16DEC ESP MEMORIA

21DEC

BAS

Report on Judicial Review Opportunities: Spanish Democratic Memory Law

Introduction

This report provides a detailed analysis and a balancing act for the specific judicial review opportunities identified in the Democratic Memory context. Following the principle of legal equivalence, these opportunities are evaluated using the public law and competition principles found in the provided legal documents, which emphasize transparency, equality, and the correct exercise of public power.

Opportunity 1: Failure to Implement Statutory Duties Regarding Exhumations

The Spanish Democratic Memory Law imposes a clear obligation on the state to facilitate the location and exhumation of victims. A judicial review can be brought on the grounds of a failure to act or irrationality if these processes are paralyzed without objective justification.

The Balancing Act

The administration may argue that delays are justified by technical complexities, limited budgetary resources, or the need to respect the rights of other property owners. They might also claim that the allocation of funds follows a top-down budget prioritization where individual project speed is not a decision variable.

However, the counter-argument rests on the mandatory nature of the statutory duty. In public law, a decision to effectively cease activity on a legal mandate can be seen as reckless and unlawful. The balancing act must weigh administrative discretion against the fundamental rights of victims to truth and reparation. If the process is so inadequate as to render the law ineffective, the court may find the government’s strategy flawed. This is particularly relevant if the delay promotes inequality between different groups of victims, potentially breaching equality and non-discrimination principles.

Opportunity 2: Unjustified Blocking of Access to Historical Archives

Reports indicate that access to historical archives remains restricted, hindering research and recognition. This provides an opportunity for judicial review based on procedural impropriety and the failure to observe the public interest.

The Balancing Act

Public authorities often cite national security, privacy, or the sensitivity of documents as grounds for restriction. They may also rely on the administrative burden of processing large-scale requests.

The balancing perspective here identifies that transparency is the rule of law in action. Inadequate disclosure of climate-related or, in this case, historical-related risks and facts prevents an informed assessment by the public. When a body acts in an administrative capacity to regulate access, it must not do so in a way that creates information asymmetry. Such asymmetry exploits the public’s lack of knowledge. A judicial review would challenge whether the restriction is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim or if it constitutes a manifest error of appraisal by ignoring the overarching public interest in historical memory.

Opportunity 3: Exclusion of SMEs from Public Contracts via Biased Reporting

There are allegations that public contracts related to the Democratic Memory Law are being awarded to a limited pool of entities, effectively excluding small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) through biased reports or inadequate competition.

The Balancing Act

The government may justify using large, established contractors to ensure stability and efficiency in complex projects. They might argue that the chosen entities possess unique expertise that smaller firms lack.

From a competition law perspective, the government must justify why it is not treating these activities as economic activities subject to open competition. If a public body participates in a market where private companies also operate, it is acting as an undertaking and must follow competition rules. The exclusion of SMEs can be viewed as an illegal attempt to protect a dominant player or as a result of regulatory capture, where the regulator is influenced by the entities it regulates. The balancing act requires that any restriction on competition must be necessary for the benefit of the public interest and must not go beyond what is required. Failure to ensure an open competitive procurement process for commercial-natured services can lead to contracts being declared illegal and void.

Opportunity 4: Denial of Recognition and Reparation to Victims

The failure to grant official recognition or provide reparations as mandated by the law constitutes a direct challenge to the administrative fulfillment of the public interest.

The Balancing Act

The state might invoke fiscal constraints or the complexity of establishing “victim status” for historical events. They may argue that the wealth effect and social time preference suggest that current public spending should be prioritized over historical transfers.

The counter-position emphasizes that the welfare or utility associated with justice and human rights does not decline as real incomes rise. Just as health and life values are discounted at a lower rate because their utility is constant, the moral and legal obligation to repair historical harm remains a high priority. A judicial review would focus on whether the government’s failure to provide reparation is irrational or represents a manifest error. If the criteria for recognition are applied inconsistently, this creates a breach of the duty of solidarity and the principle of equality, making the state’s inaction open to a claim for annulment or a claim for damages based on non-contractual liability.

Opportunity 5: Procedural Impropriety in Delegated Decision Making

Many decisions regarding the implementation of memory projects are made via delegated acts or through bodies that may lack the democratic power to make significant political choices.

The Balancing Act

The administration likely views these delegations as necessary for technical implementation and efficiency, allowing experts to handle sensitive matters outside the parliamentary spotlight.

The legal doctrine on essential elements suggests that matters involving political choices and fundamental rights cannot be delegated to administrative bodies without explicit legislative definition. If a decision touches upon the essential elements of the law, such as the definition of who deserves reparation or which sites are protected, it must be made by the legislature. A judicial review would challenge the validity of such delegated decisions on the grounds that they interfere with the sovereign rights of individuals and were made by a body without the requisite democratic power. This ensures that high-politics and sensitive policy fields remain under proper judicial and parliamentary oversight.

ALLIES

Based on the identified judicial review opportunities concerning procurement irregularities under Spain’s Democratic Memory Law, the following organizations represent the class of diffuse victims and would benefit significantly from a successful challenge. A favourable ruling would provide them with grounds for follow-on compensation claims, restore their reputation as fair competitors, and generate positive externalities for their sectors.

