16dec esp nextgen

21DEC

BAS

Custom Balancing Act and Professional Report on Judicial Review Opportunities

Introduction

This report provides a detailed professional analysis of the judicial review opportunities identified in recent legal assessments, specifically focusing on the intersection of public interest goals and competition law. Under the assumed equivalence between Spanish and UK legal frameworks, the following sections evaluate the merits of various grounds for challenge, balancing the requirements of economic efficiency against the broader social objectives often used to justify regulatory and administrative interventions. The judicial review period for annulment of decisions is typically two months and ten days, meaning that opportunities arising from recent administrative acts are currently actionable.

Judicial Review of Professional Body Exemptions and Sectoral Privileges

A primary opportunity for judicial review exists regarding the exemptions granted to professional bodies, such as those for lawyers, physicians, and accountants. These bodies are often permitted to limit competition through entry barriers and fixed fees under the guise of ensuring ethical standards.

The Balancing Act: The public interest justification for these exemptions is the preservation of service quality and ethical conduct. However, from an economic efficiency perspective, these restrictions often exceed what is necessary to achieve those goals, resulting in price-fixing and reduced consumer choice. A successful judicial review would argue that these exemptions are not justifiable on economic grounds except for the specific maintenance of standards and qualifications. The court must apply a proportionality test to determine if the anti-competitive restriction is the least restrictive means of achieving the public interest goal.

Judicial Review of Intellectual Property Rights Abuse

There is a significant opportunity to challenge the abuse of statutory monopolies granted through intellectual property rights (IPR). Firms may use patents or trademarks to engage in an abuse of a dominant position, particularly when misleading representations are made to patent offices to exclude rivals.

The Balancing Act: The public interest in IPR is the promotion of innovation through time-limited exclusivity. However, this must be balanced against the risk of creating long-term monopolies that facilitate unfair pricing or market foreclosure. A judicial review could seek to limit or withdraw exemptions for specific patents that are found to be part of an exclusionary strategy, ensuring that the incentive for innovation does not become a tool for market distortion.

Judicial Review of Regulatory Capture in Quasi-Markets

Judicial review may be sought against regulators in quasi-markets, such as the legal services market or environmental protection markets like the Emissions Trading Scheme. In these markets, there is a high risk of regulatory capture, where the regulator adopts decisions that favor regulated entities rather than the public interest.

The Balancing Act: Regulators often justify their decisions on grounds of market stability or environmental effectiveness. However, if the regulatory process is not open and transparent, it can lead to over-allocation of benefits or entry barriers for new competitors. A review would challenge the regulator for failing to observe the public interest or for allowing the market to be captured by incumbents. For example, the use of minimum fees in legal services may be challenged as an ineffective way to guarantee quality while serving as a cover for price-fixing.

Judicial Review of Merger Control and Industrial Policy

A critical area for judicial review involves decisions by the European Commission or national authorities to clear or block mergers based on industrial policy or protectionist grounds, such as the creation of national champions.

The Balancing Act: Public interest goals in merger control include employment protection, national security, and media plurality. These must be balanced against the significant impediment to effective competition that a merger might cause. A judicial review might challenge the clearing of an anti-competitive merger on the grounds that the alleged public interest benefits, such as saving jobs in an insolvent firm, do not outweigh the long-term harm to consumer welfare. Conversely, a review could challenge the blocking of a pro-competitive merger that was stopped solely to maintain domestic ownership.

Judicial Review of Delegated Acts and Essential Elements

Opportunities exist to challenge administrative decisions based on delegated or implementing acts that touch upon the essential elements of legislation. Essential elements, which require political choices and weigh conflicting interests, cannot be delegated to non-legislative bodies.

The Balancing Act: The administration may argue that such acts are necessary for technical implementation or efficient governance. However, the public interest in democratic legitimacy requires that significant policy choices involving fundamental rights or sensitive domains, such as border control or public health, be made by the legislature. A judicial review could seek to annul decisions where the regulator exceeded its powers by legislating on essential matters.

Judicial Review of Water Sector Price Controls and Financeability

In the water sector, price determinations by regulators like Ofwat can be challenged on the grounds of financeability and the treatment of the real/nominal interest rate mismatch.

The Balancing Act: The regulator’s duty is to ensure that companies can finance their activities while keeping prices affordable for consumers. However, the use of a real rate of return in price limits, while companies face nominal interest payments, creates a cashflow weakness that may unfairly force shareholders to inject new equity or face dilution. A judicial review would argue that this mismatch is an artificial constraint that distorts competition and that the regulator has failed in its legal duty to properly explain the timing of compensation for inflation.

Conclusion

The identified judicial review opportunities allow for a rigorous testing of administrative and regulatory decisions against the principles of proportionality and the rule of law. By balancing economic efficiency with legitimate public interest goals, these legal actions serve to ensure that market interventions are both necessary and effective in achieving their stated social objectives. Each opportunity remains actionable provided it is pursued within the statutory timeframes following the contested decision.

ALLIES

Based on the available information, I can provide a framework for identifying the organizations most likely to benefit from a successful judicial review (JR) of the RRF fund allocation, along with some specific sector focuses. However, the search results do not contain a direct list of affected companies or the comprehensive contact details you requested.

### 🎯 Categories of Potential Beneficiaries & Their Strategic Interest
Successful JR establishing that funds were unlawfully awarded to sanctioned cartel members would create distinct advantages for the following groups:

* **Excluded Competitors (SMEs in Key Sectors)**: These are the direct victims. A favorable JR ruling and subsequent cancellation/re-tendering of contracts would give them a new, lawful chance to compete for these projects. Their interest is direct financial gain and market access.
* **Business & Industry Associations**: Representing thousands of SMEs, they gain **positive externalities** from restored market fairness. A landmark JR would vindicate their advocacy for transparent procurement, enhancing their reputation and authority with members.
* **Consumer & Citizen Organizations**: Their core mission is to ensure public funds (€163 billion) are used effectively for public benefit. Success would prove the misuse of funds, restore public trust, and strengthen their role as watchdogs, fulfilling their organizational purpose.
* **Political Parties & Public Entities as Past Purchasers**: As demonstrated by the PSOE in the *Envelopes* cartel case, a final infringement decision (like a successful JR) can be the basis for a **follow-on damages claim** against suppliers that formed part of a cartel. Any public body that overpaid a sanctioned company could seek compensation.

### 🔍 Where to Find These Organizations
The search results point to the sectors receiving the largest shares of RRF funding, which are the most likely arenas for affected firms:
* **Green Transition & Sustainable Mobility** (€25+ billion): Associations for renewable energy, building renovation, electric vehicle infrastructure, and railway engineering.
* **Digital Transformation** (€19.7-40.4 billion): Associations for digital services, telecommunications, software developers, and SME digitalization.
* **General SME & Employer Associations**: Given that SMEs represent over 99% of Spanish firms, national and sector-specific bodies like the **Spanish Confederation of Small and Medium Enterprises (CEPYME)** or local chambers of commerce are critical.

### ⚖️ Legal Precedent for Follow-On Claims
The recent Supreme Court ruling in the *Envelopes* cartel case is highly relevant. It confirms that:
1. A final decision by a competition authority (which a JR finding of unlawful award could mirror) creates a **presumption of harm**.
2. The limitation period for follow-on damages claims is favorable, generally starting when the infringement decision is final.
This legal pathway significantly increases the incentive for any organization that can prove it suffered financial damage (e.g., by losing a contract to or overpaying a sanctioned bidder) to take action after a successful JR.

