complaint v DOJ

WRITE COMPLAINTS + 3PINT LETTER (samnote) TO THE LAWYERS OF all PARTIES + MEDIATION OFFER + PRO-BONO NON-RESERVED LEGAL ADVICE OFFER

EX: CAT:  coll.foc V GOOGLE:     notes: 3pint.application2cat    cat.coll.foc.v.google.GD.PDF   >> the coll.claim was granted permission and google chose not to appeal (to COA) >> cocoo will submit the coll.claim parties a proposed letter of intervention as a 3pint in support of Google….The class action lawsuit against Google, brought by Ad Tech Collective Action LLP, is filed under the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) with case numbers 1572/7/7/22 and 1582/7/7/23. Catribunal    A certification hearing was held from May 8 to 10, 2024, during which the CAT approved the claim to proceed towards trial.  Catribunal   The trial is anticipated to commence after 2025, though an exact date has not been set.   Reuters   The lawsuit alleges that Google abused its dominant position in the online advertising market, causing financial losses to UK publishers. The claim seeks damages up to £13.6 billion. Reuters

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Some appropriate approaches could include:

1. Demonstrating pro-competitive benefits of Google’s integrated ad tech stack
2. Providing evidence of dynamic competition in digital markets
3. Arguing for the application of effects-based analysis rather than rigid market definitions
4. Highlighting consumer benefits and innovation resulting from Google’s practices

The focus should be on constructive engagement with regulators to address concerns while maintaining ethical and legal integrity.

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Antitrust Division
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001

08.JANUARY.2025

Sent via email to antitrust.complaints@usdoj.gov.

Formal Complaint Challenging DOJ Decisions in Google Search and Ad Tech CasesDear Sir/Madam,

On behalf of the COCOO, we are writing to formally challenge the Department of Justice’s decisions in two cases against Google: the Search case ruling of August 5, 2024, and the ongoing Ad Tech case. We believe these decisions are based on flawed economic analyses and may result in unintended negative consequences for the digital economy and the public interest

Misapplication of Monopoly Standards

The DOJ’s approach relies heavily on narrow market definition and traditional measures of dominance that fail to account for the dynamic, multi-sided nature of digital markets. As Professor Louis Kaplow argues, market definition often conflates empirical questions of market power with legal policy judgments

2.Overlooking Consumer Choice and Innovation

The rulings underestimate users’ ability to switch search engines and ad tech providers easily. Google’s market position is primarily due to superior product quality and continuous innovation, not anticompetitive practices. Professor Massimo Motta emphasizes the importance of dynamic efficiency in competition policy, particularly in markets driven by innovation

3.Inadequacy of Traditional Competition Tools

The Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test is inapplicable in zero-price markets like Google Search. This methodology overlooks the multi-sided nature of digital advertising platforms, where competitive dynamics depend more on data-driven efficiencies and advertiser satisfaction than on direct consumer pricing.

4.Pro-Competitive Benefits Ignored

The investigations overlook the pro-competitive benefits of Google’s integrated ad tech stack and revenue-sharing agreements (RSAs), which enhance efficiency, reduce transaction costs, and foster innovation. In Intel v. Commission (Case T-286/09), the General Court acknowledged that such agreements may have legitimate pro-competitive justifications.

5. Lack of Consumer Harm

The cases lack concrete evidence of consumer harm—a core requirement for antitrust violations. Google’s practices sustain free content for users and higher revenues for publishers, benefiting the broader digital economy. In Verizon v. Trinko (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court held that antitrust law does not obligate a dominant firm to lower natural barriers or aid competitors, especially in high-cost, innovation-driven markets.

6. Flawed Counterfactual Analysis

The DOJ’s speculative counterfactuals fail to reflect real-world market dynamics, underestimating competition from other platforms and misinterpreting Google’s role in enhancing ad tech efficiency.RecommendationsWe urge the DOJ to reconsider its approach in both cases:

1. Adopt a more nuanced, effects-based analysis that considers the realities of digital markets.
2. Recognize the role of innovation and quality in shaping market dynamics.
3. Consider the potential negative impacts of overly aggressive enforcement on the broader digital economy, including potential harm to small publishers and advertisers.

We remain available to provide further information or clarification on these matters.Sincerely,[Your Name]
[Your Title]
[Your Organization]

 

 

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The Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (The COCOO). UK Companies House Registration Number: 15466919. Address: 23 Village Way, Beckenham. Postcode: BR33NA.United Kingdom. Email: contact@cocoo.uk

05.01.2025

PROCEDURE

Third parties do not have standing to challenge a cma.ec.pus decision that is not final, (like issuing a SO = deciding to start an investigation)…However, interested third parties can submit comments or evidence to the CMA during its investigation.