### 1. Professional & Sectoral Associations
These groups represent the SMEs and professionals directly excluded from competing for contracts. A successful JR would validate their claims of unfair exclusion and open the door to collective redress.

* **Asociación Española de Arqueología Medieval (AEAM)**
* **Official Email:** aeam.arqueologia@gmail.com
* **Address:** Parque Arqueológico de Alarcos-Calatrava, Apartado de correos -201, 13080 Ciudad Real, España[reference:0].
* **Benefit:** Represents medieval archaeologists and researchers. A win would affirm the right of specialized academic and professional SMEs to compete for publicly funded historical research, potentially leading to a claim for lost collective opportunities.

* **Asociación Española de Gestores de Patrimonio Cultural (AEGPC)**
* **Official Email:** aegpc@aegpc.org
* **Address:** Edificio B más Ferré, Campus de Somosaguas, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 28223 Madrid, España[reference:1].
* **Benefit:** Represents cultural heritage managers. Victory would directly challenge the unfair advantage given to “medios propios,” helping to level the playing field for its member companies in future tenders.

* **Asociación de Empresas de Arqueología de Cataluña (AEAC)**
* **Official Email:** (Not found in search; contact likely via website or postal address)
* **Address:** C/Viladomat, 174, 08015 Barcelona, España[reference:2].
* **Benefit:** A regional association of archaeology firms. Its members are prime examples of the SMEs harmed by fragmented contracts. A court finding of illegality would strongly support their case for damages and future fair access.

* **Asociación Española de Antropología y Odontología Forense (AEAOF)**
* **Official Email:** aeaof2025@gmail.com (congress contact)[reference:3].
* **Address:** (Not confirmed in search)
* **Benefit:** Represents forensic experts crucial for exhumation projects. The alleged contracting scheme likely bypassed their specialized services. A successful JR would restore their professional standing as essential service providers in Democratic Memory projects.

### 2. Business & SME Advocacy Groups
These organizations defend the general principles of fair competition and would benefit from a precedent that deters anti-competitive public procurement practices.

* **Confederación Española de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa (CEPYME)**
* **Official Email:** prensa@cepyme.es
* **Address:** C/Diego de León, 50, 28006 Madrid, España[reference:4].
* **Benefit:** The leading Spanish SME confederation. A win would serve a core part of its mission, providing a powerful example to use in advocacy against similar practices across all sectors of public procurement.

### 3. Victims’ & Historical Memory Associations
These groups have a non-economic but profound interest in the integrity of the processes that recover historical memory. A successful JR would help ensure the quality and independence of the work done.

* **Asociación para la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica (ARMH)**
* **Official Email:** memoria36@hotmail.com[reference:5].
* **Address:** Apartado de correos 7, 24400 Ponferrada, León, España[reference:6][reference:7].
* **Benefit:** While not a commercial competitor, the ARMH is a key stakeholder. A finding that procurement was unlawful and non-competitive validates concerns about the process’s transparency and potential quality, aiding their advocacy for rigorous, independent historical work.

### Strategic Value of Engaging These Organizations
Forming a coalition with these entities before initiating judicial review is strategically advantageous. Their support can:
* **Strengthen *Locus Standi*:** Demonstrates that the claim is backed by a broad range of directly and indirectly affected parties.
* **Provide Evidence:** Member companies can supply concrete examples of being excluded from bids, strengthening the case for diffuse harm.
* **Amplify Remediation:** Should the court award damages to be used for a sectoral fund (e.g., a “Fund for Historical Research Integrity”), these organizations would be ideal partners to design and administer it, ensuring the remedy benefits the truly affected class.

JRS

Based the provided materials, this analysis addresses the alleged irregularities in public procurement under Spain’s Democratic Memory Law (Ley 20/2022). The core allegation is that the Ministry of Democratic Memory fragmented contracts and used “medios propios” (in-house entities) to avoid mandatory open tender procedures, harming competition and causing diffuse harm to the market.

## 1. Judicial Review Status, Time Bars, and Standing

### 1.1. Existing Judicial Review
No formal judicial review (recurso contencioso-administrativo) challenging the specific DORCAPs identified in the FOI letters appears to have been filed yet. The campaign is currently in the evidence-gathering phase[reference:0].

### 1.2. Time-Bar Analysis and Ongoing Harms
While individual contract awards are typically subject to a short two-month challenge period, several factors create ongoing, challengeable opportunities:
* **Continuing Practice**: The alleged fragmentation of contracts and preferential use of “medios propios” is presented as a systemic, repeated practice[reference:1]. Each new contract awarded under this alleged scheme constitutes a fresh, challengeable decision.
* **Ongoing Policy**: The practice may stem from an internal policy or instruction. Such a continuing policy or “norma de actuación” is itself subject to challenge regardless of the age of individual decisions.
* **Regulatory Omissions**: The alleged failure of the procurement regulator (OIReScon) to adequately supervise and correct these practices[reference:2] is a continuing omission that can be challenged.

### 1.3. Strategic Creation of Fresh JR Opportunities
A proactive letter to the public body can indeed create a new justiciable decision. For example, a formal request that the Ministry or OIReScon investigate the alleged irregularities and take corrective action would trigger a duty to respond. A refusal, or “silencio administrativo” (administrative silence deemed a negative decision), would provide a fresh cause of action for judicial review[reference:3]. This strategy also strengthens *locus standi*, as the applicant is directly challenging a decision made in response to its own petition.

