17DEC DEMORAS

FOIS

Here are the three customized Freedom of Information (FOI) requests, adapted for the specific Cause of Action (COA) and the relevant public body identified in our analysis.

1. FOI Request to the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC)

Target: Investigating the regulatory omission (DORCAP) that allowed excessive pricing by pharmaceutical companies (e.g., Auden Mckenzie/Actavis) due to an “ineffectual” regulatory scheme.

To: Freedom of Information Team

Department of Health and Social Care

39 Victoria Street

London SW1H 0EU

[By Email]

Date: 17 December 2025

Re: Freedom of Information Request – Evidence of Ultra Vires Risk Reports, Investigations into Officials’ Torts, Acciones de Regreso or Similar Recovery Actions Relating to the Ineffectual Regulation of Unbranded Generic Medicine Prices (Category M/A) by the DHSC.

I am Oscar Moya, Director of Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO.uk), 23 Village Way, Beckenham, Kent BR3 3NA, Companies House Registration: 15466919, EU Transparency Register: 177568392007-84. Email: contact@cocoo.uk.

This request is submitted under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to gather evidence establishing tort liabilities for misfeasance, abuse of power, failure to notify or assess ultra vires risks and foreseeable harms, and reckless conduct by the regulator or public body responsible for the DORCAP, which may also cause competition distortions. It seeks to confirm the existence of ultra vires risk reports, any investigations into officials’ torts, and whether any acciones de regreso or equivalent recovery actions were pursued against culpable administrations or regulators for compensations paid by the state. If no such actions were taken, provide the reasons. The aim is to support potential claims for victim compensation where harms are diffuse or fragmented, creating an enforcement vacuum.

Please provide the following information in electronic format where possible. If any part is exempt, provide reasons and consider redacted disclosure.

Part 1: Establishing Enforcement Vacuum and Locus Standi

  1. Provide a breakdown of complaints or representations received regarding the volatility or excessive pricing of unbranded generic medicines (specifically Hydrocortisone) in the last 3 years, categorised by complainant type (e.g., individual, small business, large corporate). Include internal estimates of affected parties and whether harms are assessed as diffuse or fragmented.

  2. Disclose any impact assessment or economic analysis estimating average financial loss per affected party (e.g., per CCG or Trust), confirming if individual losses are low enough to make private litigation uneconomic.

  3. Confirm if any judicial review, civil litigation, or formal challenges have been commenced against the DHSC regarding failure to exercise cost control powers on this DORCAP in the last 3 years.

Part 2: Ultra Vires Risk Reports and Foreseeable Harms

4. Confirm the existence of any risk register entry, board paper, or compliance document related to pricing regulatory schemes (Category M and A) and “de-branding” loopholes that flagged ultra vires risks, abuse of power, bad faith, or foreseeable harms (including competition distortions) as medium or high.

5. Provide the movement of risk scores (inherent vs. residual) for any such entry over the last 24 months, including the risk owner and title.

6. Disclose the risk appetite statement regarding legal compliance for pharmaceutical price regulation and market stability.

7. Confirm if an impact assessment exists for the specific regulatory omission regarding generic price caps: provide date created, date finalized, and job title of the approver.

8. State the number of months the issue of unbranded generic price inflation has been reported as red (off track) or equivalent high-risk status to the board.

Part 3: Investigations into Officials’ Torts and Recovery Actions

9. Confirm if any internal investigation has been initiated to determine if officials responsible for the pharmaceutical pricing regulation policy acted with misfeasance, gross negligence, recklessness, bad faith, or failure to assess ultra vires risks (specifically in relation to the CMA findings of “ineffectual” regulation).

10. If yes, disclose the outcome and findings on liability (redacted if necessary).

11. If no, disclose the recorded rationale for not initiating one.

12. If the DORCAP resulted in the authority paying compensations, damages, settlements, or legal costs (confirm total amount paid or estimated related to Hydrocortisone pricing litigation or CMA interventions), confirm if contribution, indemnity, or recovery was sought from the responsible officials or regulators under relevant laws or policies, such as acciones de regreso or equivalent.

13. If not pursued, disclose the reasons, including any public interest justification for not recovering funds back to the state.

Part 4: Systemic Aspects

14. Provide the percentage of staff trained on policies relevant to ultra vires risks and the regulation of monopoly power in the last 2 years.

15. List titles of internal audit reports commissioned in the last 2 years relevant to pharmaceutical pricing schemes or similar issues.

If this request exceeds the cost limit under Section 12, contact me under Section 16 to refine it.

Yours sincerely,

Oscar Moya

Director, COCOO.uk

2. FOI Request to the Care Quality Commission (CQC)

Target: Investigating the bias and conflict of interest failures (DORCAP) revealed in the Cygnet Health Care case, and the lack of recovery of the legal costs paid by the taxpayer.

