HOW.2.GET.disclosure of lobbying records
(EX. of monies in and out related to a particular case being litigated)
1. The Office of the Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists: This office maintains the UK Register of Consultant Lobbyists, which records information on those engaged in lobbying activities.If you suspect lobbying related to the case in question, you can request public disclosure or file a complaint for investigation.How to Request Information:Submit a Freedom of Information (FOI) request to the Office of the Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists.Email: enquiries@orcl.gov.uk Website: Register of Consultant Lobbyists
2. Freedom of Information (FOI) Requests: If the lobbying records involve public authorities or government officials, you can file an FOI request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. How to Apply: Identify the government department or regulator that may hold the records. Submit an FOI request through their official FOI contact portal or email. Key Government Bodies to Consider for FOI Requests: | Government Body | Relevant Website / FOI Contact | |—————-|——————————–| | UK Parliament | www.parliament.uk | | HM Treasury | foi.requests@hmtreasury.gov.uk | | Department for Business and Trade | foi.requests@businessandtrade.gov.uk | | Cabinet Office | foi-team@cabinetoffice.gov.uk |
3. Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards: If the lobbying records relate to Members of Parliament (MPs) or All-Party Parliamentary Groups (APPGs), you can request an investigation through the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards.Contact: Email: standardscommissioner@parliament.uk Website: Committee on Standards
4. National Crime Agency (NCA) – If Financial Misconduct is Suspected: If the lobbying records involve potential financial misconduct, bribery, or improper payments, you can report it to the National Crime Agency (NCA) for investigation under the Bribery Act 2010 or Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.contact:Report Suspicious Activity: NCA Reporting
5. Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) – If Competition Law is at Stake If the lobbying relates to anti-competitive conduct, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) may have records or be compelled to disclose information if relevant to an ongoing case.How to Apply:Contact CMA’s FOI Team: foi@cma.gov.uk Request Competition Investigation Documents: CMA Investigations
6. Requesting Disclosure Through the Courts: If you are involved in ongoing litigation, you may apply for disclosure orders through the courts to compel parties to disclose relevant financial records related to lobbying.How to Apply: File an application for specific disclosure under Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) 31 if the case is in the UK High Court. If related to judicial review, seek disclosure under CPR 54. If needed for competition law proceedings, use the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) procedures.
= rns discls + UK BEST REGULATORY DB. Nightwish12 contact@
LOBBYING.HOW2LOBY4OI LOBBYING.APPGS LOBBYING.GOV.GROUPS LOBBYING.FINSENTIMENT.ANALYSIS. LOBBYING.UK.USA LOBYING.EU LOBBYING.EULAW.REGS LOBBYING.SI.UK LOBBYING.DISCOUNTING4INFLATION LOBBYING.INVESTIGATIONS.ORCL EXTS BY RENTSEEKING LOBBYING.LCON.LCOM LOBBYING.HOL2 LOBBYING.HOL1. LOBBYING.UES ALP INHOUSE SOLICITOR SQAL:CBI.BSI.FSB
-cocoo lobbies for taxes to be raised to tortfeasorPLCs, because tortdamages (if any litigated and awarded) is always insufficient to DETER (as most cmas.ec prefer ET1s (DETECTANCE) over ET2s (DETERRANCE). Also, victims are unlikely to litigate as they need to bear the cost and risk (except in col.claims but these take years to decide)…..For those reasons, cmas/ec/someRegs/cocoo have a stat.duty to promote clp in&out the UK, for the benefit of CONSUMERS. SIL+EEAC
regs’ COPs >> cocoo’s USP2regs+cmas to COMISSION COCOOS services to digout evidence of the financial benefits that they bring to consumers….why will they comission cocoo? becos we may disclose our own estimates of their COST2BUSINESS, DIRECT AND INDIRECT: DC2B. IC2B…and this is info they refuse to disclose.