### 📇 How to Proceed Without Direct Contact Lists
Since the search results do not provide a ready-made directory, you will need to take these steps to build your list:
1. **Identify Sanctioned Companies**: From your case file, list the companies with active CNMC sanctions that received RRF awards.
2. **Map the Sectors**: Determine which of the key RRF sectors (e.g., renewable infrastructure, digital toolkit for SMEs, railway projects) each sanctioned company operates in.
3. **Find Their Competitors & Representatives**:
* Search for **industry associations** for each identified sector (e.g., “Spanish Association of Renewable Energy Companies”).
* Search for **SME alliances** or clusters within those sectors.
* Use official business registries or procurement platforms to identify companies that **bid unsuccessfully** on the specific contracts awarded to sanctioned firms.

To get you started, would you like me to help generate search queries to find the relevant industry associations for a specific RRF sector, such as renewable energy or digital transformation?

JRS

Based on the provided case file, I have conducted an analysis of the “NextGen” case concerning the alleged mismanagement of EU Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds in Spain. My findings are as follows.

**1. Judicial Review Status, Time Limits, and Non-Time-Barred Causes of Action**

No successful judicial review has been concluded on the specific RRF awards to sanctioned firms[reference:0]. While many individual contract awards are time-barred under the standard two-month limit[reference:1], significant and timely opportunities for challenge remain due to the continuous and systemic nature of the alleged failures.

* **Ongoing Omissions:** Challenges to administrative inaction, such as the failure to exclude sanctioned entities or to initiate clawback procedures (*acción de regreso*), have no fixed deadline while the omission and the resulting harm persist[reference:2][reference:3].
* **Recent and Future Acts:** New contract awards, resolutions, and disbursements under the RRF plan have continued into late 2025. Any award published or notified after mid-September 2025 remains within the two-month challenge window as of the current date (22 December 2025)[reference:4].
* **Continuous Harm from Past Acts:** The market distortion and economic exclusion of compliant SMEs constitute an ongoing harm. This supports actions for state patrimonial liability, where the one-year limitation period runs from when the harm is known and its effects stabilise, which is likely current for 2025[reference:5].

A strategic letter to a public body, requesting it to exercise a specific duty (e.g., to investigate or initiate recovery), can create a fresh JR opportunity. A refusal or negative administrative silence in response to such a request constitutes a challengeable decision. This can also bolster an applicant’s *locus standi*, as the decision is made in direct response to their petition, creating a “sufficient interest” in its lawfulness[reference:6].

**Non-Time-Barred Causes of Action (COAs)**

* **Judicial Review (Recurso Contencioso-Administrativo):**
* **Illegality/Ultra Vires:** Challenging recent specific contract awards to proven cartel members, arguing they breach Article 13 of the General Subsidies Law and Article 71 of the Public Sector Contracts Law[reference:7].
* **Irrationality & Procedural Impropriety:** Challenging the ongoing omission to conduct ex officio exclusion of ineligible bidders and the failure to maintain transparent beneficiary registers, as required by EU and Spanish law[reference:8].
* **Indirect Challenge:** Arguing that the application of the regulatory framework (e.g., Royal Decree-Law 36/2020) to specific awards is ultra vires for contravening superior EU law principles[reference:9].

* **Tort-Based Claims:**
* **Misfeasance in Public Office:** For acts allegedly done in bad faith, knowing the companies were ineligible, or recklessly indifferent to that fact.
* **Breach of Statutory Duty:** For failing to perform the mandatory duties of verification and exclusion imposed by procurement and subsidy laws.
* **Negligence:** For the “abnormal functioning of public service” in failing to exercise due diligence, constituting *culpa in vigilando*[reference:10].
* **State Patrimonial Liability:** A strict liability claim for damages caused by the administration’s unlawful acts or omissions, which is the primary vehicle for compensation in Spanish law[reference:11].

* **EU Law Actions:**
* **Failure to Act (Art. 265 TFEU):** Against the European Commission for not triggering the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism despite evidence of systemic breaches[reference:12].

**Standing for a “No Particular Victim” Applicant**
An organisation like COCOO.uk can establish *locus standi* by demonstrating a “legitimate interest” beyond a general public concern. This can be anchored in:
* **Representative Standing:** Acting for a diffuse class of victims (excluded SMEs) who individually lack the incentive to litigate, thus filling an “enforcement vacuum”[reference:13].
* **Statutory Purpose Alignment:** Showing that the organisation’s core objectives (competition and consumer protection) are directly engaged by the systemic procurement failures alleged.
* **Interest via Triggered Decision:** The interest is strongest when challenging a refusal issued in direct response to the applicant’s own request, as the applicant is directly affected by that specific decision.

**2. Ultra Vires & Irrational DORCAPs (Ranked by Likelihood of Success)**

1. **Specific Contract Awards to Sanctioned Companies (Highest Likelihood):** Awarding contracts to entities with active CNMC sanctions is a direct and apparent violation of explicit legal prohibitions (Art. 13 LGS, Art. 71 LCSP). The illegality is clear, making this the strongest ground.
2. **Omission to Exclude Sanctioned Entities Ex Officio:** Public authorities have a continuous duty to verify eligibility. The failure to cross-reference awards with CNMC sanction lists and to act on that information is a clear omission of a statutory duty, highly likely to be found unlawful.
3. **Failure to Initiate *Acción de Regreso* (Recoupment Action):** The ongoing refusal to pursue officials potentially liable for negligent or bad-faith awards, despite evidence of ultra vires acts, could be found irrational (*Wednesbury* unreasonable) as it frustrates the purpose of accountability legislation.
4. **Regulatory Framework (Royal Decree-Law 36/2020) Weakening Controls:** While challenging the law itself may be time-barred, arguing that its *application* in the RRF context is ultra vires for breaching fundamental EU principles (non-discrimination, transparency) has a reasonable prospect.
5. **European Commission’s Omission to Enforce Conditionality:** While a strong legal argument exists, the political and discretionary nature of the Conditionality Mechanism, coupled with the high threshold for CJEU standing, makes this a more uncertain claim.

**3. Suspended Quashing Orders**

The primary quashing orders should target the individual contract awards found to be ultra vires. A suspended order is imperative to avoid immediate administrative chaos, nullification of ongoing projects, and potential liability for breach of contract with the EU.

* **Suspension Period:** Six months from the date of the order.
* **Conditions for Suspension:** The suspension should be conditional on the relevant Ministry: (i) immediately halting any further payments to the sanctioned beneficiary for the quashed contract; (ii) publishing a transparent plan for re-tendering the contract or regularising the award in compliance with the law within the suspension period; and (iii) providing a quarterly report to the court on progress.

**4. Ongoing Harm & Injunctive Relief**

The ongoing harm is the continued market distortion and exclusion of compliant SMEs, perpetuated by both the legacy of past unlawful awards and the risk of future repetitions.

**Key Elements for an Interim Injunction:**
* **Parties:** Applicant (COCOO.uk) vs. The Relevant Ministry (e.g., Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Transport).
* **Relief Sought:** An order prohibiting the respondent from awarding any new RRF-funded contract, or making any further disbursement under an existing contract, to any company subject to a final CNMC sanction for anti-competitive conduct, until the substantive judicial review is determined or until the respondent demonstrates the implementation of a verified, transparent cross-check system.
* **Undertaking in Damages:** The applicant to provide a cross-undertaking in damages.
* **Balance of Convenience:** The public interest in upholding the rule of law and protecting fair competition far outweighs any administrative inconvenience to the respondent.