To: Information Access Team

Care Quality Commission

Citygate, Gallowgate

Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 4PA

[By Email]

Date: 17 December 2025

Re: Freedom of Information Request – Evidence of Ultra Vires Risk Reports, Investigations into Officials’ Torts, Acciones de Regreso or Similar Recovery Actions Relating to Conflict of Interest Management and Inspector Appointments (specifically re: R (Cygnet Health Care Ltd) v CQC) by the CQC.

I am Oscar Moya, Director of Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO.uk), 23 Village Way, Beckenham, Kent BR3 3NA, Companies House Registration: 15466919, EU Transparency Register: 177568392007-84. Email: contact@cocoo.uk.

[Standard preamble as per model…]

Part 1: Establishing Enforcement Vacuum and Locus Standi

  1. Provide a breakdown of complaints or representations received regarding inspector bias or conflicts of interest in the last 3 years, categorised by complainant type. Include internal estimates of affected parties and whether harms are assessed as diffuse or fragmented.

  2. Disclose any impact assessment or economic analysis estimating average financial loss per affected provider due to biased inspections or delayed reports, confirming if individual losses are low enough to make private litigation uneconomic.

  3. Confirm if any judicial review, civil litigation, or formal challenges (other than Cygnet) have been commenced against the CQC on this DORCAP in the last 3 years.

Part 2: Ultra Vires Risk Reports and Foreseeable Harms

4. Confirm the existence of any risk register entry, board paper, or compliance document related to conflicts of interest in inspection teams that flagged ultra vires risks, abuse of power, bad faith, or foreseeable harms (including competition distortions) as medium or high.

5. Provide the movement of risk scores (inherent vs. residual) for any such entry over the last 24 months, including the risk owner and title.

6. Disclose the risk appetite statement regarding legal compliance for inspector impartiality.

7. Confirm if an impact assessment exists for the Conflict of Interest Policy: provide date created, date finalized, and job title of the approver.

8. State the number of months the issue of inspection integrity/bias has been reported as red (off track) or equivalent high-risk status to the board.

Part 3: Investigations into Officials’ Torts and Recovery Actions

9. Confirm if any internal investigation has been initiated to determine if officials responsible for appointing the conflicted inspector in the Cygnet case acted with misfeasance, gross negligence, recklessness, bad faith, or failure to assess ultra vires risks.

10. If yes, disclose the outcome and findings on liability (redacted if necessary).

11. If no, disclose the recorded rationale for not initiating one.

12. Given that the Cygnet judgment resulted in the CQC paying substantial legal costs (estimated >£550k), confirm if contribution, indemnity, or recovery was sought from the responsible officials or regulators under relevant laws or policies, such as acciones de regreso or equivalent.

13. If not pursued, disclose the reasons, including any public interest justification for not recovering these funds back to the state.

Part 4: Systemic Aspects

14. Provide the percentage of staff trained on policies relevant to ultra vires risks and managing conflicts of interest in the last 2 years.

15. List titles of internal audit reports commissioned in the last 2 years relevant to inspection governance or similar issues.

[Standard closing…]

Yours sincerely,

Oscar Moya

Director, COCOO.uk

3. FOI Request to the Cabinet Office

Target: Investigating the systemic failure to enforce prompt payment (The “Demora” Claim), causing market distortion and SME insolvency.

To: FOI Team

Cabinet Office

70 Whitehall

London SW1A 2AS

[By Email]

Date: 17 December 2025

Re: Freedom of Information Request – Evidence of Ultra Vires Risk Reports, Investigations into Officials’ Torts, Acciones de Regreso or Similar Recovery Actions Relating to Systemic Late Payments and Breaches of the Prompt Payment Code (Public Procurement) by the Cabinet Office/Government Functions.

I am Oscar Moya, Director of Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO.uk), 23 Village Way, Beckenham, Kent BR3 3NA, Companies House Registration: 15466919, EU Transparency Register: 177568392007-84. Email: contact@cocoo.uk.

[Standard preamble as per model…]

Part 1: Establishing Enforcement Vacuum and Locus Standi

  1. Provide a breakdown of complaints or representations received regarding late payments of valid invoices by government departments in the last 3 years, categorised by complainant type (e.g., individual, SME, large corporate). Include internal estimates of affected parties and whether harms are assessed as diffuse or fragmented.

  2. Disclose any impact assessment or economic analysis estimating average financial loss per affected supplier due to cash flow delays, confirming if individual losses are low enough to make private litigation uneconomic.

  3. Confirm if any judicial review, civil litigation, or formal challenges have been commenced against the authority on this DORCAP (breach of Prompt Payment regulations) in the last 3 years.

