16dec esp pge

21DEC

BAS

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ALLIES

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JR

Based on the FOI letters and available information, here is a strategic legal analysis of the “ESP PGE” case concerning the indefinite rollover of Spain’s State Budget (PGE) and the associated paralysis of Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds.

## 1. Judicial Review Opportunities, Causes of Action, and Standing

No judicial review (recurso contencioso-administrativo) appears to have been initiated yet. The FOI letters are a preparatory step to gather evidence. Crucially, the relevant DORCAPs are **continuing acts or omissions**, which means the standard two-month limitation period for challenging a single administrative act does not apply. The harm is ongoing, creating a live legal issue.

### Non-Time-Barred Causes of Action (COAs)
The following COAs are available for judicial review and tort claims:

* **Ultra Vires (Illegality):** The decision to roll over the PGE for a third consecutive year arguably contravenes the constitutional framework for budget approval under **Article 134 of the Spanish Constitution**. This provision mandates that the Government drafts the budget and the Cortes Generales examines, amends, and adopts it. An indefinite rollover effectively bypasses parliamentary scrutiny and may exceed the Government’s statutory powers.
* **Irrationality (Wednesbury Unreasonableness):** The widespread use of “emergency contracting” procedures (e.g., under Article 120 of the Public Sector Contracts Law) for infrastructure projects, justified solely by the lack of ordinary budget credits, is susceptible to challenge. A court may find this **irrational or disproportionate**, as the “urgency” is arguably self-induced by the administration’s failure to pass a timely budget.
* **Procedural Impropriety / Lack of Due Diligence:** The FOI letters seek evidence of internal risk assessments regarding the legality of operating without a new budget. A **failure to conduct any such assessment** prior to implementing a major policy shift could constitute a serious procedural flaw.
* **Breach of Statutory Duty (EU Law):** The blockage of RRF funds may violate Spain’s obligations under EU law, particularly the **Regulation establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility**. The failure to approve necessary credits could frustrate the achievement of milestones and targets, engaging state liability.
* **Tort: Misfeasance in Public Office:** If evidence surfaces of **bad faith or reckless indifference** to the legality of the budget rollover or the handling of RRF funds, this tort could be engaged. This requires showing a public officer acted knowingly beyond their powers or with reckless indifference to the illegality of their actions.
* **Tort: Negligence / Liability of Public Authorities (Responsabilidad Patrimonial):** The diffuse economic harm caused to sectors (construction, energy, technology) by the budget paralysis and the failure to execute EU funds could found a claim for **patrimonial liability** under Article 106.2 of the Spanish Constitution and the relevant legislation (Ley 40/2015). The “abnormal functioning” of public services is a key trigger.

### Standing (Locus Standi) for a “No Particular Victim” Applicant
The applicant, COCOO.uk, can assert standing on several grounds, drawing on Spanish and comparative principles:

* **Sufficient Interest (Interés Legítimo):** As an organization dedicated to public interest and consumer protection, it can argue a **legitimate interest** in ensuring the lawful and rational management of public funds, which directly impacts the economic interests of consumers and taxpayers.
* **Representation of Diffuse Interests:** Spanish law recognizes the standing of consumer associations to defend the collective interests of consumers (e.g., under **Law 26/1984, General for the Defense of Consumers and Users**). The diffuse harm to the economy and to taxpayers falls within this sphere.
* **Public Interest Standing (Analogous to Lordhope Model):** By analogy to the UK’s *Lordhope* model, where a “sufficient interest” is interpreted flexibly in matters of high public importance, a Spanish court could accept standing for an organization acting to fill an **”enforcement vacuum”** where diffuse harm leaves no individual with a sufficient incentive to litigate.
* **Action Popular:** While limited to specific areas, the general principle supports the idea that **citizens and organizations can act as guardians of legality** where no other effective remedy exists. The FOI strategy of gathering data on the “enforcement vacuum” is designed to bolster this argument.