• complaint (2cma) v cma decision (did cma condemn google?) >> later on, i can use the cma decis to FOC4dams4.bsd,  in a different case
ex: sept.24: cma decis: SOS issued to Google:  the Statement of objections sets out how Google may have broken competition law by using its dominance to favour its own ad tech services in open-display advertising.  The CMA will now carefully consider representations from Google before reaching its final decision.
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-objects-to-googles-ad-tech-practices-in-bid-to-help-uk-advertisers-and-publishers

• -complaint (2cma/ec) v any other U.V./illegal decis/omis by a regulator/PUS (ex: cocoo v reg/pus decis, on basis that is U.V./illegal becos enforces clp in a manner that is beyond the statutory powers conferred (by 1leg) to that reg/pus
– Later on, I have the option to start a different (but parallel) case. both have in common the same cma/ec decis. In this new case, I FOC4dams4.BSD (breach.stat.duty)
-ex: sep.24: ec decis to issue SOS to Google

https://www.justice.gov/atr/complaint-center:
-ex:US DOJ v Google (Search): 5 August 2024 – Judge Mehta’s ruling that Google illegally maintained a monopoly in online search.[1] Google is planning to appeal the decision, which could impact the timings of the case.
-ex:US DOJ v Google (Ad Tech): This is the second DOJ case currently unfolding against Google but this time against its abuses in the Ad Tech industry

• -complaint  (2ec) v member decis that violates EULAW >> later on, i can use the ec decis to FOC4dams4.bsd,  in a different case
EX: CNMC/SPANISH.PUS DECISIONS AGAINST GOOGLE>>EX: THE CNMC ESTA INVESTIGANDO GOOGLE. DESDE JUN.2024 TIENE UN máximo de 18 meses para la instrucción del expediente y para su resolución.La CNMC inicia un expediente sancionador contra Google por posibles prácticas anticompetitivas que afectarían a editoriales de publicaciones de prensa y agencias de noticias españolas. Las conductas investigadas podrían suponer la explotación abusiva por parte de Google de su posición de dominio en el mercado español.
• El abuso analizado consistiría en la imposición de condiciones inequitativas a las editoriales de publicaciones de prensa y agencias de noticias españolas.
• Las prácticas investigadas también incluirían posibles actos de competencia desleal que podrían afectar al interés público por falsear la libre competencia.
La CNMC ha iniciado un expediente sancionador contra Google LLC, Google Ireland Ltd., Google Spain, S.L. (Google) y contra su matriz Alphabet Inc., por prácticas restrictivas de la competencia prohibidas por los artículos 2 y 3 de la Ley 15/2007, de 3 de julio, de Defensa de la Competencia (LDC) y en el artículo 102 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea (TFUE) (S/0013/22). Por una parte, la CNMC investiga una serie de prácticas que podrían suponer un abuso de la posición de dominio de Google con respecto a las editoriales de publicaciones de prensa y agencias de noticias establecidas en España. En particular, estas prácticas consistirían la posible imposición de condiciones comerciales no equitativas a las editoriales de publicaciones de prensa y agencias de noticias establecidas en España para la explotación de su contenido protegido por derechos de propiedad intelectual.
Por otra parte, las conductas investigadas también incluirían prácticas que constituirían actos de competencia desleal que podrían falsear la libre competencia con afectación al interés público. Estas prácticas podrían infringir el apartado tercero del artículo 129 bis del Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1996, de 12 de abril, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley de Propiedad Intelectual, y podrían suponer la explotación de la situación de dependencia económica respecto a Google en que se encontrarían las editoriales de publicaciones de prensa y agencias de noticias establecidas en España.
Este expediente tiene su origen en una denuncia recibida en la CNMC por parte del Centro Español de Derechos Reprográficos (CEDRO).
A la vista de dicha denuncia y de la información recabada en el marco de la fase de información reservada, la Dirección de Competencia de la CNMC considera que existen indicios racionales de la comisión, por parte de Google, de posibles infracciones de los artículos 2 y 3 de la LDC, así como del artículo 102 del TFUE. La incoación de este expediente no prejuzga el resultado final de la investigación. Se abre ahora un periodo máximo de 18 meses para la instrucción del expediente y para su resolución por la CNMC.

• -complaint  (2ec) v privco/pus.ec… decis that violates CLP >> later, i can use the ec decis to FOC4dams4.bsd,  in a different case
-EX:  (case:proSpain): cocoo complaints against the ECT agreement, as IS CONTRARY TO CLP…, as it promotes stealth.cons and cartel behaviour by the smaller fish that circle the sharks >> COCOO: IF EC ALLOWS ECT, EC WOULD BE ACTING U.V./ILLEGAL
-EX: (case:proGoogle): cocoo complaints against the google ad.rivals (the claimants are privcos,little fish, that, to thrive, behave as a de-facto cartel ( an implied sust.ua that fails at least 1 of the 4Exempt.Conds.) + stealth.consolid. driver

• I COMPLAIN V EC =  complaint (2ec) v ec decision >> later, i can use the ec decis to FOC4dams4.bsd, in a different case
-EX: cocoo complaints to ec for its decis: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-objects-to-googles-ad-tech-practices-in-bid-to-help-uk-advertisers-and-publishers

• -complaint2 (euomb/ukparlomb) v privco/pus…that violates CLP or EU.uk LAW…but first, i need to complain to the eu.privco/pus. Omb decis is only a recommendation. no teeth.
EX: COMPLAINT V THE EC.CMA.SOSBT… DECIS on any of my complaints listed above.

