16dec esp valve

21DEC

BAS

This report provides a professional and detailed analysis of potential judicial review opportunities in the context of Valve Corporation’s operations in Spain, with a specific focus on balancing public interest objectives against economic efficiency goals. Pursuant to your instructions, Spanish competition law, specifically the Ley de Defensa de la Competencia, is treated as substantially equivalent to the United Kingdom and European Union frameworks discussed in the provided materials.

Opportunity 1: Judicial Review for Administrative Inaction regarding Valve’s Excessive Commission Rates

This opportunity involves challenging the failure of the national regulator (CNMC) or the European Commission to investigate Valve’s 30 percent commission on the Steam platform as an abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 TFEU and Article 2 LDC. A claim for judicial review on the ground of failure to act is appropriate where a commission has not made a decision one way or the other despite a clear complaint of market abuse.

The Balancing Act:

The economic efficiency perspective argues that a high commission allows a platform to maintain a robust, secure, and innovative global infrastructure that benefits consumer welfare through platform reliability. However, this must be balanced against the public interest (WPI) in protecting small and medium undertakings and ensuring cultural and economic diversity. Unchecked market power that results in exploitative pricing can lead to a lower standard of living for a large number of developers who see their real income reduced. High fees may also constitute a parameter of competition that ignores the public interest in developer survival and innovation.

The judicial review would seek to prove that the regulator committed a manifest error of appraisal by failing to recognize that such fees exploit a developer’s economic dependence, verging on a moral failure that requires regulatory intervention.

Opportunity 2: Judicial Review against Manifest Error in the Assessment of Platform Parity Obligations

This opportunity concerns the potential judicial review of a regulator’s decision to permit Valve’s platform parity obligations, which require developers to offer their games on Steam at the same price as on other platforms. Such agreements may fall under the prohibition of anti-competitive arrangements under Article 101 TFEU and Article 1 LDC.

The Balancing Act:

From an efficiency standpoint, parity clauses can prevent free-riding and ensure that a platform that invests in discovery and marketing is not bypassed by users seeking a lower price elsewhere. Conversely, the public interest ground emphasizes the freedom to trade and the necessity of market access for competing stores. These clauses act as regulatory barriers to entry that make market entry for domestic Spanish competitors less attractive.

A successful application for judicial review would argue that the regulator failed to consider “essential elements” (ESSE) of the legislative goal of competition, such as the decentralization of market power which reinforces democratic institutions. The court should scrutinize whether the regulator’s appraisal was too cursory and whether it neglected the long-term harm to the digital economy in favor of short-term platform stability.

Opportunity 3: Judicial Review regarding Regulatory Capture and Failure to Observe the Public Interest

This opportunity focuses on the broader failure of regulators to maintain an adequate standard of review, potentially due to regulatory capture by the dominant digital entity. If a regulator acts in a purely administrative capacity but effectively protects a monopoly, its decisions or lack thereof may be quashed if they fail a proportionality test or neglect the duty to observe the public interest.

The Balancing Act:

The platform may claim that its private regulations are necessary for an efficient allocation of resources within a “quasi-market”. However, the public interest requires a transparent and predictable regulatory process that gives domestic stakeholders and investors confidence. The “real/nominal mismatch” in the value provided to the Spanish developer ecosystem versus the wealth transferred to the foreign monopolist creates a duty on the regulator to explain its inaction.

The judicial review would seek to join the regulator and the dominant entity in a trialogue, forcing an update to the regulations to ensure they are not “rent-seeking” but truly fulfill the public interest. The onus of proof for continued protection from competition must lie with the regulator, not with those seeking to introduce competition into the Spanish market.

Opportunity 4: Judicial Review on Privacy and Data Concentration as Parameters of Competition

Given Valve’s control over massive amounts of consumer and developer data, a judicial review can be brought on the ground that the regulator failed to consider privacy breaches and data concentration as parameters of competition.

The Balancing Act:

Efficiency might suggest that data concentration leads to better personalization and service quality. Yet, the public interest in “informational self-determination” and the protection of privacy are critical parameters that must be measured. If Valve’s data control marginalizes competitors that offer better privacy, the regulator’s failure to act facilitates exploitative contracts.

The judicial review would rely on recent precedents where misleading representations or the exploitation of digital consumers through harvesting personal data were categorized as an abuse of a dominant position. This ground argues that a regulator must ensure that competition stimulates sustainability and privacy, rather than just raw economic output.

ALLIES

The success of the proposed judicial reviews against platform monopolies and restrictive practices would create significant positive externalities, compensation opportunities, and restorative effects for several key organisations and groups in Spain and Europe. The following list identifies the entities most likely to benefit as thought partners, follow-on claimants, or advocates for the diffuse victims affected by these market failures.

Spanish Game Development and Digital Economy Associations

Asociación Española de Empresas Productoras y Desarrolladoras de Videojuegos (DEV)

Address: Calle de Velázquez 94, 1ª Planta, 28006 Madrid, Spain.

Official Email: info@dev.org.es

As the primary representative for Spanish game developers, DEV would benefit from a finding of infringement (FOIG) by gaining a legal basis to help its members—mostly small and medium enterprises (SMEs)—pursue collective compensation for excessive commission fees. Success would restore the reputation of local studios that have struggled to compete due to high platform costs, allowing them to reinvest in the Spanish science and research base.

Asociación Española de Videojuegos (AEVI)

Address: Calle de Velázquez 126, 28006 Madrid, Spain.

Official Email: info@aevi.org.es

AEVI represents the entire value chain, including publishers and developers. A successful judicial review would align with their goals of integrity and fair play within the industry. While they count platform owners among their members, a ruling on platform parity would empower their developer members to offer more competitive pricing on independent Spanish storefronts.

Asociación Española de la Economía Digital (Adigital)

Address: Calle de Velázquez 126, 28006 Madrid, Spain.

Official Email: info@adigital.org

Adigital focuses on creating a competitive legal framework for digital businesses. A successful judicial review would reduce the regulatory capture they often highlight in the digital sector, ensuring that Spanish digital service providers can grow without being stifled by exclusionary market power.

European Advocacy and SME Groups

European Games Developer Federation (EGDF)

Address: 1000 Brussels, Belgium (Spanish members represented via national associations).

Official Email: jari-pekka.kaleva@egdf.eu

EGDF is a vocal advocate for SME developers across Europe and has specifically called for regulation of non-negotiable B2B contracts. A Spanish judicial victory would serve as a powerful precedent for EGDF to use in Brussels to advocate for a European-wide cap on platform commissions and the removal of “anti-competitive market behaviour” like retroactive pricing changes.

Consumer Protection Organisations in Spain

Centro Europeo del Consumidor en España (CEC-Spain)

Address: Calle del Príncipe de Vergara 54, 28006 Madrid, Spain.

Official Email: cec@consumo.gob.es

Operating under the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, this centre assists consumers with cross-border disputes within the EU. A judicial review success would provide them with a definitive ruling to help Spanish consumers seek refunds or lower prices resulting from the removal of platform-induced price inflation.

FACUA – Consumidores en Acción

Address: Calle Bécquer 25, 41002 Seville, Spain.

Official Email: tudenuncia@facua.org

As a non-profit dedicated to defending consumer rights, FACUA would gain a significant chance to lead collective “follow-on” claims for compensation on behalf of millions of Spanish users affected by homogeneous pricing caused by platform parity obligations.

Organización de Consumidores y Usuarios (OCU)

Address: Calle de Albarracín 21, 28037 Madrid, Spain.

Official Email: informacion@ocu.org

The OCU often targets market dominance that leads to a reduction in consumer choice and variety. Success in these judicial reviews would allow OCU to restore consumer welfare by proving that current platform practices deny consumers products at efficient competitive levels.

Specialised Interest Groups and Technology Providers

Cloud and Infrastructure Providers (Spanish SMEs)

Organisations such as Red.es (Address: Plaza Manuel Gómez-Moreno s/n, 28020 Madrid; Email: elena.cidon@red.es) would benefit from the positive externalities of a more open market. When platform monopolies are reduced, smaller Spanish infrastructure and cloud service companies gain the chance to compete in providing back-end services to developers who were previously “locked in” to the monopolists’ proprietary technologies.

Would you like me to draft a template letter that you can use to contact these organisations regarding the proposed judicial reviews?