## 2. Ultra Vires & Irrational DORCAPs: Analysis and Ranking

Ranked from highest to lowest likelihood of success:

1. **Decision to Use Emergency Contracting Due to Lack of Ordinary Credits.** This is the most vulnerable DORCAP. Using emergency procedures for non-emergency situations (i.e., urgency created by the administration’s own inaction) is a classic example of **irrationality and likely ultra vires**. The legal test for “urgency” is strict and cannot be used to circumvent normal budgetary planning.
2. **Omission to Propose and Secure Parliamentary Approval of a New PGE.** This continuing omission arguably breaches the **core constitutional duty** under Article 134. While political in nature, a court may intervene if the failure is so prolonged as to frustrate the constitutional framework and cause demonstrable legal and economic harm (e.g., to EU fund disbursement).
3. **Policy of Operating via Indefinite Budget Rollovers.** A policy of governing via perpetual rollovers, rather than exceptional annual extensions, likely **exceeds the intended scope** of constitutional and statutory budget provisions. It undermines parliamentary financial control, a fundamental principle of the *Estado de Derecho* (Rule of Law).
4. **Conduct in Managing/Blocking RRF Funds.** The failure to create the necessary budgetary lines to execute RRF projects could be seen as a **breach of the duty of loyal cooperation with the EU** and a failure to execute legally binding commitments, engaging both illegality and irrationality.

## 3. Suspended Quashing Orders

Given the systemic nature of the DORCAPs, immediate quashing could cause administrative chaos. The court should be asked for **suspended quashing orders**:

* **For the Emergency Contracting Policy:** Seek an order quashing the general policy or practice of using Article 120 LCSP for non-emergent, budget-related delays. **Suspension for 6 months** would allow the administration to (a) conduct a lawful review of all ongoing contracts awarded under this rationale, and (b) establish a lawful, transparent procedure for managing procurement during budget interruptions.
* **For the Budget Rollover Omission:** Seek a **declaratory order** that the continuing failure to propose a budget is unlawful. Couple this with a **mandatory order** requiring the Government to lay a draft budget before the Cortes within a specified period (e.g., 9 months), but suspend the quashing of the current rollover for **12 months** to allow for an orderly political process and avoid a government shutdown.

## 4. Ongoing Harm & Injunctive Relief

**Ongoing Harm:** The continued blockage of RRF funds causes daily opportunity cost to the Spanish economy, delays green and digital transitions, and risks EU sanctions. The use of unjustified emergency contracting distorts competition and wastes public money.

**Key Elements for an Interim Injunction:**
* **Parties:** COCOO.uk (Claimant) vs. The Ministry of Finance and/or the relevant contracting Ministries (Defendants).
* **Relief Sought:** An order prohibiting the award of any new public contracts under “emergency” procedures (Article 120 LCSP) where the sole justification is the lack of ordinary budget credits, pending the final judgment.
* **Undertaking in Damages:** The applicant should be prepared to give a cross-undertaking in damages.
* **Balance of Convenience:** The public interest in preserving lawful competition and prudent public spending outweighs any alleged administrative inconvenience to the Defendants.

## 5. Statement of Legal Principle Declaration

“It is hereby declared that the Spanish Government, by adopting a policy of indefinitely operating the State Budget through consecutive annual rollovers without presenting a new Budget Bill to the Cortes Generales for approval, acts in a manner contrary to Article 134 of the Spanish Constitution and the principle of parliamentary financial control inherent in a democratic state based on the rule of law.”

## 6. Risk Disclosure Statement Court Order

The court should order the Government to publish, within 2 months of the order, a **”Risk Disclosure Statement”** on the following terms:
* **Content:** It must clearly state (i) the DORCAPs found unlawful by the court, (ii) the nature of the diffuse economic and legal risks those DORCAPs created (e.g., opportunity cost of blocked EU funds, legal challenges to contracts, market distortion), and (iii) the specific steps being taken to remediate the situation and prevent recurrence.
* **Channels:** Publication must be made (a) prominently on the websites of the Ministry of Finance and the Transparency Portal for a minimum of 12 months; (b) in the next Annual Report of the General State Administration; and (c) via a direct notice to all Autonomous Communities and sectoral business associations most affected by the budget paralysis.