Part 2: Ultra Vires Risk Reports and Foreseeable Harms

4. Confirm the existence of any risk register entry, board paper, or compliance document related to compliance with the Late Payment of Commercial Debts Regulations that flagged ultra vires risks, abuse of power, bad faith, or foreseeable harms (including competition distortions and SME insolvency) as medium or high.

5. Provide the movement of risk scores (inherent vs. residual) for any such entry over the last 24 months, including the risk owner and title.

6. Disclose the risk appetite statement regarding legal compliance for public sector payment performance.

7. Confirm if an impact assessment exists for the Prompt Payment Policy: provide date created, date finalized, and job title of the approver.

8. State the number of months the issue of payment performance/delays has been reported as red (off track) or equivalent high-risk status to the board.

Part 3: Investigations into Officials’ Torts and Recovery Actions

9. Confirm if any internal investigation has been initiated to determine if officials (e.g., Accounting Officers) responsible for systemic payment delays acted with misfeasance, gross negligence, recklessness, bad faith, or failure to assess ultra vires risks.

10. If yes, disclose the outcome and findings on liability (redacted if necessary).

11. If no, disclose the recorded rationale for not initiating one.

12. If late payments resulted in the authority paying statutory interest, compensation fees, or legal costs (confirm total amount paid or estimated), confirm if contribution, indemnity, or recovery was sought from the responsible officials or regulators under relevant laws or policies, such as acciones de regreso or equivalent.

13. If not pursued, disclose the reasons, including any public interest justification for not recovering these funds back to the state.

Part 4: Systemic Aspects

14. Provide the percentage of finance/procurement staff trained on policies relevant to ultra vires risks and Prompt Payment legislation in the last 2 years.

15. List titles of internal audit reports commissioned in the last 2 years relevant to accounts payable processes or similar issues.

[Standard closing…]

Yours sincerely,

Oscar Moya

Director, COCOO.uk

As the solicitor for cocoo.uk, I have reviewed the case file “Demora” and the associated evidence regarding the systemic regulatory failures in the UK healthcare and public procurement sectors.

Below is the legal analysis applying your three specific questions to the identified Causes of Action (COAs).

COA 1: ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION / MARKET ABUSE (Competition Act 1998 / Enterprise Act 2002)

Subject: The abuse of monopsony power by the DHSC (Department of Health and Social Care) and the abuse of monopoly power by private pharmaceutical/service providers enabled by regulatory failure.

  • 1/ IDENTIFY ALL PROVEN FOIGS (FINDINGS OF INFRINGEMENT BY PRIVATE COMPANIES):

    • The primary proven FOIGs relevant to this case (cited as analogous evidence or “cornerstones”) are against pharmaceutical companies such as Auden Mckenzie and Actavis UK (now Accord-UK).

    • Specifics: The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) found these companies infringed competition law by charging excessive and unfair prices for hydrocortisone tablets (prices rose by over 10,000% in some instances) and entering into anti-competitive agreements to buy off potential competitors (“pay-for-delay”).

    • Relevance to Case: This serves as the evidentiary basis for “illegitimate exploitation of market power,” which we are arguing is now being mirrored by the DHSC (as a dominant buyer) or allowed by the CQC’s regulatory negligence.

  • 2/ IDENTIFY THE POSSIBILITIES THAT THESE FOIGS COULD HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY AN ULTRAVIRES/UNLAWFUL DORCAP:

    • DORCAP Identified: The “DORCAP” (Regulatory Action/Omission) here was the ineffectual and unused scheme of regulation by the State (DHSC/NHS).

    • Judicial Review/Finding: The Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) explicitly rejected the defense that the DHSC had “countervailing buyer power” that constrained prices. Instead, the Tribunal found that the regulatory scheme was “cumbersome, ineffectual and unused”—essentially a “theoretical constraint on dominance that existed on paper only.” This judicial finding confirms that the State’s omission (failure to regulate effectively) created the environment for the private FOIGs.

  • 3/ STATE REDRESS & REGRESO:

    • Redress Paid: Yes. The CMA imposed fines totaling approximately £130 million (later adjusted on appeal) on the infringing pharmaceutical companies.

    • Regreso: These fines are paid into the Consolidated Fund (the State’s general bank account). There is no public evidence of a “regreso” action where the State sought to recoup losses specifically from the individual civil servants or regulators who failed to prevent the abuse, nor were there successful “follow-on” damages paid directly to individual victims (patients) in a broad sense, though the NHS (State) theoretically “recovered” money via the fines.

  • DATES AND TIME LIMITS TO CLAIM:

    • Limitation Period: 6 years from the date the cause of action accrued (or from the “day of knowledge” of the infringement).

    • Stand-alone claims: If claiming damages for historical abuses (e.g., 2008–2018), time is of the essence.

    • Follow-on claims: Claims based on the CMA decision can be brought within 2 years of the final decision/appeal (which concluded with the CAT judgment in late 2023/early 2025).