### 1.4. Causes of Action (COAs) and “No Particular Victim” Standing

**Judicial Review COAs:**
* **Illegality/Ultra Vires**: Violation of the Public Sector Contracts Law (Ley 9/2017, LCSP), specifically Article 118 on illegal fragmentation of contracts to evade tender thresholds[reference:4][reference:5].
* **Irrationality (Wednesbury Unreasonableness)**: Awarding contracts to “medios propios” without a prior market analysis to justify the exclusion of private competition is manifestly unreasonable[reference:6].
* **Procedural Impropriety**: Systemic breach of principles of transparency, publicity, equal treatment, and open competition mandated by Ley 9/2017 and Ley 19/2013[reference:7][reference:8].

**Tort COAs:**
* **Misfeasance in Public Office**: Knowing or reckless misuse of public power to bypass procurement rules, causing economic harm to a class of competitors.
* **Breach of Statutory Duty**: Breach of the duties imposed by Ley 9/2017, which is designed to protect the economic interests of potential bidders.
* **Negligence**: Failure to exercise due diligence in public procurement, leading to diffuse market harm.

**Standing for a “No Particular Victim” Applicant:**
An organisation like COCOO.uk can establish standing (*locus standi*) based on a “sufficient interest” in defending the public interest against diffuse harms. Spanish law supports this. Article 19.1.b of Ley 29/1998 grants standing to associations legally empowered to defend collective, legitimate interests[reference:9]. By demonstrating an “enforcement vacuum” where individual SMEs lack the incentive to litigate[reference:10] and proving its statutory purpose is to protect public and competitive interests[reference:11], COCOO.uk can argue it holds a legitimate interest in challenging the DORCAPs that cause widespread, diffuse harm to the market.

## 2. Ultra Vires & Irrational DORCAPs Analysis
Ranked by likelihood of successful challenge:

1. **Individual Decisions to Fragment Contracts**: The specific acts of splitting larger projects into sub-threshold “contratos menores” are highly likely *ultra vires*. This directly contravenes the express prohibition in Article 118 LCSP[reference:12].
2. **Policy/Practice of Using “Medios Propios”**: A systemic practice of bypassing open competition by routinely commissioning work to in-house entities (e.g., Tragsa) is strongly susceptible to challenge as irrational. It lacks a rational basis if no market analysis was conducted to justify the exclusion of private sector capability[reference:13].
3. **Omission of OIReScon to Supervise and Correct**: The regulator’s alleged failure to detect, report on, or issue binding instructions against this practice[reference:14] could be *ultra vires* its statutory duty to ensure correct application of procurement law.
4. **Conduct in Favoring Specific Contractors**: Repeatedly awarding fragmented contracts to the same beneficiaries raises strong inferences of biased execution and breach of equal treatment, amounting to irrational and unlawful conduct.
5. **Internal Instructions or Guidance Promoting Fragmentation**: If any internal memo or instruction explicitly or implicitly encourages fragmentation, it would be *ultra vires* as it instructs officials to act contrary to primary legislation.

## 3. Suspended Quashing Orders
* **Order Sought**: Quashing of all individual contracts awarded through the alleged fragmented process since the entry into force of Ley 20/2022.
* **Suspension & Conditions**: The quashing should be suspended for **six months**. This period should be conditional on the Ministry: (a) immediately ceasing the practice of fragmentation; (b) publishing a transparent plan for re-tendering the affected services in compliance with Ley 9/2017; and (c) reporting to the court on progress after three months. This avoids disproportionate administrative chaos while ensuring corrective action.

## 4. Ongoing Harm & Injunctive Relief
**Ongoing Harm**: The continuous distortion of competition excludes SMEs, leads to inefficient use of public funds, and risks biasing the historical narrative through non-competitive award of research contracts[reference:15].
**Key Elements for an Interim Injunction**:
* **Restraint**: The Ministry must be restrained from awarding any further contracts for Democratic Memory projects without prior publication of a tender on the official platform, except under truly exceptional circumstances justified by a published market analysis.
* **Disclosure**: The Ministry must disclose to the court and the applicant a list of all pending procurement procedures in this area.
* **Cross-Undertaking**: The applicant to provide a cross-undertaking in damages, likely nominal given the public interest nature.

## 5. Statement of Legal Principle Declaration
“It is hereby declared that the Ministry of Democratic Memory acted ultra vires and in breach of the principle of legalidad by systematically fragmenting procurement projects for historical research and exhumations under Ley 20/2022 into sub-threshold contracts, thereby evading the mandatory open tender procedures required by Article 118 of Ley 9/2017 and violating the fundamental principles of transparency, publicity, equal treatment, and open competition that govern public procurement.”

## 6. Risk Disclosure Statement Court Order
The court should order the Ministry to publish a clear “Risk Disclosure Statement” within one month of the order. This statement must:
* Acknowledge the unlawfulness of the past procurement practice as found by the court.
* Describe the risks created (distortion of competition, exclusion of SMEs, potential waste of public funds, reputational harm to the historical process).
* Outline the specific steps taken to remediate and prevent recurrence.
* **Channels for Publication**: The statement must be published prominently on the Ministry’s website for 12 months, included in its next annual report, and sent directly to major business associations representing historians, archaeologists, and cultural SMEs.