## 7. Assessment & Publicity of Risk

The FOI letters explicitly ask for any internal risk assessments on the legality of prolonged budget rollovers. **The likely answer is that no such formal assessment exists.** This failure is a **further ground for criticism** and evidence of a lack of due diligence. It underscores the *Wednesbury* irrationality of the policy—no reasonable authority would embark on such a significant departure from normal procedure without assessing its legal and financial risks.

## 8. Responsible Parties & Individual Liability

* **Primary Responsible Body:** The **Ministry of Finance (Hacienda)** is the core department responsible for budget policy and the rollover decision.
* **Secondary Responsible Bodies:** Ministries heavily using emergency contracting (e.g., **Transport, Ecological Transition**) share responsibility for implementing irrational policies.

Regarding individual liability:
(a) **Contributorily liable in tort?** Unclear. Spanish law on personal liability of officials (*regreso*) is rarely invoked.
(b) **Disciplinary proceedings?** No public information suggests any.
(c) **Dismissed or fined?** Almost certainly not.

**Recommendation:** The FOI letters already inquire about *acciones de regreso*. The likely “none” response should be used in litigation to argue for the court to **make a symbolic declaration of fault** and to **recommend to the Spanish Parliament** that it review the adequacy of accountability mechanisms for high-level policy failures causing diffuse public harm.

## 9. Tort Damages & Remediation Project

* **Estimated Aggregate Damages:** Quantifying diffuse harm is complex. A credible starting figure could be based on the **opportunity cost of blocked RRF funds**. If, for example, €10 billion in RRF grants are delayed for a year, a conservative estimate of the economic cost (lost GDP growth, investment delay) could be 2-5% of that sum, i.e., **€200-500 million**. This is a notional figure to anchor the claim.
* **Distribution Mechanism & Remediation Project:** Given the unidentifiable victim class, damages should be paid into a **”Fund for the Restoration of Competitive Integrity and EU Fund Execution”** (FRICEF).
* **Project Design:** The FRICEF would finance:
1. **An Independent Audit and Compliance Unit:** To review contracts awarded under the challenged emergency procedures and recommend re-tendering or price adjustments where illegality is found.
2. **A Sectoral Innovation Grant Scheme:** Targeted at SMEs in the sectors most harmed by the budget paralysis (construction, renewable energy, tech). Grants would help them develop capacity to participate in future RRF-funded projects.
3. **A Public Information Portal:** Providing real-time, user-friendly data on RRF project timelines, procurement opportunities, and budget status to restore market confidence and transparency.
* **Justification & Positive Externalities:** This approach provides **meaningful, forward-looking remediation**. It fixes the systemic flaws exposed by the litigation (lack of oversight, poor transparency), directly benefits the class of persons most affected (businesses excluded from fair competition), and stimulates the economic sectors that were harmed, thereby creating positive spillover effects for the entire economy.

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17DEC

FOIS

 

 

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16DEC

The PGE case, as detailed across the provided pages on pge.cocoo.uk, centers on alleged tortious harms stemming from the Spanish government’s prolonged failure to approve annual General State Budgets (Presupuestos Generales del Estado) since 2023, relying instead on automatic rollovers of prior budgets. This practice is claimed to violate Article 134 of the Spanish Constitution, which mandates annual budget approval.

Ultra vires DORCAPS (decisions, omissions, regulations, conduct, actions, policies) are attributed primarily to the Spanish government (Council of Ministers, Ministerio de Hacienda, and related ministries) as the public body:

– Decisions and actions: Choosing to rely structurally on budget rollovers rather than as exceptional temporary measures; awarding contracts directly or via in-house mechanisms (“encomiendas a medios propios”) during rollover periods without updated parliamentary appropriations.

