to say we lack free will (although, fortunately evolution/god, has endowed us with the illusion of free will)…but Socialists are wrong to conclude that, because citizens ( or trees, planets, rocks, insects, etc), have no free will and therefore no moral responsibility, they should be exempted from the consequences of their wrongful acts….as Einstein said, we must seek liability, so as to prevent situations like that of the socialist psychopathic hospitals, where doctors are carelessly negligent/reckless, because they know they will not be prosecuted or even fired.

The Marxinians make the FALSE conclusion that a moral code agreed to by a majority of
the people, can crush the moral code of a minority…or that, like Pedro Sanchez, is morally correct to change opinion/morality on former promises/morality promised to the People before the Elections, on the basis that he is now the president of the gov … is not Sanchez’s fault to change opinion/morality, as nobody has free will, but , still, he must be held accountable…… It would be undemocratic, if the majority (gov), failed to respect the rights/morals of the minorities…eg by the gov changing its opinion/morality after the election, thus failing to do with they promised.

Socialists/Capitalists/criminals/heros/artists etc  are not so by free will, since we are fingers of the Universe/God, as it dances enjoying and suffereing his own game.  If we make war/love, is not by our free will….nobody can be morally blamed….but liabilities must be imposed.

why are socialists, correctly non believers on free will….so proud of being socialists? they should not….nor should they be ashamed of the deaths the universe caused using their bodies as ‘fingers of the universe’….however, they should be very afraid of imprisonment for those deaths.

ELENA/BUKELE

EL SUELO DEBE LIBERALIZARSE  [CURRENTLY HYPERREGULATED]….  PEOPLE ARE FORCED TO RENT, AND AT ABUSIVE PRICES….AS CANNOT BUY TO BUILD….MOST LAND OWNED BY [NACIONALISED] A FEW RICH AND THE STATE…..THIS VIOLATES CLP IN THE PROPERTY SECTOR

LITTLE FUNDING TO POLICE AND MILITARY, AND THEY ARE SCARED OF DOING THEIR JOB, BECAUSE THE WOKES WILL GET THEM IN COURT

BOLSAS DE POBREZA/MARGINALIDAD, ARE DESIGNED ON PURPOSE [NOW EVEN MORE WITH THE TWO 2030 AGENDAS: NETZERO + ……] + CREATING ‘CALL EFFECT’ TO ATTRACT MILLIONS OF IMMIGRANTS

BY GOVS, FEEDING PEOPLE WITH CRUMBS FROM THEIR FEAST, IN THE FORM OF TINY SUBSIDIES TO KEEP THE POOR GOING, TURNING THEM INTO GUARANTEED VOTERS…..  THE BEST HELP FOR PEOPLE IS TO GIVE THEM [DECENT] WORK…. OW THEY GO INTO DRUGS AND MENTAL ISSUES AND CRIME ESCALATES……..

DIFF:

A. LIBERTARIOS:   SUS OBJETIVOS:  DCHO.VIDA/LIBERTAD/PROPIEDAD

B.LIBERALIZACION = GRADUAL AND ORDERLY ELIMINATION OR LEGAL/REG/POLICY RESTRICTIONS TO FREE COMPETITION

C. LIBERTICIDAS:   COMUNISMO=SOCIALISMO= CAPITALISMO DE ESTADO = NACIONAL SOCIALISMO…FINANCIADO POR SOROS MUNDIALMENTE….HOY, PARA ENGANAR A LOS PUEBLOS, EL FEM [FORO EC.MUNDIAL], DICE QUE EL CAPITALISMO HA MUERTO…Y DICE QUE HAY AHORA QUE SEGUIR EL ‘CAPITALISMO INCLUSIVO’, QUE ES REALMENTE EL COMUNISMO DISFRAZADO, PORQUE DICEN QUE EL GOV Y EL ESTADO CONTROLARA LAS EMPRESAS Y SUS ACCIONISTAS….DICEN QUE HAY QUE SEGUIR EL MODELO CHINO , PORQUE LOS QUE ESTAN EN PODER NUNCA CAMBIAN…PARA CONSEGUIR EL CAMBIO DE CAPITALISMO A CAPITALISMO INCLUSIVO, LOS LIBERTICIDAS PROMUEVEN LAS AGENDAS DEL COVID [FUE PROPAGADO POR CHINA POR TODO EL MUNDO USANDO AVIONES DE PASAJEROS], Y LAS DOS AGENDAS 2030…OSEA, QUE EN 2030 NO TENDREMOS NADA, PERO SEREMOS FELICES.

MILEI

soy liberal libertario:   hay que reducir el estado a su minima expresion posible para que tenga la minima interferencia posible sobre la sociedad/ec,  y asi las min. tasas posibles….

el problema del socialismo es que por cada necesidad, quiere 1 dcho…pero como las necesidades son infinitas, pero los derechos requiren obligaciones del estado para hacerlos valer , lo cual requiere un estado cada vez mayor, con cada vez mas:

impuestos/imprimirmoneda/emitirdeuda[bonos=bonds]

…hasta que llega a un limite….asi que no es posible cubrir todas las necesidades con derechos.

espana ya esta superendeudada [y la gente compro bonos del e.espanol, solo porque esta garantizado por eu]….espana no puede imprimirmoneda, pues esto solo lo puede hacer eu…..asi que , si sale otra vez el psoe, seguiran subiendo los impuestos a los empresarios y ricos, que se iran de espana…

‘CUANDO OS PIDO EL VOTO, NO ES PARA QUE ME DEIS EL PODER, ES PARA QUE YO OS LO DEVUELVA’

STEPS MUST BE FOLLOWED IN THIS ORDER:

• 1/REFORMA AL ESTADO; BAJAR GASTO PUBLICO; BAJAR LOS IMPUESTOS; REFORMA LABORAL Y FINANCIERA [NEW LAWS TO LIBERALISE THE EMPLOYMENT MARKET ECONOMY]:  DEREGULATE : EVERYTHING THE STATE TOUCHES , ROTS.

EG. SI ABRIS LA ECONOMIA, PERO ANTES NO BAJIS LA PRESION FISCAL, LOS SALARIOS REALES SE DETERIORAN MUCHO, CREANDO UNA GRAN TENSION SOCIAL.

EG. SI ABRIS LA EC, PERO ANTES NO BAJIS LOS IMPUESTOS, CREAS DESEMPLEO

• 2/OPEN ECONOMY TO FREE COMPETITION
• 3/DOLARIZAR LA MONEDA, Y ELIMINAR EL BANCO CENTRAL

PORQUE HAY QUE SEGUIR ESTE ORDEN GRADUAL?  :

PORQUE LOS ZURDOS SE HAN CARGADO LA ECONOMIA CON DEMASIADAS RESTRICCIONES A LA COMPETICION DE EMPRESAS, ASI QUE QUITAR 1 RESTRICCION SOLA , POR SI, NO GENERARIA RIQUEZA,,, ASI QUE HAY QUE IR SUPRIMIENDO ESTAS RESTRICCIONES GRADUALMENTE Y EN ORDEN.= ESTA ES LA Teoría del segundo mejor, DE PARETO:  si una de las condiciones necesarias para alcanzar un óptimo de Pareto no se puede conseguir, las demás condiciones dejan de ser deseables

MUCHAS DICTADURAS MILITARES [EG PINOCHET, FRANCO…] IMPUESTAS PARA PARAR EL DESASTRE SOCIALISTA, NO HAN [ELIMINADO LAS RESTRICCIONES A LA COMPETENCIA = LIBERALIZADO] GRADUALMENTE O EN ESTE ORDEN, Y HAN CREADO CAOS SOCIAL EN SUS PRIMEROS ANOS.

INFLACCION IS THE TOOL USED BY SOCIALIST GOVS TO STEAL

INFLACCION =  EXCESS OF CURRENCY OFFER, BY:

• A. EMISSION OF CURRENCY [THE OFFER GROWS]
• B. DEMAND DROPS
• C. BOTH AT ONCE

THE IMPACT OF AN EMISSION OF CURRENCY TAKES ABOUT 2 YEARS TO BE NOTICED….THUS, EVEN WHEN GOV STOPS CURRENCY EMISSION, INFLATION KEEPS GOING FOR ANOTHER 2 YEARS….THERE ARE 3 CONCURRENT PROBLEMS: PAST EMISSION [EG GOV EMITTED TOO MUCH CURRENCY DURING COVID] + PRESENT EMISSION + FUTURE EMISSION

INFLATION REDUCES THE PURCHASING POWER OF THE PEOPLE/CURRENCY

INFLATION IS USED BY SOCIALIST GOVS, TO CONCEAL/FALSIFY THE SIGNALS GIVEN BY *PRICES.

* PRICES COORDINATES THE ECONOMY AND MAKES IT FLOW.. BUT INFLATION IS THE NOISE THAT DISTORTS COMMUNICATION [PRICES]….SO THE ECONOMY NEVER GROWS.

LAS OBRAS PUBLICAS SOLO GENERAN CORRUPCION, NO EMPLEO NI RIQUEZA, PORQUE SE FINANCIAN CON IMPUESTOS [TAKEN FROM SOME, AND DESTOYING EMPLOYMENT IN ANOTHER PART OF THE ECONOMY….SI UNA OBRA FUERA REALMENTE NECESARIA, EL SECTOR PRIVADO YA LAS HUBIERA REALIZADO HACE TIEMPO….LAS OBRAS PUBLICAS SE HACEN ROBANDOLE DINERO A UNOS SECTORES Y AL PUEBLO [TAXES] , PARA INVERTIRLO, EN OTROS SECOTRES, MALAMENTE, CON CORRUPCIONES Y SIN EFICIENCIA, EN UN PROYECTO QUE NO DEBERIA EXISTIR PORQUE EL SECTOR PRIVADO NO LO HIZO.

<> COCOO:  CLP VIOLATION

SODOMA [EGYPT] WAS A CITY WITH A CORRUPT SOCIALIST GOV…. THE ISRAELITES WERE FREE AS THEY PROSPERED WITH FREE COMPETITION….BUT THEY RECEIVED EVER LARGER TAXES AND INFLATION…UNTIL THEY BECAME SLAVES OF EGYPT [SODOMA]…MOSES LED THE ISRAELITES BACK TO FREEDOM [VIA CLP]…DO NOT TURN YOUR EYES BACK TO SODOMA, OR YOU WILL BECOME SALT [<> SALARY OF SALT = VERY LOW PURCHASING POWER DUE TO HIGH TAXES AND INFLATION]……THE HISTORY OF HUMANITY IS A HISTORY OF COUNTRIES [MAFIAS] USING INFLATION AND TAXES TO SLAVE THE PEOPLE.  CORRUPTION EXISTS BECAUSE THE STATE EXISTS. THE STATE SUSTENTS ITSELF OUT OF A COERCED INCOME [TAXES]

THE MALVINAS CAN BE RECOVERED WITH DIPLOMACY…LIKE CHINA RECOVERED HONG KONG FROM THE UK

PRIVATE PRISONS ONLY, WHERE PRISONERS MUST WORK TO EARN THEIR FOOD…IF WORK HARD, GET VERY GOOD FOOD AND CONDITIONS

LAS AEROLINEAS SE LAS DARE A LOS EMPLEADOS  <>  MILEI IS A TRUE ‘SOCIALIST’

LA EDUCACION, PUBLICA O PRIVADA,  ES UNA GRAN MENTIRA: TE LAVAN LA CABEZA, Y ES BASURA.

MARIO CONDE

SI EL CANDIDATO EMBESTIDO POR EL REY [FEIJOO] FRACASA , EN LAS 2 MOCIONES PARLAMENTARIAS DE INVESTIDURA…LA CONSTITUCION DICE QUE LOS CANDIDATOS MAS ELEGIDOS [FEIJOO Y SANCHEZ] HAN DE CONSULTAR AL REY…PERO ESTAS CONSULTAS SOLO DAN UNA PROBABILIDAD DE QUIEN SERA ELEGIDO…PERO ES UN PARIPE, PORQUE EL REY NO TIENE PODERES DEMOCRATICOS… ASI QUE , SI SANCHEZ CONSIGUE PACTAR PARA CONSEGUIR LA MAYORIA PARLAMENTARIA CON LA SUMA DE VOTOS, EL REY ESTA OBLIGADO A INVESTIRLE…..OSEA, QUE NO SE LE PUEDE CULPAR AL REY SI NO RECHAZA INVESTIR A SANCHEZ

democracy = free and fair competition among pps, to guarantee the Sovereignty of the People.

democracies face nondemocratic pps. some nations have adopted party ban. caselaw has based [the nondemo of pps] only on their external activities: pp goals/program, practices, leaders statements, and its members activities…..sadly, all courts are failing their (moral) duty to also regard pps’ internal structures ( pp organizational practices).Even the guidelines published by the eu Venice Commission regarding dissolution of political parties, do not refer to the parties internal structure

The Supreme Court of Spain dissolved the radical Basque party ”Herri Batasuna” in 2003, on the ground that it was supporting
terrorism. The German Constitutional Court considered in 2002 a petition to ban the extreme right-wing NPD party, eventually halting the proceedings on technical grounds….eg: the Turkish cases dealt with parties programs and policy statements regarding autonomy for the Kurds, national unity, and promotion of Islamic law………The Spanish and Israeli courts were concerned with the pp programs supporting terrorism.

unfortunately, most of these cases failed, because echr failed to consider the internal (antidemo) structure of these pps…

internal pp democracy should be mandatory…there should be laws to permit banning pps that lack internal
democracy. <> COCOO WILL ADVOCATE FOR THE AMENDMENT OF CURRENT LAWS THAT ALLOW PPS A NONDEMO INTERNAL STRUCTURE

(ECHR): judgments on the dissolution of pps:

All the cases concerned decisions by the Turkish government to dissolve parties or ban their activities, on the ground that these pps were encouraging violence, and activities undermining the territorial integrity and secular nature of the state

<> cocoo v PSOE, BILDU, ETC. on basis that they seek to harm democracy +  threat to the fundamental values that the Council of Europe…eg: see the video by mario conde : by constit/law, only the king can declare a referendum to divide spain.

