16dec esp telefonica

21DEC

BAS

This report provides a professional legal analysis and custom balancing act for the ongoing judicial review (JR) and regulatory opportunities concerning Telefónica and the Spanish media market, as identified in the provided documentation and recent regulatory developments. Each opportunity is evaluated through the lens of UK and EU law, assuming substantial similarity where applicable.

Judicial Review Opportunity One: Appeal to the CNMC Council regarding the Mediaset and Atresmedia Duopoly (R/AJ/031/25)

The claimant seeks to finalize an appeal against the Spanish National Markets and Competition Commission (CNMC) concerning the entrenchment of a media duopoly. The lead argument posits that a December 2024 court judgment constitutes a new fact proving that past enforcement of merger conditions failed and the original competitive harm persists.

The custom balancing act for this JR must address the tension between economic efficiency (EE) and public interest (PI) goals. While the CNMC may argue that the existing structure promotes static efficiency through economies of scale, the claimant can argue that the failure to remedy the breach harms media plurality, which is a recognized public interest goal. Under UK and EU principles, media plurality serves a vital democratic purpose by preventing the concentration of news media in a handful of owners.

The grounds for review should focus on the legality of the CNMC’s refusal to investigate. A decision may be challenged if it is based on an incorrect interpretation of law or if the facts were incorrectly established. The claimant should argue that the Directorate’s refusal is irrational and a manifest error of appraisal given the new evidence of non-remedied harm. Furthermore, the lack of effective enforcement can be characterized as a failure of the duty to ensure that the regulated public interest is adequately observed.

Judicial Review Opportunity Two: European Commission Complaint regarding Systemic Enforcement Failure

The second opportunity involves a formal complaint to the European Commission (EC) alleging that the CNMC’s inaction represents a systemic failure of enforcement at the Member State level. This inaction allegedly distorts the single market for advertising and content, causing direct harm to both EU and UK businesses.

The balancing act here centers on Member State sovereignty versus the appropriate level of EC intervention. The claimant must navigate the EC’s typical reluctance to interfere in Member State jurisdictional matters. However, the complaint can be framed using the policy-linking clauses of the EU treaties, which impose a duty on the EC to regard fundamental objectives such as economic and social cohesion.

The lead argument should emphasize that the Spanish regulatory capture has created an environment where the duopoly’s business model is incompatible with the broader goals of the EU single market. By allowing a domestic duopoly to entrench itself through failed enforcement, the Member State may be in breach of its duty to maintain price stability and support EU economic policies. This systemic failure justifies EC intervention to restore the “useful effect” of EU competition law.

Judicial Review Opportunity Three: UK CMA Complaint regarding Telefónica and Virgin Media O2 (VMO2)

This opportunity focuses on a complaint to the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) concerning the compromised governance of Telefónica following the Spanish government’s acquisition of a 10% stake via SEPI. The claimant argues that the politicized governance of Telefónica presents a direct threat to UK consumers through its control of VMO2.

The balancing act involves weighing economic efficiency against national security and infrastructure protection. Under the National Security and Investment (NSI) Act, the UK government and the CMA have the power to intervene in acquisitions or governance structures that threaten national security, essential infrastructure, or essential services. Essential services must not be undermined by foreign state influence.

The lead argument utilizes the “effects doctrine,” which allows the CMA to investigate conduct occurring outside the UK if it has a substantial and predictable effect on UK markets. The claimant should argue that the appointment of individuals with known political connections to key roles within Telefónica (e.g., in the media arm Movistar Plus+) constitutes a form of politicized governance that could lead to non-economic decision-making detrimental to the UK. This creates a high probability of harm to consumer welfare by reducing the value and independence of critical UK telecommunications infrastructure.

Conclusion on Time-Barring and Admissibility

As of December 21, 2025, these opportunities do not appear to be time-barred. The CNMC appeal is noted as “pending,” and the response to the EC’s letter of May 2025 is actively being prosecuted. In annulment actions, the two-month and ten-day time limit runs from the date of the decision or when the third party acquires actual knowledge of it. Given the recent strategic review and ongoing correspondence with regulators, these claims remain viable for judicial scrutiny.

ALLIES

Based on the legal analysis in the provided article, the following entities would likely benefit from a successful judicial review (JR) concerning the CNMC’s enforcement failures, foreign-state influence assessments, or related competition issues. These organizations could gain opportunities for follow-on compensation claims, positive regulatory changes, or enhanced reputation.

– **Organización de Consumidores y Usuarios (OCU)**
– Official Email: mvivar@ocu.org
– Address: c/ Albarracín, 21, 28037 Madrid, Spain
– Benefit: As Spain’s largest consumer association, a JR finding of infringement would strengthen its position to bring collective follow‑on damages claims on behalf of diffuse victims of anti‑competitive practices.

– **Asociación de Usuarios de la Comunicación (AUC)**
– Official Email: auc@auc.es
– Address: c/ Cavanilles, 31 – 6ºD, 28007 Madrid, Spain
– Benefit: This association directly defends telecom users’ rights. A successful JR against the CNMC’s failure to enforce merger remedies would support its advocacy and potential compensation actions for users harmed by lack of competition.

– **FACUA – Consumidores en Acción**
– Official Email: consumidoresenaccion@facua.org
– Address: C/ Bécquer, 25 A, 41002 Sevilla, Spain
– Benefit: A JR victory would provide a legal basis for FACUA to pursue damages for consumers affected by un‑remedied merger breaches, and would bolster its campaigns for stricter enforcement of competition law.

– **Confederación de Consumidores y Usuarios (CECU)**
– Official Email: cecu@cecu.es
– Address: C/ Gran Vía, nº 69, 1º, 103, 28013 Madrid, Spain
– Benefit: As a federation of consumer groups, CECU could use the JR finding to pressure authorities for systemic reforms and to initiate collective redress procedures for its member associations.

– **Asociación Global de Afectados de las Compañías Telefónicas**
– Official Email: Not publicly listed (contact via postal address)
– Address: Calle Madera, 1328004, Madrid, Spain
– Benefit: This group of affected individuals would be a direct beneficiary of a JR that establishes regulatory failure, as it would create a clear path for them to seek compensation for harms suffered.

– **BEUC (The European Consumer Organisation)**
– Official Email: contact@beuc.eu
– Address: Rue d’Arlon 80, 1040 Brussels, Belgium
– Benefit: A JR that exposes cross‑border regulatory failures would support BEUC’s EU‑wide advocacy, potentially leading to broader policy changes and coordinated actions across member states.

– **Which? (UK Consumer Association)**
– Official Email: which@which.co.uk
– Address: 2 Marylebone Road, London NW1 4DF, United Kingdom
– Benefit: A successful JR against the CMA/Ofcom for failing to assess foreign‑state influence in Virgin Media O2 would empower Which? to demand stronger consumer‑protection measures in critical infrastructure markets.

– **Communications Consumer Panel (UK)**
– Official Email: contact@communicationsconsumerpanel.org.uk
– Address: 1st Floor, 23 Stephenson Street, Birmingham B2 4BH, United Kingdom
– Benefit: The Panel, which represents telecom users, would gain leverage to ensure that national‑security and competition risks are properly considered in future regulatory decisions.

– **COCOO (the competition and consumer advocacy organisation cited in the article)**
– Note: The article is published by COCOO. As the potential applicant in the JR, its success would directly enhance its standing, amplify its advocacy, and enable it to secure compensation for the diffuse victims it represents.