**5. Statement of Legal Principle Declaration**

“It is hereby declared that the [Relevant Public Body], in awarding a contract financed by the Recovery and Resilience Facility to [Company Name] on [Date], acted ultra vires and in breach of Article 13 of Law 38/2003 (General Subsidies Law) and Article 71 of Law 9/2017 (Public Sector Contracts Law), by failing to exclude a beneficiary that was, at the time of award, subject to a final sanction from the National Commission on Markets and Competition for serious infringement of competition law, which constitutes a mandatory ground for exclusion under the said legislation.”

**6. Risk Disclosure Statement (Proposed Court Order)**

The court should order the respondent public body to, within 28 days:
1. Publish a “Risk Disclosure Statement” on the homepage of its official website and in its next annual report.
2. This statement must clearly describe the unlawfulness found by the court, the specific financial and competitive risks it created for the public treasury and the market, and the concrete steps being taken to remediate the issue and prevent recurrence.
3. The statement must be directly communicated to relevant business associations representing SMEs in the affected sectors (e.g., construction, digital, energy).

**7. Assessment & Publicity of Risk**

The case file indicates that risk registers (e.g., the “CoFFEE” system’s risk matrix) existed and *should* have identified the risk of awarding funds to sanctioned entities[reference:14]. A critical failure appears to be that either:
* No such assessment was conducted prior to the awards, demonstrating a reckless lack of due diligence; or
* Such assessments were conducted, identified the high risk, but were ignored or not made public, demonstrating bad faith and a deliberate avoidance of accountability.
This failure forms a further, independent ground for criticism and supports arguments of irrationality or misfeasance.

**8. Responsible Parties & Individual Liability**

The primary responsible bodies are the line Ministries administering the funds (Finance, Economic Affairs, Transport) and the internal audit body (IGAE). The CNMC may share responsibility for any failure to clearly communicate and enforce contracting prohibitions.

The case file unequivocally states that no *acción de regreso* (the procedure for the state to reclaim from liable officials after compensating victims) has been initiated, and no disciplinary proceedings, dismissals, or fines against responsible officials have been identified[reference:15][reference:16]. This is a “smoking gun” indicating systemic impunity. Pursuing this line is essential, potentially through a mandatory order compelling the initiation of *regreso* proceedings, or via a misfeasance claim targeting identified officials directly.

**9. Tort Damages & Remediation Project**

* **Estimated Aggregate Damages:** A reasoned starting point is the €800+ million identified as being awarded to ineligible, sanctioned entities[reference:17]. This figure represents the direct financial loss to the public purse and the scale of the distorted market. A conservative claim for patrimonial liability could seek a significant portion of this sum as damages for the collective harm to the SME sector.
* **Distribution Mechanism & Remediation Project:** Given the diffuse class of victims, a *cy-près* or analogous solution is required. Damages recovered should be paid into a ring-fenced **”NextGen Fair Competition Fund,”** administered by an independent trustee.
* **Project Design:** The fund would finance a **”SME Innovation and Market Entry Grant Scheme”** specifically for small and medium enterprises in the sectors most distorted by the unlawful awards (construction, digital, energy, automotive). Grants would support R&D, certification costs, or consortium-forming to bid for public contracts.
* **Justification:** This creates direct positive externalities by: (i) remedying the competitive handicap suffered by the victim class; (ii) incentivising innovation and fair competition; (iii) improving the quality and value for money in public procurement; and (iv) restoring public confidence in the administration of EU funds. It transforms a remedy for past wrongs into an investment in future market integrity.

 

17DEC

 

FOIS

Based on the SuperFOI Model and the specific duties of each body regarding the NextGen/RRF Case, here are the five customised FOI requests ready to be sent.

Each letter targets the specific “DORCAP” (Decision, Omission, Regulatory Change, Act, or Policy) relevant to that institution, ensuring you trap them between admitting negligence (by having no records) or admitting ultra vires acts (by revealing the records exist but were ignored).

1. LETTER TO MINISTERIO DE HACIENDA (Ministry of Finance)

Focus: The “CoFFEE” Control System, Risk Registers, and the central omission of Acción de Regreso.

[Copy and Paste into Transparency Portal: https://transparencia.gob.es]

Para: Unidad de Transparencia / Ministerio de Hacienda y Función Pública

Email: unidadinformaciontransparencia@hacienda.gob.es

Asunto: Solicitud de Acceso a Información Pública – Evidencias sobre [Gestión Fondos RRF/NextGen y Adjudicaciones a Empresas Sancionadas] y Análisis de Responsabilidad Patrimonial

Escribo en nombre de Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO.uk), una organización benéfica dedicada a la protección del Interés Público General (Wider Public Interest) y del contribuyente. Intervenimos en fallos regulatorios donde existe un “vacío de ejecución” (enforcement vacuum) porque ninguna víctima individual tiene incentivos para litigar.

Esta solicitud evalúa el DORCAP referenciado: la omisión de controles de elegibilidad en el sistema CoFFEE que permitió la adjudicación de más de 800 millones de euros de fondos MRR a empresas sancionadas por la CNMC (Cártel de la Construcción, Ferroviario, etc.), en posible vulneración del Art. 13.2 de la Ley General de Subvenciones.

Al amparo de la Ley 19/2013, solicito:

PARTE 1: VACÍO DE EJECUCIÓN (Datos de Locus Standi)

  • Quejas y Denuncias: Desglose el número de denuncias recibidas en el Canal de Denuncias del Mecanismo Antifraude (SNCA) relacionadas con la adjudicación de contratos RRF a empresas con prohibición de contratar o sanciones de competencia vigentes (2021-2025).

  • Impacto Económico: ¿Posee la Autoridad Responsable algún informe que cuantifique el impacto en las PYMES (competidores excluidos) derivado de la concentración de fondos RRF en grandes empresas sancionadas?

PARTE 2: LEGALIDAD Y RIESGO (Controles de Gobernanza)

  • Registro de Riesgos (CoFFEE): Facilite copia o resumen de las entradas en la “Matriz de Riesgos” del Plan de Recuperación que identifiquen como riesgo (Alto/Medio) la “Adjudicación a beneficiarios incursos en prohibición de contratar por infracción grave de competencia”.

  • Informes de Elegibilidad: Confirme si existen informes de la Abogacía del Estado solicitados por Hacienda sobre la aplicabilidad automática de las sanciones de la CNMC (ej. resoluciones S/0034/20) para bloquear pagos RRF en el sistema de gestión.

PARTE 3: LA TRAMPA DEL “REGRESO”

  • Procedimiento de Regreso: Confirme si este Ministerio ha incoado alguna vez el ‘Procedimiento de exigencia de responsabilidad a autoridades’ (Acción de Regreso, Art. 36 Ley 40/2015) contra gestores que autorizaron pagos RRF a empresas del “Cártel de la Construcción” o similar.

  • Si la respuesta es “cero”, justifique la omisión de proteger los derechos de cobro de la Hacienda Pública ante pagos indebidos confirmados por sentencias o resoluciones firmes.

PARTE 4: PISTA DE AUDITORÍA

  • Informes IGAE/SNCA: Facilite los títulos de los informes de control (Control 79/2023 o similares) que hayan analizado específicamente la variable “Sanciones de Competencia” en el cruce de datos de MINERVA o CoFFEE.