 

JRS

Based on the provided case file, the central issue is the alleged failure of the Spanish National Commission for Markets and Competition (CNMC) to act following the European Commission’s 2021 decision (AT.40413) that found Valve and several publishers guilty of anti-competitive geo-blocking. This analysis will proceed under the requested UK public law and tort principles, applied by analogy to the Spanish context.

### 1. Judicial Review Opportunities and Causes of Action

No definitive judicial review (JR) judgment has been rendered on the core DORCAPs (Decisions, Omissions, Regulations, Conducts, Actions, Policies)[reference:0]. The case file indicates that for ongoing administrative omissions, a JR “remains timely”[reference:1]. A “Rolling Judicial Review” strategy is also suggested for persistent inaction, which in Spanish administrative law can be challenged at any time while it persists[reference:2]. Therefore, several causes of action (COAs) are not time-barred.

**Judicial Review COAs:**
* **Illegality/Ultra Vires:** The CNMC’s omission to initiate follow-on national proceedings after a final EU infringement decision may contravene its duty under Article 4 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 and Spanish law (Ley 40/2015) to apply EU competition law effectively[reference:3].
* **Irrationality (Wednesbury Unreasonableness):** A decision (or omission) by a regulator to take no action despite a proven, market-distorting infringement that harms domestic consumers could be deemed so unreasonable that no reasonable authority would have made it.
* **Procedural Impropriety:** A blanket refusal to investigate credible complaints (e.g., regarding excessive commissions in May 2025) without proper consideration or reason could constitute a failure of procedural fairness[reference:4].

**Tort COAs against the Public Body:**
* **Misfeasance in Public Office:** If the inaction is motivated by bad faith, or the regulator knowingly acted beyond its powers with foreseeably harmful consequences.
* **Breach of Statutory Duty:** The failure to execute statutory duties (e.g., under the Spanish Competition Act) that are intended to protect a class (here, consumers and developers) can ground a tort claim.
* **Negligence:** A claim in negligence could arise if a duty of care is established, requiring the regulator to exercise reasonable skill and care in market supervision, and a breach causes foreseeable economic loss.

**Locus Standi for a “No Particular Victim” Applicant:**
In UK law, standing under section 31 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 requires a “sufficient interest.” Courts have recognized that representative bodies can have standing, particularly where there is a “vacuum of enforcement” – a diffuse harm affecting many but where no individual has a sufficient financial incentive to litigate[reference:5]. This aligns with the “Lordhope” model of public interest standing. The applicant organization (COCOO) can argue it acts to fill this vacuum, has expertise in the domain, and the issues raised are of general public importance concerning the rule of law and effective market regulation. The ongoing nature of the harm and the regulator’s continuing omission further bolster the argument for standing.

### 2. Analysis of DORCAPs: Ultra Vires & Irrationality

The key impugned DORCAPs, ranked by likelihood of successful challenge, are:

1. **The Omission to Initiate Follow-on Actions Post-EC Decision (AT.40413).** This is the strongest ground. The European Commission’s 2021 decision is a final, proven finding of infringement affecting the Spanish market[reference:6]. National competition authorities have a clear duty to enforce EU competition law. A complete failure to act on this decision is highly likely to be found *ultra vires* (outside statutory power) for disregarding this duty. It is also powerfully arguable as *irrational*; taking no follow-up action in the face of a proven cross-border harm is a decision no reasonable regulator could make.

2. **The Refusal to Investigate Complaints Regarding Excessive Commissions & Platform Parity (May 2025).** This is a discrete, reviewable decision[reference:7]. The *ultra vires* argument here would be that the CNMC incorrectly interpreted its powers or applied an unlawful policy (e.g., systematic deference to private litigation). The irrationality argument would focus on a failure to consider relevant evidence (e.g., parallel foreign proceedings, developer complaints) or giving weight to irrelevant factors. Its success is more fact-dependent than the first DORCAP.

3. **The General Passivity Regarding Digital Market Fragmentation.** This broader DORCAP of systemic inaction[reference:8] is legally sound but may be subsumed by challenges to the specific omissions above. A court may be more inclined to grant relief on a concrete failure rather than a general state of affairs, though it remains a viable ground for a declaration.

### 3. Recommended Suspended Quashing Orders

For DORCAPs 1 and 2 above, suspended quashing orders should be sought.

* **For DORCAP 1 (Follow-on Inaction):** Seek an order quashing the CNMC’s implicit decision to take no follow-on action. This order should be suspended for **three months** to allow the CNMC to lawfully reconsider its position and initiate appropriate proceedings. A condition should be that the CNMC files a witness statement with the court within **one month** outlining its proposed action plan.
* **For DORCAP 2 (Refusal to Investigate):** Seek an order quashing the CNMC’s refusal to investigate the excessive commissions complaints. This order should be suspended for **two months** to allow for a lawful reconsideration of the complaint, conducted on a proper legal basis and taking into account all relevant evidence.

Suspension is justified to avoid administrative chaos and to allow the regulator a defined period to correct its unlawful conduct in an orderly manner, thereby preserving market stability while ensuring remedy.

### 4. Ongoing Harm & Injunctive Relief

**Ongoing Harm:** The harms are continuous. Geo-blocking conduct leads to persistent price disparities (e.g., prices in Spain being 20% higher than in Germany)[reference:9]. Excessive commissions cause ongoing overcharges to developers and consumers, with estimated annual losses of up to €50 million in Spain[reference:10].

**Key Elements for an Interim Injunction:** An application should seek an order requiring the CNMC to:
* Take interim measures to prevent further, irreparable harm to Spanish consumers and the digital market pending the outcome of the JR.
* Specifically, require the CNMC to direct Valve Corporation to cease enforcing geo-blocking restrictions on Spanish consumers and to suspend the application of its 30% commission rate and parity clauses to Spanish developers, pending the CNMC’s final decision following the quashing order.

### 5. Statement of Legal Principle Declaration

The court should be asked to declare:
“It is hereby declared that the Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) acted ultra vires and in breach of its statutory duty by failing to initiate any follow-on investigation or enforcement action in Spain following the final European Commission Decision in Case AT.40413 (Valve/Geo-blocking), thereby violating its obligation under Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and its duty of effective enforcement under Ley 40/2015.”

### 6. Risk Disclosure Statement Order

The court should order the CNMC to publish, within 28 days of the order, a clear “Risk Disclosure Statement” on the homepage of its official website, in its next annual report, and via a press release. This statement must:
* Acknowledge the court’s finding of unlawfulness regarding its inaction.
* Explain the risks this inaction created for Spanish consumers and the digital market (including overcharges and market fragmentation).
* Detail the concrete steps the CNMC is taking to remediate the situation and prevent its recurrence.

### 7. Assessment & Publicity of Risk

The FOI letters explicitly seek evidence of any internal risk assessment conducted by the CNMC regarding the legal risks of its inaction[reference:11]. If such assessments exist but were not made public, this demonstrates a failure of transparency and accountability. If no such assessment was conducted prior to or during years of inaction following a major EU decision, this is a profound failure of governance and due diligence, forming a further ground for criticism and underscoring the irrationality of the DORCAP.

### 8. Responsible Parties & Individual Liability

The **Directorate of Competition** within the CNMC, and ultimately its **President**, bear responsibility for the strategic enforcement decisions and omissions. The case file indicates that no “acción de regreso” (action to reclaim liability from officials) has been initiated, and there is no record of disciplinary investigations or proceedings against CNMC officials for this inaction[reference:12].

Given the scale of the diffuse harm, the absence of any individual accountability is notable. It is strongly recommended to:
(a) Pursue lines of inquiry to identify the officials responsible for the decision-making.
(b) Argue for contributorily liability in any connected tort claim (e.g., misfeasance).
(c) Seek a court declaration that the conduct warrants disciplinary investigation by the relevant superior authority.

### 9. Tort Damages & Remediation Project

**Estimated Aggregate Tort Damages:** While precise quantification requires expert evidence, the scale of harm provides a basis for estimation. For the geo-blocking infringement, the EC imposed fines totalling €7.8 million[reference:13], which serves as a conservative proxy for the scale of anti-competitive harm. For the ongoing excessive commissions, the annual impact in Spain is estimated at up to €50 million[reference:14]. A credible aggregate claim could be in the range of tens to hundreds of millions of euros, accounting for multi-year impacts.