cma discriterionary power [to decide to review, or not]. lobbying. PIL (better than ADR). ints. in shares (IIS). settlements. BAE. creditswisse.mozambique debt. COCOO’S 5 ALP strats. EA2002 undertakings how regulators fix prices <> wpfilelist SQUALS.USP UK.loobyLOOPHOLES FCA. OFWAT… the 3 CLP jurisdictions: Regulators. CMA.Concurrent (cma/Regs) noise filter MIMIND RCS(resp civil subsidiaria)<>Vicarious liab of PPs en espana locus de PPs LSE un=cocoo. pw=Nightwish12 RNS: i filter RNS by HEADCATS (headline categories) <> how to detect when a plc misrepresents (ex via RNS):
1-misrepresentation . ex via rns. 2-inferior disclosures. 3-failure2rns
<> ININ (10%SP CHANGE) = SPREAD (MAV/IV) <> EXISTING MATOIPO BREACH <> FLAWED VALUATION…ARE CMA.FCA FAILING TO REVIEW OR EVEN TO REFER?
REVMAs
<> coco argues: the SHELL has a COI >> request indep fairness opinion <> cocoo2offerUSP
-regs’ COPs >> cocoo’s USP2regs+cmas to COMISSION COCOOS services to digout evidence of the financial benefits that they bring to consumers….why will they comission cocoo? becos we may disclose our own estimates of their COST2BUSINESS, DIRECT AND INDIRECT: DC2B. IC2B…and this is info they refuse to disclose
-cocoo lobbies for taxes to be raised to tortfeasorPLCs, because tortdamages (if any litigated and awarded) is always insufficient to DETER. Also, victims are unlikely to litigate as they need to bear the cost and risk (except in col.claims but these take years to decide)…..For those reasons, cmas/ec/someRegs/cocoo have a stat.duty to promote clp in&out the UK, for the benefit of CONSUMERS. SIL+EEAC
Even after the merger has been assessed on clp grounds (using the mcr), the outcome of the transaction may still be subject to a sector-specific policy, prompting a PSA: PARALLEL SECTORAL ASSESSMENT (parallel to cma’s clp assessment) :
DIFF: CLP/sectoral.regulation
Regulation is a very general word covering many different types of public constraints on market behavior or structures. Some regulations are applicable to all sectors and must be taken into account by competition authorities when they enforce competition laws. This is, for example, the case with intellectual property laws. Because these laws confer important legal rightsto the innovators, they occasionally (but not necessarily) allow innovators to benefit from a dominant position on an economically relevant market.
there are some instances in which sectoral regulationsprevent competition authorities from enforcing competition law altogether. However, in many countries and in many regulated sectors competition law enforcement is also by sectoral reg.
The goals of sectoral regulations differ considerably from sector to sector. In telecommunication, electricity, gas, and rail transport, one goal of sectoral regulation is usually to open these sectors to competition. In other sectors, such as professional services, health services or environmental waste services, the goal of regulation is often to limit competition because of some perceived market failure. Finally, in some sectors the goal of the sectoral regulation is, at least in principle, not to promote or to restrain competition but rather to pursue some other social goal ( for example to protect consumers)……Thus, in some sectors, sectoral regulation and clp enforcement complement each other, while for other sectors, there is a contradiction of goals, leading to bad clp enforcement.
sectoral regulations and competition law enforcement may be complementary, even if they have different goals and they may sometimes contradict one another even when they share the same goal
case: The unresolved mystery of the Hydra: assessing merger control risk in the face of parallel transactions : merger parties wanting to avoid a cma review, need to be confident that their transaction does not give rise to an SLC under any realistic counterfactual – i.e. They need to know they can slay all the Hydra’s heads.. The cmas job is predicting the future. As we’ve written previously, the task of comparing two possible futures – one with, and one without the merger (the counterfactual) – is hard enough in the best of circumstances, especially in fast-moving markets. The assessment is even more complex when the sands are potentially shifting in multiple directions, as is the case when there is the prospect of another merger in the same market (a parallel transaction). So how do authorities disentangle multiple possible futures?