## 7. Assessment & Publicity of Risk
The FOI requests directly seek evidence of any internal risk assessments conducted regarding the legality of the fragmentation practice[reference:16]. If such assessments existed and warned of legal risk but were ignored, this would powerfully evidence irrationality and bad faith. If no such assessments existed, this constitutes a serious failure of due diligence and internal governance, providing a further ground for criticism and a basis for alleging negligent administration.

## 8. Responsible Parties & Individual Liability
* **Primary Responsibility**: Likely lies with the contracting department within the Ministry of Democratic Memory and the specific officials who designed and authorized the procurement strategy.
* **Individual Liability Inquiry**: The FOI letters specifically probe whether any “acción de regreso” (recovery action against officials) has ever been initiated to recover misused funds[reference:17]. The answer is likely “no.” This lack of individual accountability should be highlighted in litigation. The court should be urged to:
* (a) Declare that the conditions for contributorily liability in tort are met.
* (b) Recommend the initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the relevant authority.
* (c) Order the Ministry to report on steps taken to recover losses from responsible individuals.

## 9. Tort Damages & Remediation Project
* **Estimated Aggregate Damages**: In the absence of precise figures, a reasoned estimate can be based on the scale of harm. If the total value of allegedly fragmented contracts is, for example, €10 million, the diffuse harm to the market (lost opportunities, distorted competition) could be quantified at a conservative 15-20%, i.e., €1.5–2 million.
* **Distribution Mechanism**: Given the diffuse and unidentifiable nature of the victim class (excluded SMEs, professionals), direct compensation is impractical. Instead, damages should be paid into a specially constituted trust fund.
* **Proposed Remediation Project – “Fund for Historical Research Integrity”**: This fund would benefit the sector most closely harmed. It could finance:
1. **Independent Research Grants**: For historians and archaeologists (especially from SMEs and academia) to conduct objective research on themes related to democratic memory.
2. **SME Capacity-Building Grants**: To help small firms in the cultural/heritage sector compete for public contracts.
3. **Public Exhibition and Dialogue Programs**: To ensure diverse historical perspectives reach the public.
* **Justification – Positive Externalities**: This project directly remedies the alleged harm by promoting fair competition, funding independent scholarship (countering potential narrative bias), and enhancing public understanding. It transforms a wrongful gain into a public good that benefits the very field the unlawful procurement sought to influence.

 

17DEC

FOIS

Here are the customised FOI (Freedom of Information) letters for the key public bodies in the MEMORIA case. These are adapted from your “SuperFOI” model, specifically tailored to the duties and competences of the Ministry of Democratic Memory, OIReScon (Procurement Regulator), and the CNMC (Competition Authority).

Instructions:

  • Language: These are drafted in formal administrative Spanish (Lenguaje Administrativo) as required by Ley 19/2013.

  • Send via: The Portal de Transparencia of each entity (requires digital certificate/Cl@ve) or registered post.

  • Deadlines: They have 1 month to respond. If they don’t, silence is effectively a rejection (desestimación por silencio administrativo), opening the door to appeal to the CTBG (Council of Transparency).

1. TARGET: MINISTERIO DE POLÍTICA TERRITORIAL Y MEMORIA DEMOCRÁTICA

(The primary contracting body alleged to have fragmented contracts and abused ‘medios propios’)

[COPY AND PASTE INTO TRANSPARENCY PORTAL]

Para: Unidad de Transparencia / Subsecretaría del Ministerio

Asunto: Solicitud de Acceso a Información Pública – Evidencias sobre [Contratación de Memoria Democrática y Fraccionamiento] y Responsabilidad Patrimonial

Escribo en nombre de Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO.uk), una organización benéfica dedicada a la protección del Interés Público General (Wider Public Interest) y de la competencia leal. Intervenimos en fallos regulatorios donde existe un “vacío de ejecución” (enforcement vacuum) que impide a las PYMES y víctimas individuales litigar por falta de incentivos financieros.

Esta solicitud se realiza para evaluar si el DORCAP (Decisión, Omisión, Regulación, Conducta, Acción o Política) referenciado —específicamente la práctica de adjudicación de contratos menores y encargos a medios propios (ej. Tragsa, Fundaciones) para informes históricos y exhumaciones— cumple los criterios de intervención por quiebra de la legalidad (Ley 9/2017 LCSP). Buscamos verificar indicios de ultra vires (fraccionamiento ilegal), abuso de discrecionalidad y falta de competencia, apoyando así la legitimación activa (locus standi) de COCOO.

Al amparo de la Ley 19/2013, de transparencia, acceso a la información pública y buen gobierno, solicito la siguiente información en formato electrónico:

PARTE 1: ESTABLECIMIENTO DEL “VACÍO DE EJECUCIÓN” (Datos de Locus Standi)

Para confirmar la legitimación de COCOO, requerimos evidencia de daños difusos al mercado.