Atentamente,

Oscar Moya | Director, COCOO.uk

2. LETTER TO MINISTERIO DE ASUNTOS ECONÓMICOS (Economy)

Focus: Digitalization Funds (Kit Digital), PERTEs, and allocation to sanctioned Tech/Consulting firms.

[Copy and Paste into Transparency Portal: https://transparencia.gob.es]

Para: Unidad de Transparencia / Ministerio de Asuntos Económicos y Transformación Digital

Email: transparencia.mineco@economia.gob.es

Asunto: Solicitud de Acceso a Información Pública – [Adjudicaciones PERTE y Kit Digital a Empresas Sancionadas]

Escribo en nombre de COCOO.uk para evaluar el DORCAP relativo a la adjudicación de fondos NextGen (PERTEs y Kit Digital) a empresas del sector tecnológico y consultoría (ej. Indra, consultoras sancionadas) pese a antecedentes de infracción de competencia.

Al amparo de la Ley 19/2013, solicito:

PARTE 1: VACÍO DE EJECUCIÓN

  • Reclamaciones de PYMES: Número de recursos administrativos interpuestos por PYMES tecnológicas contra resoluciones de concesión de ayudas del programa Kit Digital o PERTE Chip, alegando competencia desleal o posición de dominio de los adjudicatarios principales.

PARTE 2: LEGALIDAD Y RIESGO

  • Validación de “Agentes Digitalizadores”: Copia de los protocolos o “Checklists” utilizados por Red.es para verificar la ausencia de prohibiciones de contratar (Art. 13 LGS) en los Agentes Digitalizadores adheridos. ¿Se cruzaron estos datos con la base de datos de sanciones de la CNMC?

  • Declaraciones Responsables: Porcentaje de verificaciones ex-post realizadas sobre la veracidad de las “Declaraciones de Ausencia de Conflicto de Interés” (DACI) presentadas por grandes consultoras adjudicatarias de fondos RRF.

PARTE 3: LA TRAMPA DEL “REGRESO”

  • Recuperación de Ayudas: Confirme si se ha iniciado algún expediente de reintegro de subvenciones por falseamiento de las condiciones de elegibilidad (ocultación de sanciones de competencia) en el marco de los fondos NextGen gestionados por este Ministerio.

  • Acción de Regreso: Número de expedientes iniciados (Art. 36 Ley 40/2015) contra funcionarios que validaron dichas adjudicaciones sin la debida diligencia.

Atentamente,

Oscar Moya | Director, COCOO.uk

3. LETTER TO CNMC (Competition Regulator)

Focus: The Omission of enforcing the “Prohibition to Contract” and communication failures with Ministries.

[Copy and Paste into CNMC Transparency Portal: https://sede.cnmc.gob.es/tramites/general/transparencia]

Para: Unidad de Transparencia / CNMC

Email: dpd@cnmc.es (Data Protection/Transparency Officer)

Asunto: Solicitud de Acceso a Información Pública – [Ejecución de Prohibiciones de Contratar y Fondos RRF]

Escribo en nombre de COCOO.uk para evaluar la Omisión Regulatoria (DORCAP) consistente en la falta de determinación del alcance y duración de las prohibiciones de contratar en las resoluciones sancionadoras (ej. S/0034/20), permitiendo el acceso indebido a fondos RRF.

Al amparo de la Ley 19/2013, solicito:

PARTE 1: VACÍO DE EJECUCIÓN

  • Solicitudes de la Junta Consultiva: Confirme si la CNMC ha recibido solicitudes formales de la Junta Consultiva de Contratación Pública del Estado para fijar la duración de la prohibición de contratar de las empresas sancionadas en los expedientes S/0034/20, S/DC/0612/17 y S/DC/0611/17.

  • Comunicaciones a Ministerios: Copia de cualquier oficio o comunicación remitida por la CNMC a los ministerios gestores de fondos RRF (Hacienda, Transportes) alertando sobre el riesgo de adjudicar contratos a estas empresas sancionadas.

PARTE 2: LEGALIDAD Y RIESGO

  • Informes de Supervisión: ¿Ha elaborado el Departamento de Promoción de la Competencia algún informe o nota interna sobre el impacto distorsionador de los fondos NextGen en los mercados donde operan los cárteles sancionados?

PARTE 3: LA TRAMPA DEL “REGRESO” (Inaplicable a CNMC directamente, sustituir por):

  • Ejecución de Sanciones: Confirme el estado de cobro de las multas impuestas en el expediente S/0034/20. ¿Se ha solicitado a la Abogacía del Estado que recurra las medidas cautelares que suspenden la prohibición de contratar?

Atentamente,

Oscar Moya | Director, COCOO.uk

4. LETTER TO MINISTERIO DE TRANSPORTES (Transport)

Focus: Specific Infrastructure Contracts (Adif/Roads) awarded to the “G7” Cartel.

[Copy and Paste into Transparency Portal: https://transparencia.gob.es]

Para: Unidad de Transparencia / Ministerio de Transportes y Movilidad Sostenible

Email: transparencia@transportes.gob.es

Asunto: Solicitud de Acceso a Información Pública – [Contratos de Infraestructuras RRF y Cártel de la Construcción]

Escribo en nombre de COCOO.uk para evaluar el DORCAP consistente en la adjudicación sistemática de contratos de obra pública financiados por el Mecanismo de Recuperación y Resiliencia (MRR) a empresas sancionadas por la CNMC (Resolución S/0034/20 y similares).

Al amparo de la Ley 19/2013, solicito:

PARTE 1: VACÍO DE EJECUCIÓN

  • Adjudicaciones a Sancionadas: Listado de contratos financiados con fondos MRR adjudicados por ADIF y la Dirección General de Carreteras desde 2021 a empresas incluidas en la Resolución S/0034/20 de la CNMC (Dragados, Sacyr, FCC, etc.).

  • Recursos de Licitadores: Número de recursos especiales en materia de contratación interpuestos contra pliegos o adjudicaciones MRR basados en la falta de aptitud (prohibición de contratar) de estas empresas.

PARTE 2: LEGALIDAD Y RIESGO

  • Informe de Justificación (Art. 71 LCSP): Para los contratos adjudicados a empresas sancionadas, facilite el “Informe de Justificación” donde el órgano de contratación motiva por qué no se les excluyó del procedimiento por falta de aptitud legal sobrevenida o por “grave culpa profesional”.

  • Medidas de “Self-Cleaning”: ¿Ha aceptado este Ministerio alguna medida de “self-cleaning” (medidas correctoras) presentada por estas empresas para evitar su exclusión? Si es así, facilite copia de la resolución de aceptación.

PARTE 3: LA TRAMPA DEL “REGRESO”

  • Acción de Regreso: Confirme si se ha iniciado expediente de responsabilidad (Art. 36 Ley 40/2015) contra los directores de obra o mesas de contratación que propusieron la adjudicación a miembros del cártel probado, generando un riesgo de corrección financiera por parte de la UE.

Atentamente,

Oscar Moya | Director, COCOO.uk

5. LETTER TO IGAE (Intervención General)

Focus: The “Smoking Gun” of internal audits. Did they see it and ignore it?