**Distribution Mechanism & Remediation Project:** Given the diffuse nature of the victim class (millions of consumers and numerous developers), a direct compensation scheme may be impracticable. Instead, damages recovered should be paid into a specially constituted **Digital Market Remediation Trust**.

This trust should fund specific projects that benefit the injured class and create positive externalities, such as:
1. A **Spanish Independent Developer Grant Scheme**, providing funding, mentorship, and legal support to indie developers harmed by restrictive platform practices.
2. A **Digital Consumer Education and Advocacy Fund**, to empower Spanish consumers on digital rights and market fairness.

This approach provides meaningful, collective remediation, deters future misconduct, and generates spillover benefits for market innovation and consumer welfare, aligning perfectly with the public interest goals of the litigation.

 

17DEC

FOIS

Here are the four customised FOI letters, adapted from your “SuperFOI” model to address the specific duties and competences of each target body regarding the Valve/Geo-blocking case.

1. LETTER TO THE CNMC (REGULATOR)

Focus: The “Omission” to enforce follow-on actions after EC Decision AT.40413.

[Copy and Paste into Transparency Portal / Email]

Para: Unidad de Transparencia / Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC)

Email: transparencia@cnmc.es

Asunto: Solicitud de Acceso a Información Pública – Evidencias sobre [Caso Valve/Geo-blocking y AT.40413] y Análisis de Responsabilidad Patrimonial por Omisión

Escribo en nombre de Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO.uk), una organización benéfica dedicada a la protección del Interés Público General (Wider Public Interest) y del consumidor digital. Intervenimos en fallos regulatorios donde el daño es difuso y existe un “vacío de ejecución” (enforcement vacuum) porque ninguna víctima individual tiene incentivos financieros para litigar.

Esta solicitud se realiza para evaluar si el DORCAP (Decisión, Omisión, Regulación, Conducta, Acción o Política) referenciado —específicamente la omisión de actuaciones de oficio en España tras la Decisión de la Comisión Europea en el asunto AT.40413 (Valve/Geo-blocking)— cumple los criterios de intervención por quiebra de la tutela administrativa efectiva. Buscamos verificar si existen indicios de ultra vires por incumplimiento del Reglamento (CE) 1/2003, mala fe o falta de evaluación de riesgos.

Al amparo de la Ley 19/2013, de transparencia, acceso a la información pública y buen gobierno, solicito la siguiente información en formato electrónico:

PARTE 1: ESTABLECIMIENTO DEL “VACÍO DE EJECUCIÓN” (Datos de Locus Standi)

Para confirmar la legitimación de COCOO, requerimos evidencia de daños difusos.

  • Quejas Recibidas: Desglose el número de denuncias, escritos o consultas recibidas en los últimos 5 años relacionadas con “Valve Corporation”, “Steam”, “geo-bloqueo de videojuegos” o “comisiones excesivas en tiendas de aplicaciones”, categorizadas por tipo de reclamante (ej. “Desarrollador”, “Consumidor”, “Asociación”).

  • Seguimiento de Decisiones UE: ¿Posee la CNMC algún informe interno o nota de servicio que cuantifique el impacto en el mercado español de la conducta sancionada en la Decisión AT.40413 (multa de enero 2021)? Si la respuesta es negativa, confírmelo explícitamente, pues acreditaría el vacío de supervisión.

PARTE 2: LEGALIDAD Y RIESGO (Controles de Gobernanza)

Para evaluar los fundamentos de una reclamación por inactividad administrativa.

  • Evaluación de Riesgo Ultra Vires: Por favor, revele la existencia (y, si no es reservado, un resumen) de cualquier informe jurídico o entrada en el Registro de Riesgos que alertara sobre el riesgo legal de no abrir expediente sancionador nacional tras una decisión de infracción de la Comisión Europea que confirma efectos en el Espacio Económico Europeo (incluida España). ¿Advirtió la Asesoría Jurídica sobre la posible responsabilidad patrimonial por “falta de servicio” al no facilitar la reclamación de daños (follow-on) a los consumidores españoles?

PARTE 3: CIRCUNSTANCIAS ESPECÍFICAS – LA TRAMPA DEL “REGRESO”

Para reunir evidencia clave sobre la falta de recuperación de fondos públicos en casos de negligencia regulatoria.

Solicito que se confirme si este organismo ha incoado alguna vez el ‘Procedimiento de exigencia de la responsabilidad a las autoridades y personal’ (Acción de Regreso) conforme al Artículo 36 de la Ley 40/2015, frente a funcionarios o consejeros por omisiones graves en la aplicación del Derecho de la Competencia que derivaran en sentencias condenatorias contra la Administración. En concreto:

  1. Indique el número de expedientes de regreso iniciados en la historia de la CNMC (o desde 2013) frente al número total de pagos por Responsabilidad Patrimonial realizados.

  2. Si la respuesta es ‘ninguno’, confirme si existe una instrucción interna o práctica administrativa de no ejecutar estas acciones.

PARTE 4: ASPECTOS SISTÉMICOS Y PISTA DE AUDITORÍA

  1. Auditoría Interna: Facilite los títulos de los informes de auditoría o control interno emitidos en los últimos 3 años que hayan analizado la “eficacia de la aplicación de la normativa de competencia en mercados digitales” o los procedimientos de coordinación con la Red Europea de Competencia (ECN).

Asesoramiento y Asistencia

Si determina que esta solicitud excede los límites de coste o requiere subsanación, le ruego me contacte inmediatamente conforme a su deber de asistencia.

Atentamente,

Oscar Moya LLedo

Solicitor, COCOO.uk

2. LETTER TO MINISTERIO DE ECONOMÍA, COMERCIO Y EMPRESA

Focus: Supervisory failure regarding Market Unity and transposition of EU damages rules.

[Copy and Paste into Transparency Portal / Email]

Para: Unidad de Transparencia / Ministerio de Economía, Comercio y Empresa

Email: transparencia.mineco@economia.gob.es

Asunto: Solicitud de Acceso a Información Pública – Evidencias sobre [Fragmentación del Mercado Digital/Caso Valve] y Responsabilidad por Falta de Supervisión

Escribo en nombre de Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO.uk), una organización benéfica dedicada a la protección del Interés Público General y la integridad del mercado único.

Esta solicitud se realiza para evaluar el DORCAP relativo a la falta de supervisión ministerial sobre la fragmentación del mercado digital en España, evidenciada por la práctica de geo-blocking sancionada por la UE (Caso AT.40413), y la ausencia de mecanismos efectivos para la reparación de daños (Directiva de Daños).

Al amparo de la Ley 19/2013, solicito:

PARTE 1: ESTABLECIMIENTO DEL “VACÍO DE EJECUCIÓN”

  • Impacto Económico: ¿Dispone el Ministerio de algún informe, nota técnica o estudio realizado por la Secretaría de Estado de Digitalización o la de Economía que analice el “sobrecoste para el consumidor español” derivado de las restricciones territoriales (geo-blocking) en bienes digitales (videojuegos/software) en los últimos 5 años?

  • Monitorización de Precios: Confirme si existen datos o informes sobre la disparidad de precios de software entre España y otros estados miembros de la UE monitorizados por este Ministerio.

PARTE 2: LEGALIDAD Y RIESGO

  • Evaluación de Riesgo de Infracción UE: Revele la existencia de cualquier informe o comunicación interna que alerte sobre el riesgo de procedimientos de infracción contra el Reino de España por la incorrecta o insuficiente aplicación práctica del Reglamento (UE) 2018/302 (Geo-blocking) o la Directiva de Daños en el sector digital. ¿Se ha evaluado el riesgo de que la inacción de la CNMC en este ámbito genere responsabilidad subsidiaria del Estado?

PARTE 3: CIRCUNSTANCIAS ESPECÍFICAS – LA TRAMPA DEL “REGRESO”

Solicito confirmación sobre la Acción de Regreso (Art. 36 Ley 40/2015):

  1. Indique si el Ministerio ha incoado alguna vez expedientes de regreso contra altos cargos por negligencia en la transposición de directivas europeas o en la supervisión de reguladores independientes que derivase en multas o sanciones al Reino de España.

  2. Si la respuesta es cero, explique si existe justificación normativa para esta omisión sistémica.

PARTE 4: ASPECTOS SISTÉMICOS

  1. Informes al Consejo de Ministros: Facilite los títulos (y fechas) de cualquier informe elevado al Consejo de Ministros en los últimos 3 años sobre “competencia en mercados digitales” o “protección del usuario ante plataformas dominantes”.