  • Demografía de Afectados: Desglose el número de quejas, recursos o solicitudes de información recibidas en los últimos 3 años procedentes de historiadores, investigadores autónomos o PYMES del sector cultural/arqueológico, relacionadas con la adjudicación de trabajos de la Ley 20/2022.

  • Análisis de Mercado: ¿Posee el Ministerio algún informe justificativo que analice la capacidad del mercado privado para realizar estos trabajos antes de recurrir a encargos a medios propios? Si es así, revele dichos informes.

PARTE 2: LEGALIDAD Y RIESGO (Controles de Gobernanza)

Para evaluar los fundamentos de una reclamación por funcionamiento anormal.

  • Evaluación de Riesgo de Fraccionamiento: Por favor, revele la existencia (y resumen) de cualquier informe de la Abogacía del Estado, Intervención Delegada o nota interna que advirtiera sobre el riesgo de fraccionamiento de contratos (art. 118 LCSP) en la adjudicación sucesiva de informes o trabajos técnicos a los mismos beneficiarios o grupos de investigación.

  • Conflictos de Interés: Confirme si se han solicitado o archivado declaraciones de ausencia de conflicto de interés (DACI) para los adjudicatarios de contratos menores de investigación histórica.

PARTE 3: CIRCUNSTANCIAS ESPECÍFICAS – LA TRAMPA DEL “REGRESO”

Para reunir evidencia clave sobre la protección de fondos públicos.

Solicito que se confirme si este organismo ha incoado alguna vez el ‘Procedimiento de exigencia de la responsabilidad a las autoridades y personal’ (Acción de Regreso) conforme al Artículo 36 de la Ley 40/2015, para recuperar fondos malversados o pagados indebidamente por fraccionamientos ilegales o contratos nulos. En concreto:

  1. Indique el número de expedientes de regreso iniciados en este Ministerio desde 2022 frente al número de reparos de intervención o declaraciones de nulidad de contratos.

  2. Si la respuesta es ‘ninguno’, confirme si existe una instrucción o práctica administrativa de no ejecutar estas acciones, y justifique dicha omisión ante el deber de proteger la Hacienda Pública.

PARTE 4: ASPECTOS SISTÉMICOS Y PISTA DE AUDITORÍA

  1. Auditoría Interna: Facilite los títulos de los informes de la Inspección de Servicios o de la IGAE emitidos desde 2022 que hayan analizado la gestión de la contratación menor o los encargos a medios propios en la Secretaría de Estado de Memoria Democrática.

Asesoramiento y Asistencia

Si determina que esta solicitud excede los límites, le ruego me contacte inmediatamente conforme a su deber de asistencia (art. 17 Ley 19/2013).

Atentamente,

Oscar Moya

Director, COCOO.uk

2. TARGET: OIReScon (Oficina Independiente de Regulación y Supervisión de la Contratación)

(The regulator responsible for supervising strict compliance with the Public Sector Contracts Law)

[COPY AND PASTE INTO TRANSPARENCY PORTAL]

Para: División de Regulación y Ordenación de la Contratación / Presidente de OIReScon

Asunto: Solicitud de Acceso a Información Pública – Supervisión de Contratos de Memoria Democrática y Detección de Fraccionamientos

[INSERT INTRO PARAGRAPH FROM MODEL – SAME AS ABOVE]

Al amparo de la Ley 19/2013, solicito:

PARTE 1: ESTABLECIMIENTO DEL “VACÍO DE EJECUCIÓN”

  • Denuncias Recibidas: Confirme si la OIReScon ha recibido denuncias (buzón de denuncias o escritos formales) relativas a irregularidades en la contratación del Ministerio de Política Territorial y Memoria Democrática o sus organismos dependientes en los años 2022-2025.

  • Datos de Supervisión: Facilite los datos agregados sobre el porcentaje de contratos menores (<15.000€) detectados en dicho Ministerio que superen los umbrales de alerta de riesgo de fraccionamiento.

PARTE 2: LEGALIDAD Y RIESGO (Informes de Supervisión)

  • Informes Específicos: Revele si la OIReScon ha emitido algún Informe de Supervisión, Instrucción o Recomendación específica dirigida a los órganos de contratación del ámbito de la Memoria Democrática respecto al uso de medios propios (encargos a Tragsa/Fundaciones) o la fragmentación de contratos de servicios intelectuales.

  • Actuaciones Preventivas: ¿Ha remitido la OIReScon algún expediente a la Fiscalía o al Tribunal de Cuentas por indicios de nulidad en estos contratos específicos?

PARTE 3: CIRCUNSTANCIAS ESPECÍFICAS – ACCIÓN DISCIPLINARIA

Solicito confirmación sobre su actividad supervisora respecto a la responsabilidad personal:

  1. ¿Ha instado la OIReScon en alguno de sus informes anuales a que los órganos de contratación inicien la Acción de Regreso (art. 36 Ley 40/2015) contra funcionarios responsables de fraccionamientos ilegales reiterados?

  2. Si no es así, explique si existe una política interna de limitar la supervisión a la nulidad del contrato sin entrar en la responsabilidad patrimonial del gestor.

PARTE 4: ASPECTOS SISTÉMICOS

  1. Mapa de Riesgos: Facilite cualquier documento de trabajo o “mapa de riesgos” que identifique el sector de “Servicios de Investigación Histórica/Cultural” como un área de alto riesgo de corrupción o falta de concurrencia.