These entities are positioned to use a favourable judicial review outcome to advance consumer interests, seek compensation, and drive regulatory improvements in the telecom and competition sectors.

JRS

**Senior Public Law Barrister’s Opinion**

### **1. Judicial Review Status, Time‑Barring, and Available Causes of Action**

**Judicial Review Status**
A judicial review has already been concluded on one specific DORCAP: the CNMC’s use of anonymised evidence in the Mediaset sanction. The Audiencia Nacional annulled the 2015 sanction on 10 December 2024 because the CNMC’s procedure violated the right to defence[reference:0]. No other DORCAPs identified in the case have been the subject of a completed judicial review.

**Time‑Barring Analysis**
* **Core Decisions:** The initial 2023/2024 SEPI investment decision and the CNMC’s past sanctioning resolutions are likely outside the standard 2‑month (Spain) or 3‑month (UK) judicial review windows.
* **Rolling Challenges:** However, multiple DORCAPs involve **continuing omissions, ongoing policies, or persistent implementation** that create a “rolling” deadline, keeping judicial review claims timely. These include:
* The CNMC’s ongoing failure to enforce the 2010 and 2015 merger remedies[reference:1].
* The CNMC’s selective and inconsistent enforcement policy[reference:2].
* The CMA and Ofcom’s ongoing omission to assess foreign‑state influence risks in Virgin Media O2[reference:3].
* The European Commission’s continued inaction on investigating the alleged illegal state aid[reference:4].
* The Spanish government’s failure to initiate *acción de regreso* (internal liability proceedings) against officials for the annulled sanction[reference:5].

**Triggering a Fresh Decision**
Yes, a formal letter (e.g., a complaint, a call to act, a *requerimiento previo*) can be used to force the public body to make a fresh, challengeable decision. For example, a formal request to the CMA to investigate the national‑security implications of the SEPI investment would, if refused, create a new decision that can be judicially reviewed. This strategy not only revives the timeline but also strengthens *locus standi*, as the applicant is directly seeking a decision from the body and is therefore directly affected by its refusal[reference:6].

**Non‑Time‑Barred Causes of Action (COAs)**

| Jurisdiction | Judicial Review COAs | Tort COAs |
| :— | :— | :— |
| **Spain (CNMC/Spanish Government)** | **Illegality (Ultra Vires):** Continued omission to enforce merger remedies (breach of statutory duty under competition law). **Irrationality (*Wednesbury*):** Arbitrary, selective enforcement policy lacking logical basis. **Procedural Impropriety:** Failure to conduct a proper risk assessment on the legality of using anonymised evidence. | **Misfeasance in Public Office:** Knowing or reckless use of unlawful evidence and persistent refusal to enforce remedies. **Breach of Statutory Duty:** Failure to perform the duty to maintain effective competition. **Negligence:** Breach of a duty of care owed to the market and consumers. |
| **UK (CMA/Ofcom)** | **Illegality:** Failure to assess foreign‑state influence under the Enterprise Act 2002/National Security and Investment Act 2021. **Irrationality:** Decision not to investigate despite evident risks to critical infrastructure. | **Misfeasance in Public Office:** Wilful omission to exercise statutory powers. **Breach of Statutory Duty:** Non‑compliance with duties to protect competition and national security. |
| **EU (DG COMP)** | **Illegality (Failure to Act):** Breach of Article 265 TFEU by not investigating a credible state‑aid complaint. | **Non‑contractual Liability (Art. 340 TFEU):** Sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals. |

**Standing (*Locus Standi*) for a “No‑Particular‑Victim” Applicant**
The applicant, COCOO, is a competition and consumer advocacy organisation. Its standing rests on the following principles:
* **UK (Sufficient Interest):** Under s.31 Senior Courts Act 1981, courts grant standing to public‑interest groups where the issue is of general importance, the group has expertise, and no more directly affected individual is likely to come forward (e.g., *R (Greenpeace) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry*). The act of prompting a decision via a formal letter reinforces this direct interest[reference:7].
* **Spain (Legitimate Interest):** Under Ley 29/1998, associations whose statutory objects include defending collective interests (e.g., consumer welfare, competition) are routinely admitted to challenge administrative silence or ongoing omissions, especially where broader rule‑of‑law and transparency issues are at stake[reference:8].
* **EU (Direct and Individual Concern):** For a failure‑to‑act action under Article 265 TFEU, a complainant who has formally called on the Commission to act is directly concerned by its inaction.

The estimated probability of COCOO being granted standing is 60‑75% in Spain and 70‑85% in the UK for challenges targeting these ongoing omissions[reference:9].

—

### **2. Ultra Vires & Irrational DORCAPs (Ranked by Likelihood of Success)**

1. **CNMC’s Ongoing Omission to Enforce the 2010/2015 Merger Remedies.** This is the strongest ground. The CNMC has a clear statutory duty to monitor and enforce merger commitments. Its years‑long failure to act, while evidence of breaches accumulated, is a classic continuing omission that is *ultra vires* (outside its discretionary power) and arguably irrational, as it allowed market distortion to persist.
2. **CMA/Ofcom’s Omission to Assess Foreign‑State Influence on Virgin Media O2.** Both regulators have statutory duties to consider competition and national‑security risks. Their complete failure to assess the implications of a foreign state acquiring influence over UK critical infrastructure is a clear *ultra vires* omission and Wednesbury unreasonable, given the obvious potential risks.
3. **European Commission’s (DG COMP) Failure to Investigate Alleged Illegal State Aid.** The Commission is obliged to examine credible state‑aid complaints. Its inaction, despite formal complaints, constitutes a *prima facie* failure to act under Article 265 TFEU, a pure illegality ground.
4. **CNMC’s Policy of Selective/Inconsistent Enforcement.** A policy that arbitrarily chooses which merger‑remedy breaches to pursue, without a rational basis, is susceptible to challenge as irrational and a breach of the principle of equal treatment.
5. **Spanish Government’s Failure to Initiate *Acción de Regreso*.** The state’s omission to seek recovery from officials responsible for the annulled sanction (which caused a loss of public funds) is a continuing failure of internal accountability that is *ultra vires* the relevant public‑sector liability laws.

### **3. Suspended Quashing Orders**

| Order Sought | Suspension Period & Conditions |
| :— | :— |
| **Quashing of the CNMC’s ongoing omission to enforce the 2010/2015 remedies.** | **Suspended for 6 months.** Condition: The CNMC must, within that period, (a) open formal investigations into all outstanding breach complaints, (b) publish a timetable for decisions, and (c) establish a transparent monitoring framework. If conditions are met, the quashing order does not take effect. |
| **Quashing of the CMA/Ofcom’s omission to assess foreign‑state influence.** | **Suspended for 4 months.** Condition: The regulators must jointly conduct and publish a fit‑for‑purpose assessment of the national‑security and competition risks arising from the SEPI investment in Telefónica/Virgin Media O2. |
| **Quashing of the Spanish government’s failure to initiate *acción de regreso*.** | **Suspended for 3 months.** Condition: The relevant ministry must formally commence the internal liability procedure against the officials responsible for the annulled Mediaset sanction. |

### **4. Ongoing Harm & Injunctive Relief**

**Ongoing Harm:** The persistent regulatory failures enable continued anti‑competitive distortions: higher prices, reduced choice for consumers, and margin‑squeeze for competitors (e.g., Digi, Orange, Vodafone) in both Spanish and UK telecoms/media markets[reference:10].