ECHR held that the reasons given by the Turkish government and courts, did not justify the interference with the applicants (banned pps) individual liberties, as protected by the (ECHR). a pp incompatible with state pples, or challenging the organisation of a state, cannot be forcibly dissolved, UNLESS they do not seek to harm democracy itself [eg disrespecting the rules of democracy]

Some parties discriminate among their members on the basis of race, gender, or religion, while others adopt an oligarchic structure that denies members the ability to replace, or even affect, the party leadership. Hence, a political party could democratic externally but undemocratic internally

Can we have pps without democracy?: no. just fake pps

Can we have democracy without pps?

yes. because [democracy = free and fair competition among pps, to guarantee the Sovereignty of the People.], eg. the popular Will can be executed by an elected single organ, an elected king, or a elected single ruling class …..

<> cocoo: there is contradiction between democracy and [pps = groups of self-interested , lobbyied motivated crooks, operating
against the wpi/ew , obscuring the general will and national sovereignty….Even (NGOs), the indep media, and direct democracy mechanisms such as referendum, have replaced some of the pp functions, doing a much better job…also, Globalization weakens domestic governance and thus weakens political parties as well.

<> cocoo: yes…voting for specific projects, instead of pps….these projects will compete mutually and freely ..demo elected teams, for specific projects, [completed which, the team would be dissolved], would be much more efficiently than pps, to produce a better and more representative [government = set of public , indep, projects-eg building a bridge in a town etc]. each project is quality-controlled by indep teams

can a democracy have externally nondemo parties?  it should not, as demo itself is at risk

paradox:  nondemo pps need democracy to exist/organize, thus using democracy as a platform for nondemo.

 a democracy must not commit suicide but, rather, must protect itself

United States or Uk do not ban nondemocratic parties….because :

a/ they deny finance and access to media to non-incumbents [entry barriers, that distort free compet between pps] + 

b/ they have regulations that outlaw certain political opinions on the basis of their potential threat to democratic values….eg: knowingly to conspire to teach, advise, or advocate the overthrow or destruction of the U.S. government, was the basis for the federal prosecution of members of the Communist Party and other left-wing political groups during the late 1940s and early 1950s.

<> COCOO WILL USE THESE GROUNDS V. PSOE…

can a democracy have internally nondemo parties? 

no. why?

a/ pps should be role-models to society, thus we need internal democracy in parties

b/ in the long run, the internal agenda of an internal dictatorship pp, is bound to leak unto its external activities

c/ fear of the excessive power of the party leadership, to the detriment of individual pp members, is bound to end in control not only over their own members but also the general public…..party leadership becomes less internally supervised over time, eg as party members assume that other members are supervising. The individual member has no incentive to monitor the party leadership, as it entails great cost

-A pp is nondemo internally, for instance, if it fails to conduct, at regular intervals, open elections among its members for party leadership, or bans the establishment of intraparty factions. The party structure is, therefore, vertical, as authority flows from leadership to the bottom

-to defend against accusations that forcing pps internal demo would be a totalitarian demo, we need to balance internal pp democracy with other interests, such as pluralism and party autonomy…..eg: we should not ban pps for a failure to promote certain minorities/groups within the party, insofar as every individual has the right to vote in general pp elections, regardless of ideological affiliation or sexual or racial characteristics.

Political parties can ask members to prove their affiliation to the party ideology. They can also impose fees on members for participation in party elections…..Nixon v. Herndon: The Democratic party adopted a resolution that only white men were allowed to participate in primary elections. In a subsequent decision, the court ruled that the partys action was state action prohibited, for denying any person the equal protection of the laws

-the enforcement of internal democracy should be implemented by an independent and neutral political player, ideally a court, to make sure that:

A/-fake wpi goals are not implemented…..party Regulation (CLP) often use fake wpi goals, that are indeed anticomps…eg: when pps use campaign finance laws to ban certain fundraising sources used by rivals, or impose a method of holding a primary election that will disadvantage another party

<> cocoo v nations, to challenge party regs/laws [eg wrt party financing: pp funding limitations should be amended as they cause antimcomps by discriminating non incumbent pps and smaller pps, and nasciturus pps, as they are denied or restricted funding, thus is a barrier of entry, distoring clp. SEE COCOO V ANTIDEMOCRACY POST

B/-the imposition of internal democracy may be used to exclude a party or diminish its chances of success..this duty will be used by a pp to oppress a rival, or a cartel of parties, to exclude a group of competitors….The risk that a party in power will ban its opposition, or that it will refrain from banning a nondemo ally for purely political reasons [EX SANCHEZ CON BILDU ETC], has led some countries, not only to specify in their constitutions the duty of parties to be democratic, but also to grant exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether a pp is democratic, and whether it has a democratic internal structure, to independent courts

– Two (non exclusive) ways to ban internally undemocratic parties:

A/ via legislative provision, specifying a general duty of political parties to be internally democratic, as some democracies have done.

B/ party members might impose internal democracy on parties from within, using corporation(association) laws <> cocoo: pp in breach of CLP etc

C/ party banning of internally nondemo pps: eg: The German Constitution, in article 21(1, 2): pp internal structure required….Similar provisions are found in the constitutions of other democracies: Spain (CE), Turkey, and Argentina

<> cocoo:  what CE art bans internally nondemo pps???…can be used to ban bildu, erc, etc

D/ pps are disallowed from having a religious, paramilitary, or secret-association character….Or o. for pps to be founded on the basis of equality and voluntary participation

EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION)...OSCE OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (OSCE/ODIHR)...GUIDELINES ON POLITICAL PARTY REGULATION.SECOND EDITION :

democracy = free and fair competition among pps, to guarantee the Sovereignty of the People.

However, sadly, democracy (free competition) is not to be found within the parties, but between the parties.

a/ The liberal or free market model: [<> COCOO DISAGREES] pps are private associations free to establish their own internal organisation
 [eg rules for selecting party leaders and candidates] , EVEN IF DICTATORIAL, and should not be hindered by Regulations of their internal org, 
which, they say, would limit free competition (between pps)

b/The egalitarian-democratic model: [<> COCOO TOTALLY AGREES] pps are vital and have a public function, thus we need Regulations
 [on both pps internal organisation, and on free compet among pps], so that there is a fair and equal chance in electoral competitions...

c/ mix

PP PRINCIPLES

Principle 1. Freedom of Association of Political Parties; Presumption of Lawfulness
According to the freedom of association guaranteed in Article 11 ECHR and Article 22
ICCPR, the right of individuals to associate and form political parties should, to the
greatest extent possible, be free from interference.

Principle 2. Duty to Respect, Protect and Facilitate
The state shall not only (passively) respect the exercise of the freedom of association,
but shall also actively protect and facilitate this exercise.The state shall protect
political parties and individuals in their freedom of association from interference by
non-state actors, inter alia by legislative means.

Principle 3. Freedom of Expression and Opinion
 Political parties shall have the right to freedom of expression and opinion (Articles 10
ECHR and 19 ICCPR) in order to pursue their objectives and activities, in addition to
the right to free expression and opinion held by the individual member, founders and
party functionaries

Principle 4. Political Pluralism
Legislation regulating political parties should aim to facilitate a pluralistic political
environment. The ability of individuals to seek, obtain and promote a variety of political
viewpoints, including via political party platforms

Principle 5. Legality and Legitimacy of Restrictions
Any limitation imposed on the right of individuals to freedom of association and on the
fundamental rights of associations such as political parties, shall be in compliance with
international standards:  any restriction must be by law and
must have a legitimate aim recognised by international standards. Furthermore, the
law concerned must be precise, certain and foreseeable, and provide a reasonable indication as to
 how to be interpreted and applied. <>(see Principle 7): restrictive legislation must be neither too detailed nor too vague

A/-where there are no specific (law/reg) restrictions on pps' (and their members) right to free association, full protection of rights must be assumed....ow, states will be in violation of their
obligations under international human rights law. <> cocoo v States

B/- where there are specific......such restrictiions must be justified in line with Article 11(2) of the ECHR (namely, in the interests of national 
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Also 22(2) of the ICCPR. This list of aims is exhaustive

<> cocoo: this is how to get rid of socialism

Principle 6. Necessity and Proportionality of Restrictions
According to Article 11 ECHR and Article 22 ICCPR, any limitation imposed on the
rights of political parties must be necessary in a democratic society, proportionate in
nature and time, and effective in achieving its specified purpose.
prohibitive measures shall be narrowly applied and shall never completely extinguish the right or
encroach on its essence. prohibiting the establishment of a political party
or dissolving a political party are sanctions of last resort and shall only be imposed in
exceptional cases under strict conditions...thus, pp Regulations should be introduced
and implemented with restraint,

Principle 7. Effective Remedy
 according to the case law concerning Article 13 ECHR,  a domestic remedy is needed
to deal with Convention rights and to grant appropriate relief.

Principle 8. Equal Treatment of Political Parties
All individuals and groups that seek to establish a political party must be able to do so
on the basis of equal treatment before the law.40 No individual or group wishing to
associate as a political party shall be advantaged or disadvantaged in this endeavour
by the state. In particular, state regulations on political parties may not discriminate
against individuals or groups on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status

exceptions: 
-It is permissible, for instance, to require that parties
demonstrate a well identified level of support before receiving specific benefits
-it is also permissible to tailor both the
stringency of enforcement of regulations and the penalties for violations to the size and
resources of parties, so as not to unduly burden new or small parties 
-parties that are already in parliament may receive higher levels of state support than
parties that are not (yet) in parliament but may then also be subjected to stricter
reporting obligations

Principle 9. Equal Treatment by and within Political Parties, Special Measures, Internal Democracy
A political party therefore is not required to accept individuals as members or
candidates who do not share its core beliefs and values

Principle 10. Good Administration

Principle 11. Accountability
As a consequence of pps having privileges [[over other types of associations],
they have reporting requirements, transparency in financial arrangements, restrictions on the use of
special media access or regulations to ensure equal opportunities for the participation
of certain underrepresented groups

 Sanctions for pp Non-Compliance with laws/regs:

-Article 14 of Council of Europe Committee of Ministers : states should provide for independent monitoring and publication, of the funding 
of political parties and electoral campaigns , and any violations and sanctions

-where local pp branches have acted in the name of the statutory board of a national party, sanctions may be brought against the 
party at the national level. Sanctions should follow the principle of proportionality. 

-Sanction types:

• Administrative fines
• Partial or total suspension or loss of public funding and other forms of public support for a set period of time;
• Ineligibility for state support for a set period of time;
• Partial or total suspension or loss of reimbursement for campaign expenses,
• Forfeiture to the state treasury of undue financial support previously transferred to or accepted by a party;
• Ineligibility to present candidates/run for elections for a set period of time in cases where a candidate severely violated substantial rules of electoral campaigns or rules on electoral campaign finance;
• Rejection of the pps’ electoral list or individual candidates, removal from the electoral ballot;
• Annulment of a candidates’ election to office, but only as determined by a court of law and the legal violation is likely to have impacted the electoral result
• Loss of registration status for the party: Where a party is a habitual offender with regard to legal/reg provisions and makes no effort to correct its behaviour, the loss of registration status might be appropriate, depending on the rights and benefits attached to such status

la proclamacion de candidatos electos en espana

el proceso electoral muchas veces ha sido llevado al (TC)* por afectar: derechos fundamentales, y de participacion politica y el acceso a los 
cargos publicos reconocidos en el art. 23 CE

• a/la proclamacidn de las candidaturas (art. 49)
• b/la proclamacion de candidatos electos (art. 112): cabe un recurso ante la [jurisdiccion contencioso-administratia-electoral….es parte del poder judicial]
• c/procedimientos de amparo ante el TC, para recurrir contra a/o b/, una vez agotada la via judicial (arts. 49.3 y 4 y 114.2, respectivamente)…reformado por Ley Organica 8/1991 gracias a la cual hay un considerable descenso del nimero de amparos electorales resueltos por el TC, en las elecciones habidas en los ultimos anos

INELEGIBILIDAD/IRREGULARIDADES DE CANDIDATURAS

1/presentacion de candidaturas:

si en cualquiera de las candidaturas presentadas existe algun candidato sobre quien recae la inegibilidad [segun las leyes electorales], no puede siquiera presentarse como candidato, eg. se descubre que existe un coi: obliga al afectado a optar entre el abandono del cargo o el cese de la situacion incompatible, o a superar el procedimiento de subsanacion de irregularidades (como el establecido en el art. 47.2 de 1a LOREG)

la Administracion Electoral SOLO tiene la obligacion [de poner en conocimiento de los interesados las irregularidades -eg inegibilidad- en las candidaturas] , durante la fase de presentacion de candidaturas, y SOLO si las irregularidades son evidentes….TC: «la Administracion Electoral no tiene obligacion de investigar de oficio la posible existencia de irregularidades en las candidaturas

<> COCOO WILL INVESTIGATE AND REQUEST INVESTIGATION (A INSTANCIA DE COCOO]

2/proclamacion de las candidaturas

la inegibilidad [segun las leyes electorales], tambien aplica aqui (inegibilidad sobrevenida): debe ser resuelta segun el art. 7.1 de la LOREG: la inegibilidad se puede declarar el mismo dia de la presentacion de su candidatura, o en cualquier momento tras las elecciones

3/ proclamacion (definitiva) de candidatos electos.

la inegibilidad [segun las leyes electorales], tambien aplica aqui    (inegibilidad sobrevenida): deben ser resuelta segun el art. 155.1 para los diputados y senadores, en el art. 178.1 para los concejales, en el art. 201.8 (que se remite al art. 203) para los consejeros insulares, en el art. 203.1 para los diputados provinciales y el art. 211.1 para los miembros del Parlamento Europeo

art. 48.2 loreg :  las bajas tras la proclamacion de las candidaturas, seran cubiertas por los candidatos sucesivos/suplentes. 