– Omissions: Failing to approve new annual budgets, leading to lack of proper financial mandates for commitments; omitting competitive tenders in favor of direct awards without meeting strict unforeseeability or extreme urgency criteria.

– Conduct and policies: Engaging in opaque procurement practices that substitute parliamentary oversight with executive discretion, including recurring justifications of “urgency” for non-competitive awards; maintaining inadequate implementation of beneficial ownership registers under EU anti-money laundering directives.

These DORCAPS are further linked to breaches of EU law, including Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement (transparency and competition requirements), Reglamento 2020/2092 on rule of law conditionality, and anti-money laundering directives requiring public beneficial ownership registers.

Secondary involvement includes omissions by the Spanish Competition Authority (CNMC) in failing to investigate anti-competitive effects of distorted procurement, and the European Commission in delayed enforcement related to Recovery and Resilience Facility fund disbursements affected by the impasses.

Harmed companies (victims under investigation or excluded from fair competition, facing delays, lost bids, and market distortions) include those in construction (e.g., Balfour Beatty plc, ACS, Ferrovial SE, Sacyr S.A.), technology and telecommunications (e.g., Capgemini SE, Amazon Web Services, Softcat plc), energy (e.g., Iberdrola S.A., SSE plc, Vestas Wind Systems A/S), healthcare and life sciences (e.g., ViiV Healthcare, Grifols S.A., Bupa/Sanitas), and others (e.g., London Stock Exchange Group plc, 2 Sisters Food Group). These entities suffer stalled projects, disrupted EU-funded initiatives (NextGenerationEU, Recovery and Resilience Facility), non-competitive contract awards favoring incumbents, and planning uncertainty.

Consumers and indirect victims include British and EU consumers reliant on public services (e.g., healthcare, infrastructure, energy transitions) impacted by delays in EU fund execution and macroeconomic instability; SMEs dependent on public contracts; and investors facing devalued opportunities or disrupted supply chains. The pages frame companies awarded contracts under the alleged distorted processes as initial beneficiaries but ultimately part of the victim chain due to the root ultra vires administrative failures, though primary emphasis is on excluded competitors and downstream economic operators as tort victims entitled to compensation via mechanisms like responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado under Spanish Law 40/2015 or EU-level claims. The evidencia-grok page focuses separately on Meta Platforms Inc. violations without linking to PGE-specific ultra vires or harms.

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The equivalent in Spain to the UK judicial review for challenging ultra vires administrative decisions, omissions, regulations, conduct, actions, or policies is the **recurso contencioso-administrativo**, regulated by Ley 29/1998 de 13 de julio (LJCA). This allows direct challenge of general dispositions (reglamentos), express or presumed acts ending the administrative procedure, inactivities (omisiones), or material ways of acting (vías de hecho) that violate rights or interests.

Judicial review opportunities in the PGE case for ultra vires DORCAPS include:

– Recurso contencioso-administrativo against the ongoing omission of the Government (Council of Ministers and Ministerio de Hacienda) to approve annual Presupuestos Generales del Estado since 2023, relying structurally on prórrogas beyond exceptional temporary use, contrary to Article 134 of the Spanish Constitution. As an ongoing omission producing continuous harm, the recurso can be filed at any time while the inactividad persists (current in December 2025, with PGE 2025 prorrogated from 2023 via automatic mechanism and RD-ley 9/2024 of 23 December 2024). No fixed date applies; legitimacy requires demonstrating individualised harm or legitimate interest (e.g., as consumer/competition organisation affected by distorted procurement).

– Recurso contencioso-administrativo against specific acts of application, such as direct contract awards or encomiendas a medios propios during prorrogated budgets without proper parliamentary appropriations or competitive tenders, breaching Directive 2014/24/EU and national procurement rules. Plazo: 2 months from notification or publication of the act.

– Indirect challenge (impugnación indirecta) of underlying policies or regulations enabling non-competitive awards (e.g., recurring urgency justifications) when contesting an act of application, alleging they are ultra vires. No separate plazo for the indirect aspect if tied to timely challenge of the act.