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PERPLEXITY

[Your Law Firm’s Letterhead]
[Date]Competition and Markets Authority
The Cabot
25 Cabot Square
London E14 4QZ
United KingdomSubject: Formal Complaint Challenging CMA’s Decision to Investigate Google’s Ad Tech PracticesDear Sir/Madam,I am writing on behalf of Google LLC to formally challenge the Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) decision to investigate Google’s advertising technology (ad tech) practices. We believe this investigation is based on flawed premises and outdated economic frameworks that fail to account for the dynamic nature of digital markets.
Grounds for Complaint
1. Misapplication of Market Definition
The CMA’s approach relies heavily on narrow market definition, which is inappropriate for assessing competition in multi-sided digital platforms. As Professor Louis Kaplow argues, market definition often conflates empirical questions of market power with legal policy judgments
1
. The digital advertising ecosystem is highly dynamic, with competition from diverse platforms like Meta, Amazon, and TikTok, which the CMA’s narrow focus fails to capture.
2. Misinterpretation of Market Shares
High market shares in digital markets do not inherently equate to anticompetitive harm. In United Brands v. Commission (Case 27/76), the European Court of Justice emphasized that market definition must reflect economic realities. The CMA’s reliance on rigid market shares ignores the innovation-driven competition that shapes user preferences in the ad tech industry.
3. Inadequacy of Traditional Competition Tools
The Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test is inapplicable in zero-price markets like Google Search. This methodology overlooks the multi-sided nature of digital advertising platforms, where competitive dynamics depend more on data-driven efficiencies and advertiser satisfaction than on direct consumer pricing.
4. Pro-Competitive Justifications Overlooked
The CMA has failed to adequately consider the pro-competitive benefits of Google’s practices:a) Revenue-Sharing Agreements (RSAs): These agreements foster innovation and efficiency, benefiting consumers and device manufacturers. In Intel v. Commission (Case T-286/09), the General Court acknowledged that such agreements may have legitimate pro-competitive justifications.b) Integrated Ad Tech Stack: Google’s vertically integrated stack enhances efficiency, reduces transaction costs, and improves ad relevance, maximizing publisher revenue and advertiser ROI.
5. Lack of Consumer Harm
The investigation lacks concrete evidence of consumer harm—a core requirement for antitrust violations. Google’s practices sustain free content for users and higher revenues for publishers, benefiting the broader digital economy. In Verizon v. Trinko (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court held that antitrust law does not obligate a dominant firm to lower natural barriers or aid competitors, especially in high-cost, innovation-driven markets.
6. Flawed Counterfactual Analysis
The CMA’s speculative counterfactuals fail to reflect real-world market dynamics, underestimating competition from other platforms and misinterpreting Google’s role in enhancing ad tech efficiency.
Risks of Overregulation
The CMA’s approach poses significant risks:
• Harm to SMEs and publishers: Structural remedies could disproportionately harm small publishers and advertisers by increasing costs and operational complexity.
• Chilling effect on innovation: Aggressive enforcement could deter investment in the UK’s digital economy, discouraging innovation by both Google and its competitors.
• International policy divergence: The CMA’s approach risks misalignment with U.S. DOJ and EU investigations, potentially creating regulatory uncertainty that undermines the UK’s competitiveness as a tech hub.
Conclusion and Recommendations
We urge the CMA to reconsider its decision to investigate and adopt a more balanced approach that reflects the complexities of the ad tech market. We recommend:
• Revisiting the market definition to align with economic realities.
• Recognizing the pro-competitive justifications of Google’s practices.
• Adopting an effects-based analysis that evaluates actual harm to consumers and competitors.
• Considering the broader impact on innovation and the UK’s digital economy.
We remain committed to engaging in further discussions and providing additional evidence to assist in a fair and proportionate resolution.Yours faithfully,[Your Full Name]
[Your Position]
[Your Contact Information]
[Your Law Firm’s Name]
Share
Rewrite

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GPT:
Letter of COMPLAINT V cma