Parallel transactions are an often-overlooked area of risk for merger parties. Whether a parallel transaction is factored into the analysis will determine the “counterfactual” against which the transaction is assessed. A counterfactual that includes a parallel transaction, presents a more challenging situation for merger parties, as there would be less rivals left in that market.
parallel transactions (= the multi-headed Hydra SLC analysis) .
-in the uk, for mergers where a parallel transaction is in play, the only way to be confident of slaying the Hydra, is to engage with all potential heads of an SLC analysis…….<> COCOO TO UNMASK POT. UAS, to challenge SLC analysis/decis.
-in the EU, for deals which meet its mandatory and suspensory thresholds, the EC’s always follows the ‘first past the post’ approach: whichever party makes it first to the starting line (in either Phase 1 or 2) secures the counterfactual in which the parties in the parallel transaction are deemed independent players
in the uk, where there is no obligation to notify transactions (and where the legal threshold for finding competition problems at Phase 1 is too low), the ‘first past the post rule’ may affect the jurisdictional thresholds: a transaction which previously fell out of the CMA’s jurisdictional scope, could be brought into scope as a result of a parallel transaction (for example where the supply test is based on a fascia count).
however, when it comes to substantive (not jurisdictional) assessments, counterfactuals in parallel transactions are more difficult to predict. Depending on each case, the CMA will adopt either of these counterfactuals:
(i) prevailing or pre-merger conditions of competition;
(ii) stronger competition – e.g. where new entrants are expected; or,
(iii) conditions of weaker competition – e.g. where a competitor is exiting or critically for current purposes, merging with another competitor (i.e. a parallel transaction).
The CMA’s assessment of the counterfactual varies across Phase 1 and Phase 2, (becos they have diff. thresholds):
– At Phase 1, the CMA has a d.2.refer a merger which gives rise to a realistic prospect of an SLC. This threshold is very low and, as a result, the CMA adopts a restrictive, cautious approach to the counterfactual at Phase 1 (particularly when , if MA is cleared, there could be (stealth) consolidation (in an IMS). When the cma decision is a Phase 1 clearance, on a cautious basis, the regulator typically concludes that there is no realistic prospect of an SLC under either counterfactual – see, for example, Xchanging Holdings/Total Objects; Skanska Construction/Atkins; NASDAQ/LSE; and UCL/Royal Free London. …… In particular, where the CMA is presented with multiple potential counterfactuals and each of those scenarios is a “realistic prospect”, the CMA will assess the merger against the counterfactual in which the merger firms exert the strongest competitive constraint on each other, and where 3ps exert the weakest competitive constraints on the merger firms.
-At Phase 2, the substantive threshold is whether the merger gives rise to an SLC on a balance of probabilities. This higher threshold translates into the CMA selecting “the most likely conditions of competition” as its counterfactual against which to assess the merger.
(Merger Assessment Guidelines (MAGs): principle: the cma has o.2.consider.phase1.counterfactuals (with or without the parallel transaction), unless the parallel transaction may “clearly be ruled out as too speculative”. Thus, the CMA’s starting point, at least at Phase 1, is to assess(BA) a counterfactual in which a parallel transaction has completed. However, as the above cases demonstrate, the stage of the parallel transaction and the specifics of the case (e.g. whether there have been previous failed bids) are also relevant.
MAGs: in Phase 1, the CMA will consider “multiple potential counterfactual scenarios” provided each is a “realistic prospect” … “Significant changes affecting competition from 3ps, which would occur with or without the merger (and therefore form a part of the counterfactual), are unlikely to be assessed in the CMA’s counterfactual assessment” …. “The CMA seeks to avoid predicting the precise details or circumstances that would have arisen absent the merger.”