[Copy and Paste into Transparency Portal: https://transparencia.gob.es]

Para: Unidad de Transparencia / Intervención General de la Administración del Estado (IGAE)

Email: secretaria.ig@igae.hacienda.gob.es

Asunto: Solicitud de Acceso a Información Pública – [Auditoría de Fondos RRF y Riesgo de Doble Financiación/Fraude]

Escribo en nombre de COCOO.uk para evaluar la función de control interno sobre el DORCAP de asignación de fondos RRF a entidades sancionadas.

Al amparo de la Ley 19/2013, solicito:

PARTE 1: PISTA DE AUDITORÍA

  • Informes de Control Permanente: Títulos de los informes de auditoría definitiva emitidos en 2023-2025 relativos al control de los Hitos y Objetivos del Plan de Recuperación que mencionen debilidades en la comprobación de la “ausencia de conflicto de interés” o “prohibiciones de contratar”.

  • Alertas MINERVA: Número de “Banderas Rojas” (Red Flags) generadas por el sistema MINERVA relacionadas con beneficiarios sancionados por la CNMC, y el porcentaje de dichas alertas que fueron “cerradas” sin actuación correctiva.

PARTE 2: LEGALIDAD Y RIESGO

  • Dictámenes sobre Regreso: ¿Ha emitido la IGAE algún informe recomendando el inicio de expedientes de reintegro o de acción de regreso contra gestores públicos por negligencia grave en la verificación de los requisitos de elegibilidad (Art. 13 LGS) en fondos NextGen?

Atentamente,

Oscar Moya | Director, COCOO.uk

 

As the solicitor for the cocoo.uk charity, I have analyzed the case file regarding the NextGen / Spanish RRF (Recovery and Resilience Facility) mismanagement.

Here is the legal analysis of the case, applying your three statutory questions to each of the viable Causes of Action (COAs).

CASE SUMMARY: The “NextGen” Ultra Vires Awards

The core of the case is that the Spanish Government (Regulator/Public Body) committed an Ultra Vires DORCAP (Decision, Omission, Regulatory Change, Act, or Policy) by awarding over €800 million in EU RRF funds to companies that were proven infringers of competition law (FOIGs). These companies were ineligible under EU and Spanish procurement laws due to prior sanctions, yet they received public contracts, thereby distorting the market and harming compliant SMEs.

COA 1: ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW (Recurso Contencioso-Administrativo)

Claim: Challenging the specific acts (contract awards) or omissions (failure to exclude) by the Administration.

  • Dates & Time Limits:

    • Direct Appeal: 2 months from the publication/notification of the award. (Many have expired, but new awards in late 2025 are still active).

    • Inactivity (Omission): No strict deadline while the inactivity persists (e.g., failure to publish beneficiary data or conduct “Ex Officio” review).

    • Indirect Challenge: Against the regulatory framework (e.g., Royal Decree-Law 36/2020) when applied to a specific act.

1. IDENTIFY ALL PROVEN FOIGS (Findings of Infringement):

The private companies benefiting from the awards have the following proven infringements (sanctions by the CNMC – Spanish National Commission on Markets and Competition):

  • The “G7” Construction Cartel (2022): Dragados (ACS), FCC, Ferrovial, Acciona, OHLA, and Sacyr. Fined €203.6 million for altering public tenders over 25 years.

  • Railway Signaling Cartel: Alstom, Siemens Mobility, CAF, and others. Sanctioned for collusive behavior in ADIF tenders.

  • Advertising/Media Cartel: Carat España S.A. and Media Sapiens España S.L. Sanctioned for bid-rigging in institutional advertising contracts.

2. CAUSED BY ULTRA VIRES DORCAP? JUDICIALLY REVIEWED?

  • Possibility: 100% Certainty. The awards (DORCAP) were unlawful because Article 71 of the Spanish Public Sector Contracts Law (LCSP) and Article 13 of the General Subsidies Law prohibit awarding contracts to sanctioned entities. The Administration acted ultra vires by ignoring the FOIGs and failing to issue the necessary “prohibition to contract” orders.

  • Judicially Reviewed? No. There is no evidence that the specific RRF awards to these sanctioned firms have been successfully quashed via judicial review yet. The Administration has relied on “administrative silence” and the lack of automatic scope in the CNMC sanctions to avoid review.

3. STATE REDRESS / REGRESO?

  • State Paid Redress? No. No compensation has been paid to the excluded competitors (victims) via this channel.

  • Disciplinary/Regreso? No. The Administration has not initiated acción de regreso (recoupment action) against the officials responsible for the awards, nor has it clawed back the funds from the infringers.

COA 2: STATE FINANCIAL LIABILITY (Responsabilidad Patrimonial del Estado)

Claim: Seeking damages for the economic loss suffered by excluded SMEs due to the Administration’s negligent awards.

  • Dates & Time Limits:

    • Statute of Limitations: 1 Year from the moment the “harm” (loss of contract/market distortion) manifested and its effect stabilized.

    • Strategic Note: If the harm is “continuous” (ongoing market exclusion in 2025), the window remains open.

1. IDENTIFY ALL PROVEN FOIGS:

  • (Same as above: CNMC sanctions against Dragados, Sacyr, Ferrovial, Siemens, etc.)

  • Relevance: These FOIGs prove the companies were “high risk” and should have been excluded. The Administration’s failure to check this constitutes the “abnormal functioning” of public service.

2. CAUSED BY ULTRA VIRES DORCAP? JUDICIALLY REVIEWED?

  • Possibility: High. The DORCAP here is the Omission of Due Diligence. The State failed to check the “risk traffic light” of these companies.

  • Judicially Reviewed? No. The specific liability for these RRF misallocations has not been adjudicated. However, the Tribunal Supremo has previously ruled on the State’s liability for lack of oversight in other contexts, establishing a precedent for “culpa in vigilando” (negligence in supervision).

3. STATE REDRESS / REGRESO?

  • State Paid Redress? No. No settlements or court-ordered compensations have been paid to the specific victims of the NextGen allocation.

  • Disciplinary/Regreso? No. Since the State has not yet paid out, the acción de regreso (which allows the State to sue the negligent official after paying the victim) has not been triggered. This is a key failure identified in your case file.

COA 3: EU INFRINGEMENT / FAILURE TO ACT (Article 265 TFEU)

Claim: Against the European Commission for failing to trigger the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism despite evidence.

  • Dates & Time Limits:

    • Pre-action Letter: Sent (Feb/March 2025).

    • Court Filing: 2 months after the Commission’s unsatisfactory response (or lack thereof).

    • Current Status: Time is critical; if the Commission replied in May 2025 (as per file), the deadline for Art 265 action is imminent or active.

1. IDENTIFY ALL PROVEN FOIGS:

  • The FOIGs here are the Systemic Breaches identified by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) Special Report 13/2024: “Significant opacity,” failure to identify final recipients, and inability to track funds to sanctioned entities.

2. CAUSED BY ULTRA VIRES DORCAP? JUDICIALLY REVIEWED?

  • Possibility: Yes. The “DORCAP” is the Commission’s release of payments to Spain despite the Spanish Government’s breach of milestones.

  • Judicially Reviewed? No. The Commission’s refusal to cut funding to Spain (unlike Hungary) has not yet been tested in the CJEU for this specific case.

3. STATE REDRESS / REGRESO?

  • State Paid Redress? No. (Not applicable to EU funds in this context yet).

  • Disciplinary/Regreso? No.

COA 4: PRIVATE COMPETITION DAMAGES (Follow-on Actions)

Claim: Private litigation against the Cartelists (Dragados, Sacyr, etc.) for damages caused by their bid-rigging.