**Draft Injunction Key Elements:**
* **Parties:** Claimant: COCOO; Defendants: CNMC, CMA, Ofcom, Spanish Government.
* **Relief Sought:** An interim mandatory injunction requiring the defendants to:
* (CNMC) Immediately commence enforcement proceedings regarding all pending breach complaints related to the 2010/2015 merger remedies.
* (CMA/Ofcom) Immediately initiate a joint review under the Enterprise Act 2002 and NSI Act 2021 into the SEPI investment’s impact on Virgin Media O2.
* (Spanish Government) Immediately refer the matter of the annulled Mediaset sanction to the internal liability unit for action.
* **Undertaking in Damages:** COCOO to provide a cross‑undertaking in damages.
* **Urgency:** The harm is continuing and quantifiable; further delay causes irreparable damage to competition and consumer welfare.

### **5. Statement of Legal Principle Declaration**

“It is hereby declared that the Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) acts ultra vires and in breach of its statutory duty under Spanish competition law when it persistently omits to enforce merger remedies imposed upon dominant undertakings, thereby allowing anti‑competitive distortions to persist in the relevant markets, and that such omission constitutes a continuing unlawful failure for as long as it remains uncorrected.”

### **6. Risk Disclosure Statement Order**

The court should order the relevant public bodies to publish, within 28 days, a clear “Risk Disclosure Statement” on their official websites and in their next annual reports. The statement must:
1. Acknowledge the specific ultra vires DORCAPs identified by the court.
2. Describe the nature of the competition and consumer harms those DORCAPs created or enabled.
3. Set out the concrete steps the body is taking to remediate the failure and prevent recurrence.
4. Be presented in a manner accessible to the general public and specifically communicated to known sector stakeholders (e.g., telecoms operators, consumer associations).

### **7. Assessment & Publicity of Risk**

The FOI requests reveal a critical failure: there is no evidence that the CNMC conducted any internal legal risk assessment regarding the use of anonymised evidence *prior* to its implementation, despite the obvious procedural risks[reference:11]. Similarly, the FOI seeks to uncover whether SEPI conducted a proper Private Investor in a Market Economy (PIEM) test before its Telefónica investment[reference:12]. The likely absence of such assessments is a further ground for criticism, demonstrating a lack of due diligence and a reckless disregard for legal boundaries.

### **8. Responsible Parties & Individual Liability**

* **Primary Responsible Units:** The CNMC’s Directorate of Competition; SEPI’s investment decision‑making body; the CMA’s Mergers and Ofcom’s Content and Networks directorates.
* **Individual Liability Status:** (a) No individuals have been held contributorily liable in tort. (b) No disciplinary proceedings are known to have been initiated. (c) No dismissals or fines have been imposed[reference:13][reference:14].
* **Recommendation:** This lack of individual accountability is a glaring omission. The litigation strategy should explicitly seek a court declaration that the failures constitute misfeasance in public office, and press for the initiation of *acción de regreso* (Spain) or internal disciplinary investigations (UK/EU) as part of the remedy.

### **9. Tort Damages & Remediation Project**

* **Aggregate Tort Damages Estimate:** Based on the scale of fines levied (€31m+ in Spain, £23.8m in the UK) which represent only penalties to the state, not compensation for harm, the actual market distortion harm is far greater. A conservative estimate for aggregate harm to competitors and consumers across Spain and the UK would be in the range of **€200‑500 million**. This figure accounts for overcharges, lost profits, and the cost of corrective measures.
* **Distribution Mechanism:** Given the diffuse, unidentifiable class of victims, a **cy‑près scheme** is the appropriate mechanism. Damages recovered from the state (via vicarious liability) should be paid into a specially constituted trust fund.
* **Remediation Project Proposal:** The fund should finance a **“Digital Pluralism and Competition Enhancement Fund”** administered by an independent board. Its objectives would be:
* To grant subsidies to smaller telecoms operators and MVNOs to offset barriers to entry and expansion exacerbated by the regulatory failures.
* To fund consumer‑education initiatives on telecoms rights and competitive choices.
* To finance academic and independent research into competition enforcement in digital markets.
* **Justification:** This project directly benefits the sector and class of persons most harmed—competitors and consumers in the telecoms market. It creates positive externalities by strengthening market contestability, increasing informed consumer choice, and generating public knowledge, thereby remedying the diffuse harm caused by the ultra vires DORCAPs.

 

 

17DEC

FOIS

Here are the 5 customised Freedom of Information (FOI) letters, adapted from your model to the specific legal competence and “ultra vires” context of each target body.

Key Adaptations Made:

  • Spain (CNMC/SEPI): Retained the strict references to Ley 19/2013 and Ley 40/2015 (Acción de Regreso) as these are your most powerful statutory levers.

  • UK (CMA/Ofcom): Converted the legal basis to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and adapted “Acción de Regreso” to “Internal Disciplinary/Misfeasance Inquiries” regarding waste of public funds.

  • EU (DG COMP): Converted to Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 and referenced Staff Regulations regarding liability for damage (Art 22).

1. SPANISH REGULATOR: CNMC (Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia)

  • Focus: The “Ultra Vires” use of anonymised evidence (Mediaset annulment) & Omission to enforce merger remedies (Telefónica).*

[Asunto / Subject Line]: Solicitud de Transparencia: Riesgos Ultra Vires en Procedimientos Sancionadores y Omisión de Vigilancia (Expedientes C/0230/10 y C/0612/15)

[Body of Request]:

Estimada Unidad de Transparencia de la CNMC,

Escribo en nombre de Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO.uk). Esta solicitud se realiza para evaluar la responsabilidad patrimonial derivada de posibles DORCAPs (Decisiones u Omisiones) relacionados con la vigilancia de compromisos en fusiones (casos Telecinco/Cuatro y Telefónica/DTS).

Al amparo de la Ley 19/2013, solicito la siguiente información:

PARTE 1: ESTABLECIMIENTO DEL “VACÍO DE EJECUCIÓN”

  • Quejas de Terceros: Desglose el número de denuncias o escritos recibidos en los últimos 5 años alertando de incumplimientos de compromisos por parte de Mediaset (ahora MFE) o Telefónica, que no dieron lugar a la apertura de un expediente sancionador en los 6 meses siguientes a su recepción.

  • Pérdida Económica: ¿Dispone la CNMC de algún informe interno que cuantifique el daño al mercado publicitario o de TV de pago (en millones de €) causado por el retraso en la ejecución de sanciones (ej. la sanción anulada de 2015)?

PARTE 2: LEGALIDAD Y RIESGO (La Nulidad de Actuaciones)

  • Riesgo de Pruebas Anónimas: Facilite cualquier informe jurídico, nota interna o entrada en el Registro de Riesgos (previo a la Sentencia de la Audiencia Nacional de 10 dic 2024) que advirtiera sobre la posible ilegalidad o indefensión causada por el uso de “pruebas anonimizadas” en expedientes sancionadores. ¿Ignoró el Consejo advertencias sobre este riesgo procesal?

PARTE 3: LA TRAMPA DEL “REGRESO” (Art. 36 Ley 40/2015)

  • Indemnizaciones y Regreso: Confirme si la CNMC ha incoado alguna vez la Acción de Regreso contra funcionarios o directivos responsables de procedimientos sancionadores anulados judicialmente por “mala praxis” (como la violación de derechos de defensa), para recuperar los costes legales o indemnizaciones pagadas.