Atentamente,

Oscar Moya LLedo

Solicitor, COCOO.uk

3. LETTER TO MINISTERIO DE DERECHOS SOCIALES, CONSUMO Y AGENDA 2030 (D.G. CONSUMO)

Focus: Failure to protect consumers from proven infringements (Geo-blocking).

[Copy and Paste into Transparency Portal / Email]

Para: Unidad de Transparencia / Ministerio de Derechos Sociales, Consumo y Agenda 2030

Email: transparencia@consumo.gob.es

Asunto: Solicitud de Acceso a Información Pública – Evidencias sobre [Indefensión del Consumidor en Caso Valve] y Omisión de Acciones Colectivas

Escribo en nombre de COCOO.uk, organización benéfica dedicada a la protección del consumidor.

Evaluamos el DORCAP consistente en la omisión del Ministerio de ejercitar sus competencias para la defensa colectiva de los consumidores afectados por infracciones de competencia confirmadas (Caso Valve/Steam), dejando a los usuarios españoles en indefensión frente a daños masivos de bajo valor individual.

Al amparo de la Ley 19/2013, solicito:

PARTE 1: ESTABLECIMIENTO DEL “VACÍO DE EJECUCIÓN”

  • Reclamaciones: Número de reclamaciones recibidas en los últimos 5 años referentes a “Steam”, “tiendas de videojuegos digitales” o “precios abusivos en software”.

  • Actuaciones de Oficio: ¿Ha iniciado la Dirección General de Consumo alguna investigación o requerimiento de información a Valve Corporation tras la publicación de la Sanción de la Comisión Europea de 2021 por geo-bloqueo injustificado? Una respuesta negativa confirmaría el vacío de protección.

PARTE 2: LEGALIDAD Y RIESGO

  • Análisis Jurídico de Legitimación: ¿Existe algún dictamen jurídico interno sobre la viabilidad de que el Ministerio (o el Instituto Nacional del Consumo) ejercite acciones de cesación o resarcimiento en nombre de los consumidores afectados por el cártel de geo-blocking de Valve? Si se decidió no actuar, solicito acceso a la nota o informe que justifique la no intervención (“Rationale for Inaction”).

PARTE 3: CIRCUNSTANCIAS ESPECÍFICAS – LA TRAMPA DEL “REGRESO”

Sobre la Acción de Regreso (Art. 36 Ley 40/2015):

  1. Confirme si se ha exigido responsabilidad alguna vez a funcionarios por la prescripción de acciones de defensa del consumidor que hayan causado un perjuicio al erario o a la colectividad.

PARTE 4: ASPECTOS SISTÉMICOS

  1. Estudios de Mercado: Títulos de cualquier estudio financiado por el Ministerio sobre “perjuicio del consumidor en el mercado único digital” o “cajas de botín (loot boxes) y prácticas abusivas en videojuegos” desde 2021.

Atentamente,

Oscar Moya LLedo

Solicitor, COCOO.uk

4. LETTER TO OIReScon (OFICINA INDEPENDIENTE DE REGULACIÓN Y SUPERVISIÓN DE LA CONTRATACIÓN)

Focus: Public Procurement Integrity – Contracting with sanctioned entities.

[Copy and Paste into Transparency Portal / Email]

Para: Unidad de Transparencia / OIReScon (Ministerio de Hacienda)

Email: oirescon@hacienda.gob.es

Asunto: Solicitud de Acceso a Información Pública – Evidencias sobre [Contratación con Empresas Sancionadas/Caso Valve] y Fallos de Compliance

Escribo en nombre de COCOO.uk.

Evaluamos el DORCAP relativo a la falta de mecanismos efectivos para detectar y excluir de la contratación pública a operadores económicos sancionados por infracciones graves de competencia (como el caso Valve/Bandai Namco/Capcom sancionados por la UE), vulnerando el principio de integridad en la contratación.

Al amparo de la Ley 19/2013, solicito:

PARTE 1: ESTABLECIMIENTO DEL “VACÍO DE EJECUCIÓN”

  • Base de Datos de Prohibiciones: Confirme si Valve Corporation o alguna de las editoras sancionadas en la Decisión AT.40413 (Bandai Namco, Capcom, Focus Home, Koch Media, ZeniMax) han sido inscritas en el Registro Oficial de Licitadores y Empresas Clasificadas del Estado (ROLECE) con alguna anotación de prohibición de contratar derivada de dicha sanción de competencia.

  • Adjudicaciones: ¿Tiene constancia OIReScon de contratos públicos adjudicados a estas empresas (o sus filiales en España) con posterioridad a enero de 2021?

PARTE 2: LEGALIDAD Y RIESGO

  • Protocolos de Detección: Revele la existencia de cualquier guía, instrucción o protocolo interno dirigido a los órganos de contratación sobre cómo verificar si un licitador ha sido sancionado por la Comisión Europea (y no solo por la CNMC). ¿Existe un análisis de riesgos sobre la “falta de interoperabilidad” entre las sanciones de la UE y el sistema de contratación español?

PARTE 3: CIRCUNSTANCIAS ESPECÍFICAS – LA TRAMPA DEL “REGRESO”

Sobre la Acción de Regreso (Art. 36 Ley 40/2015):

  1. Indique si OIReScon ha instado o tiene constancia de que se haya incoado alguna acción de regreso contra órganos de contratación que adjudicaron contratos a empresas incursas en prohibición de contratar por infracción de competencia.

PARTE 4: ASPECTOS SISTÉMICOS

  1. Informes de Supervisión: Facilite los títulos de los Informes Anuales de Supervisión de los últimos 3 años que contengan capítulos específicos sobre “cumplimiento de normas de competencia” o “colusión en licitaciones TIC/Digitales”.

Atentamente,

Oscar Moya LLedo

Solicitor, COCOO.uk

As the solicitor for COCOO.UK, I have reviewed the case file, the associated evidence, and the wider legal context regarding the Valve Corporation matter.

Below is the analysis applied separately to each Cause of Action (COA), incorporating the specific details from our case files (16dec-esp-valve, proyecto-de-contratacion-publica, etc.) and the wider public record (“WWW INFO”).

COA 1: UNJUSTIFIED GEO-BLOCKING (Article 101 TFEU / Regulation (EU) 2018/302)

The core claim regarding the restriction of cross-border sales of activation keys.

1. IDENTIFY ALL PROVEN FOIGs (Findings of Infringement by Private Companies)

  • Proven FOIG: There is a definitive, proven finding of infringement.

    • Decision: European Commission Decision in Case AT.40413 (issued 20 January 2021).

    • Details: The Commission found that Valve Corporation and five publishers (Bandai Namco, Capcom, Focus Home, Koch Media, and ZeniMax) illegally restricted cross-border sales of PC video games based on the geographical location of users (geo-blocking).

    • Outcome: Valve was fined €1.624 million. The General Court of the EU upheld this decision in 2023 after Valve’s appeal was dismissed.

    • Status: This is a “follow-on” claim basis because the infringement is already proven by a regulator.

2. IDENTIFY POSSIBILITIES OF ULTRAVIRES/UNLAWFUL DORCAP FROM THE REGULATOR

  • DORCAP Identification: The alleged unlawful act/omission is the CNMC’s (Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia) failure to initiate follow-on investigations or enforcement actions in Spain following the 2021 EC decision.

    • Ultravires Argument: Our case file argues this omission violates Ley 40/2015 (duty of public bodies to act) and Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (duty to apply EU competition law effectively). We argue the CNMC has “omitted to quantify damages” for Spanish consumers despite the proven EU-level infringement.

  • Judicial Review Status:

    • Was it reviewed? No definitive judicial review judgment exists yet.

    • Current Status: As of late 2025, COCOO is “actively appealing” the CNMC’s initial refusal to act. The case file notes that a judicial review (recurso contencioso-administrativo) “remains timely” for these ongoing administrative omissions.

3. STATE REDRESS, DISCIPLINARY ACTION, OR REGRESO?

  • State Redress: No. The State (Spain) has not paid any redress, fine, or compensation to victims. The fines collected by the EC (€7.8m total) went to the EU budget, not to victims.

  • Disciplinary/Regreso: No. There has been no disciplinary investigation into CNMC officials for this inaction, nor any “acción de regreso” (the administration claiming liability back from negligent officials). Public record confirms that the acción de regreso is statistically almost never exercised by the Spanish administration.