Atentamente,

Oscar Moya

Director, COCOO.uk

3. TARGET: CNMC (Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia)

(The regulator for market distortion and unfair competition)

[COPY AND PASTE INTO TRANSPARENCY PORTAL]

Para: Dirección de Promoción de la Competencia / Presidencia

Asunto: Solicitud de Acceso a Información Pública – Distorsión de Mercado en Servicios de Memoria Histórica y Medios Propios

[INSERT INTRO PARAGRAPH FROM MODEL – SAME AS ABOVE]

Al amparo de la Ley 19/2013, solicito:

PARTE 1: ESTABLECIMIENTO DEL “VACÍO DE EJECUCIÓN”

  • Quejas de Operadores: Número de quejas o consultas recibidas de empresas privadas, universidades o investigadores autónomos alegando barreras de entrada o competencia desleal por parte de entidades públicas (medios propios) en el mercado de servicios de memoria histórica y arqueología (2022-2025).

PARTE 2: LEGALIDAD Y RIESGO (Análisis de Impacto)

  • Informes de Regulación: ¿Ha emitido la CNMC algún informe (ej. IPN – Informe sobre Proyectos Normativos) sobre la Ley 20/2022 de Memoria Democrática o sus decretos de desarrollo, analizando su impacto en la competencia y la posible reserva de actividad a favor del sector público?

  • Uso de Medios Propios: Revele si existe algún expediente de análisis o vigilancia sobre el uso abusivo de “encomiendas de gestión” o encargos a medios propios en este sector, que excluya injustificadamente a la iniciativa privada (art. 11 LCSP y Ley de Defensa de la Competencia).

PARTE 3 y 4: ASPECTOS SISTÉMICOS

  1. Ayudas de Estado: Confirme si se ha analizado si la financiación exclusiva a determinadas fundaciones o centros públicos para estos trabajos podría constituir una Ayuda de Estado incompatible con el mercado interior (art. 107 TFUE), y si existe comunicación con la Comisión Europea al respecto.

Atentamente,

Oscar Moya

Director, COCOO.uk

Based on the case files provided (focusing on the MEMORIA case and its sub-cases LICITACION and REPUTACION) and the current date of December 17, 2025, here is the legal analysis applied to the possible Causes of Action (COAs).

Note: The provided documents indicate that while substantial evidence has been gathered (“Grok Evidence”), many findings formally remain “Alleged” or are in the pre-litigation/complaint stage as of late 2025. No definitive court judgments confirming private infringements (FOIGs) are explicitly cited in the text, though regulatory breaches by public bodies are strongly evidenced.

CASE ANALYSIS: MEMORIA (Spain / UK)

Context: Alleged illegal implementation of Spain’s Ley de Memoria Democrática (Law 20/2022) involving procurement fraud (fragmentation) and reputational harm to UK citizens via biased historical narratives.

COA 1: ILLEGAL CONTRACT FRAGMENTATION (Public Procurement Fraud)

Breach of Ley 9/2017 (LCSP) and EU Directive 2014/24/EU via splitting contracts to avoid tenders.

1. IDENTIFY ALL PROVEN FOIGS (Findings of Infringement by Private Companies)

  • Status: None Proven Judicially Yet.

  • Analysis: The provided text states that “No private companies are explicitly named as under investigation” by regulators yet. The focus is on the Spanish Ministry of Territorial Policy and Democratic Memory. However, “Favored Entities” (e.g., specific historical consultancies, researchers, or medios propios like Centro de Documentación de la Memoria Histórica) are identified as beneficiaries of the alleged fraud. While their receipt of illegal contracts constitutes an infringement of fair competition rules, this is currently listed as “Alleged” and “pending evidence from transparency requests.”

2. IDENTIFY POSSIBILITIES THAT THESE FOIGS COULD HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY AN ULTRAVIRES/UNLAWFUL DORCAP? WAS IT JUDICIALLY REVIEWED?

  • Causal Link: Yes. The potential infringements by private beneficiaries (Unfair Competition) were directly caused by the Ultra Vires DORCAP (Decisions, Omissions, Regulations, Conduct, Actions, Policies) of the Ministry.

    • The DORCAP: Deliberate “fraccionamiento de contratos” (splitting contracts <€15k) and abuse of “medios propios” (in-house awards) to evade competitive tendering.

  • Judicial Review Status:

    • EU Level: The text references “European Commission infringement proceedings against Spain” for procurement violations, but implies these are ongoing or the basis for the claim, not yet a finalized court judgment (CJEU ruling).

    • National Level (Spain): There has been a “procedural dismissal” of information requests by the Ministry (May 23, 2025). The documents mention preparing a Recurso Contencioso-Administrativo (Judicial Review) to challenge this. As of Dec 17, 2025, a final judicial ruling on the merits of the DORCAP appears pending or not explicitly cited as completed.

3. HAS THE STATE PAID REDRESS? REGRESO PAYMENTS?

  • State Payment: No. The case files indicate the stage is “Solicita Compensación” (claiming compensation) and preparing filings. There is no mention of settlements paid to date.