– Recurso contencioso-administrativo for COCOO against the omission of the competent public authority (likely Ministerio de Hacienda or control organs under Ley 40/2015) to initiate ex officio internal procedures to pursue or publicise recovery of patrimonial responsibility from officials/regulators whose ultra vires DORCAPS caused State compensations to victims. Ley 40/2015 (arts. 32-37) establishes objective patrimonial responsibility but allows repetition against personnel with dolo, culpa or negligencia grave; no explicit mandatory ex officio initiation/publication exists, though control duties imply it. As ongoing omission with continuing harm (prórroga active), recurso viable now without expired plazo.

– Challenges to secondary regulations or policies with high probability of ultra vires (e.g., those facilitating opaque procurement or inadequate beneficial ownership registers under EU anti-money laundering directives) via direct recurso (2 months from publication) or indirect when applied. As harm ongoing via prorrogated budgets, indirect challenges remain timely when contesting current acts of application; direct if regulation recent or effects persistent.

All these allow claims for annulment, cessation of harm, and/or patrimonial responsibility indemnification under Ley 40/2015. COCOO has standing as organisation defending competition/consumer interests affected by market distortions.

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1/ From the identified judicial review opportunities via recurso contencioso-administrativo, none are subject to a strict 3-month time limit, as the general plazo under Ley 29/1998 (LJCA) article 46 is 2 months for acts or dispositions. However, the opportunities tied to ongoing omissions (the structural reliance on prórroga of Presupuestos Generales del Estado, which remains in effect on 16 December 2025 as the 2023 budgets are prorrogated via automatic mechanism under article 134.4 of the Constitution and adjustments like RD-ley 9/2024) and the related omission to initiate ex officio internal recovery procedures under Ley 40/2015 are still viable without expired plazo, since the inactividad is continuing and produces persistent harm; jurisprudence allows challenge while the omission persists, without caducity if no prior fixed requerimiento has triggered a specific countdown. Specific acts of application (e.g., recent non-competitive contract awards during the current prórroga) would have their own 2-month plazo from notification or publication, so any from October 2025 onward remain within time. Indirect challenges to underlying policies also remain timely when tied to current acts. Yes, rolling judicial review opportunities exist here for the ongoing tort and contractual harms from the continued ultra vires omission and distorted procurement, as the harm is permanent and accruing daily in 2025, allowing fresh or continued challenges to the persisting inactividad and its effects without time bar while it lasts.

2/ Proposals to prevent and remedy the tort harms from these ultra vires DORCAPS include settlement agreements where the State (via Ministerio de Hacienda) accepts vicarious patrimonial responsibility under Ley 40/2015 for damages to excluded competitors, downstream consumers, and SMEs from distorted markets, offering compensation funds, priority contract awards to harmed companies, and grants for affected projects. In exchange, regulators and officials avoid personal liability claims for dolo or culpa grave by cooperating in transparency measures, such as public disclosure of ultra vires risks in procurement during prórroga periods; evidence supports that non-publication of these risks appears designed in bad faith to block the State’s violenti non fit iniuria defence, exposing them contributorily to harms via abuse of power. This incentivises acceptance to secure immunity from individual hooks while redressing victims. Customised remedies for COCOO to propose: declaratory injunctions ordering immediate approval of new PGE or cessation of non-competitive awards lacking urgency; suspended quashing orders on distorted contracts, conditional on retroactive competition; undertakings from Government to implement full beneficial ownership registers and competitive tenders; no fines on public bodies (to facilitate win-win via vicarious State liability); cy-pres proposals including a compensation scheme funded by State (e.g., 500 million euros pool for harmed companies in construction, tech, energy sectors and consumer restitution via reduced public tariffs), plus positive spillovers like accelerated EU fund execution grants and preferential awards to investigated/excluded firms, benefiting both companies under scrutiny and their tort victims by restoring market fairness against the ultra vires tortfeasors.