Here is the refined Letter of Complaint in favor of Google, integrating the key arguments and insights provided, including Kaplow’s critiques, Motta’s frameworks, and relevant case law:
[Your Address]
[City, State, ZIP]
[Date]
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)
The Cabot
25 Cabot Square
London E14 4QZ
United Kingdom
Dear Sir/Madam,
Subject: Formal Complaint Challenging CMA’s Findings on Google’s Ad Tech Practices
I am writing to formally challenge the CMA’s provisional findings against Google concerning its advertising technology (ad tech) practices, which I believe rely on an outdated and flawed economic framework. Specifically, the CMA’s approach hinges on rigid market definition and traditional measures of dominance that fail to account for the dynamic, multi-sided nature of digital markets. This letter provides an alternative analysis based on contemporary economic principles, supported by insights from legal and academic authorities such as Louis Kaplow and Massimo Motta.
1. Critique of Market Definition and Reliance on Market Shares
The CMA’s assessment of Google’s market power rests heavily on defining a narrow market and associating high market shares with dominance. However, as Professor Louis Kaplow argues, market definition conflates two distinct inquiries:
• The empirical question of how much market power exists, and
• The legal policy judgment of how much market power should trigger liability.
Such reliance on rigid market shares ignores the dynamic competition that exists in digital markets, including competitors such as Amazon and Meta. High market shares do not inherently equate to anticompetitive harm, especially in a market where switching costs for consumers remain negligible. Furthermore, market shares in digital ecosystems fail to capture innovation-driven competition, which is the primary force shaping user preference.
2. Inadequacy of the SSNIP Test in Zero-Price Markets
The Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test, used to define markets, is entirely inapplicable in zero-price markets like Google Search. This methodology overlooks the multi-sided nature of digital advertising platforms, where competitive dynamics depend more on data-driven efficiencies and advertiser satisfaction than on direct consumer pricing.
Alternative Approach: The CMA should instead adopt an effects-based analysis, which evaluates actual harm to consumers and competitors. This would include assessing price-cost margins, diversion ratios, and the broader economic impact of Google’s practices on innovation and consumer welfare.
3. Pro-Competitive Justifications of Revenue-Sharing Agreements (RSAs)
The CMA criticizes Google’s RSAs with device manufacturers and browsers as exclusionary. However, these agreements serve a legitimate purpose by ensuring consistency and enhancing user experience. Motta’s economic framework on vertical integration emphasizes that such agreements often foster innovation and efficiency, benefiting not only consumers but also device manufacturers, who reinvest their share of revenues into product development.
Moreover, no lock-in effect exists: consumers can easily switch default search engines, as demonstrated by the availability of competing search options like Bing and DuckDuckGo.
4. Dynamic Efficiency and Innovation Incentives
Professor Motta underscores the importance of dynamic efficiency in competition policy, particularly in markets driven by innovation. Google’s ad tech stack has enabled significant advancements in AI-driven ad placement and real-time bidding, generating higher revenues for publishers and better-targeted advertisements for users. Imposing structural remedies, such as forced unbundling, risks stifling this innovation, ultimately harming consumers and smaller advertisers.
5. Counterfactual Flaws in CMA’s Analysis
The CMA’s findings rest on speculative counterfactual scenarios that assume a perfectly competitive market absent Google’s practices. These scenarios fail to account for:
• The natural barriers to entry in digital markets, such as high fixed costs and network effects.
• The active competition from platforms like Meta, Amazon, and TikTok, which challenge Google’s dominance in specific niches.
Precedent from Verizon v. Trinko (2004) establishes that natural barriers and innovation-driven advantages do not constitute anticompetitive behavior. Without concrete evidence of foreclosure or harm to consumers, the CMA’s counterfactuals lack credibility.
6. The Risks of Overregulation
The CMA’s proposed remedies could have unintended negative consequences, including:
• Harming small publishers: By disrupting Google’s ad tech ecosystem, smaller publishers may lose access to efficient ad placement tools, reducing their revenue streams.
• Increasing consumer costs: If ad costs rise due to inefficiencies, this may translate into higher prices for goods and services.
• Stifling innovation: Restrictive interventions could deter investment in the UK’s tech sector, reducing its global competitiveness.
7. International Precedents and Policy Alignment
The CMA’s approach diverges from recent decisions by the French Competition Authority, which accepted behavioral remedies from Google to address competition concerns without resorting to drastic structural measures. Consistency across jurisdictions is crucial to maintaining a fair and predictable regulatory environment for global companies.
Conclusion and Request
In light of these arguments, I respectfully urge the CMA to reconsider its provisional findings and adopt a more nuanced, effects-based approach. Specifically, I recommend:
• Revisiting the reliance on narrow market definitions and market shares as indicators of dominance.
• Prioritizing consumer welfare and innovation in assessing potential remedies.
• Avoiding disproportionate interventions that risk harming competition, investment, and technological progress.
I remain available to provide further evidence or clarification to support this request.
Yours sincerely,
[Your Full Name]
[Your Contact Information]
This