Si la causa de inegibilidad tiene lugar  durante la proclamacion de electos, no debe quedar afectado el resultado de las elecciones, pero tampoco procedera la proclamacion como electo de tal candidato.

la incompatibilidad de candidatos :    pertenece al Derecho de Sufragio pasivo, regulado en el art. 23.2 CE: ciertas causas de imposibilidad o incompatibilidad para ser elegidos …Se está hablando mucho de este derecho precisamente ahora a raíz de la polémica surgida por la lista de candidatos presentada por Bildu, comprendida por 44 condenados por terrorismo, 7 de ellos por asesinato. Se cuestiona en el panorama político, legislativo y judicial acerca de su posible ilegalización

incluir a personas condenadas por delitos de terrorismos que no hayan rechazado públicamente los fines y los medios terroristas, es causa para declarar un partido ilegal conforme exige en el art. 9.3 c) de la Ley de Partidos Políticos

LA NULIDAD DE LA ELECCION EN LA LOREG

A raiz de la anulacion judicial de las elecciones generales de 1989 en tres circunscripciones electorales, y de la consiguiente doctrina dictada por el TC, la Ley Organica 8/1991 ahora afirma que 3 principios fundamentales informan el proceso electoral de la LOREG: [se pueden usar en trib.ords y en TC),

• p. de impedimento del falseamiento de la voluntad electoral (eg escrutinio de votos y computo de actas)
• p. de conservacion del acto electoral: art. 113.2 d) de la LOREG: nulidad de la eleccion, a aquella/s Mesa/s afectadas por irregularidades invalidantes…TC: por el p. cons.acto electoral, habra repeticion parcial de la eleccion
• p. de unidad del acto electoral: la apertura de los colegios electorales se produzca a la misma hora (art. 84.1), con las dnicas salvedades del voto por correspondencia y las derivadas de la diferencia horaria. Y otro tanto sucede respecto del tra- mite de escrutinio de votos, cuya suspension esti prohibida por la LOREG salvo causas de fuerza mayor (art. 95.2)…..ow, 113d loreg: nulidad parcial. tc: repeticion parcial de las elecciones

El artículo 6 CE

2 tipos de democracias:

A/ la democracia directa = p. de identidad y participación: eg. el referéndum o plebiscito, el recall, la iniciativa legislativa popular, o el más concreto de los landsgemeinde o asambleas populares suizas

<> cocoo: proposes a different type of democracy:  people vote , not for pps, but for specific projects, to be designed and implemented by specific people, in specific territories

<> cocoo :  pasoe (partido antisocialista obrero espanol)

B/ la democracia representativa:  representantes elegidos por el pueblo. la mayoría de las democracias en el mundo

• -sistema presidencialista (usa): el Ejecutivo, en todo o en parte , es elegido , directa o indirectamente, por el electorado, y el Legislativo es elegido en otras elecciones;
• -el sistema asambleario: la asamblea elegida por el Pueblo, elige al Ejecutivo
• – el sistema parlamentario (espana): los representantes elegidos por el Pueblo, eligen al Ejecutivo

numerosas Constituciones complementan la democracia representativa, con instrumentos de democracia directa. eg. la Constitución española : es una democracia representativa (art. 6. 23. Y 66 C. E.) que  incorpora:

• -el referéndum (art. 92 C E y L.O. 2/1980,modificada por la L.O. 12/1980),
• -la iniciativa legislativa popular (art. 87.3 C E y L.O. 3/1984, modificada por la L.O. 4/2006),
• -el concejo abierto (art.140 C. E. y Art. 29 de la Ley Reguladora de las Bases de Régimen Local L.7/1985, modificado por la Disposición Final. 1ª.1 de la LO 2/2011 de modificación de la LOREG).

Los pps en la CE (Constitución Española de 1978)

El TC: pps no son poderes públicos y no son órganos del Estado, pero ejercen funciones públicas

 El estatuto de los partidos políticos: LO 3/2015 : 

-“Los ciudadanos de la UE podrán crear libremente partidos políticos conforme a lo dispuesto en la Constitución y en la presente Ley orgánica”

-pps pueden constituir e inscribir federaciones, confederaciones y uniones de partidos [eg SUMAR]

pasos de creaccion de pp

1/  (arts. 2 y 3 LOPP):  los promotores han de ser personas físicas….excepto: feds/confeds/uniones de pps, obviamente son the personas jcas.

y [salvo que hayan side judicialmente rehabilitados], no penalmente condenados por asociación ilícita (art. 515 CP) o por alguno de los delitos graves de los títulos XXI a XXIV CP 

2/ la formalización de la pp constitución, mediante el Acta Fundacional, en documento público conteniendo la identificación personal de los promotores; la denominación clara del partido , no contraria a leyes o derechos fundamentales, que no induzca a error ni siquiera fonéticamente con otro partido político…. tb. hay obligación de publicar los estatutos de los partidos en sus páginas web 

3/ inscripción en el Registro de Partidos Políticos del Ministerio del Interior, previa presentación del acta fundacional suscrita por sus promotores

 estructura de los pp

art. 7 de la LOPP:

1º) la asamblea general del conjunto de sus miembros que podrán actuar directamente o por medio de compromisarios, como órgano superior de gobierno del partido político, a quien corresponde adoptar los acuerdos fundamentales, incluida la disolución ¿autodisolución más bien- del Partido .

2º)  los órganos directivos elegidos por sufragio libre y secreto regulados en los Estatutos del partido político (llámese Comité ejecutivo, Comisión directiva nacional, Juntas directivas, Consejo general, Consejo ciudadano etc.,).

3er) requisitos procedimentales como son que haya un plazo de convocatoria suficiente para las reuniones de órganos colegiados ; quórum para inclusión de asuntos en el orden del día; reglas de deliberación que permitan el contraste de pareceres; mayorías requeridas para adopción de acuerdos, siendo la regla general la mayoría simple de presentes o representados; procedimientos de control democrático de los dirigentes elegidos; igualdad de derechos y deberes entre miembros del partido, con inclusión detallada en los Estatutos de los derechos y deberes de los militantes que, como mínimo serán:

Derechos de los afiliados: conforme al art. 8 de la LOPP, modificado por el art. Segundo. Seis de la LO 3/2015 de 30 de marzo:

-derecho de participación en las actividades del partido y en sus órganos de gobierno y representación, a ejercer el derecho de voto y de asistencia a la Asamblea general, conforme a los estatutos.

-derecho a ser electores y elegibles para cargos partidistas.

– derecho a ser informado de la composición de los órganos directivos y de administración y de las decisiones de tales órganos directivos sobre actividades y situación económica.

– derecho de impugnación de acuerdos de órganos del partido que estimen contrarios a la ley o a los estatutos.

-y derecho a acudir al órgano encargado de los derechos de los afiliados.

las decisiones judiciales sancionadoras intrapartidistas, corresponde a la jurisdicción civil, por tratarse de una controversia entre particulares, mediante juicio preferente y sumario en materia civil, en los términos del art. 53.2 CE y 249.1.2 de la LEC = juicio ordinario con carácter preferente, o tutela judicial civil de derecho fundamental y, en su caso, el de Amparo constitucional.

Deberes de los afiliados: art. 8.5 de la LOPP, en la versión dada por LO 3/2015:

-cumplir las disposiciones estatutarias.

-compartir las finalidades del partido y colaborar para su consecución

-acatar y cumplir los acuerdos válidamente adoptados por los órganos directivos. 

-abonar cuotas y otras aportaciones de acuerdo con la modalidad de afiliación que les corresponda.

Declaración de ilegalidad de un pp [<> cocoo v psoe]

Disolución judicial (por ilegalidad de un pp), procede :

• A/ por ilícito penal: asociación ilícita, conforme al CP, LECRIM, y LOPJ y cuyo enjuiciamiento corresponde al Juez penal, o

• B/ por ilícito constitucional, ya sea en el caso de consistente vulneración de la exigencia democrática relativa a su estructura y funcionamiento; ya sea por vulneración con su actividad de los principios democráticos o perseguir destruir el régimen de libertades públicas o el sistema democrático, todo ello conforme a la LOPP, y cuyo enjuiciamiento compete a la Sala del 61 del TS …..(art. 11 LOPP):

(art. 9.2, 3 y 4 LOPP, modificando el apdo 3 por LO 3/2015<> art. 10.2.a/B) LOPP en relación a los arts. 7 y 8 LOPP; <> art 9 de la ley de partidos (art. 10.2.c) LOPP) :

un pp es ilegal cuando comete un ilícito constitucional, al reiteradamente vulnerar los principios democráticos, persiguiendo deteriorar/destruir el régimen de libertades/democracia  

egs:

-por resolución judicial , si persigue fines o utiliza delito, o si tiene carácter secreto o paramilitar; fomente, promuevan o inciten directa o indirectamente al odio , hostilidad, discriminación o violencia contra personas, grupos o asociaciones por razón de su ideología, religión o creencias, la pertenencia de sus miembros o de alguno de ellos a una etnia, raza o nación, su sexo, orientación sexual, situación familiar, enfermedad o discapacidad 

– vulnerar sistemáticamente derechos y libertades, promoviendo, justificando o exculpando atentados contra vida o integridad, o la exclusión o persecución por ideología, religión, creencias, nacionalidad , raza, sexo, u orientación sexual.

-fomentar, propiciar o legitimar la violencia como método para conseguir objetivos políticos, o hacer desaparece las condiciones para la democracia, el pluralismo o las libertades.

-complementar y apoyar políticamente la organización de organizaciones terroristas para sus fines de subversión del orden constitucional o alterar gravemente la paz pública, tratando de someter a un clima de terror a los poderes públicos, a personas, grupos, o toda la sociedad, o contribuir a multiplicar los efectos de la violencia terrorista y el miedo y la intimidación.

La LOPP contiene una serie de presunciones de pp ilegalidad, si hay reiterado :

-apoyo político expreso o tácito al terrorismo, legitimando acciones terroristas o exculpando o minimizando su significado y la violación de derechos fundamentales que comporta.

-apoyar la violencia con acciones de enfrentamiento y confrontación civil, o que pretendan intimidar, neutralizar o aislar a quienes se oponen, haciéndoles vivir en un ambiente de coacción, miedo, exclusión o falta de libertad de expresión y participación pública.

-incluir regularmente en órganos directivos o listas a personas condenadas por delitos de terrorismo que no hayan rechazado públicamente los medios y fines terroristas, o mantener a un amplio número de militantes con doble militancia, salvo que hayan adoptado medidas contra estos conducentes a su expulsión.

-utilizar solos o con los propios del partido político, mensajes, símbolos que se identifiquen con la violencia.

-ceder a favor de terroristas los derechos y prerrogativas que el ordenamiento, concretamente la LOREG, conceden a los partidos políticos.

-colaborar habitualmente con grupos que actúan de forma sistemática con organizaciones terroristas o violentas o que amparan o apoyan a terroristas.

-apoyar desde las instituciones con cualquier tipo de medidas a los terroristas.

-dar cobertura o participar en actividades de homenaje a terroristas, promover distinguir acciones terroristas o violentas o quienes las cometen o colaboran con ellas.

-dar cobertura a acciones de desorden, intimidación, o coacción social vinculadas al terrorismo o la violencia.

tc: No son admisibles las actuaciones (de pps) que cuestionen el deber de las fuerzas policiales de perseguir a los responsables de la violencia terrorista. De igual modo, y por idénticas razones, también implica una justificación (de tales pps) implícita del terrorismo, que no puede asumirse en democracia, todo intento de colocar en el mismo plano el sufrimiento infligido a las víctimas de la violencia terrorista y el eventual efecto aflictivo asociado al cumplimiento de la pena impuesta a los terroristas.

Idéntica calificación han de merecer las actuaciones tendentes a otorgar al terrorismo una legitimación, especialmente si la misma está proyectada a su justificación como medio necesario para alcanzar o avanzar en la consecución de objetivos políticos o cuando se utiliza la situación latente del terrorismo como chantaje para la consecución de objetivos políticos, o exculpando y minimizando su significado, y la violación de derechos fundamentales que comporta, o ensalzando a los autores de acciones terroristas, o su presentación como víctimas o héroes..un pp que vulnera los principios democráticos y legitima la violencia terrorista cuando, con manifiesto desprecio del orden constitucional, supedita su rechazo a la consecución negociada de objetivos políticos que sólo pueden alcanzarse en un Estado de Derecho mediante la utilización de procedimientos democráticos

la Ley Orgánica 6/2002, de 27 de junio, de partidos políticos

solicitud para ilegalizar un pp

artículo 9 y 11 de la Ley de Partidos Políticos: “El proceso de ilegalización parte de una petición formal que puede, o ser de oficio, o estar rogada previamente por el Congreso de los Diputados o el Senado, estando el gobierno obligado a promoverla en tal caso.”

La solicitud inicial de ilegalidad debe revestir forma de demanda, debidamente justificada y fundada, donde se acrediten la concurrencia de los motivos de ilegalidad, y ser presentada ante la Sala especial del TS, órgano competente para resolver dicha cuestión y que previamente se pronunciará sobre la admisión o inadmisión a tramite de la demanda.

En el caso de que fuese admitida a trámite, el partido demandado tendría un plazo de 20 días para contestar la demanda, “pudiendo darse un periodo probatorio si fuera propuesto por algunas de las partes y admitido por el Tribunal. El desarrollo del proceso sería como cualquier otro procedimiento judicial regulado en nuestra normativa procesal, finalizando con la Sentencia dictada por la Sala especial del TS declarando la disolución o no del partido, teniendo efectos ejecutivos desde su notificación a las partes.”

Frente a dicha Sentencia solo quedaría la vía del recurso de amparo ante el TC

están legitimados para instar la ilegalización de un partido político el Gobierno (a instancia del Congreso de los Diputados o del Senado, vinculante para el Gobierno) y el Ministerio Fiscal. La acción se iniciará mediante demanda ante la Sala del 61 del TS con los documentos acreditativos de la concurrencia de los motivos de ilegalidad. La Sala del 61 procederá al emplazamiento inmediato del partido afectado, dando traslado de la demanda y citándole a comparecer en plazo 8 días. Una vez efectuada la comparecencia o bien incomparecencia del partido y transcurrido el plazo la Sala analizará la admisión inicial de la demanda pudiendo inadmitirla si se ha interpuesto por sujeto no legitimado o no debidamente representado, o bien porque carezca de requisitos formales o de fondo, o carezca de fundamento, causas que se pondrán en conocimiento de las partes al fin de que puedan formular alegaciones en el plazo de diez días.