  • Disciplinary/Regreso: No. The text notes an “Omission” by the public authority in initiating the ex officio “procedimiento de repetición” (Regreso – Art. 36 Ley 40/2015) to recover money from responsible officials. This omission is a specific ground for the proposed legal challenge (Inactividad).

DATES AND TIME LIMITS TO CLAIM (As of Dec 17, 2025):

  • Recurso Contencioso-Administrativo (vs. Act/Dismissal):

    • Deadline: 2 months from notification.

    • Scenario: If challenging the May 23, 2025 dismissal, the deadline was July 23, 2025 (likely expired unless notified later).

    • New Acts: For any new acts or “ongoing harms” manifested in Dec 2025, the limit is February 2026.

  • Inactividad (vs. Omission):

    • Deadline: Any time, subject to a prior 3-month requerimiento. If filed now (Dec 2025), you can sue after March 2026.

  • Responsabilidad Patrimonial (Damages):

    • Deadline: 1 Year from the “manifestation of the harm” (Art. 67 Ley 39/2015). If harm is ongoing or crystallized with a recent act in 2025, the claim is timely.

COA 2: NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION / REPUTATIONAL HARM

Harm to UK citizens/descendants due to biased historical reports funded by the State.

1. IDENTIFY ALL PROVEN FOIGS (Findings of Infringement by Private Companies)

  • Status: None Proven.

  • Analysis: The allegations are against the State for funding/publishing the reports. Private historians/consultancies who authored the biased reports could potentially be liable for professional negligence or defamation, but the documents list this as “Alleged, requiring expert historical analysis.”

2. IDENTIFY POSSIBILITIES THAT THESE FOIGS COULD HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY AN ULTRAVIRES/UNLAWFUL DORCAP? WAS IT JUDICIALLY REVIEWED?

  • Causal Link: Yes. The biased narratives (potentially an infringement of truth/professional standards) were caused by the Ministry’s Policy (DORCAP) of awarding contracts based on ideological alignment rather than merit/neutrality.

  • Judicial Review Status: The underlying “Democratic Memory Law” and its implementation policies have likely faced political opposition, but the specific administrative acts funding these reports are the target of the proposed CoCoo challenges. No specific JR judgment overturning these reports is cited.

3. HAS THE STATE PAID REDRESS? REGRESO PAYMENTS?

  • State Payment: No. CoCoo is currently soliciting claimants (“Join as UK Citizen”) and preparing a “USP” (Unsolicited Proposal) to the UK Foreign Office to fund litigation.

  • Disciplinary/Regreso: No.

DATES AND TIME LIMITS TO CLAIM:

  • Responsabilidad Patrimonial (Spain): 1 Year from the realization of the reputational damage. If the damage is continuous (reports remain online), the period may be open.

  • Human Rights Claim (ECHR – Art 10/8): After exhausting domestic remedies (which are still pending).

COA 3: UNFAIR COMPETITION (Distortion of Market)

Exclusion of SMEs/Freelancers from contracts due to “Medios Propios” abuse.

1. IDENTIFY ALL PROVEN FOIGS (Findings of Infringement by Private Companies)

  • Status: None Proven.

  • Analysis: The “Infringement” here is legally technical: beneficiaries (e.g., Tragsa or specific foundations) receiving state aid/contracts illegally. While the conduct is identified in the “SearchLink Model,” a formal “Finding of Infringement” (e.g., by the CNMC or a court) is not cited. The documents explicitly state: “No private companies are explicitly named as under investigation…”.

2. IDENTIFY POSSIBILITIES THAT THESE FOIGS COULD HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY AN ULTRAVIRES/UNLAWFUL DORCAP? WAS IT JUDICIALLY REVIEWED?

  • Causal Link: Yes. The market distortion is purely the result of the Ministry’s Ultra Vires DORCAP (awarding to in-house “medios propios” without meeting legal criteria of “absence of private capital”).

  • Judicial Review Status: The documents mention this is a “rich hunting ground” for challenges and reference EU infringement proceedings regarding general procurement violations by Spain, but no specific judgment on the Memoria contracts is listed.

3. HAS THE STATE PAID REDRESS? REGRESO PAYMENTS?

  • State Payment: No.

  • Disciplinary/Regreso: No.

DATES AND TIME LIMITS TO CLAIM:

  • Action for Unfair Competition (Ley de Competencia Desleal):

    • Deadline: 1 Year from discovery of the act, or 3 Years from its completion (Art. 32 LCD).

    • Application: If contracts were awarded in 2024/2025, claims are likely within limits.

SUMMARY FOR SOLICITOR’S FILE (Dec 17, 2025)

  • Key Proven Facts: None regarding private liability (FOIGs). The case currently rests on strong evidence of Public Administrative irregularities (DORCAP).

  • Critical Action: The “Regreso” (recoupment) action has not been triggered by the State. This failure constitutes a separate “Inactivity” DORCAP, which CoCoo plans to challenge.

  • Urgency: If the Ministry’s dismissal was May 23, 2025, strict deadlines for direct appeal have passed. Strategy must shift to Inactividad (Omission) claims or new Transparency requests to reset the clock.