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No open or closed claims, settlements, arbitrations, or cases exist where the Spanish State has paid compensation or penalties directly or tangentially related to the prolonged prórroga of Presupuestos Generales del Estado since 2023, or to alleged ultra vires omissions in annual budget approvals under Article 134 of the Constitution, or to resulting distortions in public procurement.

The prórroga mechanism is constitutional and automatic when new PGE are not approved, with no judicial findings of State liability for harms from its structural use.

No cases exist where companies have paid compensation or penalties specifically tied to these prórroga-related issues.

General responsabilidad patrimonial procedures under Ley 40/2015 apply to public administration harms, but no recorded instances link them to budget prórrogas in this context.

Related areas, such as COVID restrictions or other legislative breaches, have seen liability claims, but none connect to PGE prórrogas.

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The probability that COCOO.uk may be granted locus standi (legitimación activa under article 19 LJCA) to challenge via recurso contencioso-administrativo the ongoing omission to initiate ex officio acción de regreso (under article 36 Ley 40/2015) against officials for ultra vires DORCAPS is low, around 20-30%. Spanish jurisprudence requires a qualified interés legítimo: direct or indirect affectation aligned with statutory purposes, not mere interest in legality or auto-attributed via statutes. Associations defending competition and consumers have standing in specific sectors (e.g., consumer actions under LGDCU), but general NGOs face denial if lacking specific link or when seen as defending abstract legality (e.g., cases against anticorruption or transparency associations). Here, COCOO is not directly harmed, no members identified as affected, and the omission concerns internal State recovery post-indemnification (not yet occurred in PGE prórroga context). The sent letter creates negative administrative silence (desestimación presunta), challengeable as inactividad while persisting, but silence alone does not confer strong standing without underlying qualified interest.

Ideas to build locus standi include sending targeted letters to public bodies (e.g., Ministerio de Hacienda) requiring response on specific issues, such as confirmation of ongoing refusal to publish ultra vires risk assessments or foreseeable tort harms from DORCAPS (including PGE prórroga effects on procurement/competition). If they reply expressly denying or confirming omission, that creates an express act challengeable with potentially stronger standing (as COCOO becomes affected by the response to its petition). Pre-action disclosure-style letters (though not formal PAD in Spain) or FOI requests (under Ley 19/2013) seeking evidence of risks/non-initiation of regreso can force decisions; negative silence or express refusal then becomes the impugned act. This is possible under LJCA for inactividad/vía de hecho, but success depends on framing as defending collective competition/consumer interests distorted by prórroga (e.g., market harms to SMEs/consumers). Using judicial review as public notification mechanism for risks aligns with transparency duties, but courts reject if primary motive is notification over qualified interest; argue breach of good faith fiduciary duty via non-disclosure enabling tort harms, tying to COCOO’s purposes. Prior FOIs strengthen evidence base but not standing alone.

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The main DORCAPS identified are:

1. Ongoing omission by the Government (Council of Ministers and Ministerio de Hacienda) to approve annual Presupuestos Generales del Estado since 2023, relying structurally on automatic prórrogas under Article 134.4 of the Spanish Constitution.

Probability of being ultra vires: 5%. The prórroga mechanism is expressly constitutional and automatic when new PGE are not approved; it is presented in official documents (e.g., BOE publications like RD-ley 9/2024 and Ley 31/2022) as a standard temporary measure, not exceptional or illegal. No judicial or official recognition of ultra vires risk exists.

2. Decisions and actions awarding contracts directly or via encomiendas a medios propios during prorrogated budgets, often without competitive tenders or strict urgency criteria, allegedly breaching Directive 2014/24/EU.

Probability of being ultra vires: 40%. While direct awards are exceptional under EU and national procurement law, recurring use during prórroga could distort competition if not justified by genuine unforeseeability; however, Spanish practice allows flexibility, and no widespread findings of illegality tie specifically to prórroga periods.

3. Conduct and policies involving recurring urgency justifications for non-competitive awards and opaque procurement.

Probability of being ultra vires: 35%. Similar to above; potential for abuse exists, but justified urgency is permissible, and no official assessments label this as inherent ultra vires in prorrogated contexts.