Admitida la demanda, se lleva a cabo el emplazamiento al demandado para que conteste la demanda en plazo 20 días. Tras lo cual, se abre un período de prueba a petición de la Sala o las Partes ( rige regulación prueba LEC). De la prueba practicada se dará traslado a las partes que podrán formular alegaciones por plazo sucesivo de 20 días. Finalizado este plazo, hayan o no alegado, el proceso está visto para sentencia, que debe dictarse en 20 días. Durante el proceso la Sala del 61 del TS podrá adoptar como medida cautelar la suspensión de actividades del partido político hasta que se dicte sentencia con la correspondiente anotación preventiva en el Registro de partidos políticos del Ministerio del Interior.  Solo cabe Recurso de Amparo constitucional ante el TC…corresponde a la Sala asegurar, en trámite de ejecución, a instancia de las partes, el Ministerio del Interior, o el Ministerio Fiscal si se presenta un partido para su inscripción, la improcedencia de la continuidad o sucesión del partido disuelto si se aprecia similitud [eg erri batasuna >>> bildu]

¿Se ha ilegalizado algun pp hasta la fecha?

La Ley de Partidos Políticos entró en vigor en el año 2002 y desde dicha fecha han sido tres los partidos políticos que se han ilegalizado:

La primera ilegalización de un partido político decretado por el Supremo fue en el año 2003, con Batasuna y sus anteriores marcas (HB y EH). Este partido (continuidad de los otros dos -HB y EH-) quedó disuelto mediante una Sentencia que dictaminó que “Batasuna era una organización creada y dirigida por ETA que pretendía instaurar en el País Vasco un «clima irrespirable» para quienes se opusiesen a las tesis de la banda terrorista y sus organizaciones afines”.

En el año 2008, se ilegalizaron y disolvieron otros dos partidos: Acción Nacionalista Vasca (ANV) y el Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas (PNTV). Ambas formaciones fueron también consideradas por el Supremo como “instrumentos de ETA” y colaboradores de Batasuna, previamente ilegalizado.

LA FINANCIACION DE LOS PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS

financiación de los partidos políticos pueden ser públicos, privados o mixtos, según sea la procedencia de la financiación. En el caso español es mixto con claro predominio de la financiación pública, acorde con la cualidad pública que la CE atribuye a los partidos políticos.

En efecto la financiación de los partidos políticos se nutre de fondos públicos en forma de:

1º) subvenciones para gastos electorales conforme a la LOREG y leyes electorales autonómicas, estas subvenciones se dirigen a los partidos que ya habían obtenido representación y suponen una cantidad fija, mas otra que depende del número de votos, más la correspondiente al mailing electoral.

2º) Subvenciones estatales para la participación informativa en referéndums.

3º) Subvenciones estatales anuales para gastos ordinarios de funcionamiento, que se llevan a cabo sobre la base de representación y también vinculadas a escaños y votos.

4º) Subvenciones de otros órganos territoriales, como CC AA y entes locales, si así procede.

5º) Subvenciones a los Grupos parlamentarios por parte de las Cortes generales y parlamentos autonómicos que, en lo atinente a los grupos parlamentarios se regulan en los Reglamentos parlamentarios y se vinculan a escaños y votos obtenidos, abarcan igualmente subvenciones en especie mediante la dotación para locales, medios instrumentales como informática, prensa, asistentes etc.; y, si procede, subvenciones de las corporaciones locales.

Respecto de la financiación privada ésta comprende:

1º) las cuotas y aportaciones de los afiliados que deberán abonarse en cuentas exclusivas para tal fin

 2º) productos de las actividades del partido y de aquellas reflejadas en la documentación contable y sometidas al Tribunal de Cuentas que se vengan desarrollando tradicionalmente en sus sedes y faciliten el contacto y la interacción de los ciudadanos.

3º) los rendimientos de la gestión del patrimonio.

4º) beneficios de las actividades promocionales.

5º) beneficios de servicios relacionados con sus fines específicos.

6º) donaciones no finalistas, nominativas, en dinero o en especie de personas físicas españolas o extranjeras que no superen por donante los 50.000 euros anuales, salvo donaciones en especie de inmuebles; donaciones que deberán ingresarse en cuentas abiertas exclusivamente para dicho fin; y que, en caso de desconocimiento del donante o superación del límite y no devolución, se ingresarán en el tesoro.

7º) los fondos obtenidos mediante préstamos o créditos, respecto de los cuales la reforma de 2015 incorpora la prohibición de que las entidades de crédito efectúen condonaciones de deuda en el sentido de entender por tales las cancelaciones totales o parciales del principal de un crédito o de los intereses vencidos, o la renegociación de tipos por debajo de los que se apliquen en condiciones de mercado.

8º) las herencias y legados y, aunque no está especialmente contemplado como tal, pero tampoco está prohibido, algunos partidos, especialmente los ¿novísimos¿ recurren al crowdfundings y a microcréditos, cuyo régimen será el previsto con carácter general para donaciones, cuotas o aportaciones.

Por lo que atañe a la contabilidad, la ley establece que será anual, ordinaria y electoral, correspondiendo el control al tribunal de Cuentas que aprobará el Plan de contabilidad adaptado a las formaciones políticas (D Final octava de la LO 3/2015)

ILP (INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY)

cocoo will challenge SNs'(sovereign nations)
 convention agreements, if there was no true consent, thus no freedom of contract 
 [situational monopoly]. eg: a person/sn 'choice' not to be free 

cocoo challenges uk gov decision to recognise/refusetorecognise, a gov or state

cocoo v SNs's laws/policies that breach clcp/wpi/il

COCOO JR OF ACT/DECIS that affect the rights of other states/indivs..
..eg uk decis/act to continue to allow offshore jurisdictions

<> cocoo: claims that the contracting [banks/firm/sn], should not have entered agreements with those that did
not disclose bos.. thus failing ddp....thus disrupting clp, elp, alp, ilp

two types of international liability: 

a. intl. civil liability: redress for victims (claimants) paid by states responsible (defendants) 
[eg echr jurisdiction]

b. intl. criminal liability: victims cannot be parties, only witnesses. ICC jurisdiction.

the doctrine of ‘no (sn) recognition, no existence’:

Non-recognition may take place when norms on the use of force, have
 been violated or when regional treaty obligations have been disregarded. 
In addition, there is a duty not to recognize situations resulting from the illegal
 use of force 
UK caselaw: two exceptions: 

1/ the ‘delegated authority exception’: 
acts of an unrecognized state can be recognised, if done pursuant to powers delegated by a recognized 
sovereign authority.

2/ the ‘private acts exception’[= acts of everyday occurrence = acts regulating 
the day to day affairs of the people within the territory, are private

the effective control and the legitimacy doctrine ECLD: [The most important]:

gov is not a legal person, but is the state's agent ....thus, for recognition (of a new gov) to be lawful, 
other nations need to make sure this agency is exercised with effective control and legitimacy.
 
EG: the conflict in Libya in 2011, the recognition of LYBIA by some States, while the Gadaffi regime was 
still in control over parts of the territory, is not supported by the ECLD....
Thus, the new gov's acts/decisions were void, until
gadaffi regime fell completely.  

<>cocoo: was a recognition/rejection lawful?....contracts void, etc.

uk courts: an entity (state) unrecognized by the UK government,
 is treated by the courts simply as if it did not exist: both the unrecognized government/state, and its 
acts are a nullity ....exception: 1966 case of Carl Zeiss v Rayner & Keeler ....The defendants alleged that
 CarlZeiss had no standing to sue, since the administrative act under which Carl Zeiss had been constituted
 was an act of East Germany (GDR), not recognized (as a sn) by the UK: . While the Court of Appeal ruled
 lack of standing, the House of Lords gave standing, on the basis that ussr (sn) had 
lawfully delegated to the GDR

diff:  state creation: (needs proof); state continuity (presumed); state extinction (needs proof) 

eg: the general international rejection of Somaliland as a new state, 
is based on the presumption of continuity of somalia.

a SN has the right to regulate its own domestic affairs...But what are "domestic affairs?" 
SNs do NOT have the  right to decide which are its own domestic affairs:

SR is limited by international law, in particular by the pple of international responsibility and justice. 
[= a State's act/decis wrt a SR, are illegal, if affect the properandjust rights of other nations/individuals]

-in case of conflict between domestic and international law, courts and govs are bound by the domestic law....
but this does not mean that domestic law is superior to international law. no domestic law may alter international law.
....domestic law is not a defense to claims for IL violations 

-States sometimes impose their interpretation of IL upon weaker states... but they have no right to do so.... 
and in controversies between states of equal strength, this attempt (to impose IL interpretations) usually fails

eg-reciprocal right of states to protect their nationals/firms abroad, to demand redress for wrongs caused by 
a foreign state where they are domiciled 

eg-a state has no right to choose/alter a government, to a gov notoriously opposed to the intl order
 [eg dictatorship]

eg-a state has no right to extend/contract its territory by purchase/cession, if 
could affect the safety/peace of other states.

eg. the refusal of the Usa to recognize the ussr

eg. Italy, by an act of parliament in 1912, created a state monopoly of
the life insurance business, and expropriated the business of
foreign private companies without indemnifying them. Some foreign governments protested on the 
basis  that a state does not have a right to deprive aliens of their property rights and invoke 
as a defense its SN on domestic affairs.

eg. Uruguay passed a similar law,,but the protests of Great Britain and France were such as to
cause the Uruguayan legislature to rescind its action and abolish the monopoly

eg: usa issued a protest to the government of Romania, for enacting a mining law confiscatory of an American oil company. 

eg. france imposed nationality upon the subjects of other 
states against their will

                             AR (NORTH STEALS FROM SOUTH) <> OD (SOUTH STEALS FROM NORTH)

TRACEPublic: to TRACE BOS

share lists of politically exposed persons (PEPs) and corruption evidence 

present a statement of policy reforms to world governments, through the UNCAC Coalition

new leaks ...eg. The Panama and Paradise Papers, following the Swiss and Luxleaks investigations

a new [other than netzero] 2030 TL HAS BEEN SET: 
''the main target under Goal, by 2030, is to significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows [iffs/iafs], 
strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets, obliging States to work towards strengthening the system'' 
COCOO JR V SN'S FAILURE TO comply/UNLAWFULDECISION, WRT TO THE new 2030 tl. 
iow: cocoo will copy the strategies followed by ngos v implementation of netzero 2030 GOAL..... 

UNODC is the UN secretariat against Corruption...with its sister agency UNCTAD, UNODC measures iffs.   

cocoo to request a state, to ask another state, to immediately freeze corr assets…and then to NCC: 

[confiscation=forfeiture] requires a final (crim) corr conviction, in the country where the assets were stolen…. this is so hard, that is best to use an NCC, which only needs civil procedures.   The UN Convention against Corruption, (UNCAC) is the key int. legal instrument for inter-state AR 

ods = debts incurred and used, knowingly, against the interests of the nation

ods are not repayable, unless, and to the extent, that real advantages were obtained

ELP (ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY)

-The polluter pays pple, does not work, because legal processes donot work well to redress environ victims: How long and indirect can the chain of consequences be? Were the emissions caused by the electricity-generating company, or by whoever sold the polluting fuel, or financed the power station, or used the electricity – or by all of these?….An American attempt to pursue the legal route – the ‘Superfund’ – only achieved that the funds intended to benefit victims of pollution have ended up in the hands of lawyers, and have increased business uncertainty by holding individuals and companies liable for events long in the past.

-Article 101 and 102 TFEU<> EU treaties:   sustainability “must” be taken into account (in CLP)…..Unfortunately, there is nothing equivalent in UK law…but there is: the UK CC Act; the Paris Agreement, and hr law

-any organisation bidding for a contract of over £5 million per annum, must publish a compliant Carbon Reduction Plan (CRP) describing how  intends to achieve net zero [greenhouse gas emissions] by 2050 + crp must comply with the GHG Protocol’s Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard.  <> cocoo will challenge the credibility of firms’ crps, which fail to comply with the GHC protocol standard, thus such firms cannot bid for public tenders..and if they have already won a tender, is void….this will also affect such firms’ green credentials [ are they also greenwashing?]

a small firm won the ‘public’ tender to manage the ENZC [everything net zero multibillion contract]….how come?…..why was only 1 tender received??

<> CROWDJUSTICE JR PAP, AND WON £10K IN PAP COSTS, BY JUST ARGUING THAT THE SMALL FIRM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED THE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT

cocoo claims: 

– clp was violated, during the permitted collaborations/agreements between rivals. 

-enzc is strategically flawed.

-enzc management was unlawfully tendered and awarded

– the (mediator contract), …was unlawful awarded

-the awarded firm is failing to properly manage the enzc

-the beneficiaries of the enzct are failing their duties to implement it properly

COCOO WILL CHALLENGE THE DEVELOPMENT POLICIES OF THE 9 AMAZON COUNTRIES, AND WILL ASK FOR more funding (eu etc), for:

• • better monitoring of forest to prevent illigal fires.
  • indigenous health and safety: …eg: growing violence, impunity and organised crime affecting environmental and human rights defenders and indigenous peoples and others…eg: covid virus is doubly threatening. Environmental protections and health law enforcement have been reduced
  • strengthening the rule of law
    • , eg: laws that allow contracts oil firms, will be made illegal by cocoo;
    • eg: cpcl is infringed as such laws distort competition, as alternative energy companies are not getting those big contracts that oil firms are getting
    • • support to civil society organisations working to protect the environment of the Amazon and human and indigenous peoples’ rights;
    • • EU delegations in the region systematically take up cases of environmental defenders facing threats of violence with the countries concerned;
    • • the establishment of a specific Amazon programme to promote the rule of law in the region as part of the EU – Latin America and Caribbean relations agreement of May 2019 to promote, inter alia,democracy, the rule of law and human rights, including through technical assistance to supportministries charged with environmental protection and justice in the Amazon;
    • • collaboration with member states of the Amazonian Cooperation Treaty Organization and indigenous peoples and environmental defenders to develop initiatives to combat organised crime, and illegal land grabs and deforestation in the Amazon.