15DEC

The MEMORIA case, as detailed across the provided pages on memoria.cocoo.uk, centers on alleged irregularities in the implementation of Spain’s Ley de Memoria Democrática (Law 20/2022) and its predecessor (Law 52/2007). It comprises two subcases: LICITACION, which addresses procurement irregularities in public contracting for historical reports, exhumations, research, and related activities; and REPUTACION, which addresses reputational harm to UK citizens, particularly descendants of British International Brigade volunteers in the Spanish Civil War, stemming from allegedly biased historical narratives supported by those reports.

Ultra vires DORCAPS (decisions, omissions, regulations, conduct, actions, policies) are identified primarily in actions by Spanish public bodies exceeding legal powers under Spanish law (Ley 9/2017 de Contratos del Sector Público, Ley 19/2013 de Transparencia) and EU law (Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement). These include:

– Deliberate fragmentation of contracts (fraccionamiento de contratos) by the Ministerio de Política Territorial y Memoria Democrática to evade mandatory tender thresholds, publicity requirements, and open competitive bidding procedures. This conduct avoids principles of transparency, equality, non-discrimination, and free competition.

– Omissions in ensuring competitive processes, such as failing to publish tenders or conduct open licitaciones, leading to discretionary awards often to favored entities (e.g., in-house or specific centers like Centro de Documentación de la Memoria Histórica).

– Actions involving potential abuse of in-house provisioning (medios propios), awarding contracts to controlled entities without meeting strict legal conditions (absence of private capital, sufficient control).

– Policies and decisions facilitating biased procurement, including lack of accountability in using public funds for historical reports alleged to favor one ideological narrative, potentially involving conflicts of interest.

– Regulatory oversight failures referenced in European Commission infringement proceedings against Spain for procurement violations and excessively difficult state liability claims, violating EU principles of effectiveness and equivalence.

No private companies are explicitly named as under investigation by regulators in the materials. Instead, the Spanish Ministry and related public administrations are the focus of scrutiny for these practices.

Harmed companies and consumers (victims) include:

– Excluded companies: Small and medium enterprises (PYMEs/SMEs), freelance professionals (autónomos), historians, researchers, and consultants in sectors like historical research (SIC 7220), heritage activities (SIC 9102), exhumations, digitalization, and cultural services. These are harmed by lost opportunities, wasted bidding costs, lucro cesante (lost profits), unfair competition, and exclusion from contracts due to non-competitive awards.

– Consumers and indirect victims: Taxpayers harmed by inefficient use of public funds and market distortions; UK citizens and descendants of British volunteers suffering collective reputational damage from misrepresented historical narratives; families of Civil War victims (Spanish side) potentially affected by biased processes in exhumations or identifications; broader competitors and consumers impacted by anti-competitive outcomes.

These ultra vires DORCAPS by public bodies are claimed to create tort liabilities under Spanish administrative law (responsabilidad patrimonial de la administración pública), unfair competition rules, and potential EU-derived claims (e.g., Francovich liability), enabling compensation for both directly excluded companies and secondary victims of any resulting harms.

The equivalent to **UK judicial review** in Spain is the **recurso contencioso-administrativo**, regulated by Ley 29/1998, de 13 de julio, reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa (LJCA). This mechanism allows challenging ultra vires DORCAPS (dispositions of general character, acts, omissions, inactivities, or vía de hecho) by public bodies, including procurement irregularities under Ley 9/2017 and Ley 20/2022 de Memoria Democrática.

Judicial review opportunities in the MEMORIA case include:

– Direct challenge to specific ultra vires acts or decisions in procurement (e.g., fragmented contracts, discretionary awards without tender) via recurso contencioso-administrativo. Plazo: 2 months from the day following notification/publication of the act (art. 46.1 LJCA). For ongoing harms as of December 16, 2025, file within 2 months of knowledge or manifestation of the specific act.

– Challenge to inactividad administrativa (omissions), such as failure to publish tenders or ensure competitive processes. Requires prior requerimiento to the administration; if no compliance within 3 months, recurso contencioso-administrativo against the inactividad. Plazo: 2 months from end of the 3-month period (arts. 29 and 46 LJCA). For ongoing omissions in 2025, prior requerimiento remains possible, keeping the action timely.

– Specific opportunity for COCOO: recurso contencioso-administrativo against the public authority’s inactividad in initiating ex officio the procedimiento de repetición (action of regreso) against responsible officials for ultra vires DORCAPS causing compensated torts (art. 36 Ley 40/2015). This omission constitutes inactividad challengeable after requerimiento (3 months no response) + 2 months to file. As harms are ongoing and no mandatory initiation has occurred, file after requerimiento in 2025.

– Challenge to secondary legislation/implementation (policies, regulations, guidelines on Memoria Democrática procurement with high probability of ultra vires, e.g., facilitating fragmentation or bias). Direct recurso for disposiciones generales: 2 months from publication. Indirect (via act of application): raise illegality in recurso against the act. For ongoing implementation causing harm in 2025, indirect challenges remain timely; direct if publication recent or harm manifests newly.

– Combined with responsabilidad patrimonial claims (1-year plazo from harm manifestation, art. 67 Ley 39/2015), leading to potential repetición if compensated.

All these enable annulment, cessation of harms, and compensation for victims (excluded companies, reputational harms). Legitimación for COCOO exists via interest in competition/consumer protection.

 

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