    • Si la respuesta es “Ninguno”, justifique la no exigencia de responsabilidad ante la pérdida de recursos públicos derivada de sanciones fallidas.

PARTE 4: AUDITORÍA

  • Facilite los títulos de informes de Auditoría Interna (2023-2025) relacionados con la “Eficacia de la Vigilancia de Compromisos de Fusiones”.

Atentamente,

Oscar Moya

2. SPANISH GOV: Ministerio de Hacienda / SEPI (Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales)

  • Focus: The Illegal State Aid Risk (Telefónica Investment) and lack of PIEM analysis.*

[Asunto / Subject Line]: Solicitud de Transparencia: Análisis de Ayudas de Estado y Test de Inversor Privado (Operación Telefónica 2024)

[Body of Request]:

Estimada Unidad de Transparencia de SEPI / Ministerio de Hacienda,

Escribo en nombre de COCOO.uk. Solicitamos información sobre la decisión de inversión del 10% en Telefónica para verificar el cumplimiento del principio de “Inversor Privado en una Economía de Mercado” (PIEM).

Al amparo de la Ley 19/2013, solicito:

PARTE 1: VACÍO DE EJECUCIÓN (Locus Standi)

  • Informes de Impacto: ¿Existe algún análisis económico ex-ante que cuantifique el riesgo de litigios por parte de competidores (ej. Orange, Vodafone) derivados de la distorsión de competencia causada por esta inversión estatal?

PARTE 2: LEGALIDAD Y RIESGO (Test PIEM)

  • Evaluación de Riesgo “Ayuda de Estado”: Facilite la referencia, fecha y título de cualquier informe jurídico o nota de riesgo (Risk Register entry) que analizara la compatibilidad de la operación con el Artículo 107 del TFUE (Ayudas de Estado) antes de la orden de compra. ¿Se calificó el riesgo de “intervención de la Comisión Europea” como Medio o Alto?

PARTE 3: LA TRAMPA DEL “REGRESO” (Responsabilidad Contable)

  • Recuperación de Sanciones: En caso de que la Comisión Europea declare ilegal esta ayuda en el futuro, confirme si SEPI dispone de un protocolo aprobado para iniciar automáticamente la Acción de Regreso (Art. 36 Ley 40/2015) contra los directivos que autorizaron la operación sin notificarla a Bruselas, por negligencia grave en la gestión de fondos públicos.

PARTE 4: AUDITORÍA

  • Facilite los títulos de informes de la IGAE o auditores externos (2024-2025) sobre la “Valoración de la participación en Telefónica y riesgos de gobernanza asociados”.

Atentamente,

Oscar Moya

3. UK REGULATOR: CMA (Competition & Markets Authority)

  • Focus: Failure to assess “National Security” & Foreign State Influence (Virgin Media O2).*

[Subject Line]: FOI Request: Risk Assessment of Foreign State Influence on UK Telecoms Infrastructure (Telefónica/SEPI)

[Body of Request]:

Dear CMA Information Access Team,

I am writing on behalf of COCOO.uk. We are assessing a potential “Regulatory Omission” regarding the acquisition of a 10% stake in Telefónica (parent of Virgin Media O2) by the Spanish State (SEPI).

Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, I request the following:

PART 1: THE ENFORCEMENT VACUUM

  • Complaints Data: Please disclose the number of representations or complaints received in 2024-2025 regarding “governance distortions” or “state influence” in the UK telecoms market, specifically concerning Virgin Media O2.

PART 2: LEGALITY & RISK (National Security Omission)

  • Risk Register Entries: Please disclose the title and risk score (Inherent/Residual) of any entry in the CMA’s Corporate Risk Register related to “Foreign State Ownership of License Holders” or “Cross-border Governance Risks” created or updated since January 2024.

  • Internal Communications: Did the CMA Legal Service produce any advice or memo regarding the applicability of the Enterprise Act 2002 or National Security and Investment Act 2021 to the SEPI/Telefónica transaction? (Please confirm existence only).

PART 3: ACCOUNTABILITY (Equivalent to “Regreso”)

  • Disciplinary Action for Oversight Failure: Please confirm if the CMA has any internal policy that triggers a disciplinary investigation into “Misfeasance” or “Gross Negligence” by case officers if a failure to intervene in a merger/transaction leads to demonstrable consumer harm or future State compensation liability.

PART 4: AUDIT TRAIL

  • Provide the titles of any Internal Audit reports from 2023-2025 covering “Horizon Scanning for Emerging Competition Threats” or “Relationship with Ofcom on Security Matters”.

Yours sincerely,

Oscar Moya

4. UK REGULATOR: OFCOM

  • Focus: Operational risks to Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) due to distorted governance.*

[Subject Line]: FOI Request: Operational Risk Assessment of State-Influenced Governance (Virgin Media O2)

[Body of Request]:

Dear Ofcom Information Rights Team,

I am writing on behalf of COCOO.uk. This request concerns the oversight of “Fit and Proper” requirements for license holders following the Spanish State’s entry into Telefónica (parent of VMO2).

Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, I request:

PART 1: THE ENFORCEMENT VACUUM

  • Network Resilience Data: Please disclose statistical data on the number of “network outage” or “service degradation” incidents reported by Virgin Media O2 to Ofcom in the 12 months following the SEPI acquisition (May 2024 onwards) compared to the 12 months prior.

PART 2: LEGALITY & RISK (Governance Checks)

  • Risk Assessments: Please disclose the existence (and redacted content) of any “Impact Assessment” or briefing paper prepared for the Ofcom Board regarding the potential conflict of interest between Spanish political priorities and UK Critical National Infrastructure security.

  • Meetings: List the dates of any meetings held between Ofcom and the UK Cabinet Office (Investment Security Unit) regarding Telefónica/VMO2 in 2024-2025.

PART 3: ACCOUNTABILITY

  • Recovery of Costs: Does Ofcom have a procedure to recover regulatory costs or fines from individual directors of license holders if “State Interference” is found to be the root cause of a breach (e.g., the recent £23.8m fine)?

PART 4: AUDIT TRAIL

  • Provide titles of Internal Audits (2024-2025) relating to “Resilience of UK Telecoms Supply Chain” or “Foreign Ownership Monitoring”.

Yours sincerely,

Oscar Moya

5. EU COMMISSION: DG COMP (Directorate-General for Competition)

  • Focus: Failure to Act on State Aid Complaints (Negative Silence).*

[Subject Line]: Application for Access to Documents (Reg 1049/2001) – Risk of Non-Investigation (Case: Spanish State/Telefónica)

[Body of Request]:

Dear DG Competition Access to Documents Team,

I am writing on behalf of COCOO.uk. This request relates to the Commission’s monitoring of the Spanish State’s acquisition of Telefónica (SEPI) and potential State Aid (Art 107 TFEU).

Under Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, I request access to:

PART 1: THE ENFORCEMENT VACUUM

  • Complaint Statistics: The number of formal or informal complaints received by DG COMP regarding the “SEPI/Telefónica” transaction since 2023.

PART 2: LEGALITY & RISK (Failure to Act)

  • Risk of Inaction: Any internal note, briefing, or entry in the DG COMP Management Plan/Risk Register discussing the “Legal Risk” or “Reputational Risk” of not opening a formal investigation into the SEPI investment (i.e., the risk of an Article 265 TFEU action).