COA 2: MISFEASANCE IN PUBLIC OFFICE / REGULATORY NEGLIGENCE (Tort & Public Law)

Subject: The Care Quality Commission (CQC) acting with bias and failing to follow its own conflict of interest policies.

  • 1/ IDENTIFY ALL PROVEN FOIGS (FINDINGS OF INFRINGEMENT BY PRIVATE COMPANIES):

    • In this specific COA, the infringement is by the Public Body (CQC), not a private company. However, the private entity involved as the “victim” of the State’s unlawful act was Cygnet Health Care Ltd.

    • Note: While Cygnet has faced scrutiny, the specific legal victory cited in our evidence file is R (Cygnet Health Care Ltd) v CQC, where the court found the CQC at fault.

  • 2/ IDENTIFY THE POSSIBILITIES THAT THESE FOIGS COULD HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY AN ULTRAVIRES/UNLAWFUL DORCAP:

    • DORCAP Identified: The CQC’s appointment of an inspector who was a former detained patient of the very hospital he was inspecting, and the CQC’s failure to escalate this conflict to the Deputy Chief Inspector as required by their own policy.

    • Judicial Review/Finding: Yes. The High Court (in R (Cygnet Health Care Ltd) v CQC [2025] EWHC 1 Admin) issued a “definitive judicial finding” that the CQC acted with apparent bias and failed to follow its own procedures. The court declared the decisions “tainted by apparent bias.”

  • 3/ STATE REDRESS & REGRESO:

    • Redress Paid: The CQC (State) was ordered to pay 90% of Cygnet’s legal costs (estimated over £550,000, with £125,000 paid immediately on account).

    • Regreso: There is no evidence of a disciplinary investigation leading to “regreso” payments (recoupment) from the individual CQC officials or the biased inspector back to the State. The taxpayer effectively footed the bill for the regulator’s bias.

  • DATES AND TIME LIMITS TO CLAIM:

    • Judicial Review: Promptly and in any event within 3 months of the decision. (The Cygnet judgment is recent, 2025, implying current relevance).

    • Tort (Misfeasance/Negligence): 6 years from the date of the damage.

    • Human Rights Act (Article 6 – Fair Trial): 1 year from the act complained of.

COA 3: BREACH OF PUBLIC CONTRACT / PROCUREMENT (The “Demora” Claim)

Subject: Systemic payment delays (“Demora”) by public bodies (e.g., DHSC, NHS, and Spanish Public Administrations affecting UK suppliers) in breach of EU Directive 2011/7/UE and UK equivalents.

  • 1/ IDENTIFY ALL PROVEN FOIGS (FINDINGS OF INFRINGEMENT BY PRIVATE COMPANIES):

    • The “infringement” here is market distortion. Our investigation (“Evidencia Grok”) suggests that certain large domestic contractors (e.g., potentially Ferrovial, ACS in the Spanish context, or large Tier 1 UK suppliers) have benefited from these delays because they have the capital to survive them, effectively partitioning the market and driving SMEs (Small/Medium Enterprises) to insolvency.

    • While not a “FOIG” in the sense of a court judgment against them yet, the evidence points to a concerted practice or passive collusion where dominant private players benefit from the State’s chaotic payment cycles.

  • 2/ IDENTIFY THE POSSIBILITIES THAT THESE FOIGS COULD HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY AN ULTRAVIRES/UNLAWFUL DORCAP:

    • DORCAP Identified: The systemic failure of the Treasury/Ministries to pay invoices within the statutory 30-60 day limit (delays reaching 90-300 days). This is an unlawful omission (failure to pay).

    • Judicial Review/Finding: The CJEU (Court of Justice of the EU) and UK courts have established that such delays violate the Late Payment Directives. Our case argues this is a “reckless and ill-planned act” constituting public negligence.

  • 3/ STATE REDRESS & REGRESO:

    • Redress Paid: The State acts often settle these individual claims quietly to avoid establishing a precedent. Our charity is seeking a Collective Settlement (Mediation) to automate these penalties.

    • Regreso: No. The State pays the statutory interest and compensation costs. There is no mechanism currently enforcing “regreso” against the specific ministers or civil servants responsible for the cash-flow mismanagement.

  • DATES AND TIME LIMITS TO CLAIM:

    • Public Procurement Challenge: 30 days from the date you knew (or ought to have known) of the breach. (Strict adherence required).

    • Contractual Debt/Statutory Interest: 6 years from the date the payment became overdue.

    • Insolvency Claims: If the delay caused insolvency, the administrator has 3 years from the onset of insolvency to bring certain actions.

Immediate Action Required:

We must file the Letter Before Action for the “Demora” collective claim immediately to stop the clock on the 6-year limitation for the earliest debts in our portfolio. For the CQC bias issue, we rely on the 2025 judgment which is fresh.

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