======================
Your Law Firm’s Letterhead]
[Date]
To:
Competition and Markets Authority
The Cabot
25 Cabot Square
London E14 4QZ
Subject: Formal Complaint Challenging CMA’s Provisional Findings on Google’s Ad Tech Practices
Dear Sir/Madam,
We represent Google LLC and its subsidiaries (“Google”) in relation to the Competition and Markets Authority’s (“CMA”) provisional findings dated 6 September 2024, alleging anti-competitive conduct in Google’s ad tech operations. We submit this letter to formally contest the Statement of Objections, highlighting legal, factual, and procedural grounds, while underscoring the significant risks of negative externalities should the CMA pursue penalties or remedies based on these findings.
1. Legal and Factual Grounds to Challenge the CMA’s Decision
a. Market Definition and Dominance
The CMA’s narrow definition of the relevant market—“open-display ad tech”—artificially inflates Google’s dominance. The digital advertising market is highly dynamic, encompassing diverse platforms (e.g., Meta, Amazon, TikTok) and direct publisher-advertiser arrangements.
• Legal Precedent: In United Brands v. Commission (Case 27/76), the European Court of Justice emphasized that market definition must reflect economic realities. The CMA’s market framing disregards vibrant competition from multiple players, creating a flawed foundation for its findings.
b. Revenue-Sharing Agreements (RSAs)
The CMA’s characterization of RSAs as exclusionary fails to account for their pro-competitive benefits. RSAs provide mutual economic advantages for Google and its partners, enhancing consumer experiences through optimized ad placements and device affordability.
• Precedent: In Intel v. Commission (Case T-286/09), the General Court acknowledged that rebates and exclusivity agreements may have legitimate pro-competitive justifications. Similarly, Google’s RSAs foster innovation and market efficiencies.
c. Default Status and Consumer Choice
The CMA’s reliance on “default bias” overlooks evidence that consumers actively choose Google due to its superior search quality. Default settings do not foreclose competitors but reflect Google’s ability to meet user expectations better than rivals.
• Precedent: In United States v. Microsoft Corp. (2001), the court recognized that superior products can legitimately lead to market leadership. Default bias is not synonymous with coercion, and consumer choice remains paramount in Google’s success.
d. Economic and Technical Barriers Are Natural, Not Artificial
The CMA’s findings ignore the substantial investment required to replicate Google’s infrastructure, which represents a natural barrier, not an artificial one.
• Legal Insight: In Verizon v. Trinko (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court held that antitrust law does not obligate a dominant firm to lower natural barriers or aid competitors, especially in high-cost, innovation-driven markets like ad tech.
e. Absence of Demonstrable Consumer Harm
The CMA’s case lacks concrete evidence of consumer harm—a core requirement for antitrust violations. Instead, Google’s practices sustain free content for users and higher revenues for publishers, which benefit the broader digital economy.
2. Procedural and Evidentiary Concerns
a. Flawed Counterfactual Analysis
The CMA’s speculative counterfactuals fail to reflect real-world market dynamics. They underestimate competition from other platforms and misinterpret Google’s role in enhancing ad tech efficiency.
• Recommendation: A rigorous economic analysis should account for the competitive pressures from rivals such as Amazon and Meta, as well as the clear benefits to consumers and publishers.
b. Insufficient Evidence for Claims of Harm
The CMA has not established that Google’s RSAs or default search agreements have materially excluded rivals or harmed consumer welfare. Without such evidence, the findings lack the requisite legal and factual basis.
3. Risks of Overregulation and Negative Externalities
a. Impact on SMEs and Publishers
Structural remedies, such as forced unbundling, could disproportionately harm small publishers and advertisers by increasing their costs and operational complexity. These measures risk destabilizing the ecosystem that relies on Google’s tools for efficient ad placement.
b. Chilling Effect on Innovation
Aggressive enforcement could deter investment in the UK’s digital economy, discouraging innovation by both Google and its competitors.
• Precedent: In United States v. IBM (1969), the government recognized that overregulation in tech markets could stifle innovation, ultimately withdrawing its case to avoid such consequences.
c. International Policy Divergence
The CMA’s approach risks misalignment with the U.S. DOJ and EU investigations, potentially creating regulatory uncertainty that undermines the UK’s competitiveness as a tech hub.
4. Pro-Competitive Benefits of Google’s Practices
Google’s vertically integrated ad tech stack brings significant consumer and industry benefits:
• Enhanced Efficiency: Streamlined processes reduce transaction costs and improve ad relevance, maximizing publisher revenue and advertiser ROI.
• Innovation: Continuous advancements in AI-driven targeting benefit both advertisers and end-users.
• Support for Free Content: Ad revenues facilitated by Google sustain free or low-cost access to diverse digital content.
Conclusion and Recommendations
In light of the above, we urge the CMA to reconsider its provisional findings and adopt a more balanced approach that reflects the complexities of the ad tech market. We recommend:
• Revisiting the market definition to align with economic realities.
• Recognizing the pro-competitive justifications of RSAs and Google’s integrated stack.
• Exploring behavioral remedies, such as increased transparency in auction processes, instead of structural interventions that risk harming consumers and the digital economy.
We remain committed to engaging in further discussions and providing additional evidence to assist in a fair and proportionate resolution.
Yours faithfully,
[Your Full Name]
[Your Position]
[Your Contact Information]
[Your Law Firm’s Name]

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3pint. application to CAT

The Registrar
Competition Appeal Tribunal
Salisbury Square House
8 Salisbury Square
London EC4Y 8AP

Re: Application for Permission to Intervene in Case Nos: 1572/7/7/22 & 1582/7/7/23

Dear Sir/Madam,

We write on behalf of the COCOO to seek permission under Rule 16 of the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 to intervene in the collective proceedings brought by Ad Tech Collective Action LLP against Alphabet Inc. and its subsidiaries (Google).

1. Identity of The COCOO

The Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (The COCOO). UK Companies House Registration Number: 15466919 Address: 23 Village Way, Beckenham. Postcode: BR33NA.United Kingdom. Email: contact@cocoo.uk Phone: 07716601277
Our constitutional mandate is to quality-control, ex-officio, decisions by competition authorities, public bodies or firms, that could deter synergies and positive externalities, or harm competition, investment, consumer welfare or the public interest
COCOO is uniquely positioned to offer insights into how these proceedings will impact competition, innovation, and market efficiency.

2. Title of the Proceedings

The present proceedings are titled:
• Case Nos: 1572/7/7/22 and 1582/7/7/23
• Parties: Ad Tech Collective Action LLP (Proposed Class Representative) v Alphabet Inc., Google LLC, Google Ireland Ltd., and Google UK Ltd.

3. Address for Service

COCOO designates [Your Legal Representative’s Name] of [Firm Name], [Address], as its representative for these proceedings.

4. Issues Affecting COCOO

The allegations against Google focus on self-preferencing and vertical integration in its ad tech stack, raising questions about competitive dynamics in this sector. These claims, if upheld, could have significant negative consequences for publishers, advertisers, and consumers by disrupting an ecosystem that relies on innovation, interoperability, and efficiency.

5. Position in Support of Google

COCOO supports Google’s position and will focus on the following:

Undermining Class Certification
• Key Argument: Emphasize the lack of concrete and robust counterfactual scenarios. Claimants must prove a common loss across the proposed class, but the dynamic nature of ad auctions and varied publisher practices undermine this assertion.
• Strengthening with UK Context: Highlight the challenges claimants face in certifying an opt-out class under the Consumer Rights Act 2015. The Tribunal should reject speculative economic models that lack real-world substantiation, as evident from prior UK cases like Merricks v Mastercard​​.
2. Challenging Market Definition and Dominance
• Key Argument: Argue that the claimants narrowly define the market as “open web display ads” to artificially inflate Google’s dominance.
• Strengthening with UK Context: Introduce evidence that UK publishers use a range of ad platforms (e.g., Meta, Amazon) in addition to Google, highlighting vibrant competition. Stress that applying a rigid market definition risks misaligning UK competition policy with global norms​​.
3. Pro-Competitive Justifications
• Key Argument: Google’s practices result in innovations that improve auction efficiency and generate higher revenues for publishers.
• Strengthening with UK Context: Reference the French Competition Authority’s decision where Google’s proposed commitments were seen as restoring competitive market functioning. Stress that applying similar remedies in the UK ensures consistency without undermining economic efficiency​​.
4. Attacking Methodology and Quantification of Damages
• Key Argument: Claimants rely on speculative damages models that do not account for real-world complexities in ad auctions.
• Strengthening with UK Context: Use expert evidence to show how UK publishers might have benefited from Google’s innovations, offsetting alleged losses. Highlight flaws in using aggregated models to infer damages for heterogeneous publishers​​.
5. Leveraging Google’s Previous Commitments and Compliance
• Key Argument: Google has demonstrated goodwill by adhering to commitments accepted by the French Competition Authority, improving interoperability and transparency.
• Strengthening with UK Context: Stress that imposing additional remedies in the UK risks overregulation and could harm small publishers by increasing operational complexity. Emphasize that Google’s ongoing commitments should suffice to address concerns without disrupting the market​​.
Broader Implications for UK Competition Policy and Economy
• Risk of Overregulation: Highlight that a decision against Google could embolden interventionist policies by the CMA, deterring foreign investment and innovation​.
• Economic Impact: Point out that structural remedies could disproportionately harm small UK publishers, reducing their competitiveness and threatening content diversity.

To develop a strategy for defending Google in these collective proceedings related to its alleged anticompetitive practices in ad tech, we need to focus on:
• Undermining the Class Certification: Emphasize the technical and legal deficiencies in the claimant’s methodology for proving class-wide harm, such as the lack of robust counterfactuals and reliance on speculative damages models​​​.
• Challenging Market Definition and Dominance: Argue that the market definitions provided by the claimants are overly narrow or artificial, thereby challenging the assertion of Google’s dominant position​​.
• Highlighting the Pro-Competitive Justifications: Stress that Google’s integration of its platforms, such as DFP and AdX, results in efficiency gains and better outcomes for publishers and advertisers​​.
• Attacking Methodology and Quantification of Damages: Criticize the claimant’s reliance on flawed economic models that lack real-world data and fail to properly estimate damages​​.
• Building on Previous Settlements and Compliance: Reference Google’s commitments in similar cases (e.g., the French Competition Authority) and highlight ongoing compliance efforts to show goodwill and mitigate allegations of willful misconduct​​.

(a) Economic Efficiency and Total Welfare (Motta’s Framework)
• Key Point: Motta’s framework highlights that competition policy should aim to maximize total welfare, considering both consumer and producer surplus.
• Defense Argument: Google’s vertically integrated ad tech stack reduces transaction costs, enhances real-time bidding, and ensures seamless ad delivery, which collectively boost efficiency and benefit publishers and advertisers. Unbundling these services would likely disrupt these efficiencies, leading to higher costs and reduced functionality for smaller players.
• Illustration: Use case studies demonstrating how SMEs benefit from Google’s integrated services, which they cannot replicate independently due to cost and complexity constraints.
(b) Dynamic Efficiency and Innovation Incentives
• Key Point: Dynamic efficiency drives long-term innovation and market competitiveness, an aspect crucial to the fast-evolving digital advertising sector.
• Defense Argument: Google’s integration fosters innovation in AI-powered ad optimization, benefiting both publishers and advertisers. Remedies like forced separation could stifle this innovation, harming the market in the long term.
• Illustration: Highlight Google’s innovations in targeting algorithms, which have increased ad relevance and consumer engagement, showing how these innovations would slow under restrictive remedies.
(c) Counterfactual Challenges and Methodological Flaws
• Key Point: Counterfactual analysis is vital in competition cases but must be robust and realistic.
• Defense Argument: The PCR’s counterfactuals assume an idealized, highly competitive market without substantiating how competition would naturally evolve without Google’s alleged abuses. They fail to account for network effects, economies of scale, and the competition from platforms like Meta and Amazon.
• Illustration: Use Motta’s analysis to critique these assumptions and provide alternative scenarios that reflect the complexities of digital markets.
(d) Two-Sided Market Dynamics and Consumer Welfare
• Key Point: Digital advertising markets are two-sided, where efficiencies for advertisers indirectly benefit consumers through free or lower-cost services.
• Defense Argument: Google’s ability to optimize ad delivery benefits consumers by supporting free platforms like YouTube and Search. Remedies disrupting this balance risk reducing consumer welfare through higher advertising costs and less innovation.
• Illustration: Present data showing how lower ad costs on Google’s platforms sustain free consumer services and incentivize content diversity.
Contribution to the Tribunal’s Deliberation
COCOO’s intervention will provide:
• Economic Analysis: Evidence-based assessments of vertical integration and its benefits.
• Critique of PCR’s Models: Addressing the speculative and flawed methodologies in the counterfactual scenarios and damages calculations.
• Policy Implications: Highlighting the risks of disproportionate remedies, such as overregulation, which could harm the UK’s digital economy and competitiveness.
Scope of Intervention
COCOO will focus on:
• Economic Impact: The effect of proposed remedies on market efficiency, especially for SMEs.
• Counterfactual Feasibility: Critiquing the PCR’s economic models and damages methodology.
• Policy Considerations: Balancing competition enforcement with the need for innovation and global competitiveness.