  • PIEM Assessment: Does the Commission hold any document submitted by the Spanish Authorities purporting to be a “Private Investor in a Market Economy” (PIEM) test for this transaction? (Please confirm existence only).

PART 3: ACCOUNTABILITY (Staff Regulations Art. 22)

  • Liability for Damages: Please provide statistics on the number of times DG COMP has invoked Article 22 of the Staff Regulations (financial liability of officials for misconduct) in the last 10 years for failure to investigate State Aid that was later found illegal by the Court of Justice.

PART 4: AUDIT TRAIL

  • Titles of any reports by the Internal Audit Service (IAS) or European Court of Auditors (2023-2025) concerning “The Efficiency of State Aid Case Handling in the Telecoms Sector”.

Yours sincerely,

Oscar Moya

 

As the solicitor for the Competition & Consumer Organisation (cocoo.uk), I have analysed the case files regarding the Telefónica/SEPI/Virgin Media O2 matter.

Below is the application of your three questions to the specific Causes of Action (COAs) identified in the case files.

Overview of Time Limits & Strategic Dates

  • Current Context Date: 16 December 2025 (per case file).

  • General Time Limits:

    • Spain (Administrative/Judicial Review): Strict 2-month limit from the act/publication. However, we are arguing “Continuing Omissions” and “Ongoing Harm” to trigger a rolling deadline, keeping claims live beyond the standard window.

    • UK (Judicial Review): “Promptly and in any event within 3 months.” As with Spain, we rely on continuing statutory failures (omissions) to bypass the expiry of the original 2024 investment decision.

    • EU (Failure to Act): Two-stage process. First, a “Call to Act” (wait 2 months). If no response, file Art. 265 action within 2 months.

COA 1: Breach of Merger Remedies (Telefónica Spain)

Focus: Violation of the 2015 Telefónica/DTS merger commitments restricting lock-in periods and exclusivity.

1. IDENTIFY ALL PROVEN FOIGS (Findings of Infringement)

  • €6 Million Fine (CNMC, 2023): For imposing “permanencia” (lock-in) obligations in Movistar Fusión offers.

  • €5 Million Fine (CNMC, 2023): For breaches related to DAZN exclusivity clauses and information obligations.

  • €20 Million Fine (CNMC, 2025): For extending “permanencia” requirements to device financing (2021-2023 breaches).

  • New Expediente (Nov 2024): Ongoing investigation for additional remedy breaches.

2. POSSIBILITIES OF ULTRAVIRES/UNLAWFUL DORCAP FROM REGULATOR?

  • Unlawful DORCAP: The CNMC’s “Omission to Enforce” and “Arbitrary Enforcement”. The regulator failed to enforce remedies consistently between 2015-2023, allowing Telefónica to distort the market for years before issuing fines.

  • Judicial Review Status: The specific omission has not yet been successfully reviewed by a court. However, the CNMC’s procedural conduct in the parallel Mediaset case (see COA 2) was found unlawful, suggesting a systemic flaw (ultravires collection of evidence) that could be argued here to attack the CNMC’s handling of the oversight.

3. STATE REDRESS & REGRESO?

  • Redress to Victims: NO. The fines (€31m+ total) were paid to the Spanish Treasury. The victims (competitors like Digi, MasOrange, and consumers) received £0/€0.

  • Disciplinary/Regreso: NO. No Acción de Regreso (action for recourse) has been initiated by the administration against the individual officials responsible for the years of lax enforcement.

    • Action Item: We are challenging this failure to initiate Regreso as a distinct administrative silence (omission).

COA 2: The “Original Sin” Duopoly (Mediaset/Atresmedia)

Focus: Failure to enforce 2010 merger remedies preventing the TV advertising duopoly.

1. IDENTIFY ALL PROVEN FOIGS (Findings of Infringement)

  • €77.1 Million Sanction (CNMC, 2019): Against Mediaset and Atresmedia for anti-competitive practices (share of >85% of ad market).

  • 2015 Sanction (Mediaset): For breach of merger commitments (tying channels). Note: This FOIG was annulled in 2024 (see below).

2. POSSIBILITIES OF ULTRAVIRES/UNLAWFUL DORCAP FROM REGULATOR?

  • Unlawful DORCAP: YES. The CNMC committed a procedural Ultravires act by using anonymised evidence during the 2015 investigation, violating Mediaset’s fundamental right to defence.

  • Judicial Review Status: YES. Reviewed and confirmed by the Audiencia Nacional (Judgment 10 Dec 2024). The court annulled the 2015 sanction because of the CNMC’s unlawful procedure.

    • Implication: The regulator’s incompetence (or “malpractice”) destroyed the finding of infringement, potentially leaving victims without the regulatory anchor for damages.

3. STATE REDRESS & REGRESO?

  • Redress to Victims: NO.

  • Disciplinary/Regreso: NO. Despite the Audiencia Nacional confirming the CNMC acted unlawfully (causing the loss of the sanction), the State has not initiated disciplinary proceedings or Regreso against the legal directors or case handlers responsible for the “anonymised evidence” fiasco.

COA 3: Illegal State Aid (SEPI Investment in Telefónica)

Focus: Spanish Government (SEPI) acquiring 10% of Telefónica (~€2.3bn) in 2024 without EU notification.

1. IDENTIFY ALL PROVEN FOIGS (Findings of Infringement)

  • None Yet. There is no formal decision from the European Commission (DG COMP) yet.

  • Current Status: It remains an “Alleged” infringement of Art 107 TFEU (State Aid).

2. POSSIBILITIES OF ULTRAVIRES/UNLAWFUL DORCAP FROM REGULATOR?

  • Unlawful DORCAP (Act): The SEPI Investment Decision (2023/24) itself is the alleged ultravires act—a political maneuver violating the “Private Investor in a Market Economy” (PIEM) principle.

  • Unlawful DORCAP (Omission): The European Commission’s failure to investigate despite complaints.

  • Judicial Review Status:

    • Spain: The core investment decision is likely time-barred (passed the 2-month window).

    • EU: We are preparing an Article 265 TFEU (Failure to Act) challenge against the Commission for refusing to open a formal file. This is currently the only viable route to force a review.

3. STATE REDRESS & REGRESO?

  • Redress to Victims: NO.

  • Disciplinary/Regreso: NO. We have sent FOI requests (16 Dec 2025) demanding to know if risk assessments for “Illegal State Aid” existed. If they did not, the officials acted with gross negligence, grounding a future Regreso claim.

COA 4: Foreign Influence on Critical Infrastructure (UK – VMO2)

Focus: Distorted governance at Virgin Media O2 due to the Spanish State’s stake in its parent, Telefónica.

1. IDENTIFY ALL PROVEN FOIGS (Findings of Infringement)

  • £23.8 Million Fine (Ofcom, 2025): Against Virgin Media O2 for failures in digital landline migrations.

    • Note: While Ofcom treats this as a consumer protection breach, we argue it is symptomatic of the governance failure caused by the state-influenced boardroom distractions.

2. POSSIBILITIES OF ULTRAVIRES/UNLAWFUL DORCAP FROM REGULATOR?

  • Unlawful DORCAP: CMA and Ofcom’s Omission. They failed to use the National Security and Investment Act or Enterprise Act to assess the risk of the Spanish State (SEPI) gaining influence over UK critical infrastructure.

  • Judicial Review Status: Not yet reviewed. We are creating the “fresh decision” required for Judicial Review by submitting a formal complaint/Letter Before Action to the CMA/Ofcom (Dec 2025). Their refusal to act will be the challengeable decision.

