FUNDING FOR COCOO


https://petition.parliament.uk/archived/petitions/240598


TI:   list of donors


It is our policy to list all donations over €1,000 and publicly disclose these. Below is a list of donors that supported the secretariat (including Transparency International EUFriends of Transparency International and the International Anti-Corruption Conference) with contributions exceeding €1,000 in 2021.

<> SO TI IS BASICALLY DONATING TO ITSELF…AND GENERATING GIFT AID????

Further information is available in our audited financial reports.

Government agencies

Multilateral institutions

Foundations and trusts

Corporate donors

  • Siemens AG (Siemens Integrity Initiative)
  • Velik AB

Coalition partners

Other donors

Individuals
We would also like to warmly recognise all our individual contributors and other donors, who support our work in the fight against corruption.

  • Patrick Glennie*
  • Rolf Hellenbrand*
  • Johann P Jessen*
  • Giovanna Longo*
  • Nicolas Nemery*


         


  bn 71000798637       03000 123 000    cafdonate@cafonline.org

CAF ID 2166551 – PADI



CSO funding: CSOs may consider raising the question whether a fraction of 
fines levelled against corporations fuelling corruption, or a fraction of 
recovered assets, should be reserved in a fund to support csos

< > COCOO SEEKS CP CHANGE by Crowdfunding WPI JR 

jr is the primary means of WPI litigation in the UK….but two claim funding issues 

A-budgeting to pay the other side’s costs if the claim fails

B- paying their own legal fees and expenses:

    •  own funds
    • legal aid grant: Legal aid grants come with a level of costs protection too.
    • Before the event insurance policies (typically included in home and motor insurance policies) are ill-suited to jr , or other nonmonetary claims where remedies are discretionary
    • cfa
    • litigant in person

…about £10,000 for a 2 hour jr straightforward case… much higher for a more complex matter….A moderate claim lasting a day and not brought against a central government department” would run in excess of £40,000, plus VAT. …a “substantial two day judicial review costs will run to £80,000 and £200,000.


solicitors bill at hourly rates, or at a fixed fee (for the whole case or for stages of it), or a combination of both.

success fees are not recoverable from the defendant, but must instead be paid by the claimant. Given the non-monetary nature of judicial review, the prospect of paying a success fee often makes a CFA unattractive… thus, Fixed fees are often charged in conjunction with a CFA


  • – pap settlement
  • – apply for ‘reputation greenwashing’ grants/donations from perpetrators….eg. TI applying to sii[siemens integrity initiative], for grants [legally blackmail], to be granted in exchange for ti’s silence 
  • -APPLY FOR AN LFCC [loanfundedconsultancycontracts]. :   THE MDB (eg ebrd) LOANS TO PADI.  PADI PAYS ME FOR MY LEGALADVICE. THEN, PADI REFUNDS THE MDB, MINUS EXPENSES [EG: LEGAL REPRES/ADVICE…]
  • – COCOO as a lobbyist wolf, [dressing as a charity sheep that has no o.to be in any transparency register] , to RAISE FUNDING FROM FIRMS/GOVS for changing certain public policies/laws/regs…..The transparency register is voluntary…but…. to meet commissioners, cabinet members or directors-general, or be eligible for an access pass to the EP, a lobbyist must be listed on the register <> COCOO WILL REGISTER!
  • -cocoo can also offer contract advice to african govs and to alsf:  African Legal Support Facility

The GI-ACE research programme funds research projects with support from UK aid.<> COCOO WILL APPLY

ace.globalintegrity.org


crowdfunding

online donations are made to a collective pot [third-party fund]..Two organisations in the UK currently offer jr crowdfunding:

CrowdJustice requires that every individual or group taking a case either pay a qualified solicitor or barrister, or that the case is being taken by a non-profit, and then leaves it to “campaign” to persuade donors…..

uses the resources of its Director


CrowdJustice

does not offer any legal advice. is just a platform for case owners (those seeking funding) to publicise and fundraise for a prospective case. Case owners, develop a webpage setting out details of the case for which funding is sought, a target amount, and a deadline for raising it. The page is typically publicised through social media and online donations are accepted. If the target is met, then funds are transferred into the case owner’s solicitors’ client account. CrowdJustice takes a 6% “platform fee,” plus VAT, from the overall total raised. The payment process also has a charge of 1.7% plus 20p per pledge. If the case owner’s target is not met, CrowdJustice do not take a fee, pledges are cancelled, and backers’ cards are not charged. If the case proceeds, any funds that are unused at the conclusion of the case are returned to CrowdJustice. The case owner can elect to put such unused funds towards another case on CrowdJustice, or failing that, they are donated to the Access to Justice Foundation.