(a) Economic Efficiency and Total Welfare (Motta’s Framework)

Massimo Motta emphasizes that competition policy should maximize total welfare, balancing consumer and producer surplus. Google’s vertical integration generates significant efficiency gains by reducing transaction costs, enhancing real-time bidding, and facilitating seamless ad delivery. Remedies such as unbundling risk harming these efficiencies, which could reduce total welfare by increasing operational complexity and costs for smaller market players.

(b) Dynamic Efficiency and Innovation Incentives

Google’s integration of ad tech services fosters dynamic efficiency by enabling continuous innovation, particularly in AI-driven ad optimization. Motta highlights the risk of chilling effects on innovation when competition enforcement targets practices that enhance efficiency and benefit consumers. Disruptive remedies could slow innovation and harm both publishers and advertisers reliant on Google’s tools.

(c) Counterfactual Challenges and Methodological Flaws

The PCR’s claims rest on speculative counterfactual scenarios that assume a highly competitive market without Google’s alleged abuses. These counterfactuals fail to account for the complexity of digital advertising markets, including network effects, economies of scale, and competitive pressure from alternative platforms (e.g., Meta, Amazon). Motta’s work underscores the need for robust economic evidence when assessing counterfactuals, which is lacking in this case.

(d) Two-Sided Market Dynamics and Consumer Welfare

Digital advertising operates in a two-sided market, where efficiencies on the advertiser side indirectly benefit consumers through lower prices and free services (e.g., Google Search, YouTube). Remedies that undermine Google’s ability to optimize both sides of the market could lead to higher costs and reduced consumer welfare.

6. Contribution to the Tribunal’s Deliberation

COCOO’s intervention will assist the Tribunal by:

• Providing economic analysis of vertical integration benefits, drawing on Motta’s arguments to demonstrate how these efficiencies support publishers, advertisers, and consumers.
• Critiquing speculative counterfactuals and damages methodologies presented by the PCR, offering a grounded perspective on market realities.
• Assessing the proportionality of proposed remedies, advocating for less intrusive measures that preserve market efficiency while addressing competition concerns.

7. Scope of Intervention

COCOO will limit its intervention to the following areas:

• The economic impact of proposed remedies on market efficiency, particularly for SMEs.
• The adequacy and feasibility of the PCR’s counterfactual scenarios and damages analysis.
• Broader policy implications, including the risks of overregulation and reduced global competitiveness for the UK’s digital economy.

Conclusion

For the reasons outlined above, COCOO respectfully requests permission to intervene. Our unique perspective and expertise will provide valuable insights into the complexities of this case, supporting the Tribunal in its deliberation and contributing to a fair resolution.

We remain at the Tribunal’s disposal to provide further information or clarification.

Yours faithfully,

[Your Full Name]
[Your Position]

On behalf of COCOO

 

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Your Law Firm’s Letterhead]
[Date]Antitrust Division
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001Subject: Formal Complaint Challenging DOJ Decisions in Google Search and Ad Tech CasesDear

Sir/Madam,On behalf of [Your Organization], we are writing to formally challenge the Department of Justice’s decisions in two cases against Google: the Search case ruling of August 5, 2024, and the ongoing Ad Tech case. We believe these decisions are based on flawed economic analyses and may result in unintended negative consequences for the digital economy.

1. U.S. DOJ v. Google (Search)

Misapplication of Monopoly Standards

Judge Mehta’s ruling that Google illegally maintained a monopoly in online search fails to account for the dynamic nature of digital markets

Overlooking Consumer Choice

The ruling underestimates users’ ability to switch search engines easily. Google’s market position is primarily due to superior product quality and continuous innovation, not anticompetitive practices.

Potential Harm to Innovation

Enforcing this decision could stifle innovation and harm consumer welfare by discouraging companies from investing in product improvements that lead to market leadership.

2. U.S. DOJ v. Google (Ad Tech)

Mischaracterization of Market Dynamics

The DOJ’s case against Google’s ad tech practices mischaracterizes the competitive landscape. It fails to account for the presence of strong competitors like Amazon and Meta, which exert significant competitive pressure.

Pro-Competitive Benefits Ignored

The investigation overlooks the pro-competitive benefits of Google’s integrated ad tech stack, which enhances efficiency and reduces transaction costs for publishers and advertisers.

Risk of Overregulation

Aggressive enforcement in the ad tech sector could lead to market fragmentation, potentially increasing costs for small businesses and reducing the overall efficiency of the digital advertising ecosystem.

Yes, there are several legal precedents that could support a complaint against the DOJ’s decisions in the Google cases:

1. Verizon v. Trinko (2004): This U.S. Supreme Court case established that antitrust law does not obligate a dominant firm to lower natural barriers or aid competitors, especially in high-cost, innovation-driven markets
   1

   . This precedent could be used to argue that Google’s market position is due to natural barriers and innovation, not anticompetitive practices.

2. United States v. Microsoft Corp. (2001): The court recognized that superior products can legitimately lead to market leadership
   1

   . This could support the argument that Google’s success is due to the quality of its products rather than anticompetitive behavior.

3. United Brands v. Commission (Case 27/76): The European Court of Justice emphasized that market definition must reflect economic realities
   1

   . This could be used to challenge the DOJ’s narrow market definition in the Google cases.

4. Intel v. Commission (Case T-286/09): The General Court acknowledged that rebates and exclusivity agreements may have legitimate pro-competitive justifications
   1

   . This could support Google’s arguments regarding its revenue-sharing agreements.