DATES AND TIME LIMITS TO CLAIM:

  • Start Date: The clock started upon the finalization of the infringement decision. With the General Court upholding the decision in 2023, the “knowledge” requirement is definitively met.

  • Limitation Period: 5 Years (under Royal Decree-Law 9/2017 transposing the EU Damages Directive).

  • Deadline: Claimants likely have until 2028 (5 years post-2023 judgment) to file damages claims.

COA 2: EXCESSIVE COMMISSIONS & PLATFORM PARITY (Abuse of Dominance – Article 102 TFEU)

The claim regarding the 30% “Steam Tax” and “Most Favored Nation” (MFN) clauses preventing lower prices elsewhere.

1. IDENTIFY ALL PROVEN FOIGs

  • Proven FOIG: None yet.

    • Unlike the geo-blocking case, there is no final regulatory decision from the EC or CNMC declaring Valve’s 30% commission or parity clauses to be an infringement.

    • Status: These are alleged infringements.

    • Evidence: The case relies on “stand-alone” actions (where we must prove the infringement ourselves) or parallel foreign proceedings (e.g., the UK Class Action certified in 2024 and the US Wolfire Games litigation). These are essentially “evidence,” not binding “FOIGs” in Spain yet.

2. IDENTIFY POSSIBILITIES OF ULTRAVIRES/UNLAWFUL DORCAP FROM THE REGULATOR

  • DORCAP Identification: The CNMC’s refusal to investigate complaints lodged by Spanish developer associations (referenced in our files as occurring in May 2025).

    • Ultravires Argument: We argue the CNMC is acting ultra vires by deferring to private enforcement (lawsuits) rather than fulfilling its public duty to investigate obvious market distortions, potentially violating Article 2 LDC (Spanish Competition Act).

  • Judicial Review Status:

    • Was it reviewed? No.

    • Current Status: This would require a fresh challenge to the CNMC’s rejection of the May 2025 complaints.

3. STATE REDRESS, DISCIPLINARY ACTION, OR REGRESO?

  • State Redress: No. Neither the State nor Valve has paid compensation to Spanish developers/consumers for this specific COA.

  • Disciplinary/Regreso: No.

DATES AND TIME LIMITS TO CLAIM:

  • Start Date: For a “stand-alone” claim, the limitation period begins when the harm ceased or the victim knew of the harm. Since the conduct (commissions) is ongoing, the damage is continuous.

  • Limitation Period: 5 Years (Royal Decree-Law 9/2017).

  • Deadline: Rolling deadline. Victims can claim for damages suffered in the last 5 years from the date of filing.

COA 3: ADMINISTRATIVE INACTION / STATE LIABILITY (Ley 40/2015)

The claim against the Spanish State for failing to protect consumers/market integrity.

1. IDENTIFY ALL PROVEN FOIGs

  • N/A. This COA targets the Public Body (CNMC), not a private company. The underlying “FOIG” is the Geo-blocking decision (COA 1) which triggered the duty to act.

2. IDENTIFY POSSIBILITIES OF ULTRAVIRES/UNLAWFUL DORCAP FROM THE REGULATOR

  • DORCAP Identification: The total passivity of the CNMC regarding the digital market fragmentation confirmed by the EC.

  • Judicial Review Status:

    • Was it reviewed? Not yet.

    • Strategy: Our file suggests a “Rolling Judicial Review” strategy. In Spanish administrative law, inaction (inactividad) can be challenged at any time while it persists.

    • Probability: Our internal assessment rates the locus standi success at 40-60%.

3. STATE REDRESS, DISCIPLINARY ACTION, OR REGRESO?

  • State Redress: No. There are no records of the Spanish State settling liability claims (Responsabilidad Patrimonial) related to competition enforcement failures in this sector.

  • Disciplinary/Regreso: No.

DATES AND TIME LIMITS TO CLAIM:

  • Limitation Period: 1 Year for Responsabilidad Patrimonial (State Liability) claims from the moment the “determinant fact” (the injury caused by administration) happens or manifests.

  • Deadline: If arguing “continuous inaction,” the deadline remains open. However, if tied to a specific rejection of a complaint, the claim must be filed within 1 year of that rejection.

SUMMARY TABLE

COA Proven FOIG? Regulator DORCAP? Judicially Reviewed? State Redress/Regreso? Claim Deadline (Approx)
Geo-blocking YES (EC Dec. AT.40413) Yes (Inaction on follow-up) No (In process) No / No ~2028 (5 yrs from 2023 appeal outcome)
Commissions/Parity NO (Alleged) Yes (Refusal to probe) No No / No Rolling (Ongoing harm)
State Liability N/A YES (The COA itself) No No / No 1 Year from rejection/act

 

16DEC

Subcase: Geo-blocking.

Possible causes of action include violations of Article 101 TFEU and Article 1 of Ley 15/2007 de Defensa de la Competencia through anti-competitive agreements restricting cross-border sales, Regulation (EU) 2018/302 on unjustified geo-blocking, and tort claims for inducing breach of contract or unlawful means conspiracy leading to economic harms like overcharges and market segmentation.

Related decisions: The European Commission’s 2021 infringement decision in Case AT.40413 found Valve and publishers guilty of geo-blocking, imposing fines totaling 7.8 million euros and confirming market fragmentation in the EU, including Spain.

Related omissions: Valve omitted to ensure unrestricted cross-border access in its Steam activation keys, allowing price disparities such as 20 percent higher prices in Spain compared to Germany; the CNMC omitted to initiate follow-on investigations post-2021 despite evidence of ongoing harms under Ley 40/2015.

Related regulations: Article 101 TFEU prohibiting anti-competitive agreements, Article 1 LDC as its Spanish transposition, and Regulation (EU) 2018/302 mandating no unjustified geo-restrictions on digital content.

Related conducts: Valve engaged in geo-blocking by restricting Steam key activations based on geography at the request of publishers, preventing consumers from accessing lower prices across EU states.

Related actions: Valve implemented agreements with publishers like Bandai Namco and Capcom to enforce geo-restrictions, while the CNMC took no enforcement actions despite complaints from Spanish developer associations in May 2025.

Related policies: Valve’s Steam Distribution Agreement policy included terms enabling geo-blocking to maintain regional pricing, contradicting EU single market policies on free movement of goods and services.

Subcase: Excessive commissions.

Possible causes of action include abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU and Article 2 LDC for supracompetitive 30 percent commissions leading to inflated prices and reduced margins, unfair commercial practices under Regulation (EU) 2018/302, and tort claims for economic interference causing developer revenue losses estimated at up to 50 million euros annually in Spain.

Related decisions: The European Commission’s ongoing scrutiny of platform fees under the Digital Markets Act as reported in June 2025, paralleling the 2021 decision’s findings on Valve’s market power.

Related omissions: Valve omitted transparency on commission cost breakdowns and their impact on developers, failing to adjust fees despite developer protests in July 2025; regulators like the CNMC omitted assessments of these fees as excessive post-2021.

Related regulations: Article 102 TFEU and Article 2 LDC prohibiting abuse through excessive pricing, with the Digital Markets Act requiring fair fee structures for gatekeepers.

Related conducts: Valve consistently charged 30 percent commissions on sales and in-game transactions, passing costs to developers and consumers via higher prices.

Related actions: Valve enforced these commissions through its platform terms, while Spanish indie developers reported 15 percent margin reductions in X posts from June 2025.

Related policies: Valve’s internal policy of financial independence allowed maintenance of high commissions without external pressure, while EU policies on digital market fairness aim to prevent such supracompetitive fees.

Subcase: Platform parity obligations.

Possible causes of action include abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU and Article 2 LDC for restricting price competition on rival platforms, tort claims for inducing breach of contract by preventing lower pricing elsewhere, and violations of Regulation (EU) 2018/302 through unfair terms.

Related decisions: A Spanish developer association’s complaint to the CNMC in May 2025 highlighted parity clauses as restrictive, building on the UK class action’s certification in 2024 for similar abuses.

Related omissions: Valve omitted to allow flexible pricing on competitors like Epic Games Store, foreclosing market entry; the CNMC omitted to investigate these obligations despite their link to the 2021 geo-blocking decision.

Related regulations: Article 102 TFEU and Article 2 LDC against exclusionary practices, with EU guidelines on vertical restraints prohibiting broad parity clauses.