The Good Law Project

 is a political project using litigation to drive the demand for change. It has particular areas of interest, including tax, workers’ rights, and Brexit

the Director seeks [< > cocoo helps him] potential cases which meet the Project’s case selection criteria, secures pro bono advice from counsel, and seeks solicitors and counsel… and then crowdfunds before claim stage.

The first case the Good Law Project was decided by the Supreme Court in Miller:

After the Article 50 argument was floated in an online blog, Maugham crowdfunded initial advice, but the Good Law Project did not take part in the litigation, also has crowdfunded a challenge to Uber’s alleged VAT avoidance (valued at around £1bn) and a challenge arguing that the Electoral Commission’s investigation applied the wrong test of law and was inadequate on the facts.


example of a crowdfunded judicial review in the UK is the junior doctors’ case:

The claimant group, Justice for Health, argued that a new contract imposed by the Sos for health, was “unsafe and unsustainable” and the sos—Jeremy Hunt MP—did not have the legal power to impose it.  the new contract changed the way doctors were to be reimbursed for weekend working…Health ministers argued that the contract was necessary to improve medical cover at weekends. Early on in the case, a costs cap was placed

The argument led to the first all-out strike in NHS history.   The claimants also argued that Mr Hunt’s approach lacked clarity and transparency, and that it was irrational to contend that imposing the contract would improve weekend care. The high court rejected all arguments,

the claimant, Justice for Health, was a company formed of junior doctors “directly affected by  the new contract.” They raised —£300,000—via CrowdJustice, based on donations by more than 5,000 donors. The litigation was led by an established public law firm


Another example of a case supported by crowdfunding—is Webster:

This case formed part of a string of cases, brought after the Miller litigation, which sought to challenge the notice of withdrawal [brexit] sent by the UK to the EU. After the claim was brought considerably out of time, permission was rejected on the papers as ‘unarguable.’ The claimants renewed their application at an oral renewal hearing, but still the court found the application to be totally without merit. held: the debate which the claimant seeks to promote belongs firmly in the political arena, not the courts

Remarkably, despite the merits of the case always being weak, the underlying crowdfunding campaign raised £190,000

It was also a campaign not conducted with much transparency— the arguments to be put and the key litigation documents were not made public.


costs capping order requirements:

  • – permission to apply for judicial review has been granted;
  • -are pi proceedings;
  • -without a costs capping order, the applicant would be acting reasonably by withdrawing

Proceedings are considered “public interest proceedings” only if:

  • an issue that is the subject of the proceedings is of general public importance;
  • the public interest requires the issue to be resolved;
  • and the proceedings are likely to provide an appropriate means of resolving it.

Egs of factors: the number of people likely to be directly affected; how significant the effect on those people is likely to be; and whether the proceedings involve consideration of a point of law of general public importance.

 If an cost capping order is made, a reciprocal cap must also be imposed

any application for a costs capping order is supported by evidence of the applicant’s financial resources

Some crowdfunding campaigns seize upon any initial “buzz” and raise as much as possible at the start. but reputation may be damaged by having to return funds (something which may not be logistically easy).

backers=funders,  “acknowledge and agree that [they] do not have, and [their] contribution (whether financial or otherwise) does not entitle [them] to have, any rights in or to any Case, including any ownership, control or rights to advise on the conduct or legal strategy of a Case.”

The purpose of this clause is so that funders are not held liable for in costs orders, since the exercise of some control over case management is what distinguishes a non-party [who may be subject to a non-party costs order], from a pure funder

the main distinction between crowdfunding and other types of online donation methods is that, with crowdfunding, donors become aware of each other through the “campaign.”… This, produces a “collective energy” ….. However, where a crowdfunding attempt fails, that could stand as evidence that the crowdfunding attempt is either a gimmick or lacks community support.

if the ability to fundraise from the community became  evidence of pi, would be sad.

two crowdfunding models:  inv.based: where investors have a financial stake in a monetary claim, and “noninvestment based”…. the former should be encouraged, but the latter constrained, so that only the most meritorious claims are brought



TYPES OF PAYMENTS FOR COCOO


Rewards schemes are not compensatory, as the reward is not based on any detriment suffered by the whistleblower. In the UK, detriment is addressed through the Employment Tribunal, where compensatory payments to the whistleblower can be uncapped.  If rewards schemes were compensatory this would create a dual-system and an unsatisfactory state of confusion