  • Dates & Time Limits:

    • Limitation Period: 5 Years (EU Damages Directive) from the date the infringement ceased and the victim knew of the harm.

    • Status: The CNMC sanctions were ~2022. The claim period is OPEN until at least 2027.

1. IDENTIFY ALL PROVEN FOIGS:

  • CNMC Resolution S/0034/20 (Construction Cartel).

  • CNMC Resolution S/DC/0612/17 (Railway Signalling).

  • CNMC Resolution S/DC/0611/17 (Road Maintenance).

2. CAUSED BY ULTRA VIRES DORCAP? JUDICIALLY REVIEWED?

  • Possibility: Yes. The “DORCAP” (Government Award) facilitated the harm, but the root cause was the private cartel. The Government’s ultra vires act was failing to stop them.

  • Judicially Reviewed? Yes (The FOIGs themselves). The companies appealed the CNMC fines. Some secured interim suspensions (cautelares) of the “ban on contracting,” which allowed the Government to keep awarding them contracts. This legal loophole is central to the case.

3. STATE REDRESS / REGRESO?

  • State Paid Redress? No.

  • Disciplinary/Regreso? No. The companies have paid some fines to the Treasury, but no compensation to the victims (competitors/SMEs). There has been no “regreso” because the State hasn’t paid damages to victims to then recoup from the companies.

Summary of “Regreso” Status

Across all COAs, no acción de regreso has been initiated. This is your “Smoking Gun.” The Public Administration is shielding its officials and the cartelists by:

  1. Not paying victims (so no debt arises).

  2. Not investigating the officials who authorized awards to sanctioned firms (bad faith/negligence).

  3. Not triggering the automatic prohibition to contract.

 

16DEC

The NextGen case, as detailed across the provided pages on nextgen.cocoo.uk, centers on alleged systemic mismanagement and irregularities in Spain’s implementation of the European Union’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds under NextGenerationEU. The content claims breaches of EU and Spanish laws in public procurement, transparency, and competition, leading to unfair allocation of funds.

Regulators and public bodies identified with potentially ultra vires DORCAPS include Spanish public authorities and ministries (such as those responsible for Finance, Economic Affairs, Industry, and Transport), which awarded RRF contracts through opaque processes, direct awards, and without adequate due diligence on recipient eligibility, ignoring prior anti-competitive sanctions. The European Commission is cited for omissions in substantive action, inadequate response to complaints, and failure to enforce transparency or trigger mechanisms like suspension of payments. The Spanish National Commission on Markets and Competition (CNMC) issued sanctions but the awards proceeded despite them. Key ultra vires elements involve decisions to allocate over €800 million in RRF funds to ineligible recipients, omissions in reporting final beneficiaries and conducting controls, conduct involving favoritism and non-transparent tenders, actions via Royal Decree-Law 36/2020 weakening procurement controls, and policies breaching RRF Regulation (EU) 2021/241 (Articles 5, 9, 22), Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092, EU procurement directives, and Spanish laws like General Subsidies Law (Article 13).

Companies harmed as victims (excluded competitors under investigation or sanctioned by regulators, yet ultimately victimized by the ultra vires awards) include Dragados S.A. (ACS Group), Sacyr S.A., FCC Construcción S.A., Ferrovial Agroman S.A., Carat España S.A., Media Sapiens España S.L., Alstom, Siemens Mobility, CAF, and others that received funds despite CNMC fines for bid-rigging and cartels, facing risks of contract nullification, clawbacks, and liabilities.

Consumers and tort victims harmed (primarily excluded SMEs and competitors suffering economic loss from distorted markets) include small and medium-sized enterprises in sectors such as heavy/civil engineering construction (e.g., Obrascón Huarte Lain, COMSA Corporación, Elecnor), energy/green transition (e.g., Solaria Energía y Medio Ambiente, Nexus Energía), automotive/EV supply chain (e.g., Gestamp, CIE Automotive), digital transformation/technology (e.g., Everis, GMV), and healthcare (e.g., Ribera Salud, Vithas), along with broader classes represented by associations like National Confederation of Construction, APPA Renovables, SERNAUTO, and Adigital. These parties face lost opportunities, unfair exclusion, and market distortions traceable to the regulators’ and public bodies’ alleged ultra vires DORCAPS. No references to Google or Gemini appear in the case content.

The equivalent in Spain to the UK judicial review is the recurso contencioso-administrativo, which allows challenges to administrative acts, omissions, regulations, and policies for illegality, including ultra vires actions by public bodies.

Judicial review opportunities in the NextGen case to challenge ultra vires DORCAPS include the following.

Recurso contencioso-administrativo against specific contract awards or direct allocations of RRF funds to ineligible recipients despite CNMC sanctions, on grounds of breach of RRF Regulation (EU) 2021/241, procurement directives, and Spanish laws. Excluded competitors or associations like COCOO have standing if directly affected. Time limit is generally two months from notification or publication of the act, or six months for presumed acts via silence administrativo. As awards continue into 2025 and harm is ongoing through distorted markets, filings remain timely for recent or future awards.

Recurso contencioso-administrativo against Royal Decree-Law 36/2020 provisions weakening procurement controls, or its implementation in RRF fund management, as ultra vires or disproportionate. Regulations have a two-month limit from publication (expired since 2020), but ongoing implementation and harm allow indirect challenge when applied in specific acts, or direct if arguing continued effects. High probability of success if proven to breach EU law principles.

Recurso contencioso-administrativo for administrative inactivity or omission, such as failure by Spanish ministries or authorities to report final beneficiaries, conduct adequate controls, or exclude sanctioned entities ex officio. This includes the specific opportunity for COCOO to challenge the public authority that should have initiated, but omitted, an internal procedure to pursue or publicise recovery against the ultra vires regulator/public body causing torts compensated by the State. Inactivity challenges have no fixed act date; filing is timely while omission persists and harm is ongoing.

Action for patrimonial liability of the public administration for damages from ultra vires DORCAPS, seeking compensation for victims (excluded SMEs, competitors). One-year limit from when harm is known and stabilised, timely for ongoing distortions in 2025.

At EU level, action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU at the CJEU against European Commission decisions approving payments or omitting enforcement despite complaints on transparency or eligibility breaches. Two-month limit from publication or notification; limited standing for non-privileged applicants like COCOO unless directly and individually concerned. Preliminary ruling requests via national courts also possible on EU law interpretation.

These avenues establish grounds to annul acts, compel action, or obtain compensation traceable to ultra vires DORCAPS by Spanish authorities and Commission omissions.

From the previously identified judicial review opportunities via recurso contencioso-administrativo, the ones still within a potential 3-month time limit as of 16 December 2025 are those challenging specific contract awards or direct allocations of RRF funds that occurred after 16 September 2025 (3 months prior). Recent adjudications and resolutions of PERTE and other NextGenerationEU funds have continued into late 2025, with ongoing convocations, resolutions, and payments reported throughout the year, including new projects and disbursements in sectors like agro, energy, and infrastructure. For these recent awards (published or notified after mid-September 2025), the standard 2-month deadline from notification or publication applies and remains open.