The CMA always tries to avoid publishing detailed assessments of the likely counterfactual <> COCOO TO REQUEST
TYPES of Cases considering parallel transactions:
1. Scenario 1: the parallel transaction has received all regulatory approvals >> the CMA considers the merged entity as a single player, regardless of whether closing has taken place. In Sika/MBCC, for its Phase 2 assessment, the CMA took into account a parallel transaction (Saint-Gobain/GCP) that received CMA clearance during the course of the CMA’s Phase 2 review.
2. Scenario 2: the parallel transaction is subject to ongoing merger control review (in the UK or elsewhere) : ie, the Hydra starts to grow multiple heads and there are limited precedents that consider this scenario in detail. In 2006 in NYSE/Euronext, for example, the OFT in its phase 1 decision concluded that the parallel transaction (between Nasdaq and LSE) did not qualify as “sufficiently likely and imminent”. The OFT noted that there had been speculation as to many possible merger permutations among the major European and US exchanges but that no major transaction between key players had actually completed. That the parallel transaction would have required a substantive competition assessment appears to have influenced this decision – the OFT noted in particular that “to assume that Nasdaq would acquire full control of the LSE … would, among other things, prejudge competition clearance” and concluded that the appropriate counterfactual was the status quo ante. Conversely, for the assessment of NASDAQ/LSE, the OFT did take into account the parallel transaction. It noted that, irrespective of the likelihood of clearance and completion, it would consider the relevant counterfactual in this case on the basis of a completed merger between NYSE and Euronext.
In the more recent BT/EE, the CMA dismissed arguments from the parties that the parallel transaction (H3G/O2) was subject to merger control clearance in another jurisdiction (the EU), the outcome of which was “highly speculative”. The merger parties submitted that to predict such a counterfactual would require the CMA to prejudge the outcome of the European Commission’s review. They argued that taking a counterfactual with H3G/O2 merged was not realistic, and that the correct counterfactual should be the continuation of the prevailing conditions of competition absent the parallel transaction. The CMA dismissed these arguments, noting that since the transaction had “been signed and announced … [i]t is not therefore too speculative”. The CMA did recognise that taking into account the H3G/O2 merger posed some challenges, as the Commission’s assessment of the H3G/O2 merger could lead to a range of possible outcomes (including an outright prohibition, an unconditional clearance, or a conditional clearance). However, the CMA concluded that the unconditional clearance of the H3G/O2 merger is the most appropriate counterfactual at Phase 1 as it is “the most cautious counterfactual for the purposes of the CMA’s competitive assessment … recognising that the CMA is not in a position to conduct a competitive assessment of the H3G/O2 merger”. The CMA was not persuaded by submissions that it was possible to predict the likely outcome of the parallel transaction by reference to previous commitments accepted. The CMA instead countered that recent EC decisions in this sector had uncertain precedent value since these related to competition in different Member States with different competitive environments.
The stage of the parallel review is also relevant. The Saint Gobain/GCP : there was a parallel transaction involving the anticipated acquisition by Sika of MBCC. At that time, the parties in Sika/MBCC had fast-tracked the Phase 2 review to remedies (see our previous Platypus post on this). Unsurprisingly, the CMA concluded that there was no longer a realistic prospect that Sika’s and MBCC’s chemical admixtures businesses in the UK could operate under combined ownership in the counterfactual. The logic here is clear: the parties had waived their procedural rights and the only possible outcomes were an outright prohibition or a conditional Phase 2 clearance that, in turn, would be expected to restore the competitive situation existing before the merger (as noted in the BT/EE Phase 2 decision).
stealth.cons <> bad regulations (ex.too.high.thres)-rns news>> find plcs failing to disc.mat.fact-did cma fail to properly det the fine.amount? ex: was the cocon implemented (by the plc)? if so, for how long?. whats the cocon nature?. whats the combined MAS?. whats the geoscop <> mj <> is the plc sole or joint ownership?-request discl of IPO’s DDRs, becos most of them are negligent, since cliients prefer speed over quality. >> my DDR will challenge the IPO.vals (made by inv.banks), on the grounds of: sp; ind.comparables; growing.prospects; compelling.narrative .ex: argue that not all -spills have been internalised (by plc) and/or not all +spills have been considered (by cma).-did cma clear a sustua, even though the 4exempconds (101.3 tfeu) are not met?:
-Read government strategies and plans: are they inadequate?. High Court litigation is available, for instance to request a redraft.