Related conducts: Valve imposed contractual obligations in its Steam agreements requiring uniform pricing across platforms, stifling competition.

Related actions: Valve included these clauses in distribution agreements with developers, leading to reported losses for Spanish studios as per indie developer testimonies in 2025.

Related policies: Valve’s policy of platform-centric control reinforced parity to protect Steam’s dominance, contrasting with EU competition policies promoting multi-platform price flexibility.

Subcase: Tying and anti-steering.

Possible causes of action include abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU and Article 2 LDC for tying services like in-game payments to Steam’s system, unfair practices under Regulation (EU) 2018/302, and tort claims for economic harms from restricted payment options.

Related decisions: The European Commission’s potential investigation into digital tying practices as mentioned in June 2025 X posts, extending from the 2021 decision’s market dominance findings.

Related omissions: Valve omitted alternatives for payment processing, forcing exclusive use of its system; regulators omitted scrutiny of these ties in follow-on actions.

Related regulations: Article 102 TFEU prohibiting tying that forecloses competition, Article 2 LDC as equivalent, and Digital Markets Act rules on self-preferencing.

Related conducts: Valve required all in-game transactions and DLC sales through its payment infrastructure, preventing cheaper alternatives.

Related actions: Valve enforced anti-steering clauses in agreements, while consumer forums in June 2025 reported frustrations over restricted access.

Related policies: Valve’s ecosystem policy tied services to maintain revenue streams, while EU policies under the DMA seek to untie such practices for fair competition.

Subcase: Administrative inaction by regulators.

Possible causes of action include claims under Ley 40/2015 for failure to enforce competition laws post-2021 EC decision, potential state liability for negligence in protecting consumers and markets, and tort claims for harms arising from regulatory omissions.

Related decisions: The CNMC’s initial refusal to investigate COCOO’s complaints, with an appeal under review as of 2025.

Related omissions: The CNMC omitted to quantify damages or pursue follow-on enforcement despite the 2021 EC infringement, leaving harms unaddressed.

Related regulations: Ley 40/2015 requiring public bodies to act on legal duties, Article 265 TFEU for failure to act at EU level, and LDC provisions for national enforcement of EU decisions.

Related conducts: Regulators like the CNMC engaged in passive conduct by not initiating probes into Valve’s practices.

Related actions: The CNMC declined action citing no new facts, while the Ministry of Economy was contacted but provided no detailed responses.

Related policies: Spanish public sector policies under Ley 40/2015 emphasize duty to protect markets, but implementation gaps allowed inaction.

Subcase: Killer acquisitions.

Possible causes of action include abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU and Article 2 LDC if acquisitions eliminate competition without notification, and potential tort claims for market foreclosure harms.

Related decisions: No specific decisions noted, but emerging EC scrutiny of unreported acquisitions in digital markets as per 2025 reports.

Related omissions: Valve omitted to report potential acquisitions since 2015 that could consolidate dominance; regulators omitted merger reviews.

Related regulations: Article 102 TFEU against abusive acquisitions, EU Merger Regulation for notification thresholds.

Related conducts: Valve potentially conducted acquisitions to remove rivals, though evidence is emerging.

Related actions: No detailed actions specified, but searches for unreported deals are proposed to substantiate claims.

Related policies: Valve’s growth policy may include strategic acquisitions, while EU policies require transparency to prevent anti-competitive consolidation.

Subcase: Geo-blocking.

Relevant regulations with high probability of being ultra vires: Regulation (EU) 2018/302 on addressing unjustified geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on customers’ nationality, place of residence or place of establishment within the internal market, as transposed into Spanish law. This regulation mandates no unjustified geo-restrictions on digital content, but the CNMC’s application or enforcement may be ultra vires if it omits to pursue follow-on actions post-2021 EC decision without sufficient justification, exceeding its discretion under Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the implementation of competition rules, which requires national competition authorities to apply EU competition law effectively. Since harms like price disparities (e.g., 20 percent higher in Spain) are ongoing, judicial review remains timely under Article 265 TFEU for failure to act or under Ley 40/2015 for administrative omissions, allowing challenges to CNMC’s inaction as beyond its powers.

Relevant policies with high probability of being ultra vires: CNMC’s internal enforcement policy requiring “new facts” for national investigations following an EC infringement decision, as this may contradict its duty under Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 to not take decisions running counter to EC findings, potentially rendering it ultra vires by undermining effective EU law application. Ongoing market fragmentation supports timely judicial review via national courts or ECJ referral to establish liabilities for unaddressed tort harms like overcharges.

Subcase: Excessive commissions.

Relevant regulations with high probability of being ultra vires: Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, transposed into Spanish law via Royal Decree-Law 9/2017. The CNMC’s omission to quantify damages or initiate probes into Valve’s 30 percent commissions as excessive pricing may be ultra vires if it fails to fulfill its obligation under Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU where trade between Member States is affected, exceeding its procedural discretion. With ongoing harms like developer margin reductions (e.g., 15 percent losses reported in 2025), judicial review is viable under Ley 40/2015 for state liability in omissions.

Relevant policies with high probability of being ultra vires: CNMC’s policy of deferring to private enforcement without active oversight of platform fees, potentially ultra vires under the Digital Markets Act (Regulation (EU) 2022/1925) guidelines on fair fee structures for gatekeeper-like platforms, as this may ignore its duty to prevent abuse of dominance, allowing challenges since harms persist.

Subcase: Platform parity obligations.

Relevant regulations with high probability of being ultra vires: Regulation (EU) 2018/302, specifically its provisions on unfair commercial terms in vertical agreements, as CNMC’s failure to investigate parity clauses post-EC decision could be ultra vires by breaching Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, which empowers NCAs to require cessation of infringements. Ongoing foreclosure of competitors (e.g., reported losses for Spanish studios in 2025) ensures judicial review timeliness under national administrative courts.

Relevant policies with high probability of being ultra vires: CNMC’s investigative policy limiting scope to “new facts” despite links to 2021 geo-blocking findings, which may be ultra vires under EU vertical restraints guidelines (Commission Notice on vertical restraints), as it restricts multi-platform competition beyond authorized discretion.

Subcase: Tying and anti-steering.

Relevant regulations with high probability of being ultra vires: Digital Markets Act (Regulation (EU) 2022/1925), particularly Article 5 on anti-steering and self-preferencing prohibitions, where CNMC’s omission to scrutinize Valve’s payment tying could be ultra vires if it disregards its enforcement role under Article 37 of the DMA for cooperation with the EC. Persistent harms like restricted payment options support ongoing judicial review.

Relevant policies with high probability of being ultra vires: CNMC’s policy of non-intervention in digital tying without explicit complaints, potentially ultra vires under Commission guidelines on Article 102 TFEU enforcement priorities, as it may exceed limits on discretionary inaction.

Subcase: Administrative inaction by regulators.

Relevant regulations with high probability of being ultra vires: Ley 40/2015 de Régimen Jurídico del Sector Público, specifically its provisions on administrative procedure and duty to act (Articles 21-23), where CNMC’s refusal to quantify damages or enforce post-EC decision may be ultra vires by violating public sector obligations to protect markets. Also, Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 Article 35 on NCA designation and powers, if inaction undermines EU competition enforcement. Ongoing unaddressed harms enable judicial review, as seen in Spanish High Court annulments of CNMC decisions in 2022-2025 for similar procedural flaws.

Relevant policies with high probability of being ultra vires: CNMC’s policy on complaint handling requiring “irreparable harm” or “desamparo” for standing under Article 47 LDC, which may be ultra vires if it overly restricts access to remedies contrary to Directive 2014/104/EU’s aim to facilitate damage actions, allowing challenges amid continuing regulatory gaps.

Subcase: Killer acquisitions.

Relevant regulations with high probability of being ultra vires: Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (EU Merger Regulation), where CNMC’s omission to review unreported acquisitions below thresholds could be ultra vires under Article 22 referrals if it fails to address anti-competitive effects in digital markets. Ongoing market consolidation supports timely judicial review.

Relevant policies with high probability of being ultra vires: CNMC’s merger scrutiny policy focusing only on notified deals, potentially ultra vires under EC guidelines on Article 102 TFEU abusive acquisitions, as it may ignore duties to prevent foreclosure.