The opportunities older than 3 months but where the tort or contractual harm is ongoing as of 16 December 2025, allowing for potential continued or renewed challenge (equivalent to a rolling judicial review), include the recurso contencioso-administrativo for administrative inactivity or omission, such as the failure by Spanish ministries or authorities to report final beneficiaries, conduct adequate controls, exclude sanctioned entities ex officio, or initiate/publish internal procedures to pursue recovery against ultra vires bodies causing State-compensated torts. This omission persists daily while funds remain undistributed or distorted markets continue, with market harms from unfair allocations ongoing in 2025 due to active execution of the Plan de Recuperación. Jurisprudence supports that challenges to persistent inactivity have no fixed deadline and can be filed while the omission and harm endure, without strict prescription barring access.

Additionally, the action for patrimonial liability of the public administration for damages from ultra vires DORCAPS remains timely, as the 1-year limit runs from when the harm is known and its effects manifest or stabilise; with ongoing market distortions and economic losses in 2025 traceable to the continuing implementation and effects of past awards/omissions, filings for current harms are within time.

To prevent and remedy the tort harms from ultra vires DORCAPS in the NextGen case, proposals focus on leveraging the State’s vicarious liability under Spain’s responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado regime, where the State bears objective responsibility for damages caused by public bodies’ illegal acts or omissions, including ultra vires ones. This shields individual officials from personal fiduciary liabilities while enabling victims (excluded SMEs, sanctioned companies facing risks, and their downstream tort victims) to obtain compensation through administrative claims or recurso contencioso-administrativo.

Evidence supports that public bodies’ unwillingness to publish ultra vires risks, such as ineligible RRF awards despite CNMC sanctions or omissions in beneficiary reporting, constitutes bad faith and abuse of power, depriving the State of any potential “volenti” defense (analogous to volenti non fit injuria, inapplicable here as victims did not consent to harms). This contributory liability arises from reckless concealment, incentivising bodies to accept proposals that redress victims and avoid escalation to personal accountability claims.

Customised remedies and undertakings for COCOO to propose include commitments by ministries (e.g., Economic Affairs, Industry) to immediate transparency on all PERTE/RRF final beneficiaries and sanctions checks, with public disclosure of ultra vires risks in ongoing 2025 awards (e.g., PERTE Chip, decarbonisation, economy circular projects resolved post-September 2025). Propose undertakings for ex officio exclusion of ineligible recipients and clawback initiation, plus reallocation of recovered funds via new grant awards to harmed excluded SMEs in affected sectors (construction, energy, automotive, digital).

No fines on public bodies, as focus is vicarious State liability, not punitive sanctions. Injunctions via recurso contencioso-administrativo to compel reporting omissions and halt further distorted awards while harms persist. Suspended quashing orders on past awards, conditional on redress commitments. Cy-pres equivalents through extrajudicial settlements under responsabilidad patrimonial procedures, directing State compensation funds to victim classes (e.g., associations representing excluded SMEs) for positive spillovers like sector grants or contract priority awards to investigated companies and their victims.

These proposals benefit all: public bodies/regulators avoid personal hooks via State coverage and bad faith exposure; investigated companies gain risk mitigation and potential reallocation; tort victims (SMEs) secure compensation, injunctions, and new opportunities; State redresses distortions efficiently.

No open or closed claims, settlements, or arbitrations have been identified where the Spanish State has paid compensation or penalties directly or tangentially related to the NextGen case, involving alleged ultra vires awards of RRF/PERTE/NextGenerationEU funds to sanctioned companies despite CNMC sanctions, lack of transparency, or exclusion of SMEs.

Tangentially related matters include a 2024 Tribunal Supremo ruling annulling direct subsidies of 6 million euros from RRF funds awarded to certain autonomous communities, on grounds of insufficient justification, but this involved reallocation rather than State payment of compensation or penalties. Another tangential issue is the 2025 European Commission suspension of 626 million euros in NextGenerationEU funds to Spain due to non-compliance with public employment temporary contracts milestones (unrelated to procurement irregularities), resulting in withheld payments but no compensation or penalty paid by the State.

Companies involved in the case have faced penalties from the CNMC for past cartel conduct in public tenders, including a 2022 sanction totalling 203.6 million euros on six constructoras (Dragados/ACS: 57.1 million; FCC: 40.4 million; Ferrovial: 38.5 million; Acciona: 29.4 million; OHLA: 21.5 million; Sacyr: 16.7 million) for altering licitaciones over 25 years, with some suspensions cautelar while appealed. No payments of compensation by these companies to victims or the State have been identified in relation to RRF awards, and no clawbacks or recoveries tied to their receipt of NextGenerationEU funds despite sanctions. No claims or settlements involving COCOO or related to the specific ultra vires DORCAPS in RRF implementation have been found.

The probability that COCOO.uk may be granted locus standi (legitimación activa under Article 19 LJCA) to challenge via recurso contencioso-administrativo the ongoing public body’s decision (manifested as negative administrative silence to your letter) not to initiate acción de regreso against the ultra vires tortfeasor regulator, public body, or officials is approximately 40-50%. This estimate derives from Tribunal Supremo jurisprudence requiring associations to demonstrate a legitimate interest beyond mere statutory aims or general public interest defence, with the interest arising from direct affection to collective rights promoted in statutes (not auto-attribution) or specific impact producing benefit from annulment. COCOO’s role in competition and consumer protection aligns partially with transparency and fair procurement harms in NextGen, but lacks direct harm to COCOO or proven specific affection to members/victims, and acción de regreso is discretionary post-compensation payment (rarely exercised, per doctrine). The silence to your letter strengthens interest as the challenged decision, but courts often deny broad associational standing without concrete ties, as in cases rejecting anticorruption or transparency associations for lacking direct impact.

Ideas to build locus standi include sending targeted letters (requerimientos) to public bodies demanding express resolutions on specific duties, such as publishing ultra vires risk assessments (including foreseeable tort harms) or confirming denial of public notices on DORCAP risks. If ignored (silence after 3 months under Article 29.1 LJCA), this creates a challengeable inactivity while ongoing, per STS allowing reiterated requerimientos without caducity (plazos reopen). If they respond expressly denying, this produces a recurrible act (express resolution). Pre-action disclosure equivalents exist via transparency requests (Ley 19/2013) or FOI already used by COCOO, forcing responses evidencing omissions and bolstering interest claim. This is possible and strategic: it generates recurrible decisions/inactions, evidences bad faith concealment (breach of good faith duty), and serves public notification by highlighting risks in proceedings, compelling disclosure that prevents harms and supports fiduciary breach arguments against bodies for non-publication of foreseeable tort risks. No “tricking” needed; requerimientos are lawful tools to activate duties and create judicial hooks.

The main DORCAPS identified in this chat history are decisions by Spanish ministries to allocate over €800 million in RRF funds to recipients ineligible due to prior CNMC sanctions, omissions by Spanish authorities in reporting final beneficiaries and conducting controls, conduct and actions involving favoritism and non-transparent tenders, policies via Royal Decree-Law 36/2020 weakening procurement controls, and European Commission omissions in enforcement despite complaints.

For decisions allocating funds to ineligible recipients despite CNMC sanctions, the probability of being ultra vires is 70%. This opinion bases on clear breaches of RRF Regulation (EU) 2021/241 Article 22 requiring protection of EU financial interests and exclusion of entities undermining competition, plus Spanish procurement laws mandating exclusion post-competition sanctions, with awards proceeding despite known CNMC fines constituting disproportionate and illegal favoritism under EU principles.

For omissions in reporting final beneficiaries and controls, the probability of being ultra vires is 80%. Article 22(2)(c) and (d) of Regulation 2021/241 impose mandatory duties on Member States for transparency and controls, with persistent non-reporting despite complaints violating these directly applicable obligations.