SO THAT ALL AMAZON EVILS END SOONER RATHER THAN LATER, COCOO IS LEFT WITH NO CHOICE BUT TO EXERCISE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL DUTIES (UNDER BOTH COCOO’S CONSTITUTION AND THE CONSTITUTIONS OF ENBB’S [EU/nations/banks/businesses operating in eu],  TO PRESS ENBBs TO CHALLENGE the 9 Amazon Nations (AN):

how? : their SR = soverign right [= right to determine their own policy (development) priorities]… IS SUBJECT TO A BALANCING EXERCISE (right to ec.dev (ew) <> right to environment). 

ENBB+AN HAVE A STATUTORY DUTY TO FUND COCOO TO PROTECT r.to envir.

1- silogism:

1. true: the principal driver of all amazon evils, are the extractive industries : mining and oil extraction, and large-scale agriculture (eg mcdonnalds) and logging and associated infrastructure projects
2. true: the Amazon‘s carbon sink capacity is predicted to reach zero by 2035. “This decrease is decades ahead of what even the most pessimistic climate models predicted…SO BY 2035, a collapse in amazon’s capacity to absorb CO2 means it will subsequently become a contributor to greenhouse gases with impacts on livelihoods locally, regionally and worldwide
3. true: ENBBs [EU/nations/banks/businesses operating in eu], are themselves the amazonian extractive industries, or at least their collaborators giving them funding, housing them etc
4. conclusion 1: AN SR is subject to the [BALANCING EXERCISE]: ew<>elp
5. conclusion 2: contribute to amazon deforestation and human rights violations
6. conclusion 3: ENBB have a duty to challenge their business partner, the AN SR [exclusively on this particular issue], so that all amazon evils end.

2-CLP + ELP+ HRL  ARE VIOLATED

3-AN+ENBB’S duty to further strengthen their measures on business and dd, by:

• implementating the EU-Mercosur Treaty, to respect the rights of indigenous peoples including
the right to be consulted and to obtain their free and informed consent prior to any development
activity affecting their lands, territories and resources;

• an effective, affordable, and culturally accessible grievance mechanism, where
indigenous peoples can address European corporate violations of their rights

• support for mandatory dd legislation, so that companies based, registered or having a significant market or administrative presence in the EU, are held to account for violations of indigenous peoples´ rights in the Pan Amazon region…..such dd should also be required of investors;

• support for the maintenance of the Soy Moratorium and its extension to the Amazon savannah
(‘Cerrado’) and forest certification schemes, to ensure that products entering the
EU market are not sourced from the Amazon

• an EU-initiated multi-stakeholder dialogue on indigenous peoples´ rights and business enterprises operating in the Amazon region focused on regulation in accordance with the Un Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and other relevant international standards,

4- AN+ENBB’S duty to implement POLICY changes in:

•  enbb’s trade, finance and development activities and policies…EG:ANSR policies are potentially life-threatening to the indies
• to establish a legal framework that prohibits actions that undermine the Paris Climate Agreement PCA, 
• in cpcl

5- AN+ ENBB’S DUTY TO  alert the ICC to a possible crime against humanity affecting the integrity of the Amazon biome, causing the illegal dispossession of indigenous peoples’ lands and threatening the lives of indigenous 
.
6- AN+ENBB DUTY TO build on their initiatives for a sustainable forest programme, give political
and financial backing to the indigenous peoples as forest guardians

7- ENBB+AN, DUTY TO PRIORISISE cases that cause environmental destruction.  THE ICC HAS ALREADY PRIORITISED THEM: ‘The ICC must prioritise prosecuting Rome Statute envir crimes .’.=ICC PROSECUTOR Policy paper on case selection and prioritisation’

Rabobank told Reuters “it had stopped financing Ecuadorian crude cargoes earlier ,” and communicated to Stand.earth and Amazon Watch the financing “violated our existing policies that prohibit activities in World Heritage Sites or high conservation value areas.” UBS:  “it already has declined some crude oil transactions from the region due to concerns about indigenous land rights.” However, UBS has yet to make any firm commitments <> COCOO V UBS

Natixis bank was the only bank, among the top 6, to keep making trades in Amazon oil after the release of the report <> cocoo v natixis

2 ecocide types:

 land grabbing disputes in Cambodia had been reported by the UN Special Rapporteur on Cambodia <> cocoo will look at un
 special rapporteur reports...as a source for new cases

defining international environmental crimes in the context of CAH(crimes against humanity), has more chances to win, than under the context of genocide ….OTP cannot prosecute cah based on recklessness, because recklessness is not within the jurisdiction of the court.’’ …also, genocide, or CAH,  require a specific result (e.g. ‘‘killing members of the group’’),but do not require harm to environment or human health

Principles on protection of the environment in relation to war and postwar:

- Principle 10 :States must ensure that their firms, exercise dd wrt the protection of the
 environment, including wrt human health

-Principle 11: States must ensure that their firms can be held liable for harm caused to
 the environment, including wrt human health

<> cocoo v SNs, for failing their duty to ensure [eg via laws/regs + enforcement]

2011.DEFENSA DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE  EN EL OCA [ORDEN CONTENCIOSO-ADMINISTRATIVO]...

de acuerdo con el Convenio de Aarhus, el Derecho comunitario y el español

tjue: tribunal de justicia de la unión europea

cedH: convenio europeo para la Protección de los derechos Humanos.
tedH: tribunal europeo de derechos Humanos.
loPj: ley orgánica del Poder judicial.
lrjca: ley de régimen jurídico de las administraciones Públicas y del Procedimiento administrativo común
COE : El Consejo de Estado, fundado en 1526 por Carlos V, es el supremo órgano consultivo del Gobierno
de España.El Consejo sitúa en el centro de sus preocupaciones la lealtad constitucional 
y la defensa del Estado social y democrático de Derecho

art. 45 ce : «Todos tienen el derecho a disfrutar de un m adecuado para el desarrollo de la
persona, así como el deber de conservarlo»....excepcion en el art. 53.3 de la ce:
si la actividad que dana el ma, esta protegida por ley.
en mi opinión, interpretar el art. 24.1 de la ce para restringir aun mas la legitimación
procesal (locus standi), es inconstitucional.
la tutela judicial del ma es insignificante, erc (en relación con) la
tutela administrativa a que obliga la constitución 

la normativa EU [a differencia de la CA]:

1/ Los estados pueden decidir la fase en la que pueden impugnar DOCAS
2/ los recursos no se exigen que sean «suficientes y efectivos»
3/ no se exigen mecanismos de asistencia apropiados,encaminados a eliminar o reducir 
los obstáculos financieros o de otro tipo , al acceso a la justicia» 

Por tanto, la ley 27/2006 no cumple con los requisitos materiales
exigidos en los párrafos 4 y 5 del artículo 9 del CA

EL CONVENIO DE AARHUS (CA)

el convenio sobre el acceso a la información, la Participación del Público en
la toma de decisiones, y el acceso a la justicia en materia de Medio ambiente,
elaborado en aarhus (dinamarca), entró en vigor en espana en 2005.

ca define ma como un derecho humano 

el artículo 9 ca, contiene tres mecanismos de tutela judicial

1/ el acceso a la información
2/ la participación del público en la toma de decisiones
3/ el acceso a la justicia en materia de ma

ca:  legitimacion activa (locus standi):

«el público» se encuentra legitimado para iniciar un procedimiento
de cumplimiento del ca. art. 2.4 ca
''publico'' =«una o varias personas físicas o jurídicas y, 
con arreglo a la legislación o la costumbre del país,
asociaciones, organizaciones o grupos». 

dar locus standi al publico, es un elemento característico del ca,
ya que la gran mayoría de instrumentos internacionales de derecho ambiental únicamente permiten 
la participación de los estados miembros u organismos internacionales.

9.3 ca: el publico puede exigir('RECURRIR'),ante los tribunales penales, civiles o administrativos: 

por:

decisiones (eg aprobacion de una norma o ley) o conductas u omisiones, ilegales [ por incumplimiento
de cualquier norma de:  ma nacional/ acceso a informacion / participacion del publico en decisiones.

contra:

a. las autoridades públicas
b. privados(corporaciones/individuos)....eg: admin.decide aprovar, projecto privado 
que dana el ma.

tjeu: el solo hecho de que una decision/conducta/omision, priv/pub, pueda tener algún tipo de relación
 con el ma, no implica que pueda aplicarse el 9.3, sino que ma, ha de ser la finalidad y
contenido de tal decision/conducta.

la determinación de los requisitos de locus stadi del público, se deja al derecho nacional.
pero el locus no puede reservarse a una determinada nacionalidad [eg solo los espanoles]
eg. la onG belga Bond Beter Leefmileu Vlaandereb VZW (BBl) en 2005, alego el incumplimiento
 de los artículos 2.5, 3.1 y 9, párrafos 1 a 4 del ca...solicitando la anulación de dos normas de 
planeamiento en las que se aprobaba un vertedero y una licencia de urbanización....pero....
las demandas fueron inadmitidas por falta de legitimación de dichas organizaciones. 

porque?:

el coe [consejo de estado] exigió a las ngos(ongs) los mismos requisitos de legitimación 
exigidos a las personas naturales: 

i) un criterio social:  
el objetivo estatutario de la organización no puede ser tan amplio que se confunde con el interés general

ii) un criterio geográfico:
las actividades de la organización no pueden cubren un área amplia,salvo que tenga un objetivo social
 específicamente definido....si el objetivo de la organización se extiende a un amplio territorio,
 solo tiene locus, si el acto (ilegal) amdministrativo, afecta a todo o una gran parte del territorio
 previsto en los estatutos de la organización. 

Dif:
1/ca 9.2: en acciones/omisiones/conductas [ilegales por infringir ma] que requieren la participación
pública [eg el plan de urbanizacion...], para tener locus, hay que demostrar 
un interés suficiente o invocar la lesión de un derecho

2/ca 9.3: en acciones/omisiones/conductas [ilegales por infringir ma] que NO requieren la participación
publica [eg:  el plan por el que se aprobó el vertedero] para tener locus, hay que cumplir 
los requisitos del derecho nacional.

ca: 'locus debe seguir el criterio, si lo hay, establecido en la ley nacional'....
por tanto, la regla general es dar locus, salvo que la ley nacional lo niege.

al «fallar en proporcionar unos recursos efectivos respecto al planeamiento urbanístico» ,
el COE incumplio también el artículo 9.4 

 más de los legales, para no restringir el acceso a la tutela judicial del derecho
ambiental de tal manera que impida a todas, o a la mayoría, de organizaciones
ambientales recurrir los actos u omisiones que contravengan el derecho nacional en
 materia ambiental o que puedan privar de la reparación efectiva a
los miembros del público. esto ocurriría 

en casos, como éste, en el que a las onGs se les exigiere los mismos requisitos de legitimación que
a las personas físicas, se traduce en que las ongs nunca tienen legitimacion.

CA : legitimacion pasiva

acciones administrativas y judiciales contra acciones/omisiones de las autoridades públicas
o de particulares (eg corps)...si es contra acc/omis de particulares, solo se puede solicitar la 
declaracion de nulidad de la actuación de la administración + solicitar que el estado ejercite
 su poder punitivo y sancionador contra tales particulares (corps).....osea, los ciudadanos no tienen
 derecho a castigar, directamente, a otros, por medio de un procedimiento
 administrativo sancionador, ya que el ejercicio de esta potestad queda reservado a la administración

EL DERECHO COMUNITARIO

tjue de 2011(asunto c-240/09): el derecho comunitario debe interpretarse de acuerdo con el ca...
pero ca no forma parte del dcho.com

caso:
una ong eslovaca solicitó constituirse como «parte» de un
procedimiento administrativo sobre la concesión de excepciones al régimen
de protección de especies, el acceso a los espacios naturales protegidos y a
la utilización de productos químicos en tales espacios. 
dicha solicitud fue rechazada, ante lo cual se presentó recurso administrativo y, posteriormente,
recurso contencioso-administrativo, argumentando la aplicación directa del
art. 9.3 ca. 

la defensa al derecho al ma, es protegido a través del art. 8 del cepdh (convenio europeo
para la Protección de los derechos Humanos)<> ca dice que ma es un dcho humano. 

para entablar recursos de incumplimiento ante el tjue, únicamente están legitimados 
los estados miembros. en consecuencia, los particulares tienen que acudir
a vías indirectas :

A/comunicando a la comision su incumplimiento, para que ésta inicie un procedimiento de infracción,
que puede terminar con la interposición de un recurso de incumplimiento

B/solicitando a los tribunales domésticos una cuestión prejudicial, cuando se plantee una cuestión 
sobre la interpretación o la validez de una norma comunitaria, en un litigio nacional

estas vías indirectas [de los particulares] de legitimacion [para acceso a la justicia comunitaria]
,infringen el ca...pues ca propone vias directas.