4. Omissions in adequate implementation of beneficial ownership registers under EU anti-money laundering directives.

Probability of being ultra vires: 60%. Spain has faced EU criticism and infringement procedures for delays or inadequacies in transposition/implementation of directives like 2015/849; ongoing issues increase likelihood of non-compliance.

5. Omission by CNMC to investigate anti-competitive effects of distorted procurement during prórroga.

Probability of being ultra vires: 15%. CNMC has discretionary enforcement powers; no mandatory duty to investigate every potential distortion, and no evidence of required ex officio action ignored.

6. Omission by competent authorities (e.g., Ministerio de Hacienda) to initiate ex officio acción de regreso under Ley 40/2015 against officials for potential dolo or culpa in ultra vires acts.

Probability of being ultra vires: 10%. Acción de regreso is discretionary post-indemnification; no strict ex officio obligation exists without proven fault, and no harms have triggered State payments here.

7. Delayed enforcement by European Commission related to rule of law conditionality (Reglamento 2020/2092) and Recovery funds affected by budget impasses.

Probability of being ultra vires: 20%. Commission has tools but acts cautiously; no direct finding against Spain tying budget prórrogas to conditionality breaches.

For those with good ultra vires probability (above 30%):

– Prórroga omission (5%): No published notices, reports, or URLs from public bodies (Ministerio de Hacienda, Consejo de Ministros, BOE) acknowledge ultra vires risk; documents treat it as routine constitutional application.

– Direct/opaque contract awards (40% and 35%): No specific notices or mandatory risk reports from contracting authorities or Ministerio de Hacienda identify ultra vires risks tied to prórroga; general procurement guidance exists, but not framing this as inherent illegality.

– Beneficial ownership registers omission (60%): Some EU Commission reports note Spanish delays/incumplimientos in anti-money laundering directives, but no public Spanish notices (from Ministerio or regulators) admit ultra vires risk levels.

No publications found for other lower-probability DORCAPS framing them as ultra vires risks.

In this case, the probability of successfully arguing that the regulator/public body (not the State) is the contributorily liable party, shifting tort victim claims exclusively against them via personal liability for dolo/culpa grave (excluding vicarious State responsibility under Ley 40/2015), is very low, around 10-15%. Spanish law establishes objective vicarious patrimonial responsibility of the State for harms from public bodies’ agents; personal liability requires proven fault, and non-publication of risks does not automatically negate State’s primary hook or enable violenti defence to block victim compensation entirely.

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Target bodies for FOI requests under Ley 19/2013 are:

– Main decision maker: Ministerio de Hacienda y Función Pública (responsible for PGE preparation, prórroga management, and patrimonial responsibility procedures).

– Operational arm: Consejo de Ministros/Gobierno de España (decisions on budget submission and prórroga reliance).

– Regulator/oversight: Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) (potential competition distortions from procurement during prórroga).

Requests submit via Portal de la Transparencia (https://transparencia.gob.es or https://sede.transparencia.gob.es) for central administration, or CNMC sede electrónica (https://sede.cnmc.gob.es) for CNMC.

No public risk registers, board papers, or strategic risk frameworks found acknowledging ultra vires risks related to prolonged PGE prórroga, non-competitive procurement during prórroga, or beneficial ownership implementation delays.

### DRAFT A: Strategic Knowledge Probe (Target: Ministerio de Hacienda y Función Pública)

Oscar Moya Lledo
DNI: 11820221S
Direccion: Paseo de la chopera, 9, Madrid 28045
contact@cocoo.uk

16 December 2025

Ministerio de Hacienda y Función Pública
Unidad de Información Transparencia
Via Portal de Transparencia (or registered submission)

Solicitud de acceso a la información pública al amparo de la Ley 19/2013, de 9 de diciembre.