For conduct and actions via favoritism and non-transparent tenders, the probability of being ultra vires is 65%. These breach EU procurement directives and Spanish laws requiring open competition, with direct awards and opacity traceable to weakened procedures under emergency justifications exceeding permissible limits.

For policies in Royal Decree-Law 36/2020 weakening controls, the probability of being ultra vires is 60%. While justified under urgency, ongoing application distorts competition beyond necessity, potentially disproportionate under EU law proportionality principle, though courts may uphold emergency basis.

For European Commission omissions in enforcement, the probability of being ultra vires is 50%. The Commission has discretion under Article 24 but omissions despite evidenced breaches could fail duty to protect interests under Article 22, though high deference to Commission margin limits success.

Searches across official sites (planderecuperacion.gob.es, mineco.gob.es, hacienda.gob.es, transparencia.gob.es) and reports reveal publications of general antifraud plans, risk maps for fraud/conflicts (e.g., Guía Medidas Antifraude at pap.hacienda.gob.es, planes by ministries/IDAE), beneficiary lists (top 100 perceptores at portal.mineco.gob.es), and CoFFEE/MINERVA tools for risk detection. No publications found of specific ultra vires risks, such as illegality of awards to CNMC-sanctioned entities, breaches of Regulation 2021/241 eligibility/transparency, or Royal Decree-Law 36/2020 legal risks; reports focus on fraud/irregularities, not ultra vires or procurement illegality tied to sanctions. No URLs disclose these particular DORCAP ultra vires probabilities or mandatory reports admitting such risks.

In this case, the probability of successfully arguing contributory liability solely against the regulator/public body (shifting claims from vicarious State liability under responsabilidad patrimonial) is low at 15-20%. Spanish law imposes objective State liability for public agents’ illegal acts/omissions (Ley 40/2015 Article 32), with acción de regreso against officials only post-State compensation and requiring proven dolo or culpa grave (rarely granted, discretionary). Non-publication of risks strengthens bad faith arguments but does not override vicarious regime or enable volenti-like defense, as victims lack consent/notice; jurisprudence favors State as primary payer for efficiency, limiting personal hooks.

The target bodies for these FOI requests under Ley 19/2013 de Transparencia are the main Spanish public authorities involved in managing and overseeing NextGenerationEU/RRF funds and related procurement in the NextGen case.

Target Body 1 (The Big Decision Maker): Ministerio de Hacienda y Función Pública (overall PRTR coordination, antifraud, beneficiary controls, potential acción de regreso via responsabilidad patrimonial).

Target Body 2 (The Operational Arm): Ministerio de Economía, Comercio y Empresa (formerly Asuntos Económicos, direct management of PERTE awards and allocations to sanctioned entities).

Target Body 3 (The Regulator/Auditor): Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC, competition sanctions relevant to eligibility) and Intervención General de la Administración del Estado (IGAE, financial controls, SNCA antifraud).

The Issue/Case Topic: Allocation of RRF/PRTR funds to entities despite prior competition sanctions, omissions in transparency/controls on final beneficiaries, and potential ultra vires breaches of Regulation (EU) 2021/241.

The Suspected Harm: Market distortions, economic losses to excluded competitors/SMEs, foreseeable tort harms from non-publication of legal/eligibility risks.

Relevant Dates: Decisions/omissions ongoing from 2021 to 2025.

Reconnaissance shows Spanish authorities publish Planes de Medidas Antifraude with general risk matrices (fraud/conflicts focus), but no specific risk registers admitting ultra vires/legal challenge risks on sanctioned recipients or transparency omissions. No smoking gun docs with Risk IDs for ultra vires found in board papers (mostly fraud-oriented). Requests target metadata to evade refusals.

Draft A: The “Strategic Knowledge” Probe (Target: Ministerio de Hacienda y Función Pública, as main decision maker/coordinator).

Oscar Moya LLedo
DNI: 11820221S
Direccion: Paseo de la chopera, 9, Madrid 28045
contact@cocoo.uk

Unidad de Información de Transparencia
Ministerio de Hacienda y Función Pública
Calle Alcalá, 9
28014 Madrid

Email: unidadinformaciontransparencia@hacienda.gob.es

16 December 2025

Solicitud de acceso a la información pública (Ley 19/2013)

I request the following information on any risk registers or matrices maintained in relation to the management of Plan de Recuperación, Transformación y Resiliencia (PRTR) funds:

1. Titles, descriptions, and risk owners of any entries related to risks of legal non-compliance, eligibility breaches for beneficiaries with prior competition sanctions, or transparency obligations on final beneficiaries.

2. Movement of inherent vs residual risk scores (e.g., dates of changes, previous/current scores) for such entries over the period 2023-2025.

3. Any statement or document outlining the risk appetite for legal compliance in PRTR fund allocation and controls.

Additionally, whether any acción de regreso has been initiated (or reasons for non-initiation) against administrations, regulators, or officials for potential responsabilidad patrimonial arising from PRTR-related harms, and if no such procedure exists or was pursued, the reasons.

This is factual/administrative metadata, not content requiring privilege exemptions.

Draft B: The “Operational Failure” Probe (Target: Ministerio de Economía, Comercio y Empresa, as operational allocator).

Oscar Moya LLedo
DNI: 11820221S
Direccion: Paseo de la chopera, 9, Madrid 28045
contact@cocoo.uk

Unidad de Transparencia
Ministerio de Economía, Comercio y Empresa
(Submit via Portal de Transparencia or known contact if available; alternatively through general Hacienda transparency portal)

16 December 2025

Solicitud de acceso a la información pública (Ley 19/2013)

I request metadata on any impact assessments or monitoring related to PERTE/PRTR awards:

1. Dates of creation, finalisation, and job titles of approvers for assessments on eligibility checks (e.g., exclusion of sanctioned entities) or transparency reporting.

2. Number of months or periods in 2023-2025 where PRTR/PERTE allocation processes were reported as high risk or off-track internally regarding legal/eligibility compliance.

Additionally, details on whether acción de regreso procedures were considered or initiated for any potential State compensation claims linked to PRTR awards, including reasons if not pursued.

This seeks existence/proof metadata only.

Draft C: The “Systemic Flaw” Probe (Target: CNMC and IGAE/SNCA).

For CNMC: Submit via sede.cnmc.gob.es/tramites/general/transparencia

For IGAE: secretaria.ig@igae.hacienda.gob.es or transparency portal.

Oscar Moya LLedo
DNI: 11820221S
Direccion: Paseo de la chopera, 9, Madrid 28045
contact@cocoo.uk

[Relevant transparency unit]

16 December 2025

Solicitud de acceso a la información pública (Ley 19/2013)

I request:

1. Percentage or numbers of staff trained on policies for competition sanctions impacting EU fund eligibility or PRTR antifraud measures (2023-2025).

2. List of titles of internal audit reports commissioned in 2023-2025 related to PRTR fund implications of sanctions or transparency controls.

Additionally, for IGAE/SNCA: Information on any acción de regreso pursued (or reasons not) against regulators/public bodies for PRTR-related potential liabilities.

These questions trap authorities because factual metadata on risk scores/movements proves awareness of escalating legal risks without admitting illegality, evidencing reckless failure to mitigate foreseeable harms; existence of assessments without action supports misfeasance/abuse claims; training/audit gaps reveal systemic recklessness in concealing ultra vires risks, strengthening tort liability for non-publication and bad faith contributory conduct.

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