None of the identified DORCAPs are within the 3-month time limit to start judicial review in Spain’s contentious-administrative jurisdiction, which parallels UK judicial review and is typically handled by the Audiencia Nacional for acts of national authorities like the CNMC, with potential cassation appeals to the Tribunal Supremo. The most recent DORCAPs, such as CNMC’s refusal to investigate complaints from May 2025 and related omissions in June-July 2025, occurred more than 3 months before December 16, 2025.

Yes, there are older DORCAPs than 3 months where the tort or contractual harm is ongoing today, such as CNMC’s post-2021 omissions to enforce follow-on investigations under Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and Ley 40/2015, leading to persistent consumer overcharges from geo-blocking and developer losses from excessive commissions and parity obligations. A rolling judicial review could apply in this case for ongoing omissions or continuous breaches, as Spanish law allows challenges to administrative inaction at any time while the duty remains unfulfilled, potentially establishing liabilities for negligence or abuse of power to enable victim compensation.

The only closed case directly related to Valve’s geo-blocking practices is the European Commission’s 2021 decision (Case AT.40413), which imposed fines totaling €7.8 million on Valve (€1.624 million) and five publishers (Bandai Namco, Capcom, Focus Home, Koch Media, and ZeniMax) for breaching EU antitrust rules through geo-blocked Steam activation keys restricting cross-border sales. Valve’s appeal was dismissed by the EU General Court in 2023, upholding the fine. The publishers cooperated for reduced fines, but no victim compensation or cy-près was awarded; payments were penalties to the EU budget.

No settlements, arbitrations, or claims have resulted in compensation payments to victims in this case or tangentially related matters like excessive commissions or platform parity.

Ongoing tangential actions include a UK collective claim filed in 2024 seeking £656 million for alleged overcharging of 14 million UK users due to Steam’s dominance and pricing restraints, a US developer class action (Wolfire Games v. Valve) certified in 2025 alleging supracompetitive commissions, and related US consumer mass arbitrations, but none have reached settlement or compensation outcomes.

No instances were found where the Spanish government, CNMC, or any state entity paid compensation or penalties for antitrust enforcement failures or inaction related to this case. Spanish law allows state liability claims for regulatory omissions under Ley 40/2015, but no such paid claims exist here. The CNMC has not imposed or faced fines in Valve-related matters beyond the EU-level geo-blocking case.

The probability that COCOO.uk may be granted locus standi (legitimación activa) to start a judicial review (recurso contencioso-administrativo) for the identified opportunities in this case, particularly challenges to CNMC inaction or omissions in enforcing competition rules post-2021 EC decision, is approximately 40-60 percent, depending on how courts assess the alignment of COCOO’s statutory purposes with consumer protection in digital markets and competition harms like overcharges or developer losses.

Spanish law under Article 19 of Ley 29/1998 requires a derecho subjetivo or interés legítimo for individuals/entities, and for associations, proof that they are affected or legally habilitated to defend collective interests, with courts rejecting mere statutory self-attribution or abstract legality defense as insufficient. COCOO, as a consumer organisation focused on competition harms, could argue an interés legítimo colectivo in protecting consumers/competitors from ongoing tort harms, similar to recognised standing for consumer associations in diffuse interest cases under TRLGDCU, but success varies as courts demand specific connection to the matter, not general advocacy.

Locus standi is not easier if challenging secondary legislation (regulations, real decretos, or policies) rather than a decision or action. Article 19 LJCA applies the same interés legítimo requirement across challenges to disposiciones generales, acts, or inactions, with no differentiated ease for normative challenges; courts scrutinise association standing strictly in all cases, often denying it for diffuse or non-specific interests unless explicitly habilitated by law (e.g., environment or specific consumer statutes).

Yes, it is possible to force the CNMC to make a reviewable decision by sending a formal requerimiento or solicitud (e.g., via pre-action letter requesting public notice of UV risks, tort harms, or enforcement action), potentially under Ley 39/2015 procedures or as a complaint under LDC. If the CNMC responds expressly (e.g., denying the request) or remains silent (creating acto presunto), this produces a challengeable act, allowing COCOO to seek judicial review of that decision/inaction under Articles 25-29 LJCA. This strategy creates a concrete DORCAP for review, potentially strengthening standing arguments tied to the response, and serves as a mechanism to publicise risks via proceedings, though courts may still examine if COCOO has sufficient interés legítimo and could reject if viewed as contrived.

COCOO’s prior FOI requests gather evidence supporting ultra vires claims, but do not directly confer standing; they may bolster merits if a reviewable act emerges. Challenging failure to publicise UV risks and foreseeable tort harms could frame CNMC omissions as breach of duties under Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 or Ley 40/2015, potentially establishing fiduciary-like liabilities for bad faith inaction enabling victim harms, though Spanish law rarely imposes personal fiduciary duties on regulators absent proven negligence.

Subcase: Geo-blocking.

The probability that the CNMC’s application or enforcement of Regulation (EU) 2018/302 is ultra vires is 35 percent. Courts grant national competition authorities discretion in enforcement priorities under Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, and inaction alone rarely qualifies as exceeding powers unless proven arbitrary or contrary to EC decisions; here, post-2021 omissions lack explicit mandate for mandatory follow-on actions, reducing ultra vires likelihood despite ongoing harms.

The probability that CNMC’s internal policy requiring “new facts” for investigations is ultra vires is 45 percent. This policy risks conflicting with Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 by potentially undermining EC findings, but judicial deference to NCA discretion often upholds such criteria if not overtly contradictory.

No public notices, reports, or URLs from CNMC or other regulators disclose ultra vires risks related to these DORCAPs in Valve geo-blocking enforcement.

Subcase: Excessive commissions.

The probability that CNMC’s omission under Directive 2014/104/EU or Digital Markets Act is ultra vires is 30 percent. Enforcement discretion is broad, and Valve/Steam has not been designated a gatekeeper, limiting mandatory obligations.

The probability that CNMC’s deferral policy to private enforcement is ultra vires is 40 percent. It may strain DMA fair fee duties if applicable, but absence of gatekeeper status and general discretion lower the risk.

No public notices, reports, or URLs from CNMC disclose ultra vires risks here.

Subcase: Platform parity obligations.

The probability that CNMC’s failure to investigate parity clauses is ultra vires is 35 percent. Vertical restraints guidelines allow discretion, and links to 2021 decision do not compel action.

The probability that CNMC’s “new facts” policy is ultra vires is 45 percent, for reasons stated in geo-blocking subcase.

No public notices, reports, or URLs from CNMC disclose ultra vires risks.

Subcase: Tying and anti-steering.

The probability that CNMC’s omission under DMA Article 5 is ultra vires is 25 percent. Valve is not a designated gatekeeper, so cooperation duties under Article 37 DMA are not triggered.

The probability that CNMC’s non-intervention policy is ultra vires is 30 percent. Article 102 guidelines permit priority-based inaction.

No public notices, reports, or URLs from CNMC disclose ultra vires risks.

Subcase: Administrative inaction by regulators.

The probability that CNMC’s refusals under Ley 40/2015 or Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 are ultra vires is 50 percent. Persistent omissions post-EC decision and complaints could exceed discretion if shown to undermine EU enforcement duties, enabling stronger challenges for procedural flaws.

The probability that CNMC’s complaint handling policy (e.g., requiring irreparable harm) is ultra vires is 40 percent. It may restrict remedies contrary to Directive 2014/104/EU facilitation aims, but courts often uphold standing thresholds.

No public notices, reports, or URLs from CNMC disclose ultra vires risks in inaction or complaint policies.

Subcase: Killer acquisitions.

The probability that CNMC’s omission under EU Merger Regulation is ultra vires is 20 percent. No evidence of unreported Valve acquisitions reaching thresholds or requiring Article 22 referral.

The probability that CNMC’s merger policy is ultra vires is 25 percent. Focus on notified deals aligns with standard practice.

No public notices, reports, or URLs from CNMC disclose ultra vires risks.

Across all subcases with good ultra vires probabilities (above 30 percent), no CNMC annual reports, memorias, or public documents (2021-2025) mention ultra vires risks, mandatory assessments, or specific Valve/Steam enforcement gaps; general guides on damage quantification exist but do not address these DORCAPs or ultra vires possibilities. Absence of publication heightens tort claim risks against the State for ongoing harms from unaddressed omissions, as no constructive notice to victims could support a Violenti defence.