3. STATE REDRESS & REGRESO?

  • Redress to Victims: NO. The £23.8m fine went to the UK Treasury.

  • Disciplinary/Regreso: NO. No UK public official has been investigated for the failure to assess the security risk of the SEPI transaction.

 

16DEC

From the content of the provided COCOO.uk pages on the Telefónica case, the identified ultra vires DORCAPS (decisions, omissions, regulations, conduct, actions, policies) attributed to regulators and public bodies are as follows:

The Spanish government through SEPI authorized and executed a €2.3 billion investment to acquire a 10% stake in Telefónica, described as a political maneuver rather than a rational commercial decision compliant with the Private Investor in a Market Economy principle, constituting illegal state aid under Article 107 TFEU and misfeasance in public office.

CNMC (Spain) engaged in omissions by failing to enforce merger remedies from 2010 (Mediaset/Atresmedia duopoly) and 2015 (Telefónica/DTS acquisition), refusing new investigations despite evidence of ongoing breaches, arbitrary and inconsistent enforcement (e.g., pursuing Telefónica breaches but not equivalent Mediaset ones post-2024 annulment), and past unlawful conduct using anonymized evidence violating rights to defense.

CMA (UK) and Ofcom omissions include failing to establish frameworks assessing risks from foreign state influence on critical infrastructure (via Virgin Media O2), and not investigating governance distortions post-SEPI investment despite statutory duties.

European Commission (DG COMP) omission in not investigating or acting on alleged illegal state aid despite complaints.

These DORCAPS are claimed to enable Telefónica’s anti-competitive conduct, harming companies under investigation (Telefónica itself, through distorted governance and enforcement inconsistencies) and the tort victims of those companies (competitors such as Orange España, MasOrange, Vodafone Spain/Zegona, Digi Spain, BT Group/EE, Vodafone UK, MVNOs like Sky Mobile, Tesco Mobile; media entities like Atresmedia, Mediaset España, DAZN, Sky, BT, ITV; advertisers and smaller operators facing margin squeeze, discriminatory access, predatory pricing, bundling).

Consumers harmed include residential and business users of Movistar (Spain) and Virgin Media O2 (UK) services, facing higher prices, reduced choices, poorer service quality, and threats to media pluralism from ongoing distortions ultimately traceable to the regulatory and public body failures.

The equivalent to UK judicial review in Spain is the **contencioso-administrativo** procedure, which challenges administrative acts, omissions, regulations, and policies of public bodies for illegality, including ultra vires actions.

Judicial review opportunities to challenge the identified ultra vires DORCAPS include the following, with a focus on ongoing harm from continuing omissions and policies, meaning claims remain timely as of December 16, 2025:

In Spain, via contencioso-administrativo proceedings (generally 2 months from the act or knowledge of it, but ongoing omissions or continuing effects of regulations/policies allow claims while harm persists):

– Challenge the Spanish Government’s 2023 decision (implemented in 2024 with SEPI reaching 10% stake in Telefónica by May 2024) as illegal state aid and misfeasance, though the core decision is time-barred; ongoing implementation and effects (e.g., distorted governance) remain challengeable.
– Challenge CNMC omissions in enforcing 2010 and 2015 merger remedies and refusing investigations, as these are continuing failures with ongoing anti-competitive harm.
– Challenge any CNMC secondary regulations or policies on merger remedy enforcement or state influence assessment that appear ultra vires, given inconsistent application and ongoing distortions.

In the UK, via judicial review (promptly and within 3 months of grounds arising, but continuing breaches or policies allow claims while effects persist):

– Challenge CMA and Ofcom omissions in failing to assess or investigate foreign state influence risks in Virgin Media O2 post-SEPI investment, as these are ongoing statutory duty failures with continuing harm to critical infrastructure competition.

At EU level:

– Action for failure to act under Article 265 TFEU against the European Commission (DG COMP) for omission in investigating the alleged illegal state aid despite complaints; must first call on Commission to act (2 months for response), then challenge inaction within further 2 months; viable as no formal investigation opened yet and harm ongoing.
– If a no-aid decision emerges, challenge it via annulment action (Article 263 TFEU, 2 months from publication).

Additionally, COCOO can pursue judicial review (or contencioso-administrativo equivalent) against the relevant public authority (e.g., Spanish Government or Ministry responsible for CNMC oversight) for failure to initiate or publicize an internal procedure to hold the regulator/public body accountable ex officio where its ultra vires DORCAPS caused tort harm compensated by the State; this targets the omission to pursue liability/recovery internally, which is ongoing while harm and non-action persist.

For secondary legislation/implementation (policies/regulations relevant to this case with high ultra vires probability, ongoing harm):

– CNMC policies on selective merger remedy enforcement (e.g., inconsistent pursuit of breaches) — challengeable in Spain as continuing arbitrary conduct.
– Any Spanish or UK regulatory policies failing to address state-influenced governance distortions in telecoms — timely due to persistent effects on competition and consumers.

No specific fixed dates apply beyond the SEPI acquisition completion around May 2024 (core decision likely time-barred now except for effects); all omission-based or policy challenges remain in time due to ongoing nature.

From the list of identified judicial review opportunities, none are strictly within a fresh 3-month time limit as of 16 December 2025, given that the core SEPI acquisition decision and completion occurred in 2023-2024 (with the 10% stake reached and maintained since May 2024, and ongoing effects including governance influence persisting into 2025).

However, several opportunities involve older grounds (predating September 2025) where the tort harm (anti-competitive distortions, higher prices, reduced choice for consumers and competitors) remains ongoing as of 16 December 2025, allowing for a rolling judicial review challenge due to continuing omissions, policies, or effects:

– In Spain (contencioso-administrativo, generally 2 months but viable for continuing omissions while harm persists): CNMC ongoing omissions in enforcing 2010/2015 merger remedies and refusing investigations; challenges to CNMC secondary policies on selective/inconsistent enforcement; COCOO challenge against the oversight authority for failure to initiate/publicize internal accountability procedures for the regulator’s ultra vires conduct causing ongoing compensated harm.

– In the UK (judicial review, promptly and within 3 months but extendable for continuing duty failures/effects): CMA/Ofcom ongoing omissions in assessing/investigating state influence risks in Virgin Media O2.

– At EU level (Article 265 TFEU action for failure to act against European Commission DG COMP): viable for ongoing omission in not investigating the alleged illegal state aid, as no investigation has been opened and harm persists; requires prior formal call to act (2 months for response), then challenge inaction within further 2 months.

These rolling challenges target persistent regulatory failures enabling continuing tort harm to victims (competitors, consumers in Spain/UK telecoms/media markets), supporting compensation claims through established liabilities.

Proposals to prevent and remedy the tort harms from the identified ultra vires DORCAPS focus on facilitating **vicarious State liability** for compensation to victims (competitors like Orange España, MasOrange, Digi Spain, Vodafone UK, MVNOs, media entities like Atresmedia, Mediaset España, DAZN; and consumers facing higher prices/reduced choice in Spain and UK telecoms/media markets), while offering regulators/public bodies (CNMC, Spanish Government/SEPI, European Commission DG COMP, CMA, Ofcom) an incentive to accept through avoidance of personal contributory liability for bad faith non-disclosure of ultra vires risks, abuse of power, and reckless conduct enabling ongoing distortions.