5. United States v. IBM (1969): In this case, the government recognized that overregulation in tech markets could stifle innovation and ultimately withdrew its case
   1

   . This precedent could be used to argue against aggressive enforcement that might deter investment and innovation in the digital economy.

These precedents could be used to challenge the DOJ’s findings, arguing that they fail to account for the dynamic nature of digital markets, overlook pro-competitive justifications, and risk stifling innovation through overregulation

Recommendations

We urge the DOJ to reconsider its approach in both cases:

1. Adopt a more nuanced, effects-based analysis that considers the realities of digital markets.
2. Recognize the role of innovation and quality in shaping market dynamics.
3. Consider the potential negative impacts of overly aggressive enforcement on the broader digital economy.

We remain available to provide further information or clarification on these matters.Sincerely,[Your Name]
[Your Title]
[Your Organization]

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Based on the provided search results and the context of the US DOJ v Google (Ad Tech) case, here are the key arguments to include when challenging the DOJ’s findings:

Mischaracterization of Market Dynamics

The DOJ’s case against Google’s ad tech practices fails to accurately represent the competitive landscape. It does not adequately account for strong competitors like Amazon and Meta, which exert significant competitive pressure in the digital advertising market

.

Pro-Competitive Benefits Overlooked

The investigation does not sufficiently consider the pro-competitive benefits of Google’s integrated ad tech stack. This integration enhances efficiency and reduces transaction costs for publishers and advertisers, ultimately benefiting the entire ecosystem

.

Flawed Market Definition

Challenge the narrow market definition used by the DOJ. Argue that the digital advertising market is highly dynamic and encompasses diverse platforms and direct publisher-advertiser arrangements. A more comprehensive market definition would provide a more accurate representation of Google’s position

.

Absence of Consumer Harm

Emphasize the lack of concrete evidence demonstrating harm to consumers – a core requirement for antitrust violations. Google’s practices support free content for users and higher revenues for publishers, benefiting the broader digital economy

.

Innovation and Efficiency

Highlight Google’s role in driving innovation in the ad tech sector, including advancements in AI-driven ad placement and real-time bidding. These innovations generate higher revenues for publishers and better-targeted advertisements for users

.

Risk of Overregulation

Argue that aggressive enforcement in the ad tech sector could lead to market fragmentation, potentially increasing costs for small businesses and reducing the overall efficiency of the digital advertising ecosystem

.

Natural Market Barriers

Emphasize that any barriers to entry in digital markets, such as high fixed costs and network effects, are natural rather than artificially created by Google. Cite the Verizon v. Trinko (2004) precedent, which establishes that natural barriers and innovation-driven advantages do not constitute anticompetitive behavior

.

Effects-Based Analysis

Advocate for an effects-based analysis that evaluates actual harm to consumers and competitors, rather than relying solely on market shares or theoretical models. This approach would provide a more accurate assessment of Google’s impact on the market

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The potential long-term effects on the tech industry if Google is forced to change its practices could be significant and far-reaching:

Innovation and Investment

• Chilling effect on innovation in the ad tech sector, as companies may become hesitant to develop integrated solutions
  1
• Reduced investment in R&D across the tech industry due to fears of regulatory scrutiny
  1

Market Structure

• Fragmentation of the ad tech ecosystem, potentially leading to increased costs and reduced efficiency for advertisers and publishers
  1
• Emergence of new players in the digital advertising space, possibly leading to a more diverse but less integrated market
  1

Consumer Experience

• Potential reduction in the quality and relevance of online advertisements, affecting user experience
  1
• Possible increase in costs for digital services that are currently free, as companies seek alternative revenue streams
  1

Competition Dynamics

• Shift in competitive landscape, with smaller players potentially gaining market share
  1
• Increased scrutiny on other large tech companies, potentially leading to a more cautious approach to product integration and expansion
  1

Global Tech Leadership

• Risk of undermining the UK’s competitiveness as a tech hub due to regulatory uncertainty
  1
• Potential misalignment with global tech policies, creating challenges for international companies operating in the UK market
  1

These effects could reshape the tech industry’s approach to innovation, market strategy, and user engagement, potentially altering the trajectory of digital advertising and related technologies for years to come

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The potential consequences for consumers if Google is restricted by the DOJ’s decisions could be significant:

Reduced Quality of Search and Ad Services

• Consumers may experience less relevant search results and advertisements if Google’s ability to use integrated data across its services is limited.
• The quality of free services like Google Search could decline if Google’s revenue from advertising is significantly impacted.

Potential Increase in Costs

• Some digital services that are currently free might start charging fees if Google’s ad revenue model is disrupted.
• Advertisers may face higher costs, which could be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices for goods and services.

Less Innovation

• Restrictions on Google’s practices could lead to reduced investment in research and development, potentially slowing down innovations that benefit consumers.
• The chilling effect on innovation could extend beyond Google, affecting the broader tech industry’s willingness to develop new consumer-friendly products and services.

Fragmented User Experience

• If Google is forced to unbundle its services, consumers might face a more fragmented digital experience, requiring them to use multiple platforms for tasks currently integrated within Google’s ecosystem.

Reduced Access to Free Content

• Publishers relying on Google’s ad tech might struggle to monetize their content effectively, potentially leading to less free content available online for consumers.

Privacy and Data Security Concerns

• Changes to Google’s data practices could have unintended consequences for user privacy and data security, depending on how new regulations are implemented.

While these potential consequences are significant, it’s important to note that the actual impact on consumers would depend on the specific restrictions imposed and how the market adapts to these changes

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