-Public recruitment with no advertising or fair process?
-Non-tendered contracts?. No contract award notices?. Connections? Conflicts of interest? . Research the awarded company: do they have enough resources and experience? do their websites engage in data analysis and targeting of competitors or political adversaries? (contact AWO data breach agency). Who’s behind these breaches of data protection? why did they do it? Who is funding them?
-Research leaked documents
A local authority may be convicted of a civil or a criminal offence…Also, for a
v a local authority, a claimant has to establish:
Parliament imposed a statutory duty for a limited class of the public
Breach of the duty should give rise to a private law action for damages
A common law action for damages is difficult for breach of statutory duty although a civil remedy may still be possible. Cases: X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council……Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council
-cma/sos decision (or failure to decide)?:
ex: should SOS have (or not) issued a (or such a) PII? <> SEE PDF PII NOTICE AND CMA REPORT
V GOV OR REGULATORS <> REGULATORS FAILURESWHY REG.COS EXHIBIT WEAK INTEREST COVER RATIOS:
exs: See full details in PDFs :
-has the regulator estimated the cost of capital properly?…are the reg.cos complying?
-has the regulator calculated price controls properly?… are the reg.cos complying?
–has the regulator calculated co. incentives (for co. to improve its efficiencies) properly?… are the reg.cos complying?
-Threaten a reg.co to complaint to its regulator / or threaten a non.reg.company with a duty to be regulated:
a. companies in the airports and telecom sectors: i can threaten to ask regulator to make a market power determination, if i think the co should be regulated (or should not).
b. companies in all other sectors: i can allege that the co needs to be (or not be) regulated, which would have to be via: appointment; designation; or licence (eg. solicitors LPC)
PADI PRODUCES A POSITION PAPER/ DUE DILIGENGE REPORT/PROPOSED REMEDIES ETC AND THEN TRIES TO BE RESTITUTED BY THE COMPANIES
Green Network SpA v Arera: interpretation of : Article 37(1)(i) and (n) and Article 37(4)(d) of Directive 2009/72:
a Member State may confer on a national regulatory authority, the power to order uas to reimburse their final consumers for the sums they paid, to cover ‘administrative management costs’, in an unlawful contractual term
<> cocoo v eu members reg auths for failing to order uas to reimburse consumers…
-wpims [=quasimarkets] may cause regulatory capture <> thanks to using ec cl, – and only if the case to fall within the scope of EC cl: PADI v regulator, on the ground that, the regulated wpi >> wpim is captured >> the regulated wpi is not really fully a wpi, and therefore should be reduced, or terminated, by updating the regulation… and padi also seeks compensation from the regulators whose failure of:
(a)duty to observe the wpi (to be exposed in the court’s proportionality test of a national measure), which brings with itself, the subsequent failure to meet
(b) the duty to observe that the regulated wpi was inadequate, was causing the wpim capture b. or, is helping to avoid the capture of the wpim… thus, the regulated wpi is really fully a wpi, and therefore its scope should be redefined and upgraded by updating the regulation
consumers/professionals should complain, to expose overly anticompetitive regulations. EC competition law, and the useful effect doctrine – UED, allows that. UED was developed in connection with (semi) self-regulation by private parties. this (semi) self-regulation is private…. Whereas pure self-regulation could fall under Article 81 EC, public authorities’ involvement in such semi self-regulation, is governed by the UED….(semi) self-regulation is particularly prominent in the professions, where governments need to reconcile public tasks with the fact they are administered by private parties operating partly in their own interest. The results are inefficiencies, resulting from barriers to entry, tariff regulations, and regulation of market conduct