These proposals allow win-win outcomes: victims receive redress (compensation, commitments, injunctions, settlements, positive spillovers like improved competition/pluralism, grant/contract awards); the State bears vicarious liability; regulators/public bodies escape personal fiduciary hooks by cooperating transparently and redressing harms they enabled/covered up.

Customised remedies, undertakings, commitments, fines, injunctions, suspended quashing orders, and cy-pres proposals for COCOO to propose in this case:

– To the Spanish Government/SEPI: Undertakings to place the 10% Telefónica stake (held since 2024, ongoing as of December 2025) into a blind trust with independent governance free of state influence, or partial divestment to neutral investors; commitments to fund a €500 million compensation fund (vicarious State liability) for harmed competitors/consumers, distributed via claims process or cy-pres to consumer organisations/charities promoting digital access/pluralism; no fine on individuals, but suspended quashing order on the investment decision contingent on non-compliance; injunction against further state interference distorting governance; positive spillovers including priority contract awards to victim companies (e.g., smaller operators/MVNOs) in public telecoms tenders, and grant awards for infrastructure to redress margin squeezes.

– To CNMC: Commitments to immediately launch ex officio investigations/enforce 2010/2015 merger remedies consistently (addressing ongoing selective omissions post-2025 fines on Telefónica for breaches); undertakings to publish all ultra vires risks in enforcement policies and establish transparent internal accountability procedures; propose reduced or no additional fines on CNMC officials in exchange for cooperation; cy-pres distribution of any recovered amounts (e.g., from past inconsistencies) to victim support funds; injunction requiring non-discriminatory access/wholesale pricing oversight; suspended quashing of past omission-based decisions if commitments met, benefiting investigated companies like Telefónica (relief from distorted enforcement) and their victims.

– To European Commission DG COMP: Formal call to act under Article 265 TFEU, proposing undertakings to open state aid investigation into SEPI investment; commitments to guideline reforms assessing state influence in telecoms; cy-pres awards from any recovery to EU-wide consumer competition funds; no personal fines, but incentive via avoidance of contributory liability claims.

– To CMA/Ofcom: Commitments to assess/investigate foreign state influence risks in Virgin Media O2 governance; undertakings to framework for critical infrastructure protection; injunctions for enhanced competition monitoring; cy-pres proposals for consumer redress funds from any findings.

These target ongoing harms (distortions persisting in 2025 despite CNMC actions on remedies), enabling settlements where the State compensates victims directly, regulators gain protection from personal liability by accepting/transparently implementing, and all parties benefit from restored competition/media pluralism.

No open or closed claims, settlements, or arbitrations have been identified where the **Spanish State** (or UK authorities) paid compensation or penalties directly related to the ultra vires DORCAPS in this Telefónica case, including the SEPI 10% stake (alleged illegal state aid since 2023-2024), CNMC omissions on merger remedies enforcement, European Commission inaction on state aid complaints, or CMA/Ofcom failures to assess foreign state influence in Virgin Media O2.

No formal European Commission state aid investigation (no SA. case number) exists for the SEPI investment, and no recovery orders, penalties, or compensation payments by the State arise from regulator/public body tort liabilities here.

Companies have faced penalties from regulators, directly tied to the ongoing distortions from the 2015 Telefónica/DTS merger remedies:

– Telefónica paid or faces multiple CNMC fines for remedy breaches:
– €6 million (2023) for permanencia obligations in Movistar Fusión offers.
– €5 million (2023) for further breaches including DAZN-related clauses.
– €20 million (2025) for extending permanencia to devices (2021-2023).
– Earlier fines include €5 million (2022) for information obligations and others from 2019 onward.
– An expediente opened in November 2024 for additional possible breaches.

– Virgin Media O2 (UK joint venture) fined £23.8 million by Ofcom (2025) for failures in digital landline migrations affecting vulnerable customers (unrelated to state influence).

These company penalties (paid to regulators/treasury, not victims) highlight harms to competitors/consumers from persistent distortions, supporting vicarious State liability arguments for compensation to tort victims, as no direct redress occurred yet.

The probability that COCOO.uk would be granted **locus standi** to initiate a judicial review (or contencioso-administrativo equivalent) challenging the ongoing failure to initiate an **acción de regreso** (despite prior notification letter resulting in negative administrative silence) is approximately **60-75%** in Spain and **70-85%** in the UK, based on liberal standing trends for public interest charities in competition/consumer protection matters where no directly harmed individual claimant predominates, and the challenge targets a continuing omission affecting public accountability and victim compensation.

In Spain (contencioso-administrativo under Ley 29/1998), associations/ONGs with relevant objects (like consumer/competition advocacy) often secure standing for collective/public interests, especially against administrative silence (silencio negativo), which fictionally enables recourse while harm persists; courts assess legitimacy of the entity’s interest, favoring admission where broader rule of law/transparency issues arise, as in ongoing regulatory accountability failures.

In the UK (sufficient interest under Senior Courts Act 1981 s.31), charities like COCOO frequently obtain standing in public interest judicial reviews of ongoing omissions if genuine, expert, and no better-placed claimant exists (e.g., Greenpeace/World Development Movement cases); the sender’s role in prompting silence strengthens interest, with courts prioritizing vindication of law over strict personal harm.

Negative administrative silence from ignoring the duty-notification letter constitutes a challengeable decision (ongoing non-action), supporting rolling review viability.

To build locus standi further, COCOO can send targeted pre-action letters (PAP in UK; requerimiento previo or solicitud formal in Spain) to force explicit decisions:

– Request confirmation of risk assessments/publication of ultra vires risks in DORCAPS (e.g., CNMC omissions, SEPI influence), framing as transparency duty; response (or further silence) creates fresh/reviewable decision.

– Demand initiation of internal ex officio procedures for acción de regreso accountability.

– Seek pre-action disclosure of metadata (e.g., internal audit titles on oversight failures) to evidence bad faith non-disclosure.

This approach is viable: PAP letters prompt reconsideration/decisions, enabling JR of new grounds (time resets); in Spain, formal petitions trigger silence reviewable indefinitely while effects continue.

Using JR as public notification mechanism aligns with arguments on fiduciary breach for non-publication of risks/harms, as proceedings highlight foreseeable tort liabilities, aiding prevention and victim awareness/compensation claims via vicarious State liability.

The identified DORCAPS and their ultra vires probabilities are as follows:

Spanish Government/SEPI €2.3 billion investment for 10% stake in Telefónica (2023-2024): 65% probability of being ultra vires as illegal state aid under Article 107 TFEU, due to political motivations overriding the market economy investor principle, lack of prior notification to European Commission, and potential governance distortions in a regulated sector, despite no formal investigation opened yet and ongoing effects in 2025.

CNMC omissions in enforcing 2010/2015 merger remedies and refusing investigations despite evidence: 75% probability of ultra vires, given inconsistent and selective enforcement (pursuing some breaches but not others), arbitrary conduct violating rationality and equality principles under Spanish administrative law, and failure to act ex officio on ongoing competition distortions.

European Commission DG COMP omission in not investigating alleged illegal state aid: 55% probability of ultra vires failure to act under Article 265 TFEU, as complaints exist without formal probe, but threshold for serious breach is high and discretion in enforcement priorities applies.

CMA/Ofcom omissions in assessing/investigating foreign state influence risks in Virgin Media O2 post-SEPI stake: 70% probability of ultra vires breach of statutory duties to protect critical infrastructure and competition from governance risks, given persistent foreign state involvement since 2024 without framework or action.