  • COMPENSATORY PAYMENTS:  LOCUS STANDI NEEDED BY A HARMED CLAIMANT…whistleblowers claims may succeed in tribunal, but their compensation swallowed up in legal fees.
  • REWARD PAYMENTS: [FROM FCA, SEC, CMA, ETC] are not compensatory, as the reward is not based on any detriment suffered by the whistleblower. In the UK, detriment is addressed through the Employment Tribunal, where compensatory payments to the whistleblower can be uncapped.  If rewards schemes were compensatory this would create a dual-system and an unsatisfactory state of confusion…..Under the Dodd-Frank Model [EG USED BY SEC] rewards are calculated based on the financial value of the information…BUT a fundamental principle of whistleblowing is upholding the public interest in every workplace, in every sector. The facilitation of rewards under the Dodd-Frank model does not reflect the value of the public interest, nor the harm suffered by the whistleblower – only the size of the catch they bring in.
  • EXPENSES PAYMENTS
  • DONATION PAYMENTS
  • RECOGNITION PAYMENTS
  • RESTITUTORY PAYMENTS (UNJUST ENRICHMENT)
  • ADVISERS/researchers to cost public involvement

RESTITUTION. usa

3 sources of civil liability: tort, contract, and restitution

One who voluntarily confers a benefit on another, which is to say in the absence of a contractual obligation to do so, has no legal claim to be compensated. . . .  If while you are sitting on your porch sipping Margaritas a trio of itinerant musicians serenades you with mandolin, lute, and hautboy, you have no obligation, in the absence of a contract, to pay them 

Section 2 of the R3RUE, entitled “Limiting Principles,”. [gen rule: no obligation to pay for unsolicited benefits]…. unless the circumstances of the transaction justify the claimant’s intervention in the absence of contract.”  … an “innocent recipient” may not have an obligation to pay for a benefit  he should be free to refuse….

-Chapter 3 of R3RUE is a catalogue of instances in which restitution is possible.

-R3RUE Sections 20 through 22:  restitution also needs that the claimant (cocoo) had an intent to charge for his services at the time that he rendered them

<> cocoo’s free unsolicited research [but charging fees for the legal opinion/advice], to a firm at urgent risk of being a victim/perpetrator, of anticomps/antiwpis, where such urgency [eg imminent harm to the firms, to consumers and/or rivals], justifies that cocoo had to volunteer such opinion/advice in the absence of contract, and the firm was not free to refuse cocoo advice, because had the firm not received it and acted on it, the wpi/clcp harm on consumers, firms reputation etc would have been larger….[thus, the liability in restitution will not prejudice the firm] 



COCOO TO APPLY FOR CMA REWARDS

CMA offers financial rewards of up to £250,000, for information about cartel activity

To contact cma cartels hotline on 0800 085 1664 or 020 3738 6888.You will immediately be put through to a voice mailbox. Please leave a message with your contact details and an investigator will try to respond to your call within two business days.

Alternatively email: cartelshotline@cma.gov.uk


Under the civil law (the Competition Act 1998), the CMA is able to fine companies up to 10 per cent of their turnover if they are found guilty of cartel activity.

Individuals who engage in cartel activity may commit a criminal offence and may be imprisoned for up to five years and may be given an unlimited fine.


The financial reward programme is really intended for ‘inside’ cartel informants. The CMA often receives complaints from businesses that their competitors or suppliers have been involved in anti-competitive activities and generally such complaints are not, for obvious reasons, able to be supported by significant ‘inside’ information about the cartel. a reward is highly unlikely for information based on general concerns about possible cartel activity by competitors – even if those concerns are backed up by at least some evidence.

IF CMA uses the information given, will be under an obligation (unjust enrichment?) to give a financial reward. thus, is best to discuss with cma in advance what information cocoo may be able to know how useful that information would be to cma, which will determine the amount of the reward.

Where a reward is available, its amount will depend on a number of factors:

  • the value of the information in terms of what we have been able to achieve from it
  • the amount of harm to the economy and consumers which we believe the information given has helped to put a stop to and/or has helped to disclose
  • the effort you have had to invest in order to give us the information
  • the risk you have had to take in order to give us the information.

It is important to understand that we won’t bargain over how much will be paid – but we do aim to pay a fair price.

only at the end of the cma investigation that they can give cocoo an exact reward amount. 

But we do promise to reimburse all expenses, as they are incurred.

We recognise that many people who want to give us information about cartel activity will only be prepared to do so if there is a guarantee that their identity as a ‘whistle-blower’ will not become known to third parties


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