-la aplicación del derecho ma supone una desventaja competitiva??  ca <> cpcl ??

 ley 27/ 2006

la ley 27/ 2006, por la que se adecua españa al ca....y del principio 10 de la declaración de Río:
''para la protección del ambiente se tendrá que proporcionar un acceso efectivo a los
 procedimientos judiciales y administrativos y, dentro de
éstos, al resarcimiento de daños y a los recursos pertinentes»

la ley 27/2006 :exige disponer de instrumentos adecuados, reales y efectivos para que 
la participación pública ante los tribunales y remedios adecuados(eg.injunctions) 

artículo 20: legitimación solo por derecho e interés legitimo, individual o colectivo;

artículos 22 y 23 :  derecho a acción legal, para la aplicación de la legislación ma...
no requiere que el claimant tengo un interes directo/legitimo en la coa.

ce (art. 9.2)+ (art. 7.3 ley orgánica del Poder judicial):grupos/ongs pueden ser partes (contenciosas)
si tienen personalidad jca. 

artículo 24.1 ce: la legitimación activa, como requisito procesal, debe: 
1/estar prevista en una norma  jurídica; 
2/justificarse por una finalidad constitucional razonable y proporcionada; 
3/interpretarse en el sentido más favorable a la efectividad de los derechos fundamentales

las onGs ambientalistas pueden acreditar con más facilidad [que un grupo de ciudadanos sin personalidad
juridica], un interés legitimo , solo poniendo es la constitucion de la ong que el ma, es un
interes legitimo].... y esta legitimación no puede resultar ignorada por la ley 27/2006, 
ya que sería contrario a la legitimación por intereses legítimos colectivos reconocida a las onGs
 en el ordenamiento español : el artículo 19.h) ljca otorga legitimación a cualquier ciudadano 
en ejercicio de acción popular...  todos los ciudadanos estan legitimados para 
actuar en defensa de
la legalidad

DIF:

A/ el artículo 19.1.b) lrjca, que prácticamente reproduce el artículo 7.3 loPj,
otorga legitimación a las corporaciones, asociaciones, sindicatos y grupos
«que resulten afectados o habilitados legalmente» para la defensa de los derechos e intereses legítimos
colectivos[sus finalidades estatutarias]eg.asociaciones de protección
del medio ambiente, tienen locus....cocoo tiene locus

B/acciones popular: sólo pueden ser presentadas por las entidades habilitadas legalmente 
para la defensa de intereses legítimos colectivos.....cocoo no puede presentar una accion popular.

LA TUTELA JUDICIAL DEL ACCESO A LA INFORMACIÓN

art. 9.1 ca: «toda persona que estime que la solicitud de informaciones que ha presentado en 
aplicación del art. 4 ha sido ignorada, rechazada abusivamente, en todo o en parte, 
o insuficientemente tenida en cuenta,puede presentar un recurso ante un órgano judicial o
ante otro órgano independiente e imparcial establecido por la ley». vemos,
pues, que no se especifica los requisitos de legitimación para plantear dicho recurso

LA TUTELA JUDICIAL DEL DERECHO A LA PARTICIPACION

ca artículo 6: 
DOCAS publicas, que emergen de ciertas actividades, requieren la participación del público....si no,
se puede impugnar su legalidad (del contenido y/o la forma/procedimiento)

requisitos de legitimacion activa: 

i) publico interesado....el art. 2.5 ca incluye dentro del «público interesado» a las organizaciones
asociaciones o grupos constituidas exclusivamente para proteger los derechos afectados
eg. cuya constitucion dice «que trabajan a favor del medio ambiente». 
+
ii) tengan un interés para actuar (eg victims)....la legitimidad aqui, no se determina exclusivamente
 de acuerdo con las finalidades constit. de la ong.
por tanto, habrá que tener en cuenta el convenio sobre el reconocimiento de la personalidad
jurídica de las onGs, adoptado en el contexto del consejo de europa en 1986
o 
iii) invoquen un atentado contra un derecho (art. 9.2 ca).

case: 

la onG húngara Clean Air Action Group, mediante comunicación [ante el comite de cumplimiento
del CA], en 2004, alegando la violación de los artículos 6 y 9.2 y 4 del CA....en base a que
una ley hungara sobre interés público y desarrollo de la red ferroviaria de alta velocidad 
, infringia CA.... dicha ley, según la comunicante (ong),  
establecía la necesidad de demostrar un interés «considerable» del demandante,para tener locus.

el comité [de CA], consideró que la ley húngara no
contiene unos estándares inferiores a los exigidos por el ca...pero el comité recomendó :

1/que los paises firmantes deben abstenerse de 
, como en este caso, reducir los derechos que da el ca [acceso a la 
información, la participación pública y proteccion ambiental], incluso cuando no
conlleven la violación del convenio

2/ que las Partes que los hayan restringido, han de mantener esas restriciones
 bajo revisión constante, para evitar incumplimientos.

case:

tres onGs armenias enviaron una comunicación al comité de cumplimiento del CA, en la que
 alegaban la violación de los artículos 4, 6, 7,8 y 9.2 del convenio.

ongs: las decisiones publicas sobre cambio de uso de suelo, y zonificación del suelo,
 fueron adoptadas mediante decretos,
 por lo cual no se tuvo en cuenta la opinión del público y, de acuerdo con la legislación armenia, 
éstos no fueron publicados. 

ongs: estas son decisiones que, de acuerdo con la ley armenia,requieren evaluación 
de impacto ambiental. las ongs enviaron solicitudes de información a lasautoridades públicas
,sin recibir  respuesta satisfactoria;
los comunicantes demandaron la nulidad de tales decretos por violar el CA y la ley armenia.

esta demanda fue inadmitida por falta de jurisdicción del tribunal,
 ya que, de acuerdo con la constitución armenia, dichos
decretos sólo podían ser anulados por el tribunal constitucional armenio, y, según las
leyes internas, para ello únicamente se encuentran legitimados el Gobierno,
el Presidente y la asamblea nacional 

CASE:  STATE AID .  NGO V EU

EC : Brussels, 17.5.2023

THE GELMATO STRATEGY

1- PADI RESEARCHES (of ANY YEAR…BECAUSE THE LIMITATION CLOCK HAS NOT STARTED TICKING THANKS TO CONCEALMENT), EX/CAT Press Releases (about statements of objection (SOs)), and also Bloomberg, to find possible Gelmatos (cos that do not fully know they still* have a claim)

* tort claims, set out in section 2 of the Limitation Act, is that claims are time-barred six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued….. EXCEPTION: where there is “deliberate concealment” of facts relevant to the cause of action (which is frequently alleged in follow-on damages claims of this nature and indeed was agreed between the parties in this case), the limitation clock only starts to run from the time a claimant discovered, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered, the relevant facts.

Gelmatos still have a claim becos the fact they have a claim has been CONCEALED from them.

IDEALLY, there will be an anticompetition EC/CATetc Regularory Decision* (that could legitimate Gelmatos to make a claim) which was never published. thus, the harm has been concealed from them by both the EC/CAT and by the perpetrators…. (but PADI found it… ).

2- This finding of padi research is disclosed to the Gelmatos under total confidenciality and oath not to disclose, and, their offer contract to instruct me as lawyer, as consideration for my research and for disclosing it to them in confidentiality)… I offer Gelmatos a CFA as legal representative, so i can start the PAP….before they can  refuse i let them know my plans to organise sh action*, or alternatively sell the package to shortsellers, and then to the news, stating the possible recklessness of Directors in failing to issue claim to obtain redress for the company.

could contact the larges shareholders (in confidentiality) of the company … or padi buys shares and ask shs to relinquish votes….to press the Directors to let me PAP.. or to start shareholder action v company for not starting the claim…..

* If there is such unpublished Regulatory Decision I can PAP for a follow on claim…. Alternatively, if there is no such Decision, I can PAP for a stand alone claim.

Whether stand alone or follow on, my PAP will be for a claim for anticompetition damages (v anyone), and the goal is ADR or private settlement cash for the Gelmatos. i keep my fees (legal + PADI Donation for its research)

COCOO COMBINES 

ANTICORRUPTION LAW (AL) + ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (EL) + HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (HRL) + COMPETITION LAW (CL)

TO WIN SETTLEMENTS

search for tenders of over 2 billion:

GOV UK NEWS PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS

FIND A HIGH VALUE CONTRACT UK <> FRAs

Find a Tender  Contracts Finder  Tender Pipeline [best]

GOV UK COMPETITION UPDATES

MERGERS ORDERS AND UNDERTAKINGS REGISTER

BREACHES OF MERGERS ORDERS/UNDERTAKINGS/REMEDIES

COCOO’S 2 STRATEGIES

A/ JR [eg glp v enzc]. 3m tl.

A SURPRISING PIECE OF NEWS MAKES COCOO/GLP WONDER [WE KNOW NOTHING YET!], SO WE JR, TO FIND OUT…. [THANKS TO JR’S SHORT TL 3M, WE DO NOT NEED A LONG PAP OR TO KNOW MUCH ABOUT THE CASE] …WE JUST WANT TO KNOW [EG WHY A LARGE CONTRACT IS GIVEN TO SMALL FIRM ETC]…CLAIM FOR POSSIBLE FAILED PROCUREMENT PROCESS

B/ TORT CLAIM HARM TO WPI [TAXPAYER ETC] 5 years tl, from date known.

DIG SHIT [TO KNOW] AND KEEP EYE ON NEWS, ABOUT LARGE FIRMS [CONSISTENTLY] GETTING LARGE CONTRACTS [EG MOD/BAES] … CLAIM THAT THEY FAILED PROC.PROCESS OR JUST CEASED BEING ELIGIBLE FOR THE CONTRACT…DUE TO NEW/ONGOING CLCP BREACHES, ,BRIBING ETC…SO CONTRACT IS VOID OR STOPPED…..

WEBARCHIVES UK PI

cocoo’s STANDING

2011.DEFENSA DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE  EN EL OCA [ORDEN CONTENCIOSO-ADMINISTRATIVO]...

de acuerdo con el Convenio de Aarhus, el Derecho comunitario y el español

ma: medio ambiente

DOCA (decisión/omisión/conducta/accion)

ts: tribunal supremo.

ce: constitución española.

ca:convenio de aaruhs

tjue: tribunal de justicia de la unión europea

cedH: convenio europeo para la Protección de los derechos Humanos.
tedH: tribunal europeo de derechos Humanos.
loPj: ley orgánica del Poder judicial.
lrjca: ley de régimen jurídico de las administraciones Públicas y del Procedimiento administrativo común
COE : El Consejo de Estado, fundado en 1526 por Carlos V, es el supremo órgano consultivo del Gobierno
de España.El Consejo sitúa en el centro de sus preocupaciones la lealtad constitucional 
y la defensa del Estado social y democrático de Derecho

art. 45 ce : «Todos tienen el derecho a disfrutar de un m adecuado para el desarrollo de la
persona, así como el deber de conservarlo»....excepcion en el art. 53.3 de la ce:
si la actividad que dana el ma, esta protegida por ley.
en mi opinión, interpretar el art. 24.1 de la ce para restringir aun mas la legitimación
procesal (locus standi), es inconstitucional.
la tutela judicial del ma es insignificante, erc (en relación con) la
tutela administrativa a que obliga la constitución 

la normativa EU [a differencia de la CA]:

1/ Los estados pueden decidir la fase en la que pueden impugnar DOCAS
2/ los recursos no se exigen que sean «suficientes y efectivos»
3/ no se exigen mecanismos de asistencia apropiados,encaminados a eliminar o reducir 
los obstáculos financieros o de otro tipo , al acceso a la justicia» 

Por tanto, la ley 27/2006 no cumple con los requisitos materiales
exigidos en los párrafos 4 y 5 del artículo 9 del CA

EL CONVENIO DE AARHUS (CA)

el convenio sobre el acceso a la información, la Participación del Público en
la toma de decisiones, y el acceso a la justicia en materia de Medio ambiente,
elaborado en aarhus (dinamarca), entró en vigor en espana en 2005.

ca define ma como un derecho humano 

el artículo 9 ca, contiene tres mecanismos de tutela judicial

1/ el acceso a la información
2/ la participación del público en la toma de decisiones
3/ el acceso a la justicia en materia de ma

ca:  legitimacion activa (locus standi):

«el público» se encuentra legitimado para iniciar un procedimiento
de cumplimiento del ca. art. 2.4 ca
''publico'' =«una o varias personas físicas o jurídicas y, 
con arreglo a la legislación o la costumbre del país,
asociaciones, organizaciones o grupos». 

dar locus standi al publico, es un elemento característico del ca,
ya que la gran mayoría de instrumentos internacionales de derecho ambiental únicamente permiten 
la participación de los estados miembros u organismos internacionales.

9.3 ca: el publico puede exigir('RECURRIR'),ante los tribunales penales, civiles o administrativos: 

por:

decisiones (eg aprobacion de una norma o ley) o conductas u omisiones, ilegales [ por incumplimiento
de cualquier norma de:  ma nacional/ acceso a informacion / participacion del publico en decisiones.

contra:

a. las autoridades públicas
b. privados(corporaciones/individuos)....eg: admin.decide aprovar, projecto privado 
que dana el ma.

tjeu: el solo hecho de que una decision/conducta/omision, priv/pub, pueda tener algún tipo de relación
 con el ma, no implica que pueda aplicarse el 9.3, sino que ma, ha de ser la finalidad y
contenido de tal decision/conducta.

la determinación de los requisitos de locus stadi del público, se deja al derecho nacional.
pero el locus no puede reservarse a una determinada nacionalidad [eg solo los espanoles]
eg. la onG belga Bond Beter Leefmileu Vlaandereb VZW (BBl) en 2005, alego el incumplimiento
 de los artículos 2.5, 3.1 y 9, párrafos 1 a 4 del ca...solicitando la anulación de dos normas de 
planeamiento en las que se aprobaba un vertedero y una licencia de urbanización....pero....
las demandas fueron inadmitidas por falta de legitimación de dichas organizaciones. 

porque?:

el coe [consejo de estado] exigió a las ngos(ongs) los mismos requisitos de legitimación 
exigidos a las personas naturales: 

i) un criterio social:  
el objetivo estatutario de la organización no puede ser tan amplio que se confunde con el interés general

ii) un criterio geográfico:
las actividades de la organización no pueden cubren un área amplia,salvo que tenga un objetivo social
 específicamente definido....si el objetivo de la organización se extiende a un amplio territorio,
 solo tiene locus, si el acto (ilegal) amdministrativo, afecta a todo o una gran parte del territorio
 previsto en los estatutos de la organización. 