Solicito la siguiente información relativa al período 2023-2025 respecto de riesgos asociados a la prórroga automática de Presupuestos Generales del Estado y sus efectos en contratación pública y competencia:

1. Si existe entrada en cualquier registro de riesgos estratégico, marco de gestión de riesgos o equivalente, incluyendo título de la entrada, descripción breve (sin contenido detallado), propietario del riesgo y fechas de creación/actualización.

2. Evolución de puntuaciones de riesgo (inherente vs residual, o equivalente) para cualquier entrada relacionada con legalidad constitucional, cumplimiento Directiva 2014/24/UE o distorsiones competitivas derivadas de prórroga presupuestaria, indicando fechas y cambios de puntuación numérica o cualitativa.

3. Declaración de apetito de riesgo (risk appetite statement) respecto de cumplimiento legal en materia presupuestaria y contratación pública.

4. Si se ha iniciado acción de regreso (art. 36 Ley 40/2015) contra funcionarios o autoridades por daños derivados de prórrogas presupuestarias o contrataciones asociadas; en caso negativo, motivos registrados para no iniciarla ex officio.

Esta información es metadata administrativa para evidenciar evaluación de riesgos previsibles y deberes de recuperación interna.

### DRAFT B: Operational Failure Probe (Target: Consejo de Ministros / Presidencia del Gobierno, via Portal Transparencia)

Oscar Moya Lledo
DNI: 11820221S
Direccion: Paseo de la chopera, 9, Madrid 28045
contact@cocoo.uk

16 December 2025

Presidencia del Gobierno / Consejo de Ministros
Unidad de Información Transparencia
Via Portal de Transparencia

Solicitud de acceso a la información pública al amparo de la Ley 19/2013.

Solicito información operativa (metadata, no contenido) relativa a 2023-2025 sobre prórroga PGE y ejecución presupuestaria:

1. Fechas de creación, finalización y titular del cargo aprobador de cualquier evaluación de impacto o informe interno sobre efectos de prórroga prolongada en ejecución de fondos europeos o contratación.

2. Número de meses o períodos en que la prórroga presupuestaria o sus efectos (ej. contrataciones directas) han sido reportados como “rojo” (off track, alto riesgo o equivalente) en dashboards o informes al Consejo de Ministros.

3. Si consta iniciación ex officio de procedimiento de responsabilidad patrimonial o acción de regreso por daños a terceros derivados de prórroga; en caso negativo, motivos administrativos registrados.

Esta solicitud busca datos factuales sobre seguimiento operativo de riesgos previsibles.

### DRAFT C: Systemic Flaw Probe (Target: CNMC)

Oscar Moya Lledo
DNI: 11820221S
Direccion: Paseo de la chopera, 9, Madrid 28045
contact@cocoo.uk

16 December 2025

Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia
Via sede electrónica (https://sede.cnmc.gob.es/tramites/general/transparencia)

Solicitud de acceso a la información pública al amparo de la Ley 19/2013.

Solicito la siguiente información relativa a 2023-2025 sobre posibles distorsiones competitivas derivadas de prórroga PGE:

1. Porcentaje de personal formado en políticas de defensa de competencia aplicadas a contratación pública durante prórrogas presupuestarias o procedimientos de urgencia.

2. Lista de títulos de informes de auditoría interna o revisiones encargadas relacionados con investigación de efectos anticompetitivos en contratación pública estatal o fondos europeos durante períodos de prórroga presupuestaria.

3. Si la CNMC ha evaluado o registrado riesgos de omisión en investigación ex officio de distorsiones por prórroga PGE; en caso de acción de regreso iniciada contra CNMC por tales omisiones, estado y motivos si no se inició.

Esta información es agregada y de títulos para evaluar cumplimiento sistémico.

These questions trap authorities because confirming existence of risk entries with rising scores or red status evidences knowledge of foreseeable ultra vires harms and competition distortions without mitigation or disclosure, supporting misfeasance/reckless conduct claims; absence or non-initiation of acción de regreso highlights failure to pursue internal recovery, strengthening vicarious State liability while exposing personal/contributory fault for non-disclosure of risks.

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