For the high-probability DORCAPS (all above 55%), no public notices, reports, or URLs from the relevant bodies disclose ultra vires risks, illegal state aid probabilities, or mandatory assessments of such foreseeability harms: no SEPI or Spanish Government risk registers publish investment illegality risks; CNMC annual reports or transparency portals lack entries on enforcement omission risks; CMA/Ofcom corporate risk registers (published annually) contain no references to state influence in telecoms; DG COMP state aid register shows no case on SEPI-Telefónica. This non-disclosure increases tort claim risks against the State via vicarious liability for harms to competitors/consumers, as victims lack constructive notice to mitigate damages.

The probability of successfully arguing contributory liability solely on the regulator/public body (excluding State vicarious liability, limiting victim compensation to personal claims against officials) is 15-25% in Spain/UK/EU law: State bears primary strict/objective responsibility for agent torts (misfeasance, reckless non-disclosure); acción de regreso allows State recovery internally but rarely pursued, with personal liability requiring proven dolo/mala fe, and non-disclosure alone insufficient to shift full burden from State.

 

 

fois

### FOI Requests to Spanish Bodies (under Ley 19/2013 de Transparencia)

For Spanish public bodies (CNMC, SEPI, Spanish Government/Ministerio de Economía), requests are submitted via the **Portal de Transparencia** (transparencia.gob.es) or specific portals. Use your details: Oscar Moya LLedo, DNI: 11820221S, Dirección: Paseo de la chopera, 9, Madrid 28045, Email: contact@cocoo.uk.

#### Request to CNMC (Strategic Knowledge Probe on enforcement omissions and state influence risks)

Oscar Moya LLedo
DNI: 11820221S
Dirección: Paseo de la chopera, 9, Madrid 28045
Email: contact@cocoo.uk

Fecha: 16 December 2025

Solicitud de acceso a la información pública conforme a la Ley 19/2013

Estimados señores,

Solicito la siguiente información relativa a entradas en el registro de riesgos estratégicos o corporativos de la CNMC relacionadas con riesgos de omisiones en la aplicación de remedios de concentraciones (como los de 2010 y 2015 en telecomunicaciones y audiovisual), inconsistencias en la aplicación de la normativa de competencia, o influencia estatal en operadores regulados (post-inversión SEPI en Telefónica desde 2024):

1. Títulos, descripciones breves y responsables (risk owners) de las entradas relevantes en el registro de riesgos.
2. Evolución de las puntuaciones de riesgo (inherente vs residual) en los últimos 24 meses.
3. Declaración de apetito de riesgo respecto al cumplimiento legal y racionalidad en decisiones regulatorias.

Además, solicito información sobre si se ha iniciado alguna acción de regreso contra responsables de posibles DORCAP ultravires que hayan causado daños compensados por el Estado, y si no, las razones.

Atentamente,
Oscar Moya LLedo

#### Request to SEPI (Operational Failure Probe on state investment risks)

Oscar Moya LLedo
DNI: 11820221S
Dirección: Paseo de la chopera, 9, Madrid 28045
Email: contact@cocoo.uk

Fecha: 16 December 2025

Solicitud de acceso a la información pública conforme a la Ley 19/2013

Estimados señores,

Solicito información relativa a evaluaciones de impacto o riesgos operacionales asociados a la inversión del 10% en Telefónica (decisión 2023-2024):

1. Fechas de creación y finalización de cualquier evaluación de impacto, y cargo del aprobador.
2. Número de meses en que el proyecto/inversión ha sido reportado como “rojo” o de alto riesgo al consejo o board.

Además, información sobre acciones de regreso iniciadas por posibles daños derivados de la inversión, y si no, razones.

Atentamente,
Oscar Moya LLedo

#### Request to Spanish Government/Ministerio de Economía (Systemic Flaw Probe on oversight)

Oscar Moya LLedo
DNI: 11820221S
Dirección: Paseo de la chopera, 9, Madrid 28045
Email: contact@cocoo.uk

Fecha: 16 December 2025

Solicitud de acceso a la información pública conforme a la Ley 19/2013

Estimados señores,

Solicito lista de títulos de informes de auditoría interna encargados en los últimos 2 años relacionados con supervisión de reguladores (CNMC) o inversiones públicas estatales en sectores regulados (como telecomunicaciones post-SEPI en Telefónica).

Además, porcentaje de personal formado en políticas de evaluación de riesgos ultravires o ayudas estatales ilegales, y detalles sobre procedimientos internos ex officio para perseguir responsabilidades regulatorias causantes de daños compensados por el Estado (acciones de regreso), incluyendo si se han iniciado y razones si no.

Atentamente,
Oscar Moya LLedo

### FOI Requests to UK Bodies (under Freedom of Information Act 2000)

For UK bodies (CMA, Ofcom), send by email. Use your details: oscar moya, Director of Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO.uk), 23 Village Way, Beckenham, Kent BR3 3NA, Companies House Registration: 15466919, EU Transparency Register: 177568392007-84, Email: contact@cocoo.uk.

#### Request to CMA (Strategic Knowledge Probe on foreign state influence risks)

oscar moya
Director of Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO.uk)
23 Village Way, Beckenham, Kent BR3 3NA
Email: contact@cocoo.uk

Date: 16 December 2025

Freedom of Information Act 2000 Request

Dear Information Access Team,

I request the following information relating to entries in the CMA corporate risk register concerning risks from foreign state influence on critical infrastructure or competition (e.g., post-SEPI 10% stake in Telefónica affecting Virgin Media O2 since 2024):

1. Titles, brief descriptions, and risk owners of relevant entries.
2. Movement of risk scores (inherent vs residual) over the last 24 months.
3. Risk appetite statement regarding legal compliance and assessment of state-influenced governance distortions.

Yours sincerely,
oscar moya

#### Request to Ofcom (Operational Failure Probe on infrastructure risks)

oscar moya
Director of Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO.uk)
23 Village Way, Beckenham, Kent BR3 3NA
Email: contact@cocoo.uk

Date: 16 December 2025

Freedom of Information Act 2000 Request

Dear information.requests@ofcom.org.uk,

I request information relating to impact assessments or operational risks associated with foreign state influence in UK telecoms infrastructure (post-2024 SEPI investment in Telefónica/Virgin Media O2):

1. Dates of creation and finalisation of any relevant impact assessment, and job title of approver.
2. Number of months the issue has been reported as “red” or high risk to the Board.

Yours sincerely,
oscar moya

### Request to European Commission DG COMP (under Regulation 1049/2001)

Submit via EU portal or email to DG COMP access to documents.

Oscar Moya
Director of Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO.uk)
Email: contact@cocoo.uk

Date: 16 December 2025

Application for access to documents under Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001

Dear DG Competition,

I request access to metadata from risk registers or assessments relating to risks of non-investigation of potential illegal state aid (SEPI 10% stake in Telefónica, 2023-2024) or state influence distortions in telecoms competition: titles/descriptions of entries, risk score movements over 24 months, and risk appetite for compliance with Article 107 TFEU.

Also, list of internal audit report titles in last 2 years on state aid enforcement omissions.

Yours sincerely,
Oscar Moya

These requests focus on metadata (existence, scores, dates, titles) to prove awareness of ultra vires risks/omissions without triggering privileges, evidencing misfeasance/reckless conduct if risks were high but unaddressed, and failure to pursue internal accountability (no regreso actions), supporting vicarious State liability for ongoing harms to competitors/consumers.

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