Dif:
1/ca 9.2: en acciones/omisiones/conductas [ilegales por infringir ma] que requieren la participación
pública [eg el plan de urbanizacion...], para tener locus, hay que demostrar 
un interés suficiente o invocar la lesión de un derecho

2/ca 9.3: en acciones/omisiones/conductas [ilegales por infringir ma] que NO requieren la participación
publica [eg:  el plan por el que se aprobó el vertedero] para tener locus, hay que cumplir 
los requisitos del derecho nacional.

ca: 'locus debe seguir el criterio, si lo hay, establecido en la ley nacional'....
por tanto, la regla general es dar locus, salvo que la ley nacional lo niege.

al «fallar en proporcionar unos recursos efectivos respecto al planeamiento urbanístico» ,
el COE incumplio también el artículo 9.4 

 más de los legales, para no restringir el acceso a la tutela judicial del derecho
ambiental de tal manera que impida a todas, o a la mayoría, de organizaciones
ambientales recurrir los actos u omisiones que contravengan el derecho nacional en
 materia ambiental o que puedan privar de la reparación efectiva a
los miembros del público. esto ocurriría 

en casos, como éste, en el que a las onGs se les exigiere los mismos requisitos de legitimación que
a las personas físicas, se traduce en que las ongs nunca tienen legitimacion.

CA : legitimacion pasiva

acciones administrativas y judiciales contra acciones/omisiones de las autoridades públicas
o de particulares (eg corps)...si es contra acc/omis de particulares, solo se puede solicitar la 
declaracion de nulidad de la actuación de la administración + solicitar que el estado ejercite
 su poder punitivo y sancionador contra tales particulares (corps).....osea, los ciudadanos no tienen
 derecho a castigar, directamente, a otros, por medio de un procedimiento
 administrativo sancionador, ya que el ejercicio de esta potestad queda reservado a la administración

EL DERECHO COMUNITARIO

tjue de 2011(asunto c-240/09): el derecho comunitario debe interpretarse de acuerdo con el ca...
pero ca no forma parte del dcho.com

caso:
una ong eslovaca solicitó constituirse como «parte» de un
procedimiento administrativo sobre la concesión de excepciones al régimen
de protección de especies, el acceso a los espacios naturales protegidos y a
la utilización de productos químicos en tales espacios. 
dicha solicitud fue rechazada, ante lo cual se presentó recurso administrativo y, posteriormente,
recurso contencioso-administrativo, argumentando la aplicación directa del
art. 9.3 ca. 

la defensa al derecho al ma, es protegido a través del art. 8 del cepdh (convenio europeo
para la Protección de los derechos Humanos)<> ca dice que ma es un dcho humano. 

para entablar recursos de incumplimiento ante el tjue, únicamente están legitimados 
los estados miembros. en consecuencia, los particulares tienen que acudir
a vías indirectas :

A/comunicando a la comision su incumplimiento, para que ésta inicie un procedimiento de infracción,
que puede terminar con la interposición de un recurso de incumplimiento

B/solicitando a los tribunales domésticos una cuestión prejudicial, cuando se plantee una cuestión 
sobre la interpretación o la validez de una norma comunitaria, en un litigio nacional

estas vías indirectas [de los particulares] de legitimacion [para acceso a la justicia comunitaria]
,infringen el ca...pues ca propone vias directas.

-la aplicación del derecho ma supone una desventaja competitiva??  ca <> cpcl ??

 ley 27/ 2006

la ley 27/ 2006, por la que se adecua españa al ca....y del principio 10 de la declaración de Río:
''para la protección del ambiente se tendrá que proporcionar un acceso efectivo a los
 procedimientos judiciales y administrativos y, dentro de
éstos, al resarcimiento de daños y a los recursos pertinentes»

la ley 27/2006 :exige disponer de instrumentos adecuados, reales y efectivos para que 
la participación pública ante los tribunales y remedios adecuados(eg.injunctions) 

artículo 20: legitimación solo por derecho e interés legitimo, individual o colectivo;

artículos 22 y 23 :  derecho a acción legal, para la aplicación de la legislación ma...
no requiere que el claimant tengo un interes directo/legitimo en la coa.

ce (art. 9.2)+ (art. 7.3 ley orgánica del Poder judicial):grupos/ongs pueden ser partes (contenciosas)
si tienen personalidad jca. 

artículo 24.1 ce: la legitimación activa, como requisito procesal, debe: 
1/estar prevista en una norma  jurídica; 
2/justificarse por una finalidad constitucional razonable y proporcionada; 
3/interpretarse en el sentido más favorable a la efectividad de los derechos fundamentales

las onGs ambientalistas pueden acreditar con más facilidad [que un grupo de ciudadanos sin personalidad
juridica], un interés legitimo , solo poniendo es la constitucion de la ong que el ma, es un
interes legitimo].... y esta legitimación no puede resultar ignorada por la ley 27/2006, 
ya que sería contrario a la legitimación por intereses legítimos colectivos reconocida a las onGs
 en el ordenamiento español : el artículo 19.h) ljca otorga legitimación a cualquier ciudadano 
en ejercicio de acción popular...  todos los ciudadanos estan legitimados para 
actuar en defensa de
la legalidad

DIF:

A/ el artículo 19.1.b) lrjca, que prácticamente reproduce el artículo 7.3 loPj,
otorga legitimación a las corporaciones, asociaciones, sindicatos y grupos
«que resulten afectados o habilitados legalmente» para la defensa de los derechos e intereses legítimos
colectivos[sus finalidades estatutarias]eg.asociaciones de protección
del medio ambiente, tienen locus....cocoo tiene locus

B/acciones popular: sólo pueden ser presentadas por las entidades habilitadas legalmente 
para la defensa de intereses legítimos colectivos.....cocoo no puede presentar una accion popular.

LA TUTELA JUDICIAL DEL ACCESO A LA INFORMACIÓN

art. 9.1 ca: «toda persona que estime que la solicitud de informaciones que ha presentado en 
aplicación del art. 4 ha sido ignorada, rechazada abusivamente, en todo o en parte, 
o insuficientemente tenida en cuenta,puede presentar un recurso ante un órgano judicial o
ante otro órgano independiente e imparcial establecido por la ley». vemos,
pues, que no se especifica los requisitos de legitimación para plantear dicho recurso

LA TUTELA JUDICIAL DEL DERECHO A LA PARTICIPACION

ca artículo 6: 
DOCAS publicas, que emergen de ciertas actividades, requieren la participación del público....si no,
se puede impugnar su legalidad (del contenido y/o la forma/procedimiento)

requisitos de legitimacion activa: 

i) publico interesado....el art. 2.5 ca incluye dentro del «público interesado» a las organizaciones
asociaciones o grupos constituidas exclusivamente para proteger los derechos afectados
eg. cuya constitucion dice «que trabajan a favor del medio ambiente». 
+
ii) tengan un interés para actuar (eg victims)....la legitimidad aqui, no se determina exclusivamente
 de acuerdo con las finalidades constit. de la ong.
por tanto, habrá que tener en cuenta el convenio sobre el reconocimiento de la personalidad
jurídica de las onGs, adoptado en el contexto del consejo de europa en 1986
o 
iii) invoquen un atentado contra un derecho (art. 9.2 ca).

case: 

la onG húngara Clean Air Action Group, mediante comunicación [ante el comite de cumplimiento
del CA], en 2004, alegando la violación de los artículos 6 y 9.2 y 4 del CA....en base a que
una ley hungara sobre interés público y desarrollo de la red ferroviaria de alta velocidad 
, infringia CA.... dicha ley, según la comunicante (ong),  
establecía la necesidad de demostrar un interés «considerable» del demandante,para tener locus.

el comité [de CA], consideró que la ley húngara no
contiene unos estándares inferiores a los exigidos por el ca...pero el comité recomendó :

1/que los paises firmantes deben abstenerse de 
, como en este caso, reducir los derechos que da el ca [acceso a la 
información, la participación pública y proteccion ambiental], incluso cuando no
conlleven la violación del convenio

2/ que las Partes que los hayan restringido, han de mantener esas restriciones
 bajo revisión constante, para evitar incumplimientos.

case:

tres onGs armenias enviaron una comunicación al comité de cumplimiento del CA, en la que
 alegaban la violación de los artículos 4, 6, 7,8 y 9.2 del convenio.

ongs: las decisiones publicas sobre cambio de uso de suelo, y zonificación del suelo,
 fueron adoptadas mediante decretos,
 por lo cual no se tuvo en cuenta la opinión del público y, de acuerdo con la legislación armenia, 
éstos no fueron publicados. 

ongs: estas son decisiones que, de acuerdo con la ley armenia,requieren evaluación 
de impacto ambiental. las ongs enviaron solicitudes de información a lasautoridades públicas
,sin recibir  respuesta satisfactoria;
los comunicantes demandaron la nulidad de tales decretos por violar el CA y la ley armenia.

esta demanda fue inadmitida por falta de jurisdicción del tribunal,
 ya que, de acuerdo con la constitución armenia, dichos
decretos sólo podían ser anulados por el tribunal constitucional armenio, y, según las
leyes internas, para ello únicamente se encuentran legitimados el Gobierno,
el Presidente y la asamblea nacional 

CASE:  STATE AID .  NGO V EU

EC : Brussels, 17.5.2023

ALP (anticorr law and policy)

How come military decisions are in the hands of those who invest in defrnce stocks or benefit directly or indir??..eg usa congresman are ibuying defence stocks are thry are spiking with the israel war

How come pandemic decisions are in hands or pharma [ make the decision] and on those who ptofit?

is not just immoral but supercorruption

Lobbying for war…by creating such profit incentives for wars to exist and prolong

Politicians should not be allowed to buy shares in firms that profit from war,,,should be ilegal, and IS in vio

Ation of codes of conduct…becos they r voted to protect the int of people .not their own int

(i) NCC

= non conviction confiscation = judicial confiscation for a criminal offence without criminal conviction =  “civil forfeiture”, “in rem forfeiture”, or “objective forfeiture”. In Spanish,  “extinción de dominio” and “decomiso sin condena” 

Confiscation is the  part of ar,  for permanent deprivation of property 

NCC can take place within criminal proceedings and may target individuals: in some cases, the assets of a convicted person, including those lawfully obtained, may also be subject to confiscation

‘Confiscation enhancements’ CE: permitting the confiscation of assets not connected to the crime. They are especially useful whenever the crime assets cannot be located or are unavailable <> COCOO will pap/foc v offender (res iudicata) , to seek the confiscation of non-crime assets of already prosecuted large firms/banks/govs/, for an equivalent value (to the crime assets)…and/or ask court to order [disgorgement= restit]

3/ attack:

• impose sanctions/debarment/suspension : 

-sanctions/debarment, in ODA funded contracting, are consulted by development practitioners and NGOs during the know your customer (KYC) and due diligence processes +. UN sanctions lists are also used by financial institutions and NGOs 

-debar/susp [from proc or non-procurement (for example: grants, cooperative agreements, loans, leases) ]: [even without a conviction/civiljudgment, debarment is possible just “based upon a preponderance of the evidence” for:

• • • wilfully violating contract terms
    • a history of poor contract performance
    • violating drug-free workplace laws
    • intentionally violating “made in America”product labelling regulations;
    • committing certain unfair trade practices
    • having delinquent taxes 
    • knowing failure by a principal to disclose certain types of misconduct
    • breach of:    clp + elp+ hrlp+ alp [eg:  breach of fatf and oecd guidelines [ncp: oecd national contact point], and breach of the [uncac = The United Nations Convention Against Corruption : Articles 12 and 14 call on States Parties to enact measures to identify bos behind companies] …..eg: failure to create (more transparent) BORS + [fatf fines+ targeted admin/crim sanctions] v firms/banks/nations, for failing to properly comply with BOR rules + for failing ddp , by doing business with a firm that did not disclose bos [the contracting firm failed to draft a proper ddp, thus disrupting clcp]

• ---

  COCOO WILL COOP WITH SAIS , V GOVS:  cocoo to threaten FIRMS/GOVS/BANKS, WITH REPORTING TO SAIS…EG ON GROUNDS OF DELAYED REPAYMENTS TO LENDERS….LENDERS COLLUDE [WITH THE COUNTRY’S MISREPRES OF THE FISCAL ACCOUNT], BECAUSE KNOW ABOUT THE MISREPRESENTATION, BUT THEY DO NOT COMPLAIN ABOUT THE DELAYS, AND DONOTCLAIMMONEYBACKFAST… SO AS TO MAKE SURE THAT SUCH COUNTRY WILL EVENTUALLY REPAY, AND KEEP FUTURE BUSINESS…eg. In Brazil, the Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU) is the SAI, established under the Constitution…TCU has the power to make a final verdict on the accounts of public resources. The sanctions which the TCU can impose are broad…..the rejection of a gov fiscal accounts, is one of the most severe sanctions….eg the rejection of President Rousseff’s fiscal accounts in 2015 was considered grounds for a possible impeachment. TCU found that Rouseff’s government had systematically delayed repayments to Brazilian lenders (US$11.6 billion)…..thus misrepresentating brazil’s fiscal account [appearing to be healthier than it was]

• ---

  ML [presumption applies]:

[ eu directive 2018 + FATF + Article 23 of (UNCAC)], and in many countries, like france:   ml is a stand-alone offence [ unlike focs, there is no need to have a prior conviction]

-presumption of ml =   the [source=operation] : [ investment, concealment or conversion] of funds, is presumed illicit, if either the:

• • • a. material conditions
    • b. legal conditions 
    • c. financial conditions: eg. unnecessarily complex financial vehicles lacking economic rationality

have no other justification than to conceal either:

• • • • a. the asset/income origin
      • b. the bo

• ---

  cocoo to challenge firms that cheat on carbon credits +  press for proper public accountability, oversight and governance….see the 2013 report by Interpol :  ways of manipulating carbon measurements, to fraudulently claim additional carbon credits

-iat admits NGO (as amicus) submissions in Gabriel Resources’ claim against Romania 
concerning mining  projectthe Canada-Romania BIT (the BIT). Gabriel Resources’ allegations of
 breach of the BIT arise in relation to a proposed open pit mining development in Roşia Montană,
 Romania (the Project) which was not implemented However, the Tribunal denied admission to 
arguments on the law, as well as references to or reliance on testimonies which could not be
 tested by cross-examination. The Tribunal also rejected the NGOs’ request to attend and 
participate in the oral hearing 

• ---

  COCOO: identify firm sentences against fbig (firmsbanksindivsgovs), for ccpm (compliancecorrprevmeasures) failures…then identify fbigs that keep failing to ccpm because of :

eg. fbigs’ accounting practices

eg. fbig’s [whether sentenced or not!] TAS (tax avoidance schemes), causing ongoing failure to properly account for bribery 

eg. fbig’s failing to pay alimony [financial support ordered by court]

eg. fbig’s [or individuals thereof] illicit enrichment

eg. fbig’s [or individuals thereof]in breach of the principles of public administration [<> PUBLIC LAW]

1/ electoral power inequalities, giving unfair electoral advantage to incumbents, compromise the integrity of an election, reduce public trust in the legitimacy of the process and its outcomes, 

2/CLCP BREACH: An incumbent’s ASR distorts/harms/anihilates free and fair political competition (<>cpcl):

• • • PP rivals are restricted their ability to raise funds and exposed to criminal sanctions. Therefore, those implementing political finance reform implement laws and regulations to regulate themselves (COI)
    • Democratic political systems need to be competitive systems, and this requires the political system regulating parties to be based on equality and operate in an unbiased manner 
    • legislative discretionary spending [LDS]: incumbent or dominant pps or coalitions engage in pork-barrel spending of discretionary funds -eg grants- [to support their constituents only]…So the constituents keep voting for them…..most of eu grants etc are granted by eu elected representatives, to their consitutents, to perpetuate themselves in the eu 

• COCOO V COL ETC:

THE BRITISH FINANCIAL EMPIRE = financialisation of finance

As the british empire started to collapse, the brits decided to create a cobweb of financial jurisdictions [offshores], to conceal their crimes [and the crimes of escobar etc who also use these cobwebs]. 99.9% of banks offshore clients [indivs/corps] are involved in:

market rigging, coi nondisclosure, arms trading, illicit pp donations, contract kickbacks, fraudulent invoicing, trade mispricing, bribery and tax evasion…. moreover, these corps are then rewarded with public proc. contracts.