REGULATION (EU) 2022/1031 : thirdcountryfirms can be excluded [=decision not to apply the ipi measure] from eu procurement/concessions, if wpi goals outweight the benefit competition [from allowing thirdcountryfirms to compete for eu tenders
<> COCOO WILL CLAIM THAT 3rd.COUNTRY.plcs SHOULD , OR SHOULD NOT, BE EXCLUDED FROM TENDERS
- WPI OUTWEIGH ANTICOMPS: MERGER SHOULD BE CLEARED
- ANTICOMPS OUTWEIGH WPI: MERGER SHOULD BE BLOCKED
- ANTICOMPS OUTWEIGH WPI, BUT THE ANTICOMPS ARE NOT (EXCEPTCIONALLY) HARMING EW : MERGER SHOULD BE CLEARED….exs:
a. where economies of scale [EOS] support the existence of only one enterprise
b. where there is a NE “network effect”: the utility of a product/service increases with the increase in the number of consumers, e.g. in telecommunications or personal computer operating systems. in these cases, competition is not good. it is more beneficial to have only one or a few producers
- PLC.TRANSCRIPTS ELP COL.SUPERCOMPS.COLLFOCS CLP.STRATEGIES ILP.OD.AR.FTM.ARB.NIGERIA CPR.5.45 3PINT.CLP DDREPORTS.HOW2behave stealth.CONSOLIDATION APPS.OC.OS.. L+ CLP.PROMPTS TOP.MAs Step.filters.1(Cocoos.RULES)
- PPPS.SUBFOLDERS PPPS.SUBFOLDERS2 PPPS.SUBFOLDERS.3 OTHER MIMINDS MADE.REALMA.EC MACOCON.IDENTIFICATION
- USP.SUMMARY USPS.GLOBAL usp2CMA UK.IPR UR.RAIL.DFT… PPP.USP NDA USP.LVPS.UK USP.IPA
- USP.IA.VALUATION USP.CLP.IPR USP.INTL.CAP.OF.NATIONS USP.HOW2ESTIMATE.IPR.OF.NATIONS.CITIES
- USP.CITIES.IPCAP USPS.AUS USPS.3PINT.RISKMITIG UK.SC
COCOO’S PROPOSED REMEDIES ETC AND THEN IS RESTITUTED BY THE PLCS PAP for possible:
a.private action (v company) , to void the MA, for failing to notify the MA, or failing the undertakings/SOIs;
b. for possible JR (judicial review) v decision (or omission to decide) by:
-SOS (only has jurisdiction on PI ground=17 areas) to decide to issue (or not) an I.N.(intervention notice), or decision (type II error) to support a national champion, when is not necessary. this error is more common and serious, becos it creates a national NM.
-TOP/CMA failure to implement undertakings/SOI etc…. and to follow them up
-CMA (has jurisdiction on both PI or competition grounds…thus, on any areas (of the economy) …. Most MAs are outside the 17 areas, thus notification is voluntary, and most are only reported after taking place!…. this is risky, because CMA could investigate and order the MA to be undone (the merged company must sell very quick a big chunk, usually at a huge loss
-my DDR will include spreadsheets. ex: the Pennon / Bournemouth merger :
the reflect the central case assessment in our final submission to the CMA (with two exceptions), although Ofwat’s submissions to the CMA took account of a range of modelling assumptions. In our statement of methods for future water sector merger evaluations, we committed to publish sample spreadsheets to illustrate the type of analysis we expect may be undertaken in future merger investigations. This note is a guide to the spreadsheets we have published that were used in the Pennon / Bournemouth Water merger. The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)’s findings and Ofwat’s submissions to the CMA in the that merger investigation are available on the CMA’s website. When carrying out their impact assessment, merger parties will want to make their own assumptions about company performance and to be able to justify them. The spreadsheets therefore provide the option to customise the assumptions made in South West / Bournemouth merger assessment