The probability of successfully arguing contributory liability falls primarily on the regulator/public body (CNMC) rather than the State, allowing victims to claim compensation only against the regulator and not the State, is 15 percent. Under Ley 40/2015 Articles 32-36, patrimonial responsibility is objective and attaches to the Administration (State), with subsequent reversion to negligent authorities/personnel; Spanish courts rarely isolate independent regulators like CNMC from State liability in competition inaction cases, treating omissions as State functioning harms.

In this Valve/Steam case involving ongoing harms from geo-blocking, excessive commissions, parity obligations, tying, and regulatory inaction, COCOO should propose the following customised remedies in settlement negotiations with Valve, publishers, and CNMC, or via complaints, judicial review, or private damages facilitation.

These proposals benefit Valve (avoiding or reducing fines and litigation), publishers (similar avoidance), victims (direct compensation), and CNMC (exemption from personal/state liability for ultra vires omissions by committing to enforcement and victim redress).

**Proposed undertakings and commitments from Valve (and publishers where applicable):**
Valve commits to cease all geo-blocking on Steam for EU users, allow unrestricted key activation across borders, reduce commissions to 20 percent maximum for Spanish/EU developers and sales, eliminate platform parity obligations and anti-steering clauses, and permit alternative payment systems for in-game transactions. Valve also undertakes to notify users and developers of past overcharges and provide refunds or credits.

**Fine yes/no and amounts:**
No new fine on Valve or publishers, or a symbolic reduced fine of 1-5 million euros payable only if commitments breached, in exchange for full cooperation and victim redress. This avoids full CNMC sanctions under Ley 15/2007 (up to 10 percent of turnover) while incentivising compliance.

**Injunctions:**
Mandatory injunction requiring CNMC to initiate follow-on investigation into Valve’s practices post-2021 EC decision, with cessation orders against ongoing infringements. In judicial review, seek injunction compelling CNMC to publish public notices assessing ultra vires risks and foreseeable tort harms (e.g., consumer overcharges estimated at tens of millions euros in Spain).

**Suspended quashing orders:**
In contencioso-administrativo proceedings against CNMC inactions or refusals, request quashing of refusal decisions suspended on condition that CNMC accepts commitments to quantify damages, facilitate private claims, and establish a redress scheme, avoiding full annulment if complied with.

**Cy-près proposals:**
Valve (and publishers) fund a 50-100 million euros compensation pot for unclaimed damages, distributed cy-près to Spanish consumer/developer organisations (including COCOO) for competition advocacy, digital market education, or grants to affected indie developers and consumers proving harm. Alternatively, unclaimed amounts from any class or follow-on actions revert to a CNMC-supervised fund for victim support, with COCOO administering parts for public benefit. In exchange, CNMC commits to no further enforcement against Valve and immunity from state liability claims under Ley 40/2015 for past omissions.

These proposals establish tort liabilities on CNMC for ultra vires inaction enabling harms, while providing win-win outcomes: victims receive compensation/redress, Valve avoids escalation, and CNMC evades fiduciary breach claims by proactive commitment.

Target Body 1 (The Big Decision Maker): Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC), as the primary national competition authority responsible for enforcing EU and Spanish competition rules, including follow-on actions after the 2021 European Commission decision in Case AT.40413 (Valve geo-blocking).

Target Body 2 (The Operational Arm): Ministerio de Economía, Comercio y Empresa, as the supervising ministry overseeing competition policy and digital markets.

The Issue / Case Topic: The omission or inaction by the CNMC in initiating follow-on investigations, quantifying damages, or enforcing cessation of ongoing anti-competitive practices by Valve Corporation (Steam platform) related to geo-blocking, excessive commissions, platform parity obligations, and tying/anti-steering, despite the 2021 EC infringement decision and subsequent complaints/evidence of persistent harms.

The Suspected Harm: Ongoing economic tort harms to Spanish consumers (overcharges due to market fragmentation and higher prices) and competitors/developers (reduced margins and foreclosure), enabled by regulatory omissions potentially ultra vires under Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and Ley 40/2015, with foreseeable competition distortions and unredressed victim losses.

Relevant Dates: Decisions, omissions, or inactions occurring or persisting between January 2021 and December 2025.

No specific public risk registers, board papers, or strategic risk entries identifying ultra vires risks, legal challenge risks, or inaction-related risks in competition enforcement (including Valve/Steam matters) were located in CNMC annual reports, memorias, or transparency portals for 2024-2025. CNMC transparency disclosures focus on general organisational risks or data processing activities, not enforcement-specific ultra vires or liability risks.

FOI requests under Ley 19/2013 should be submitted via the CNMC electronic seat at https://sede.cnmc.gob.es/tramites/general/transparencia or the general state portal at transparencia.gob.es for the Ministry.

**DRAFT A: The “Strategic Knowledge” Probe (Target: CNMC as Main Decision Maker)**

Oscar Moya LLedo
DNI: 11820221S
Direccion: Paseo de la chopera, 9, Madrid 28045
contact@cocoo.uk

Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia
Portal de Transparencia / Solicitud de Acceso a la Información Pública

Fecha: 16 December 2025

Asunto: Solicitud de acceso a la información pública en virtud de la Ley 19/2013, de 9 de diciembre, de transparencia, acceso a la información pública y buen gobierno

Dear Sir/Madam,

I request the following information related to any entries in the CNMC’s strategic risk register, board assurance framework, or equivalent internal risk management records concerning risks associated with enforcement inaction or omissions in competition cases involving digital platforms (such as follow-on actions after European Commission decisions under Regulation (EC) No 1/2003):

1. The title, description, risk owner, and risk ID (if any) of any such register entries existing between 2021 and 2025.

2. For each relevant entry, the movement of risk scores (inherent risk score versus residual risk score, including dates of assessments) over the period 2023 to 2025.

3. The CNMC’s risk appetite statement or tolerance levels regarding legal compliance risks or risks of ultra vires omissions in competition enforcement duties.

This request seeks only metadata and factual administrative data, not the full content of assessments.

Yours sincerely,
Oscar Moya LLedo

**DRAFT B: The “Operational Failure” Probe (Target: Ministerio de Economía, Comercio y Empresa as Supervising Body)**

Oscar Moya LLedo
DNI: 11820221S
Direccion: Paseo de la chopera, 9, Madrid 28045
contact@cocoo.uk

Ministerio de Economía, Comercio y Empresa
Solicitud de Información Pública

Fecha: 16 December 2025

Asunto: Solicitud de acceso a la información pública en virtud de la Ley 19/2013

Dear Sir/Madam,

I request the following metadata related to any impact assessments, monitoring reports, or oversight records concerning national enforcement of EU competition rules in digital markets (including potential follow-on actions post-2021 EC decisions):

1. The date created, date finalized (if applicable), and job title of the responsible officer or approver for any such assessments or reports produced between 2021 and 2025.

2. The number of months (or reporting periods) during 2023-2025 in which risks related to competition enforcement gaps in digital platforms were reported as “high” or “red” status in ministerial dashboards or oversight frameworks.

This request is limited to existence proofs and operational metadata.

Yours sincerely,
Oscar Moya LLedo

**DRAFT C: The “Systemic Flaw” Probe (Target: CNMC as Regulator)**

Oscar Moya LLedo
DNI: 11820221S
Direccion: Paseo de la chopera, 9, Madrid 28045
contact@cocoo.uk

Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia
Portal de Transparencia / Solicitud de Acceso a la Información Pública

Fecha: 16 December 2025

Asunto: Solicitud de acceso a la información pública en virtud de la Ley 19/2013

Dear Sir/Madam,

I request the following information on internal governance and training related to competition enforcement duties under EU and national law:

1. The percentage of CNMC staff (or staff in the Competition Directorate) who have received training on obligations for effective application of Articles 101/102 TFEU, Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 enforcement priorities, or risks of ultra vires omissions, as recorded in the last two years (2023-2025).

2. A list of titles (only) of any internal audit reports or reviews commissioned between 2023 and 2025 concerning competition enforcement procedures, complaint handling, or follow-on investigations in digital markets.

This focuses on training data and audit titles only.

Yours sincerely,
Oscar Moya LLedo

These questions trap the authority because: If they confirm the existence of high/red risk entries, worsening scores, or low training percentages without corresponding action, it evidences knowledge of ultra vires risks and foreseeable harms (supporting misfeasance, reckless conduct, or abuse of power claims); if they deny existence, it proves failure to assess mandatory risks under public duty, heightening tort liability for unnotified ongoing harms to victims.

 

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