Despite the Panama papers leak (that prompted the setup of the panama commission), authorities are still unable to enforce the law, because the assets belong to a few, but very powerful [the elite] who are also within gov [eg hmrc], and lobbying, thus Democracy is a fake. COL has the uk gov and offshore govs, totally captured

<> cocoo: corps with offshore assets should not be eligible for proc +  setup public bors in all jurisdictions of the world. + disclose lobbyists/gov with offshore assets

COL is a state within the state, as COL is goverened by the Corporation of London [ a liability firewall to insulate from their economic crime]. COL has:

-col has private tribunals and police;  Lord Major, different from London’s major; absence of democracy [col lord major is nominated by the col corps, and not by residents]; a permanent member in the house of commons; in the heart of col is the bank of england [regulator + central bank];

-col has 40% share of the world’s financial market;

<> cocoo: col’s liable for ADP

-col has exemption from most uk laws/regs, so that can decide policies contrary to uk’s

<> cocoo:  what’s the impact of col’s policies in uk’s policies (cl,al, ehr, el)??

col strategy:

a legal fiction where economic transactions take place in the city of london [COL], and not on the offshores. Assets are not really in the offshores, but in col. why? because ow, the dollar and pound would drop, and the currencies of the offshores would rise in proportion….however, uk chooses not account for offshore asset figures into the uk BOP (balance of payments), on the basis that this figure belongs to the offshores.

col advertises itself to foreign banks as a liability firewall: confidentiality; no investigation; secrecy; ….the assets (money+goods = 50 trillion dollars, ownership of best real estyate, artworks, cars etc) are in Trusts. fictionally deposited in offshores [former brit empire colonies], via Trusts [fideicomisos]. The fiduciary/fideicomisary = settlor of trust, hands the assets to a trustee (usually a lawyer), so that the fiduciary becomes legally insulated from the assets, thus with no o.to pay tax, no o.to disclose asset origin, no liability….how?  because there is no regulatory body or obligations to disclose the trust agreement existence and content….uk/usa keep blocking in the UN, the applications from developing countries for the creation of a UN transparent intl. organisation for taxation with enforcement powers that would end the offshore fraud

<> [cocoo v uk/usa for unlawful decision to block in UN, these proposals….

 Trusts are therefore invisible agreements for the trust to administer the assets, which each trust does by setting up a large number of shell companies in offshores of different jurisdictions. this is so that the cobweb is impossible to untangle.

banks are now willing to partially [iea: info exchange agreements, between offshores and uk/eu/usa] end banking confidentiality because it allows them to capture a larger market share of the global banking sector.

the uk gov dismisses the situation by arguing that they lack the power to intervene to end offshore criminality [eg by ordering public bors] on the basis that they are indep.juridictions……. the uk gov lies.  they do have that power and could enforce it overnight, since the offshores are not really indep.jurisdictions: uk gov appoints their governors, etc…and uk can veto their laws/regs……the uk therefore has to communicate their orders to the offshore governors via subtle, codified secret language, during a cup of tea in the home office …cocoo: just like firms plotting anticomps during meetings at TAs.

the bank of england, as banking regulator, is failing to prosecute for fraud all uk based banks [all setup and use offshores]

<> cocoo will press for the prosecution of banks based in the offshores

the biggest loser is africa, as their NS (natural resorces) keep getting depleted, and the resulting assets keep falling into these cobwebs, while to africans suffer poverty….. the total african assets on these cobwebs is 5 times bigger than africa’s external debt: 200 billion….thus, africa is really a creditor

people in uk/usa also do not benefit, since these assets are not used by uk/usa banks to invest in local industry, but just to speculate in real estate and in the stockmarkets.

The PFI [private financial initiative]:  private sector (elite) to lend for infrastructure (schools, bridges, hospitals…), over 30 years, with repayment 5 times higher than if gov[bank of england] had lent….. is a giant scam, implemented by the big 4 accounting/auditing firms [who have staff infiltrated into hmrc]….incredibly, hmrc offices are property of offshore corps, via a company called mapley steps.

<> cocoo v uk , for failing to act in the wpi, by prioritising the interests of the elite, over the citizen’s…eg by use of pfi etc….. cocoo proposes these measures to end the offshore fraud:

• procurement banned for corps operating/connected to offshores
• speed up introduction of worldwide public bors, for : trusts, corp ownership, and foundations.
• total transparency of transactions and fiscal agreements between corps and govs
• public reports of multinational corps in every country
• automatic exchange of info amongst all countries
• End secrecy in ownership of companies which acts as a barrier to detection and investigation of foreign bribery.
• Make enforcement statistics and case outcomes public to show how international corruption is being handled.
• Stop treating foreign bribery as a victimless crime and build in victims’ compensation into the enforcement process.
• Strengthen laws and enforcement systems to handle complex international corruption cases and improve international structures for cooperation.
• Explore increased liability of parent companies for the actions of their subsidiaries to help deter foreign bribery and related money laundering

Statistical evidence assists the parties in meeting their burdens of proof, but rarely will statistical 
evidence alone be determinative, specially in criminal cases

Based on leaked documents, such news stories, including the Panama Papers, Paradise Papers, 
Luanda Leaks, Open Lux, Pandora Papers

according to StAR (Stolen Asset Recovery Initative),(UNODC), and World Bank initiative, the number
 of countries pursuing cross-border asset recovery cases involving corruption proceeds is growing 
rapidly

how CSOs should prioritize their AR work:

1. The pre-judicial phase: before concrete corruption cases reach the courts or where investigations
 by authorities are not ongoing.
2. The judicial phase: as soon as cases reach the court system,including for example in initial 
freezing orders, and up until confiscation.
3. The return phase: starting from a court final decision and
including negotiations on the return of funds,and the transparent management of recovered assets.

According to the OECD, tax authorities worldwide identified in 2019 more than
80 million financial accounts held offshore by their residents, recovering
total assets of EUR 10 trillions....sources: tax avoidance, tax evasion, corruption

Stolen assets and corruption are human rights issues because acts of corruption have a negative impact
 on the realization of human rights

<> cocoo presents itself as a CSO with the objective of  defending against human rights violations
[MORE RESPECT to COCOO],originating from corruption/anticomps.
 
... SNs have human rights HR obligations [nder uncac and hra] to enter into anti-corruption
efforts and to seek the recovery (and to seek to coop) of stolen assets, in line with their human rights
obligations.....

<> cocoo claims that SNs failed to comply with these HR os.

WHY SNS SHOULD ALLOW COCOO TO ENGAGE IN ASSET RECOVERY:

Article 13 of the UNCAC : 
signatory countries should promote the active participation of individuals and groups outside the
public sector, such as csos, ngos, and community-based organizations, in the prevention of 
and the fight against corruption and to raise public awareness

+ OHCHR principle 2: Recommended Principles on Human Rights and Asset Recovery, which give
 importance to the role of CSO participation in ensuring accountability and transparency

+ HRA.

<> SNs that fail to coop with cocoo, of fail to fund cocoo,or to allow cocoo to propose policy 
and legal tools to assist AR, are in breach of their duty to promote the participation of csos [in AR]

1/ Tools and Support FOR CSOS:

CiFAR: https://cifar.eu/what-is-assetrecovery

Country Profiles / CiFAR: https://cifar.eu/country-profiles

Basel LEARN / ICAR (Basel Institute): https://baselgovernance.
org/basel-learn

Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative / World Bank and UNODC:
https://star.worldbank.org

Corruptionary / Transparency International: https://www.
transparency.org/en/corruptionary

Basel AML Index / Basel Institute: https://baselgovernance.org/
basel-aml-index

Financial Secrecy Index / Tax Justice Network: https://fsi.
taxjustice.net/en

2) QUESTIONS TO IDENTIFY ACTORS:

If international, which other countries are involved?

Do institutions use criminal proceedings, or are
institutions using non-conviction-based forfeiture?

Has the government engaged StAR in the case?

Who in your country is the lead governmental actor for
investigating cases of (grand) corruption?

Could other CSOs nationally working on anti-corruption
collaborate with you on asset recovery?

Is this actor - or a different actor - responsible for prosecuting
corruption?

Are there CSOs who work on social issues who could consider
collaboration on asset recovery?

Is this actor - or a different actor - responsible for
communicating with other jurisdictions on cross-border cases?

Who is responsible for coordinating on the recovery of stolen
assets?

Are there CSOs, journalists or research centres working on this
topic from the countries of destination or internationally?

Is there a dedicated asset recovery office?

Is data collected on asset recovery? Is it published?

Are there any coordination bodies established for high profile
cases?

Is there a mechanism established for managing frozen assets
and receiving confiscated and returned assets?

Are other jurisdictions involved in the case?

If yes, what departments are responsible for collaboration on the
investigation and prosecution stages?

Which departments are responsible for discussions around the
return of funds?

Is the government cooperating with a regional asset recovery
working group?

3) RISK AWARENESS AND PLANNING:

UNCAC recommends that countries should not only recognise
civil society work in anti-corruption, but also promote their active participation,
csos can face resistance from gov. 
csos inputs are not always seriously considered, for example, in policy design and implementation.

Personal and organisational risks can also be present, particularly for
those investigating cases of corruption involving powerful individuals or
those work on issues that may impact the lives of powerful individuals

in most countries, especially those practicing common law, SLAPPs (Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation) can be used to hinder public
participation through the threat of defamation law suits

At a more personal level, it is important to consider self-preservation,
home security and the protection of personal contacts such as family,
friends and colleagues

In addition to having a documented risk assessment, it is also advisable
to give a copy to someone in your organisation. In case something
does go wrong, others will be aware of it and will be able to trace back
possible leads or motives as to what may have happened.

csos start by identifying gaps/challenges highlighted by the national authorities:

A thematic report by UNODC published in 2021 presented a
compilation on the barriers and successes found in 53 country review AR reports 

CSOs should assess whether the country has sufficient laws and procedures to effectively conduct
asset recovery in the following areas, in order of relevance:

Pre-judicial phase

1. Prevention: risk assessment, relevant data publication and collection 
(beneficial ownership, politically exposed persons,asset declaration)
2. Detection of transfer of stolen assets
3. Legal and institutional framework, including domestic
interagency coordination

Recovery phase

1. Legislation and other measures for the return of proceeds to
requesting States.
2. Regulation of costs or means of deducting expenses
3. Protection of the rights of bona fide third parties in return
proceedings

Judicial phase

1. Procedures for the confiscation of assets
2. Direct recovery of property: mechanisms or legal basis for to
establish ownership of property, be awarded compensation or be recognized as the legitimate 
owner of property
3. Mechanisms for the transparent and accountable maagement of recovered assets

Return phase: 

-engaging lawmakers and institutions on the modalities for return
-advocating either for a specific use for returned funds, or
for procedures that allow greater transparency, accountability and participation, particularlyof victims

eg advocating for participation during negotiations, or for safeguards, or establishing
 a monitoring programme over returned funds, or releasing alternative reports analysing or
 auditing the use of returned funds, or engaging with legal and policy reform, to establish 
permanent mechanisms or for laws and policies
on how your country returns assets to other countries.

 COCOO to seek compensation for damages for corruption :

UNCAC article 35: entities or persons who have suffered damage as a result of an act
of corruption have the right to initiate legal proceedings , to seek compensation, against those
responsible .....if a human right is breached, the rights holder should be able to seek remedies
 from those responsible. CSOs should therefore consider how the money is to be returned and
whether there is adequate recognition of victims

french csos cases:

Teodorin Obiang, who had been suspected of having assets in France obtained through
the proceeds of corruption. As a sitting member of the executive
of Equatorial Guinea and the son of the president, neither guinea nor france dared 
...but Two French CSOs: Sherpa and Transparency International France, required the opening 
of a judicial investigation into the alleged misdoing....Despite resistance from authorities, the
csos convinced the Superior Court of Appeals that they could bring such a case
and allowed for the reversing the burden of proof, requiring
suspected perpetrators to prove the licit origin of his funds/goods.

A Peruvian NGO was able to successfully advocate for regulatory
changes that led to the adoption of a corporate leniency agreement.